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Abstract: In contemporary biological approaches to psychiatry it is rarely 
questioned that psychiatric disorders stem from biological “dysfunctions”. This 
assumption appears to be confirmed by the fact that biological research has been 
successful at uncovering diverse biological disparities between the brains of persons with 
mental illnesses and normal controls. However, the fact that something is different or 
unusual does not mean it is dysfunctional. The thesis of the dissertation is that there is 
little warrant for the claim that psychiatric disorders stem from biological dysfunctions. 
This prompts a question of definition: what does it mean to say that something – e.g., a 
given part of the brain or nervous system – is “functioning properly” or that it is 
“dysfunctional”? The dissertation argues that the theory of function appropriate for 
psychiatry is one that holds that the function of an entity consists in that activity that, in 
the past, contributed to the differential persistence or reproduction of that entity or type of 
entity. A consequence of this view is that just because something is not adaptive in a 
given environment, it is not necessarily dysfunctional. Finally, the dissertation examines 
 vii
two major neurobiological perspectives on schizophrenia – a neurochemical perspective 
and a neurodevelopmental perspective. From a neurochemical perspective, it argues that 
even if the dopamine system is abnormal in schizophrenia, it is not dysfunctional. It also 
shows that on certain neurodevelopmental hypotheses, schizophrenia could be said to 
stem from a biological dysfunction, but on other neurodevelopmental hypotheses, it could 
not. The fact that there is currently not enough information to decide which of these 
multiple hypotheses is correct means that there is currently little warrant for saying that 
schizophrenia stems from a biological dysfunction Since this has been shown to be 
unwarranted through detailed analysis of some neurobiological examples, then it is 
reasonable to suspect that careful attention to neurobiological details associated with 
other mental disorders might reveal the same thing. Consequently, it should not be 
assumed that psychiatric disorders in general stem from biological dysfunctions on the 
part of the brain unless there is evidence for this conclusion other than the existence of 
biological abnormalities. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 THESIS OVERVIEW 
This dissertation begins with the observation that categories of mental disorder 
are normative; that is, in addition to describing how people actually behave, they describe 
how people should behave. More precisely, they describe how people actually behave in 
terms of deviation from a norm concerning how they should behave. This normativity 
prompts the following question: Where do these norms come from and how are they 
justified? According to one prominent view, these norms have a social origin and 
justification. In other words, the behavior, thoughts, or feelings of people with mental 
disorders deviate from social standards regarding appropriate conduct. According to 
another prominent view, these norms are biological in their origin and justification. In 
other words, mental disorders are symptoms of inner conditions, such as neurochemical 
imbalances or gross neuroanatomical variations, which deviate from standards of normal 
or proper biological functioning (“biological dysfunctions”). According to a third view, 
categories of mental disorder include both types of norms. It is also possible that the 
norms involved in mental disorder classification are psychological, ethical, or 
epistemological. 
The thesis of the dissertation is that the norms appealed to in the context of 
psychiatric research and classification possess little biological justification. To express 
this thesis in a simple slogan, it is that there is little warrant for the claim that psychiatric 
disorders stem from biological dysfunctions. In other words, despite the continuous and 
substantial scientific and therapeutic advances in biological psychiatry, there is little 
warrant for believing that having a mental disorder involves a deviation from biological 
standards of proper functioning. This does not mean that mental disorders themselves do 
 2
not have biological bases, but that the norms that such categories express: “normal” 
versus “pathological”, “functional” versus “dysfunctional”, “appropriate” versus 
“inappropriate” – have little biological justification, nor is there reason to believe that 
such justification is forthcoming. This suggests that when psychiatrists implicate 
“dysfunctional” biological variation as a cause of a given mental disorder, the 
justification for the expression often involves an implicit appeal to the fact that the 
conduct of the person with the mental disorder deviates from external standards of 
appropriateness rather than intrinsic biological standards. The remainder of this section 
will expand upon this basic observation that motivates the dissertation, the question that 
it provokes, and the thesis.  
The basic observation that motivates this dissertation is that the classification of a 
given psychological state or type of behavior as a mental disorder appears, on the surface, 
to involve a type of value-judgement that is very distinctive in the scientific context. Of 
course, the decision to accept any scientific theory is a value-laden one, in that it appeals 
to that theory’s epistemic virtues, such as simplicity, explanatory or predictive power, or 
heuristic fruitfulness (Kuhn [1977, 331]). Medical concepts may be value-laden as well, 
in that the concept of “disease” or “pathology” seems to appeal to a norm, or set of 
norms, concerning the nature of individual well-being. Psychiatric classification, 
however, is distinctive in that the ascription of a given psychological or behavioral state 
to the status of a mental disorder often rests on judgements concerning the 
“inappropriateness” of the person’s behavior, or psychological state, to a situation.  
More specifically, a standard template for characterizing or defining a given 
mental disorder involves: a person who confronts a situation, where the situation calls for 
or merits a particular response (behavioral or psychological), and the response actually 
produced by the person is not an appropriate or fitting one. This response exceeds, falls 
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short of, or otherwise violates that which is appropriate to the situation. For example, 
according to the fourth, text-revised, edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)1, published by the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) (APA [2000]) one of the diagnostic criteria for disorganized type schizophrenia is 
“flat or inappropriate affect” (315); for catatonic type schizophrenia, the “voluntary 
assumption of inappropriate or bizarre postures” (316); for major depressive episode, 
“feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt” (356); for specific phobia, 
“marked and persistent fear that is excessive or unreasonable” (449); for schizotypal 
personality disorder, “odd, eccentric, or peculiar” behavior and appearance, as well as 
“inappropriate or constricted affect” (701); for antisocial personality disorder, “failure to 
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors” in addition to “consistent 
irresponsibility as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or 
honor financial obligations” (706). One who has obsessive compulsive personality 
disorder may be “excessively devoted to work and productivity to the exclusion of leisure 
activities and friendships”, and may be “overconscientious, scrupulous, and inflexible 
about matters of morality, ethics, or values” (729); one with histrionic personality 
disorder may exhibit “inappropriate sexually seductive or provocative behavior” as well 
as an “exaggerated expression of emotion” (714); the manic episode is characterized by 
“excessive involvement in pleasurable activities that have a high potential for painful 
 
1 Throughout this dissertation, “DSM” refers to some edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, which is the American Psychiatric Association’s official classification of mental 
disorders. There are currently four editions that differ in important ways, hence they will be identified with 
the appropriate edition number: DSM-I (APA [1952]); DSM-II (APA [1968]); DSM-III (APA [1980]); and 
DSM-IV (APA [1994]). Additionally, there is a revised version of the DSM-III, labeled DSM-III-R (APA 
[1987]), and the most current edition, DSM-IV, also has a text revision, labeled DSM-IV-TR (APA 
[2000]). Finally, “APA” will replace all future references to “American Psychiatric Association”, but since 
the American Psychological Association has the same initials, the name of the latter organization will 
always be rendered in full.  
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consequences” such as “engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or 
foolish business investments” (362). 
The basic question that this observation provokes, then, is the following: What are 
the origin of and justification for the standards or norms of appropriateness that are 
embodied in mental disorder ascriptions?  
There are two very general views that, by and large, have structured the debates 
concerning the origin and justification of these standards, each of which has strong 
implications for the self-conception of psychiatry, its domain of investigation, and its 
relation to other disciplines. The first position will be referred to as the “social values” 
position; the second the “biological dysfunction” position. These two positions are not 
exhaustive, but they are the most prominent.  
With respect to the origin of these standards of appropriateness, the first position 
holds that these standards originate from widely-held social values. Each society 
constructs a code of mores or expectations that are applied to each person within it; 
mental disorder categories simply define rather extreme ways in which people can 
deviate from this code.2 For example, with respect to behavior, it is not socially 
appropriate to speak rudely to superiors, to laugh during funerals, or to undress in public. 
Such standards are not only applied to public behavior, but also to “private”, 
psychological states, such as the emotions that motivate one’s behavior or the rationale 
that justifies one’s behavior. Certain situations are widely held to be pleasurable: 
 
2 E.g., Szasz (1961); Scheff (1966); Sarbin (1969). This view was prominent in the so-called 
“antipsychiatric” tradition; see Section 1.3. However, this view is by no means restricted to that tradition, 
and is expressed in some conventional psychiatric textbooks. For example, Redlich and Freedman (1966) 
define “behavior disorder” as “behavioral patterns…that are not compatible with the norms and 
expectations of the patient’s social and cultural system (quoted in Boorse [1982, 38])”; Ullmann and 
Krasner (1966) define “maladaptive behavior” as “behavior that is considered inappropriate by those key 
people in a person’s life who control reinforcers (quoted in Boorse [1982, 40])”. Ausubel (1961) defines 
“mental illness” in terms of “gross deviation from a designated range of desirable behavioral variability 
(Ibid., 72)”, although he does not specify the agent or agents whose desires are relevant to determining the 
appropriate such range of variation.  
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advancing in one’s chosen career, meeting with good friends over dinner, or pursuing a 
long-term intimate relationship. Someone who displays a lack of interest in these 
pleasures, for example, who displays indifference toward praise or criticism,3 or exhibits 
emotional withdrawal from friends or family,4 or who derives sexual gratification from 
unusual objects or situations,5 seems not to recognize the pleasurable events in life, and 
therefore from the point of view of these social standards, the person’s emotions reflect 
an incorrect evaluation of the value of the situation. Similarly, some explanations for 
one’s behavior are thought to be reasonable (“I rushed into the burning building to save 
my friend”), while some are unreasonable (“I rushed into the burning building to save 
my goldfish”), and some are simply incoherent or bizarre (“I rushed into the burning 
building because God told me to”). To say that a belief is “bizarre” is to say that it 
deviates widely from the expectations and beliefs that are widely shared within a 
community.6  
From the “social values” position, then, the standards of appropriateness 
embodied in psychiatric concepts, whether they refer to behavior, thought, or feeling, 
describe a lack of fit between the behaviors, thoughts, or feelings of the individual and 
the values held by the society at large. This does not mean that the individual does not 
share the same values held by the society at large, or does not recognize his or her own 
actions or attitudes to be in conflict with them, or does not wish to seek the help of 
mental health professionals in order to change them. For example, a criterion of specific 
phobia is that one acknowledges his or her fear to be excessive or unreasonable (APA 
[2000, 449]). 
 
3 E.g., schizoid personality disorder (APA [2000, 697]).  
4 E.g., posttraumatic stress disorder (APA [2000, 468]). 
5 This is a defining feature of the paraphilias (APA [2000, 536]).  
6 The standard psychiatric definition of a “bizarre delusion” is “a false belief that involves a phenomenon 
that the person’s culture would regard as totally implausible” (APA [1987, 395]). 
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The question of the justification of such standards – that is, the question of why 
these standards, rather than others, should be brought to bear on the individual – can 
often be answered by an appeal to pragmatic social grounds. At one extreme, a person 
diagnosed as having a mental disorder may be unpredictable, in that he or she acts in 
ways that seem bizarre or unruly, and therefore may represent a danger or threat to 
others. In this case, the revocation of certain liberties, for example, the involuntary 
hospitalization of the person so diagnosed, may be warranted for the sake of protecting 
the other members of society. At a lesser extreme, the person so diagnosed may pose a 
risk to himself or herself. The condition in question may result in job loss, social 
exclusion or stigmatization, or, if the disorder has a strong affective component, the 
possibility of suicide. Hence it may be beneficial to the person so diagnosed if treatment 
plans are made available to that person, if medical insurance providers are willing to 
cover for such treatment plans, and if the person has some amount of legal protection 
with respect to potentially discriminatory employment practices. The question of what 
degree of potential harm a person must represent to others, or to self, in order to justify 
the revocation of liberties or the bestowal of privileges, is a nuanced ethical, economic, 
and political question that will not be broached here (Robinson [2003]; Edwards [1982]). 
However, from this perspective, there is no principled reason why, e.g., racism should not 
be judged to be a mental disorder,7 along with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and anti-
social personality disorder: extreme racism represents a form of conduct or belief that 
violates widely-shared standards of appropriateness and that is associated with harmful 
behavior. 
 
7 See Poussaint’s op-ed in the New York Times (“They Hate. They Kill. Are they Insane?”), which 
recommends that extreme racism be recognized as a major psychiatric illness (26 August 1999), as well as 
a number of dismissive rejoinders that shortly followed (“Racism is Not a Treatable Illness”, 30 August 
1999; “Classifying Racism as Insanity isn’t that Easy”, 31 August 1999).  
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However, the social values position also leaves open the possibility that there are 
behavioral or psychological conditions that are currently recognized as mental disorders 
according to standard classification and diagnostic systems, but that are relatively 
harmless and that largely reflect overly narrow or parochial social judgements. In this 
case, on the basis of the principles that govern a liberal society, it may be preferable if 
those social standards were themselves modified or expanded to embrace, or at least 
tolerate, these unusual conditions. For example, the delisting of the category of 
homosexuality from official APA nomenclature in 1973 probably reflects, in part, a shift 
in widely-held social values with respect to sexual orientation that occurred during this 
period.8
From this perspective, then, the domain of investigation of psychiatry amounts to 
the explanation, prediction, and correction of deviance, in thought or action, from 
standards of appropriateness that originate from within, and possess whatever 
justification they have by virtue of, a person’s social sphere. In this respect, the domain of 
psychiatry borders upon that of sociology, on the one hand (which explicates and 
enumerates such social codes), and that of law, on the other (which seeks to correct such 
violations). This position does not imply, however, that biological medical intervention 
constitutes an inappropriate treatment method. It does, however, imply that such 
intervention (e.g., pharmacological intervention for schizophrenia) has the same status as 
biological intervention in the case of, e.g., sexual offenders who are not typically deemed 
to have mental disorders. In both cases, a socially undesirable and potentially harmful 
disposition is alleviated or corrected, ideally for the benefit of all parties.  
 
8 To say that homosexuality was “delisted” at this time is actually an overstatement. After a series of 
debates within the psychiatric community in the early 1970s (see Stoller et al. [1973]) the category was 
renamed “Ego-dystonic Homosexuality” and appeared as such in DSM-III (APA [1980, 281]). The 
category was eventually dropped only in 1987 with the publication of DSM-III-R (APA [1987]). See 
Section 2.1.1 for a more extensive overview of the history of this debate.  
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The second major view concerning the origin and justification of the standards of 
appropriateness embodied in mental disorder categories, the “biological dysfunction” 
position, is one that is more consistent with the current thinking and practice of most 
biologically oriented psychiatrists. With respect to the origin of such standards, they are 
held to stem from the biological sphere itself, rather than the social sphere. As is widely 
believed throughout several biological and medical disciplines, the various parts of the 
organism, and perhaps the organism itself, are subject to standards of functioning. In 
healthy individuals, the biological parts or activities of the organism function normally or 
properly; in the case of disease, some organ or activity is said to be malfunctioning or 
dysfunctional. To say of a given biological entity that it is functioning properly, or that it 
is malfunctioning, is to appeal to standards or norms of proper biological functioning that 
the entity in question may or may not satisfy. Hence the concept of a biological function 
does not necessarily describe the current activity of a given entity, but sets up a standard 
or norm by which the activity of the entity is evaluated. In this sense, standards of 
biological functioning are normative. To use a paradigmatic example, the function of the 
eye is to see. This does not describe what all eyes do; rather, it is often used to articulate 
the intuition that seeing is what eyes are “supposed to” do, what they are “there for”, or 
what they have the “purpose” of doing. If they do not enable a person to see, it is 
sometimes said that they are “malfunctioning” or “dysfunctional”. This provokes the 
question as to how such biological standards originate, and whether they are in fact 
explicable purely on the basis of biological considerations.9
 
9 In the following, there is no intended implication that the “social realm” and the “biological realm” are 
mutually exclusive. In Section 2.3.2, it will be argued that whether or not a given condition ultimately has a 
“biological” or “social” cause is irrelevant to whether or not it currently stems from a “biological 
dysfunction”, and hence the importance of the debate about the relative role of biological or social causes 
in the etiology of mental disorders will be minimized from the standpoint of the dissertation.  
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 Depending on the concept of “biological function” that is appealed to, these 
standards or norms may have one of several distinct biological origins. They may be 
evolutionary in origin: perhaps an organ is functioning properly when it is performing the 
activity that it was selected for by natural selection to perform, and it is malfunctioning 
otherwise. Alternatively, such standards may be related to the current adaptiveness of the 
performance of an activity, regardless of its evolutionary origin: perhaps a part is 
functioning properly when it contributes to the survival or reproduction of the organism 
which contains it, and malfunctioning otherwise. A third alternative – one which restricts 
the concept of functioning to sentient creatures – is that these standards of functioning are 
partly psychological in nature; a part is functioning properly when it contributes to the 
well-being of the organism that possesses it, that is, to a relative freedom from physical 
suffering or to the organism’s capacity to pursue self-chosen goals, and “dysfunctional” 
otherwise, regardless of whether the dysfunction is reproductively disadvantageous for 
the organism or has been selected against historically. This last alternative, of course, 
does not reduce the question of the origin of standards of functioning to purely biological 
considerations, but, in addition to biological considerations, it involves some prior 
conception about the nature of personal well-being for sentient creatures.10  
According to this perspective, mental disorders are, or stem from, biological 
dysfunctions on the part of the individual. They are differentiated from physical disorders 
in that they typically undermine proper psychological functioning rather than proper 
 
10 Sedgwick (1981), for example, holds that the concept of disease generally, whether mental or physical, 
rests on a value-judgement concerning the undesirability of an otherwise value-neutral biological condition 
(see Section 1.3 for an elaboration of this position, according to which “disease” is an evaluative term that 
does not possess much in the way of specific descriptive content). However, the diagnosis of tuberculosis 
or cancer does not necessarily appeal to standards of the “appropriateness” of the afflicted person’s 
behavior or psychological state with respect to the social sphere, and therefore remains less problematic 
than the ascription of a mental disorder.  
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physiological functioning.11 They may inhibit the person’s capacity to engage in means-
ends reasoning, or to produce an accurate internal representation of his or her current 
situation, or they may lead to despair or suffering on the part of the individual. They may 
also eventuate in the person’s inability to comprehend or conform to widely-held social 
values, but nonetheless, the inappropriate behavior that the person exhibits is not 
constitutive of having a mental disorder, but one of its symptoms or effects. 
(Consequently, deviation from a social code of conduct may be legitimately used as a 
heuristic for the identification of a mental disorder.) What transforms a given biological 
cause into a biological dysfunction is merely that it falls short of biological standards of 
functioning. In this way, schizophrenia is analogous to cancer, heart disease, or diabetes, 
and does not involve presuppositions that are any more problematic than those involved 
in determining that the latter conditions constitute diseases.12 From this perspective, 
racism is very unlikely to constitute a mental disorder, since it is probably not a symptom 
of a biological dysfunction.  
The justification for applying these biological standards or norms of well-
functioning to the organism or to its parts stems merely from the recognition that humans 
are biological in nature and therefore that biological activity on the part of humans can 
legitimately be judged in terms of the norms that govern the remainder of the biological 
sphere. However, the justification for medical intervention will rely on some of the same 
considerations discussed earlier, e.g., the recognition of the potential harm or suffering 
caused by the dysfunctional item.  
 
11 In Chapter 2 it will be argued that the most consistent development of the “biological dysfunction” 
position should hold that the concept of a mental disorder has no substantive differentia over and above 
non-mental medical disorders, but that this difference is purely methodological or heuristic.  
12 To make the proposed analogy more concrete, one might say that cancer results from the overproduction 
of infected cells, just as schizophrenia may result from the overproduction of dopamine.  
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From this perspective, the goals of psychiatry are more intrinsically aligned with 
those of medicine rather than law, insofar as it is concerned with the treatment of 
biological dysfunctions on the part of the individual rather than the elimination or 
modification of socially undesirable conduct, and insofar as it utilizes the methods of the 
natural sciences, such as those found in neuroscience, molecular biology, and 
evolutionary biology, to understand the etiology of those dysfunctions, and on that basis, 
to devise rational treatment plans or to predict treatment outcomes. 
This is not to say that social norms or values, according to this perspective, are 
not relevant to the classification of a given type of psychological state or behavior as a 
mental disorder. For each proposed mental disorder category, it must be asked whether 
having the mental disorder represents a sufficiently grave threat to society, or to the 
person so diagnosed, to warrant the ethical, legal, social, and economic consequences of 
its subsumption within an official diagnostic or classification scheme.13 Nonetheless, the 
appeal to social values within the context of psychiatric classification and research would 
be secondary to the determination that the aberrant behavior or thinking in question stems 
from a biological dysfunction on the part of the individual.14  
 
13 For example, transitory cognitive impairment (TCI) is often considered to be a “sub-clinical” type of 
epilepsy, in that it is not associated with pronounced seizures (although it manifests itself in performance 
on certain specific cognitive tests). To the extent that it represents a mild form of epilepsy it is thought to 
stem from a biological dysfunction. However, it is debatable whether the symptoms of TCI result in a 
sufficient degree of social maladaptiveness or harm to be included within a standardized medical or 
psychiatric nomenclature (Binnie [2003]). Hence, from the “biological dysfunction” position, there is an 
important distinction to be drawn between the sort of justification involved in the professional authorization 
and application of the “mental disorder” label to a given condition, and the sort of justification involved in 
determining whether someone has a mental disorder in the first place. See, e.g., Sarbin (1967) and Ellis 
(1967), who debate the merits of the institution of labeling on the basis of its social, ethical, and therapeutic 
consequences.  
14 As noted above, there also exists a third, prominent position, which is a combination of the “social 
values” position and the “biological dysfunction” position. According to this view, mental disorders 
involve violations of both types of normativity: they are caused by biological dysfunctions on the part of 
the individual and they also violate social standards of appropriate conduct. However, this position is 
relatively unimportant from the perspective of the dissertation, which is more exclusively concerned with 
analyzing the appropriateness of appealing to biological norms at all in the psychiatric context.  
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Having described the observation that motivates the dissertation (that mental 
disorder concepts are laden with norms of appropriateness), and the basic question that 
the dissertation seeks to resolve (the origin and justification of these norms), the thesis of 
the dissertation can be stated. The thesis of the dissertation is that appeal to the notion of 
a “biological dysfunction” in the context of psychiatric research and classification often 
presupposes standards of appropriateness which have no biological justification. The 
problem is that it is often assumed that just because, e.g., the brain of a person with 
schizophrenia is different from the brain of a person without it, then the schizophrenic 
brain must be “dysfunctional”. But just because something is different does not mean that 
it is dysfunctional! Often, in the context of psychiatric research, the judgement that 
something within an individual is specifically “dysfunctional” (rather than merely 
“different” or “uncommon”) is based solely upon the fact that its behavioral or 
psychological effects are inappropriate to various situations that the individual confronts 
in everyday life. Therefore, far from reducing these standards of appropriateness to 
biological standards of functioning, the notion of a biological dysfunction as it is often 
used in psychiatry presupposes them.  
This conclusion does not imply that these standards or norms of appropriateness 
are social in their origin and justification. They may also appeal to psychological norms, 
or to universal ethical, epistemic, or aesthetic values. For example, as noted above, a 
criterion for antisocial personality disorder is “consistent irresponsibility as indicated by 
repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations” (APA 
[2000, 706]). This appears to represent an ethical norm. The purpose of the dissertation is 
not to engage in an analysis or evaluation of the type of norms involved in psychiatric 
research and classification (e.g., Sadler [2004]), but merely to reject a prominent 
viewpoint about the nature of those norms. 
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The fact that biological dysfunction ascriptions made in the context of psychiatry 
often presuppose norms of appropriateness the origin and justification of which cannot be 
biologically established does not undermine the scientific status of psychiatry as a 
discipline. Many disciplines are inherently normative in nature, where these norms have 
their origin and justification on the basis of social or ethical values. Conservation biology 
(which is concerned with methods for successfully conserving biodiversity, where the 
conservation of biodiversity is an important social, ethical, and aesthetic value – see 
Soulé [1985]) is a paradigmatic example of such a discipline. However, it does suggest 
that the appeal to these values in the context of psychiatric classification and research 
should be rendered as explicitly as possible, and not concealed by biological terminology 
– such as “dysfunctional”, “dysregulated”, “chemical imbalance”, “neurohormonal 
disturbance”, etc. – that appear to attribute these norms to the biological sphere in ways 
that are not warranted by biological research.  
This does not mean that such terminology is never warranted or applicable in the 
medical context, or even that it is impossible for a psychiatric disorder to be shown to 
originate from a biological dysfunction, but that typically, in fact, it has little warrant in 
the psychiatric context, and there is little reason to suggest that such warrant is 
forthcoming. Three caveats, then, about the epistemological and ontological status of the 
thesis are in order:  
 
(i) the thesis that appeal to the notion of a “biological dysfunction” in the context 
of psychiatric research is not biologically justified does not bear conceptual 
necessity. It is not a purely conceptual claim; rather, it is entailed by conceptual as 
well as empirical premises. It involves conceptual considerations insofar as it 
presupposes the proper explication of the concept of a “biological dysfunction” 
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that is appropriate to psychiatry. It involves empirical considerations in that the 
empirical evidence currently available concerning the biological bases of 
psychiatric conditions typically does not warrant the claim that a given psychiatric 
condition stems from a biological dysfunction (although it may stem from a 
biological cause); 
 
(ii) the thesis does not have the status of a universal generalization about 
biological (dys-)function ascriptions applied to mental disorders. Epilepsy, 
Huntington’s disease, and general paresis, are examples of conditions that can 
probably correctly be said to stem from biological dysfunctions on the part of the 
individual, and which can eventuate in delusional, disoriented, or demented 
psychological states, as well as to behaviors that are socially inappropriate. Thus, 
consistent with the “biological dysfunction” position, such psychiatric 
manifestations should be counted as “symptoms” of an underlying dysfunctional 
process (e.g., synchronous waves of electrical discharge throughout large areas of 
the brain [epilepsy]; late stage syphilis [general paresis], and trinucleotide repeat 
disorder [Huntington’s disease]).   However, with respect to one major category 
of mental disorder that has gained substantial contemporary research attention by 
biologically-oriented psychiatrists – schizophrenia – the current understanding of 
the biological correlates of this condition does not warrant the claim that 
schizophrenia stems from a “biological dysfunction”. As will be discussed below, 
the rationale employed to arrive at this conclusion should be generalizable to 
other mental disorders as well; and 
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(iii) the thesis, however, is not simply a reiteration of the fact that there is much 
that is biologically unknown about the etiology of most mental disorders – a fact 
that is routinely acknowledged by psychiatrists as an incentive for further 
research. But in acknowledging this, there is typically little or no consideration 
about what sort of etiological account of the biological basis of a mental disorder 
would qualify as showing that the psychiatric symptoms result from a biological 
dysfunction (rather than, e.g., “normal variation” in a biological trait). It is 
important, therefore, not just to provide an overview of current evidence and 
research, but to go beyond the given evidence to examine broader theoretical 
perspectives on mental disorders, and evaluate the extent to which the following 
question can be answered in the affirmative: Were this theory to be well-
confirmed in the future, would one be warranted in claiming that this mental 
disorder stems from a biological dysfunction on the part of the individual? For 
example, according to the “sensory-gating” theory of schizophrenia (e.g., Grace 
[2000]), the so-called “positive symptoms” of schizophrenia (hallucinations and 
delusions) are a consequence of the relaxation of sensory filtering mechanisms 
that lead to sensory bombardment. Although there is some evidence for this 
theory,15 all that is strictly speaking derivable from the theory is that there is 
variation in the strength of sensory gating across schizophrenic and non-
schizophrenic populations; it does not alone explain why a certain degree of 
variation should be conceived of as dysfunctional or pathological. The latter 
judgement is a further theoretical and empirical claim that involves for its 
justification (according to this dissertation) the determination of the “proper 
function” of the mechanism, the range of environments under which, historically, 
 
15 See Heinrichs (2001, 74-75) on the P50 evoked potential “gating” defect as a reliable marker for 
schizophrenia. 
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the mechanism came to possess the function, and the range of activity which is 
consistent with performance of that function. Once such information is available, 
then the variation in question may be shown to qualify as “dysfunctional” 
variation. Nonetheless, many other possibilities may emerge, for example, that the 
biological variation in question is within its historically “normal” range, or, that 
though the biological variation falls outside of this normal range, it does so 
because it is placed within a historically abnormal context and therefore it is not 
necessarily inherently dysfunctional. 
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will accomplish the following three 
objectives. First, it will place the thesis of the dissertation in the context of classic debates 
on the value-ladenness of psychiatric classification (“Antipsychiatry and the Medical 
Model”; Section 1.2), as well as in the context of current debates on the value-ladenness 
of psychiatric classification (“Descriptivism and Prescriptivism”; Section 1.3). In doing 
so, it will clarify the thesis by providing a contrast between the framework presented here 
and those of the classic and contemporary debates. Secondly, a schematic overview of the 
argument that will be presented in the dissertation will be provided (Section 1.4). Thirdly, 
a section overview will be provided (Section 1.5). 
1.2 RELATION OF THESIS TO CLASSIC DEBATES: ANTIPSYCHIATRY AND THE 
MEDICAL MODEL 
To clarify the thesis of the dissertation – that there is little warrant for the claim 
that psychiatric disorders stem from biological dysfunctions – it is helpful to contrast this 
thesis with one that was popular within the antipsychiatric tradition that flourished in the 
1960s and early 1970s, particularly in France, Britain, and the US.16 In the following, 
 
16 E.g., Szasz (1961); Goffman (1961); Laing and Esterson (1964); Scheff (1966); Foucault (1967); Cooper 
(1967); Sarbin (1969).  
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after providing an informal overview of the “antipsychiatry” tradition and its relation to 
the “medical model” of psychiatry, some of the central assumptions governing both 
traditions will be more formally identified and criticized. The thesis of the dissertation 
will be shown to be compatible with a weakened version of the antipsychiatric empirical-
sociological claim that the purpose of psychiatry as an institution is the explanation, 
prediction, and correction of certain forms of deviation from norms of appropriateness 
that are social in their origin and justification. However, it will be pointed out that the 
formulation of this thesis does not necessarily imply the stronger normative claims about 
treatment methodology that the antipsychiatrists advocated; for example, it does not 
suggest that biomedical treatment of mental disorders is inappropriate and should be 
replaced by community-based treatment, or that “role-playing” models of mental disorder 
are valid. 
1.2.1 Overview and Criticism of Antipsychiatry 
One of the predominant themes in the antipsychiatric tradition is the notion that 
the behavioral and psychological patterns typically conceived of as symptoms of mental 
disorders (e.g., delusions, hallucinations, etc.) cannot be conceptualized in abstraction 
from the complex set of social interactions within which a person comes to adopt a 
certain social role (namely, that of the “mentally ill person”, or the “sick role”17). The 
reasons that a person adopts this role, moreover, are typically held to be explicable in 
terms of normal interpersonal situations or stressors, and hence do not need to be 
explained in terms of a peculiar or “special” inner cause, whether psychological or 
biological. Consequently, proponents of antipsychiatry were equally opposed to 
 
17 See Parsons (1951) for the theoretical framework that defines the “sick role”; this notion will be 
elaborated in Section 2.3.3.  
 18
biological as well as psychodynamic psychiatry, insofar as both tend to be exclusively 
individualistic.  
For example, Cooper (1967), who coined the term “anti-psychiatry”, defines 
schizophrenia in the following terms:  
 
Schizophrenia is a micro-social crisis situation in which the acts and experience of 
a certain person are invalidated by others for certain intelligible cultural and 
micro-cultural (usually familial) reasons, to the point where he is elected and 
identified as being “mentally ill” in a certain way, and is then confirmed (by a 
specifiable but highly arbitrary labeling process) in the identity “schizophrenic 
patient” by medical or quasi medical agents. (Ibid., 2) 
 
The sociologist, Scheff (1966), similarly conceives of mental illness as the 
outcome of generic social reinforcement techniques by which normal deviation from 
social standards is aggravated, and implicitly rewarded, by the community which 
evaluates it as such. (Similar views are expressed in Szasz [1961], Goffman [1961, 
especially pp. 350-366]; Laing and Esterson [1964], Sarbin [1969], and Rosenhan 
[1973].) The reason that the label “antipsychiatry” is often used to describe these views is 
that insofar as psychiatric institutions perform the role of the “medical or quasi medical 
agents” described by Cooper which “confirm” the mental illness label, they are thereby 
thought to perpetuate, by reinforcement, the very conditions that they are assigned to 
ameliorate.  
It is important to point out that many of the conditions deemed by more 
conventional psychiatrists to constitute mental disorders are also conceived of by the 
antipsychiatrists as forms of human suffering that are prima facie undesirable to have. 
Consequently, the label “antipsychiatry” is perhaps unwarranted, since many of those 
who fall under the category (such as Szasz, Cooper, and Laing) are themselves 
psychiatrists who recognized a need for help and advocated more interpersonal or 
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community-based modes of treatment. One of the motivations that fueled the 
antipsychiatry approach, then, was their view that they were in possession of better, more 
effective techniques of ameliorating human suffering. To this extent, “antipsychiatry” (or 
at least the version presented here) refers to a set of overlapping theoretical frameworks 
from which empirically testable hypotheses concerning the alleviation of certain forms of 
suffering can be derived.18
 Having provided an informal overview of the tradition, some of the central 
assumptions of that tradition can be more formally identified and criticized. Despite 
variations in their formulations, advocates of the antipsychiatric perspective typically 
coupled two claims, one empirical-sociological and the other conceptual.19 The empirical 
claim is that psychiatry is an institution that has the function of regulating social 
deviance. The conceptual claim is that the statement that “Person P has a mental disorder, 
D” either:  
 
(i) does not attribute a non-relational property to an individual. Rather, it 
describes a relationship between the psychological or behavioral state of an 
individual and the values held by a particular social community. In other words, 
to say that a person has a mental disorder is to say that the person’s behavior is 
deviant with respect to that particular society’s mores or values; or 
 
18 For example, much of the empirical impetus that motivated the social-role theory of schizophrenia 
stemmed from work in the US by Bateson and colleagues on the “double-bind” theory of schizophrenia 
(Bateson et al. [1956]), according to which schizophrenic symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations, 
catatonia, and disorganized thought can be understood as intelligible responses to conflicting demands that 
are imposed upon a person (typically by the family, and most commonly by the mother) each of which is 
associated with punishment and which jointly admit of no satisfactory resolution. This work formed the 
theoretical basis for Laing and Esterson (1964) and Cooper’s (1967) resulting “definition” of schizophrenia 
(above).  
19 This rendering of the two theses simplifies the antipsychiatric approach and excludes reference to the 
antipsychiatrists’ moral and political contention that medical psychiatry is inhumane or that it produces 
undue suffering. See Dain (1994) and Wilson (1993) for more detailed and scholarly overviews of the 
moral and political aspects of antipsychiatry.  
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(ii) the statement does not describe anything at all, but is purely prescriptive. In 
other words, to say that a person has a mental disorder is to say that the person 
ought to be excluded from normal social intercourse, or that the speaker, or the 
institution of which the speaker is a representative, does not like the person’s 
behavior, etc. “Mental disorder”, according to this view, has the status of an 
epithet for expressing a negative attitude about someone’s conduct. In this respect 
it is similar to ethical emotivism (Stevenson [1937, 18]; Ayer [1952, 107]), 
according to which the function of moral terms is to evince disapproval of 
something and to incite similar emotional attitudes in others. 
 
Although from a philosophical point of view, version (i) and version (ii) of the 
conceptual claim have very different implications – one endorses relativism and the other 
non-cognitivism about “mental disorder” ascriptions – both versions lead to the same 
critical conclusion that, insofar as the values that are expressed in prescriptive norms 
often change as a function of social context, the sorts of behavioral or psychological 
conditions that may warrant or provoke the “mental disorder” label in one society or era 
will not necessarily warrant or provoke the “mental disorder” label in another society or 
era.   
 Often the conceptual claim is supported by providing a social history of a given 
mental disorder category and revealing correlations between changes in the psychiatric 
status of the condition, on the one hand, and changes in widespread social values and 
economic structures, on the other. This correlation is supposed to show that changes in 
the public conception of what qualifies as a mental illness is best explained as a function 
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of widespread social values and mores, rather than medical or scientific facts.20 The 
conceptual claim is also often supported by providing cross-cultural evidence that 
patterns of behavior that in one society constitute evidence for a mental disorder may, in 
another society, be considered “normal” or even commendable. A well-worn example, 
taken from Silverman (1967), is of the trance-like behavior characteristic of the Siberian 
shaman, which would be considered evidence for schizophrenia in the West, although the 
shaman performs a valuable and respectable social role in his own social context.21  
The empirical claim is typically supported by documenting the history of the way 
in which psychiatric institutions largely succeeded in excluding those labeled mentally ill 
(who were often “social deviants”, such as unrepentant alcoholics, criminals, or vagrants) 
from normal human intercourse: through involuntary hospitalization, abusive medical 
intervention, or merely by the social stigmatization that invariably followed a diagnosis.22 
Such documentation is used to suggest that the true function of psychiatry is to regulate 
social deviance and that any claim to the contrary is ideological.  
 Both theses are unnecessarily strong, and neither will be advocated here. With 
respect to the empirical claim, if the expression “social deviance” is taken in its common 
sense, e.g., “criminal”, “unruly”, or “disruptive of the social order”, then it is false. 
Depression, anxiety, or Alzheimer’s dementia, for example, are not “socially deviant” in 
any of these senses, yet they are all widely considered to be mental disorders. Similarly, 
 
20 This is presumably why Foucault (1967) is often classified as “antipsychiatric”, although Foucault does 
not in that context explicitly expound any general antipsychiatric position.  
21 See, however, Murphy (1978) for a critical evaluation of this claim from an anthropological perspective. 
In her own ethnographic work with this group she finds no overlap between those considered insane 
(nuthkavihak) and those considered shamans; that though shamans exhibit some of the behavior of the 
nuthkavihak, they do so exclusively in the context of circumscribed, ceremonial occasions; that those 
considered nuthkavihak do not typically occupy useful social roles; and that most of the characteristic 
behaviors of the nuthkavihak would also be considered signs of mental disorder in the West (Ibid., 6).  
22 For a recent text, see Whitaker (2002); however, this sort of polemical historiography of psychiatry is 
currently undergoing a shift towards a more balanced assessment of the historical role and function of 
psychiatric institutions (see Porter and Wright [2003] for a recent anthology).  
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criminal violence or anti-war protest may be considered to be “socially deviant”, but they 
are not necessarily considered to be mental disorders.23 (In the common sense of “social 
deviance”, antisocial personality disorder and conduct disorder would be two of the only 
psychiatric conditions that are largely defined in terms of a history of unruly, disruptive, 
or violent behavior). However, the thesis of the dissertation is compatible with a weaker 
sociological claim: Psychiatry is an institution one of the functions of which is to explain, 
predict, and correct certain forms of deviation from norms of appropriateness that are 
social in their origin and justification. This does not imply that such norms are 
illegitimate or unjustified, or that the resulting applications of social and political power 
are wrong.  
 The conceptual claim, according to which mental disorder concepts are largely 
relative to the values of a particular society, appears to import a thesis about social or 
historical relativism into the view that mental disorder categories embody social values: 
namely, that if a statement is laden with social values then the statement is held to be true 
in some societies and not in others. But a statement may be at once laden with social 
values, and nonetheless cross-culturally or cross-generationally shared. For example, it 
may be a universally shared moral platitude that taking personal advantage of communal 
resources is a disreputable thing. Thus, even if there exists anthropological evidence that 
certain types of behaviors are universally considered to be signs of mental disorders, this 
would not uphold the thesis that categories of mental disorders are not laden with social 
values of appropriateness.24
 
23 Boorse (1982, 39); Wakefield (1992a). 
24 Similarly, even if there were biological evidence that some social values, such as the prohibition of 
taking personal advantage of communal resources, are themselves a product of evolution, this does not 
entail that the person who violates such norms suffers from a biological dysfunction. The thesis endorsed 
here does not even imply the conceptual possibility that a society could exist that does not hold certain 
norms. For example, it may be conceptually impossible for there to be a society that did not impose a 
prohibition on taking personal advantage of communal resources. 
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Similarly, the converse of the above implication – that if a statement is held to be 
true in some societies and not in others, then the statement is laden with social values – is 
also invalid. The proposition that epilepsy is a disease is not universally recognized as 
such, but that does not entail that its endorsement is laden with social values. For 
example, among the Hmong in Laos, epileptic seizures are commonly thought to indicate 
divine blessings (Fadiman [1997]).25 However, this does not mean that epilepsy is not 
“really” a disease, or that in calling epilepsy a “disease” one is tacitly expressing a set of 
socially-relative value judgements. It may suggest that being a “disease” and being a 
“blessing” are not incompatible;26 it may also suggest that that the nature of epilepsy is 
widely misunderstood in some cultures.27
Although the failure of this inference is fairly obvious, it has an important 
implication that has been largely unrecognized by advocates of the antipsychiatric 
position, which is that anthropological or historical evidence that certain mental disorder 
ascriptions are not, or have not been, universally recognized as such, or that they change 
over time, does not imply that they do not really stem from biological dysfunctions on the 
part of the individual. Consequently, although the thesis of the dissertation is that 
biological dysfunction ascriptions made in the context of psychiatry are typically 
biologically unwarranted, evidence for cultural variation in the application of mental 
disorder concepts will not be invoked to establish this thesis. 
 
25 The association between epilepsy and divine causation has a long history in the West; Hippocrates 
(1952; see “On the Sacred Disease”), for example, explicitly denounces the view that epilepsy is a “sacred 
disease”, arguing that it is caused by the brain and should be treated like other diseases, rather than by 
religious ceremonies.  
26 According to Fadiman (1997, 20) epilepsy possesses this dual status among the Hmong.  
27 Neander (1983, 30).   
 24
                                                
1.2.2 Overview and Criticism of the “Medical Model” of Psychiatry 
 Advocates of the antipsychiatric position typically pitted themselves against 
proponents of the so-called “medical model” of psychiatry, who commonly endorse 
opposing conceptual and empirical claims.28 They reject the empirical claim that the 
function of psychiatry is to regulate social deviance. Instead, they hold that psychiatry is 
a branch of medicine, and its function is to treat diseases. The conceptual claim is that to 
say that “Person P has a mental disorder, D” is to attribute a non-relational property to an 
individual. Often, the “medical model” in psychiatry is associated specifically with the 
idea that this property is a biological property, such as a disorder of the brain or nervous 
system. However, at the time of these disputes, many psychodynamic psychiatrists 
thought of themselves as practicing a form of psychological medicine – psychoanalysis – 
that isolates and cures unconscious psychological conflict in a manner analogous to the 
way in which physicians isolate and cure diseases.29 Hence, in the context of the 
antipsychiatry debates, the “medical model” should be taken to connote individualistic 
conceptions of treatment rather than more narrowly construed “biological” ones. 
The medical thesis, that the function of psychiatry is to treat diseases, is typically 
argued for on the basis of recent medical advances in the knowledge of the biological 
correlates of mental disorders, and in their treatment.30 Historically and sociologically, 
this has been an overwhelmingly powerful argument: the neurobiological and 
 
28 The most classic exposition of the tenets of the “medical model” of psychiatry is Feighner et al. (1972) 
and Klerman (1978). However, it should also be kept in mind that there is no unambiguous definition or 
characterization of what the “medical model” is supposed to be; see, e.g., Macklin (1973).  
29 Ironically, this assertion runs counter to Freud’s own explicit rejection of the medical status of 
psychoanalysis. In the postscript to his 1927 book, The Question of Lay Analysis, he writes, “I have 
assumed…that psychoanalysis is not a specialized branch of medicine. I cannot see how it is possible to 
dispute this…The possibility of its application to medical purposes must not lead us astray” (quoted in 
Siegler and Osmond [1974, 49]).  
30 The introduction of Chlorpromazine (marketed in the US as Thorazine) into the psychiatric asylum in 
1954 for the treatment of schizophrenia is often held as the first major step toward the twentieth century 
“biological revolution” in psychiatry (Swazey [1974]).  
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pharmacological advances made by biological psychiatry have, more or less, brought 
closure to the heyday of antipsychiatric literature. Nonetheless, the argument that medical 
advances in the understanding and treatment of mental disorders substantiates the 
medical thesis is straightforwardly question-begging. The discovery that a certain type of 
behavioral or psychological condition has a biological component does not show that it 
stems from a disease or a biological dysfunction; it merely suggests that it has a 
biological cause. For the physicalist, all mental states have physical (and presumably 
biological) causes. Strictly speaking, all that scientific advances in the understanding of 
the biological foundations of psychology and behavior show is that psychiatry is 
becoming progressively more effective in controlling certain types of behavior that are 
deemed undesirable to have. 
A second claim that is often supposed to substantiate the medical thesis is that 
newer diagnostic and classification systems for mental disorders are more reliable and 
valid than older diagnostic systems: they are more reliable in that the diagnostic 
descriptions they offer have a higher level of inter-rater agreement, and they are more 
valid in that the diagnoses has greater predictive accuracy.31 But the question of whether 
or not current classification systems are more reliable or valid than older ones is 
orthogonal to the question of what makes the conditions so classified describable as 
“disorders” or “diseases”. The classifications of economic status, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation are fairly reliable and valid, although presumably these are not “disease 
classifications”.32  
 
31 E.g., Andreasen (1997, 1586).   
32 Presumably, the reason that the improved reliability of current classification systems is often mistakenly 
used as an argument against antipsychiatry is that some antipsychiatrists, such as Rosenhan (1973), made 
the unreliability of then-current classification systems, and especially of the concept of “schizophrenia” as 
used in the United States, the target of their criticism of the profession (see Section 2.1.1 for an elaboration 
of Rosenhan’s criticism). But, conceptually, the relative vagueness or precision of a category has nothing to 
do with whether it is value-laden or with the nature and source of those values. 
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The conceptual claim that mental disorders are non-relational properties of 
individuals is intimately bound up with the medical thesis that the function of psychiatry 
is to treat diseases. One plausible way of deriving this claim is the following: if a disease 
is (or stems from) an internal dysfunction on the part of the individual, and an internal 
dysfunction on the part of the individual a non-relational property of that individual, the 
view that mental disorders are diseases implies that mental disorders are (or stem from) 
non-relational properties of individuals. 
Despite their intuitive merit, these first two premises are not trivial. The first 
premise involves a semantic claim that the concept of a disease refers to an internal 
dysfunction on the part of the individual. However, a significant and long-standing debate 
within the philosophy of medicine concerns the question of whether the concept of 
disease refers exclusively to a type of internal state that can, in principle, exist in the 
absence of any disposition to produce suffering, whether “disease” necessarily refers to a 
state that disposes its bearer to suffering, or, at the extreme, whether “disease” simply 
refers to any internal condition that disposes its bearer to suffering, without additional 
qualification.33 If the term “disease” merely refers to any internal condition that produces 
suffering, with no additional qualification, then it is not clear why diseases should 
involve internal dysfunctions, since intuitively, suffering can occur in the absence of an 
internal dysfunction. Nonetheless, the conceptual content of the word “disease” will not 
be pursued any further in this dissertation. It will be stipulated that having an internal 
“dysfunction” is at least a necessary condition for having a “disease”, whether or not a 
 
33 Sedgwick (1981) claims that diseases are just undesirable biological conditions. Canguilhem (1991, 208-
9) appears to defend the weaker claim that being a biological condition that disposes its bearer to suffering 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for being a disease; that is, something would not be a “disease” 
unless at some historical point someone experienced the condition as an obstacle to his or her goals.   
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disease is also accompanied by a subjective experience of suffering on the part of the 
individual who has the condition.34  
The second premise, that an internal dysfunction on the part of the individual is a 
non-relational property of the individual, is also a conceptual claim that depends on how 
the notion of internal “function” and “dysfunction” are explicated. If the notion of an 
internal “function” is explicated in terms of the contribution of a trait to the relative 
fitness of the organism that possesses it (i.e., as held by the “propensity theory” of 
biological functions), then whether a given trait has a biological function depends partly 
on the organism’s environment and hence is not a non-relational property of the 
individual. On the other hand, if the notion of function is explicated exclusively in terms 
of the history of the functional trait, without making any claims about its current 
contribution to fitness (i.e., as held by the “etiological theory” of biological functions), 
then whether or not a trait has a function is a property of an individual that is not relative 
to its current environment but one that supervenes entirely on its structure and history.35
 
1.2.3 Clarification of Thesis in Relation to Antipsychiatry and the Medical Model 
Having provided a schematic outline of the classic debate between advocates of 
the antipsychiatric position and advocates of the medical model, the thesis that will be 
advocated here can be placed in relation to them. The thesis of this dissertation is that 
 
34 That “causing suffering” is not a necessary condition for having a disease is often argued for on the 
following basis: intuitively, a person can have a disease without being aware of it and without experiencing 
physical discomfort (Kendell [1975a, 10]); apparently non-sentient beings, such as plants, can have 
“diseases” (Boorse [1975, 53]), etc. However, there is no reason that these arguments could not be resolved 
by restricting “disease” language to sentient beings, rendering “causing suffering” as “being known to have 
a disposition to cause suffering”, and so on. (Perhaps one would never have spoken of “diseases of plants” 
unless such conditions were disposed to produce suffering on the part of humans; if so, then the fact that 
plants can have “diseases” is not a good counterexample to the subjectivist view of disease.)  
35 The concept of a biological function will be described in Section 2.3 and Chapter 3; in Chapter 3, a 
version of the etiological theory of functions will be defended as the only theory capable of satisfying some 
minimal adequacy criteria that the biological perspective in psychiatry imposes on the explication of 
function statements. 
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there is little warrant for the claim that psychiatric disorders stem from biological 
dysfunctions. This suggests that the norms involved in psychiatric research and 
classification may be psychological, social, ethical, epistemic, legal, etc., in nature. 
Hence, this thesis is compatible with the weaker sociological thesis that psychiatry is an 
institution one of whose functions is to explain, predict, and correct certain forms of 
deviation from widely-held norms of appropriateness that are social in their origin and 
justification. However, it will also accept the conceptual claims proposed by advocates of 
the medical model concerning the concept of disease: namely, that diseases do entail the 
presence of internal dysfunctions on the part of individuals, and that such dysfunctions 
are non-relational properties of individuals (that is, they are not relative to that 
individual’s current environment). It will use these conceptual claims to argue against the 
proposition that mental disorders are best conceptualized as diseases.  
However, this is not to say that biologically-oriented medical procedures are not 
appropriate to the amelioration of these conditions. Consequently, the thesis departs from 
the normative implications that were often drawn, by antipsychiatrists as well as 
proponents of the medical model of psychiatry, concerning appropriate treatment 
measures. What should not be neglected, as mentioned at the beginning of the section, is 
that the debates about the concept of “mental disorder” were often fueled by prior 
commitments concerning the most appropriate means of ameliorating human suffering – 
for example, biological, psychodynamic, and community-based treatment methods. 
Often, these conflicting commitments gave rise to heated conceptual debates concerning 
the nature of “mental disorder”, and these debates were supposed to provide an a priori 
basis for generating acceptance for the favored method of therapy. Szasz (1961), as well 
as Sarbin (1969), for example, draw heavily upon Ryle’s (1949) analysis of “mind” to 
argue that most forms of psychiatry, whether biologically or psychodynamically oriented, 
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rest upon a problematic analysis of “mind” as a substantive entity that exists “in the 
head” and that can provide a substrate for “abnormalities” or “diseases”. They then argue 
that this concept is metaphorical, that “mind” refers instead to a set of practices that are 
embodied in a matrix of social transactions, and therefore that the purpose of therapy 
should be to help people to become aware of how their behavior reflects the adoption of 
social roles that may not be conducive to their well-being. But this is to conflate 
conceptual analysis and treatment methodology.  It would be equally invalid to argue 
from the physicalist premise that mental states are physical states of the brain to the 
conclusion that neurological intervention alone is warranted for the alleviation of mental 
disorders. Certainly, no conceptual analysis of “mind” or “mental disorder” should 
foreclose the question of effective therapeutic procedures for alleviating suffering or 
preventing harmful conduct.36  
1.3 RELATION OF THESIS TO CONTEMPORARY DEBATES: DESCRIPTIVISM AND 
PRESCRIPTIVISM 
Much of the recent philosophical literature on categories of mental disorder 
reflects a shift away from the debate between the proponents of antipsychiatry versus 
those of the medical model; they are more explicitly oriented towards conceptual analysis 
of medical and psychiatric terms. On the broadest level, the debates concern the question 
of the relation between facts and values in psychiatric classification and research; more 
specifically, they concern the extent to which the concept of mental disorder has purely 
descriptive meaning, prescriptive meaning, or some mixture of both. Unlike the classical 
debates, however, there is no implicit assumption that the “scientific status” of psychiatry 
 
36 Ironically, Matthews (2003) takes up a similar Rylean position to argue for methodological pluralism in 
psychiatry.  
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hangs in the balance of the debates, or that, if “mental disorder” contains any prescriptive 
meaning, then its application would be arbitrary, subjective, or ideologically driven.37
The reason that the debate is important is because, if one were to understand how 
values – here narrowly construed in terms of “prescriptive meaning” – enter into medical 
and psychiatric concepts, then one would have a better appreciation for the appropriate 
place of moral discourse in medical theory and practice. For example, if, according to the 
descriptivist view of “disease” (e.g., Boorse [1977]), whether or not something is a 
disease does not depend on whether or not its consequences are negatively valued, then 
moral discourse may occupy a more marginal role within medical theory than it would 
otherwise, and be limited to standard topics treated in introductory medical ethics courses 
– the right to die, the nature of competence, the standards for informed consent, and so 
on. If, on the other hand, whether or not something is a “disease” is partly determined by 
whether its consequences are negatively valued, then its ascription would presuppose 
some conception of personal or individual well-being in relation to which disease is an 
obstruction or hindrance. In this case, at least in principle, the role of moral discourse 
would be more central to medical decision-making. For example, if there were 
disagreement concerning whether or not obesity is a disease, or racism is a mental 
disorder, then it would be helpful to know which types of disagreement could be resolved 
on fairly straightforward empirical grounds, and which types stem from divergent value-
commitments. (This is not to suggest that the latter types of divergence cannot be 
rationally resolved, or that no other sources of disagreement exist.) The use of conceptual 
analysis to clarify the role of values in medical theory, then, has substantial practical 
importance. 
 
37 Unless, of course, one holds a “pure prescriptivist” view as described in the previous section, according 
to which “mental disorder” possesses no cognitive content and serves, in psychiatric and social discourse, 
as an epithet for any psychological condition that the speaker disapproves of and wishes his or her audience 
to disapprove of as well.  
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The terminology appealed to in these debates stems from R.M. Hare’s (1952, 
1963) analysis of moral language; hence Hare’s usage will be briefly recapitulated.38 
Hare defined the terms “descriptive meaning” and “prescriptive meaning” largely 
ostensively. The term “red” is paradigmatic of a term with purely descriptive meaning, in 
that it picks out an empirically discernable property of an object and does so in a way that 
does not necessarily commit the speaker to any particular value-judgement concerning 
whether an object’s being red is commendable or not.39 The term “good”, however, 
contains prescriptive meaning in that it essentially performs the function of 
commendation: to say that something is good is a way of commending that thing, or 
things that are similar to that thing in some determinate respect. Another way of 
expressing the idea that a term “essentially performs the function of commendation” is 
that any intelligible usage of the term presupposes an act of commendation on the part of 
the person who utters it. Thus, a person who says sincerely that “X is good”, but does not 
commend X, cannot be said to “exhibit mastery” of the English language.  Unlike the 
term “good”, the term “courageous” exemplifies both types of meaning, in that it both 
describes an empirically discernable pattern of behavior or psychological disposition, and 
has the function of expressing commendation of that property (compare, e.g., 
“courageous” with “foolhardy” or “reckless”, which often agree extensionally but are 
used to express different value-judgements). 
Although the concepts of “descriptive meaning” and “prescriptive meaning” are 
fairly clear, Hare’s definitions of “descriptive term”, “prescriptive term”, and “evaluative 
 
38 The primary exposition can be found in Hare (1952), Chapter 7; and (1963), Chapter 2. Since the usage 
is not consistent across texts, the 1963 exposition will be used here. Additionally, reference will be by 
chapter and section rather than by pagination.  
39 Of course, any term can occasionally be used to express commendation; a person who is known to like 
the color red may exclaim, “Why, it’s red!” to convey that being red is a praiseworthy quality and to 
suggest a course of action (Sadler [2004, 29]). However, this does not make “red” an evaluative term in the 
narrow sense (Ibid., 30) insofar as this commendation is not part of the meaning of the word itself. 
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term” do not correspond in an obvious manner to the former. This situation has created a 
significant amount of discrepancy with respect to the way these categories are applied in 
contemporary literature. In short, according to Hare, a term is a “descriptive term” if it 
contains exclusively descriptive meaning; a term is a “prescriptive term” if it contains 
any prescriptive meaning (whether or not it also contains descriptive meaning); and a 
term is an “evaluative term” if it contains both descriptive and prescriptive meaning 
(1963, §2.8). Consequently, all evaluative terms are necessarily prescriptive terms, but it 
is possible that there are prescriptive terms that are not evaluative terms.  
However – and this is an important caveat – Hare does not believe that moral 
terms, such as “good”, “right”, and “ought”, contain exclusively prescriptive meaning. 
Hence they are evaluative terms rather than prescriptive terms. His argument for this is 
that the purpose of commendation is to establish something as an example for guiding 
selection (1952, §8.1). For example, to say “Rembrandt is a good painter” is to posit 
Rembrandt’s work, or his creative process, as a model to which aspiring painters should 
strive. Thus, in order for the statement to fulfill this purpose, the speaker must imply that 
there are replicable features of Rembrandt’s paintings or creative process, and that any 
painter whose work or creative process satisfies these standards is also a “good painter”. 
Consequently, when one states that “X is a good Y”, one expresses the judgement that X 
has some set of descriptively expressible properties P1, P2,…, Pn, and one is committed to 
the universally quantified statement, “Any Y that has properties P1, P2,…, Pn, is a good 
Y”. Another way of putting this point is that the property of being a “good” example of a 
kind supervenes upon a set of descriptively expressible properties such that two objects 
cannot differ solely with respect to their goodness. Hence the descriptive meaning of 
moral terms implies that moral judgements are universalizable (1963, §2.5). The reason 
for Hare’s emphasis on the coexistence of prescriptive and descriptive meaning in moral 
 33
language is that it constitutes a weak constraint on the rationality of moral discourse, 
although one that avoids the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” associated with rejecting the 
prescriptive meaning of moral terms altogether and defining “good” in terms of a set of 
descriptively expressible properties (1952, §5.4). 
However, it should be noted that this is a very weak constraint on moral 
discourse, insofar as there is very little descriptive content associated with the term 
“good” in the way that, e.g., there is specific descriptive content associated with the term 
“courageous”; for in order to be “courageous” one must, at least, have a psychological 
disposition to take risks, but no such unique property is implied by being “good”. In other 
words, “courage” is, as Williams (1985) puts it, a “thick” ethical concept (Ibid., 129), 
because it is relatively constrained by specific descriptive content; “good” would be a 
“thin” ethical concept because it is relatively unconstrained. 
The distinction between descriptive and evaluative terms will allow two major 
positions on the evaluative character of the term “mental disorder” to be rendered more 
precisely: if the term “mental disorder” is an evaluative term, then what specific 
descriptive content, if any, constrains its ascription? In other words, supposing the term 
“mental disorder” to contain prescriptive meaning, then can virtually any psychological 
characteristic or phenomenon qualify as a “mental disorder”? Or only very specific sorts 
of psychological conditions?  
The above recapitulation of Hare’s schema may seem to belabor the point, but it 
is important because there is often disagreement concerning the conditions for classifying 
a given term as “evaluative” or “nonevaluative”, and these disagreements tend to distort 
the debates. Of course, one cannot argue that there is a “correct” usage of the terms 
“descriptive” and “prescriptive”; one can merely stipulate one’s meaning and justify that 
stipulation in terms of historical usage and current usefulness. In particular, there are two 
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assumptions that are often made in the debates about the evaluative content of psychiatric 
nomenclature that will not be made here, since these assumptions have the effect of 
trivializing the notion of an evaluative term. The first assumption that will not be used 
here is that “evaluative term” designates a pragmatic, rather than a semantic, category. 
“Pragmatic” factors for linguistic usage refer to the empirical conditions that motivate the 
utterance of a term in a given context; “semantic” factors refer to the meaning of the term 
itself or the conditions of its intelligible usage. The second assumption that will not be 
used here is the assumption that a term is evaluative if the conditions of its truth are 
relative to the values held by some person or another, rather than specifically relative to 
the values held by the speaker or one whose values the speaker represents. Examples of 
how both assumptions enter into the debates will be provided in order to clarify the 
relatively narrow scope of the term “evaluative” that will be used here.  
An example of the first assumption involves the inference from the fact that a 
given use of a term is motivated by values (pragmatic) to the claim that the term is 
evaluative (semantic), that is, that some value-commitment is part of its meaning. Agich 
(2002), for example, notes uncontroversially that, “[D]isease language arises from a 
response to the everyday experience of illness, namely the individual experience of 
feeling bad or of not being able to perform some normal action…”(Ibid., 106). What he 
believes to follow from this observation is that “[D]isease language is essentially 
evaluative. It is bound up with evaluative concepts of illness” (Ibid., 107). But to say that 
disease language is motivated by a negatively-valued experience of suffering (pragmatic) 
does not imply that such an experience is part of the meaning of the term “disease” 
(semantic). This inference, if valid, would trivialize the concept of an evaluative term. 
For example, geometry may have arisen out of the collective desire to exchange and 
accumulate property, but this does not imply that terms such as “point” and “polygon” 
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are evaluative. (Geometry may be evaluative in another sense, namely, that geometrical 
theorems are epistemically normative – in the sense that one ought to believe in them – 
but that is not the sort of value that is typically thought to be involved in the debates 
concerning the evaluative status of psychiatric terms.)40
The second way of trivializing the concept of an evaluative term is to claim that a 
term is evaluative if it refers to the values held by some person, rather than that it 
presupposes an act of commendation specifically on the part of the speaker (or one whose 
values the speaker represents) as a condition of its intelligible usage. Fulford (2000), for 
example, claims that “rape” is an evaluative term. The reason for this is that absence of 
voluntary consent is one of the truth-conditions for the correct application of the term 
“rape” (Ibid., 85), and thus it imputes to the victim a negatively-valued experience. Thus 
there is a reference to the values held by the victim. However, this fact does not suffice to 
infer that the term is evaluative in the sense that will be used here, since it does not 
necessarily impute to the speaker any particular attitude toward rape, or, more generally, 
to one person’s using another as a means to which the latter does not consent. Despite the 
fact that anyone who could have a neutral attitude about rape exhibits a deficiency in 
ethical judgement, it is not a contradiction in terms to imagine such a person.  
Fulford claims explicitly that the concept of an evaluative term carries no such 
restriction to the speaker’s values. Yet, if there is no such implication, then virtually all 
psychological description is evaluative, in that any factual description of a person’s 
emotions, desires, values, or preferences is “evaluative”. Psychiatric classification would 
 
40 Sadler (2004) draws a helpful distinction between the fairly encompassing idea of value-ladenness and 
the relatively narrow idea of a “value-term”. The notion of “value-ladenness” can be applied to virtually 
any linguistic or conceptual entity – words, sentences, discourses, and theories – that is associated with 
values, where a value is a concept that is used to impute praise or blame to something and to guide action 
and is indifferent between semantic and pragmatic considerations. The notion of a “value term” is much 
more narrowly construed to refer to individual words or expressions that have prescriptive meaning. In this 
sense, one may say of, e.g., conservation biology that it embodies “value commitments”, and that it is a 
“value-laden” science even if no particular term in its specialized nomenclature is a “value term”.   
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be “evaluative” merely because it deploys psychological descriptions. This would seem 
to trivialize the debates concerning whether psychiatric nomenclature is evaluative. By 
contrast, in the sense of the term to be used in this context, to describe a person as a 
“victim” of rape is evaluative, since the use of the term “victim” necessarily imputes to 
the speaker the belief that the person was wrongly violated, and that freedom from such 
transgression is inherently good. (Of course, it may be that the notion of “voluntary 
consent” is evaluative, if by stating this, the speaker imputes to the person the 
“competence” to consent, and if the notion of “competence” is only definable in terms of 
epistemic, legal, or ethical norms. But that was not the point that Fulford was making). 
Hence, to say that “mental disorder” is evaluative is to say that the intelligible usage of 
the statement “X is a mental disorder” presupposes an act of commendation on the part of 
the speaker (or the community that the speaker purports to represent) – for example, that 
X is prima facie undesirable to have, or that it produces negative consequences, or that it 
ought to be treated, etc.  
Having provided an overview of the conceptual apparatus that informs the debate, 
as well as some common assumptions that will not be made here, some of the major 
contrasting positions on the evaluative content of the concept of a mental disorder can be 
described. Interestingly, there are very few pure prescriptivists or pure descriptivists with 
respect to the meaning of “mental disorder” or other psychiatric or medical terms. Most 
of the participants assume that the term is evaluative, but disagree about the precise 
nature of the descriptive constraints that are imposed upon it. Hence the debates cannot 
accurately be glossed in terms of the opposition between “descriptivists” and 
“prescriptivists”, or between “naturalists” and “normativists”, as is often done.  
One view is that “mental disorder” is a relatively constrained by specific 
descriptive content. According to one prominent analysis, given by Wakefield (e.g., 
 37
1992a; 1992b; 1999a), “disorder” as such can be analyzed as “harmful dysfunction”. For 
Wakefield, the notion of “harm” contains a prescriptive component. Presumably, for a 
person to judge something to be “harmful” is for that person to judge that it has the 
capacity to undermine or destroy something that he or she deems worthy of preservation, 
something that ought to be protected, and so on. Insofar as there are few, if any, 
intelligibility constraints upon what sorts of items a person may deem worthy of 
preservation, then the judgement that something is harmful is relatively unconstrained by 
any specific descriptive content. However, according to Wakefield, the concept of 
“dysfunction” contains only descriptive meaning. It refers to the inability of a biological 
trait to perform its function, where a “function” of a trait can be defined, in turn, 
exclusively in terms of the activity that it was selected for by natural selection to perform. 
Hence according to Wakefield’s view, the term “mental disorder” is an evaluative term 
that is relatively constrained by descriptive content. If this is correct, then even though 
one should acknowledge the relevance of value judgements to psychiatric research and 
classification, one should not be a radical antipsychiatrist and assume that mental 
disorder classification is merely an expression of socially-conditioned value judgements. 
This position will be developed in more detail in Chapter 2; it is an elaboration of Klein’s 
(1978) analysis of “illness” as an involuntary impairment of an evolved function that 
warrants the “sick role” (Section 2.3.3).  
Wakefield’s position, however, prompts a closer analysis of the allegedly 
descriptive status of “dysfunction” (and the corresponding concept of function). Although 
Wakefield is a descriptivist with respect to the term “dysfunction”, others have proposed 
that the concept of dysfunction itself contains prescriptive meaning. Moreover, 
philosophers who hold that the term “dysfunction” is evaluative can be divided, like those 
who believe the term “mental disorder” to be evaluative, into those that hold 
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“dysfunction” to be relatively constrained or unconstrained by specific descriptive 
content.  
Sedgwick (1981), for example, holds that the concept of “disease” is relatively 
unconstrained by specific descriptive content; his analysis, however, can easily be 
extended to the notion of “dysfunction”. For Sedgwick, to say that something is a disease 
is to say merely that it is an undesirable biological condition: “Outside the significances 
that man voluntarily attaches to certain conditions, there are no illnesses or diseases in 
nature” (Ibid., 121). Presumably, if one were to extend his analysis to the concept of 
dysfunction, Sedgwick would hold that the term “biological dysfunction” merely refers to 
a biological condition that the speaker deems undesirable to have. Consequently, to 
append the notion of “dysfunction” to the notion of a “biological” condition does not 
amplify the descriptive content of the latter. Hence it would be relatively unconstrained 
by specific descriptive content. This view, of course, would obviously undermine the 
point of invoking the notion of a biological dysfunction to justify the ascription of a 
mental disorder: to say that a disorder is a “harmful dysfunction” would just be to say that 
it is harmful and that it represents a condition that is undesirable to have. Similarly, 
Moore (1978, 103) seems to hold that a person’s conception of “functional organization” 
is structured around his or her conception of well-being and thus that there is no value-
neutral fact about what constitutes the proper functioning of a trait (also see Toulman 
[1975, 60-62]; Engelhardt [1976, 133-4], and Erde [1979, 44] who hold similar views).  
Others hold that “function” and “dysfunction” are evaluative terms that are 
relatively constrained by specific descriptive content. An example of a person who holds 
this position on the concept of function is McLaughlin (2001) (although Bedau [1991, 
1993] may be interpreted as holding a similar position; also see Megone [2000]).41 Like 
 
41 In the philosophy of psychiatry, one of the most prominent advocates of the view that “function” is 
evaluative is Fulford (1989, 1999, 2000). However, Fulford’s view will not be elaborated here because he 
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Wakefield, McLaughlin believes that in order for a biological trait to have a function, it 
must have historically contributed to its own persistence or reproduction. Thus, 
“function” has some descriptive meaning. However this is not sufficient: its activity must 
also be judged to “benefit” the organism in question (Ibid., 191). To judge that an 
organism “benefits” from the activity of a trait is to judge that the organism, unlike a 
simple autocatalytic reaction that perpetuates itself across time, is the sort of thing that 
can have a “good”. Hence to say that the function of the heart is to beat is to say the 
heart’s beating benefits the individual that possesses it and that it has contributed to the 
reproduction of the organism precisely because it has so benefited the organism. In other 
words, according to this view, “function” contains prescriptive as well as descriptive 
meaning, because to say that performance of the function is beneficial to the organism is 
to imply that it serves as a means to an end that the speaker considers good, i.e., survival 
or reproduction. 
A critical point that is often ignored in the debates concerning whether “function” 
is an evaluative term is that there are several different concepts of “biological function” 
in circulation in biology. At times, “function” simply means something along the lines of 
“characteristic activity of a structure” (e.g., Bock and von Wahlert [1965]). In this sense, 
both “circulating blood” as well as “producing oscillations in air pressure that can be 
detected through a stethoscope” can be referred to as functions of the heart. It is plausible 
this liberal construal of “function” is purely descriptive. However, it is also plausible that 
this notion of function is not strong enough to explicate the sense in which pumping 
blood is the “proper function” of the heart and making beating sounds is not (e.g., that the 
latter represents an “accidental by-product” of the heart’s proper functioning). Similarly, 
 
does not offer any particular analysis of the notion of “function”; rather, he argues that close attention to the 
analogy between artifact “functions” and biological “functions” reveals that any particular explication of 
“function” that introduces normativity into the biological realm must have prescriptive meaning.  
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it does not seem to provide any explication of the locution that the heart can 
“malfunction” when it does not pump blood. As described at the beginning of this 
chapter, one prominent notion of “function” is normative: the statement “the function of 
X is Y” does not describe the current activity or disposition of X; rather it says of X that it 
is “supposed to” do Y, or that the purpose of X is to do Y, and that it is malfunctioning 
(e.g., functioning poorly) otherwise. (Often the “litmus test” for whether or not a concept 
of function is normative is whether it supports the inference that a part can 
“malfunction”.) Hence, the debate about the evaluative content of the term “biological 
function” can be made more precise by saying that, according to the evaluativist position, 
any notion of function that is normative must possess prescriptive meaning (in that the 
speaker must commend the functional activity, or believe that the outcome of such 
activity is good – e.g., survival), and that this prescriptive meaning explains its 
normativity. The descriptivist position is that the normative content of function 
statements does not entail that the term contains prescriptive meaning; that is, the truth of 
the judgement that a part is “functioning properly” or “malfunctioning” contains no 
implicit reference to the values of the person who so judges.  
 Having provided an overview of the current framework for the debates on the 
value-ladenness of psychiatric classification, the thesis of this dissertation and the 
argumentative strategy it employs can be placed in relation to them. Although it does not 
offer or defend any particular analysis of the concept of mental disorder, it will adopt, as 
a working definition, an explication that is consistent with the biological perspective in 
psychiatry; namely, that “mental disorder” is an evaluative term that refers to a failure of 
social-role functioning caused by an internal dysfunction on the part of the individual 
(see Section 2.2). Insofar as the notion of failure of social-role functioning contains 
prescriptive meaning, then the definition adopted here implies that the term “mental 
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disorder” is evaluative. However, the dissertation will provide and defend an explication 
of “biological function”. According to the explication that will be proposed here, the 
concept of function is a descriptive one, and it is also normative. It is descriptive in that 
to say that, “the function of X is Y”, does not necessarily impute to the speaker any 
particular attitude about X’s doing Y or its outcome. It is normative in that to say that, 
“the function of X is Y”, is to say that X is supposed to do Y and that X is capable of 
malfunctioning. Accordingly, the definition of “mental disorder” that is adopted here 
implies that it is an evaluative term that is relatively constrained by descriptive content.  
 To the extent that this dissertation defends an explication of the concept of 
function according to which the concept of function (dysfunction) is descriptive, it is in 
basic agreement with Wakefield’s view. However, the use to which the concept of 
function will be put departs significantly from the analytically-oriented framework of the 
debates, for it will concern two questions that have scarcely been asked in the literature:  
 
(i) given an explication of the notion of a biological function, how can biological 
functions, or dysfunctions, be empirically identified? Providing a definition is not 
sufficient to resolve any substantive issues if the definition does not lend itself to 
the construction of appropriate empirical indices that warrant its application; and 
 
(ii) given the definition of “biological function” as well as the empirical indices 
for its warranted application, is there any reason to believe that those conditions 
that are commonly identified as mental disorders – and in particular, those that are 
standardly targeted by biologically-oriented researchers – in fact stem from 
biological dysfunctions on the part of the individual? Furthermore, is there any 
reason to believe that they soon will be shown to stem from biological 
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dysfunctions? The answer that the dissertation gives to both of these questions is 
that there is no reason to believe that these conditions stem from biological 
dysfunctions, or that they will soon be shown to do so.   
 
 As a consequence, although the dissertation attempts to avoid some of the 
conceptual issues concerning the precise explication of “mental disorder”, it does have an 
important bearing on the debates. First, if “mental disorder” is explicated in such a way 
that it necessarily refers to an internal dysfunction on the part of the individual, then there 
are few, if any, mental disorders. Hence, supposing that there are mental disorders, such 
an analysis does not constitute a good explication of the term. To the extent that pursuing 
the correct analysis of “mental disorder” is a worthwhile task, then those who pursue this 
task ought to seek out a different basis for explicating the concept – for example, via a 
psychological, phenomenological, moral, social, or legal analysis. In short, then, the 
conclusion that the dissertation draws is in basic agreement with the view of, e.g., Fulford 
(1994) and Sadler (1999), both of whom argue that the notion of “dysfunction” is of 
limited value in explicating the normative dimensions of mental disorder ascriptions and 
of limited relevance to the practical demands of mental disorder classification and 
diagnosis. 
1.4 ARGUMENT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The next three paragraphs provide a short overview of the argument of the 
dissertation. The remainder of the section will provide a more detailed description of that 
argument. 
The argument will begin by assuming that there is a notion of “biological 
function” that is appropriate to the context of psychiatry, and that once this concept of 
biological function is understood, then the “biological dysfunction” position – that the 
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origin and justification of the standards or norms of appropriateness that are appealed to 
in psychiatric categories are explicable purely on the basis of biological considerations – 
will be given a precise formulation. On the basis of this formulation, a clarification of the 
nature of the evidence that would have to be marshaled in order to warrant its application 
in any given case can be provided. Thus the concept of biological function that will be 
proposed will allow the question of the origin and justification of the norms and standards 
of appropriateness appealed to in psychiatric research to be rendered amenable to 
empirical research, rather than exclusively to conceptual analysis.  
This notion of biological function will then be used as a framework primarily for 
interpreting experimental work on the biological basis of schizophrenia. It will show that 
the current evidence and hypotheses concerning the biological basis of schizophrenia fail 
to show that it results from a biological dysfunction on the part of the individual, though 
it may have one or several biological causes. The reason that the dissertation specifically 
focuses on schizophrenia is that the heterogeneous set of conditions that fall under that 
category are paradigms of lay or colloquial usage of “mental disorder” itself, or its more 
pejorative associations: “madness”, “insanity”, and “craziness” (e.g., see Smith [1982, 
13]; Heinrichs [2001, 3]). This implies that the norms of appropriateness appealed to in 
what is currently considered to be a central target of biologically-oriented research in 
psychiatry, as well as a paradigm case of “mental disorder”, do not currently have 
biological justification.  
But the sorts of considerations relevant to establishing that schizophrenia does not 
necessarily stem from a biological dysfunction are equally applicable to biological 
research associated with other mental disorders, such as bipolar disorder or antisocial 
personality disorder. The problem is that psychiatrists too often assume that just because 
a mental disorder is associated with some biological abnormality, then it must result from 
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a biological dysfunction. Since a careful evaluation of some of the biological 
abnormalities associated with schizophrenia shows that this is not necessarily the case, it 
raises a legitimate question: why should it be the case for the other major mental 
disorders?  Although the dissertation leaves open the possibility that schizophrenia – and 
other mental disorders – may stem from biological dysfunctions, it also shows that there 
is little warrant for this claim. 
The remainder of this section will provide a more detailed account of the 
argument. The argument will begin by analyzing the concept of biological function. It 
will be argued that there are two conditions of adequacy on any explication of the 
concept of biological function that is appropriate to the psychiatric context. The first is 
that it should lend itself to the explication of a corresponding notion of “dysfunction”. To 
say of a biological entity, however, that it is “dysfunctional” is to apply a standard or 
norm for evaluating its activity. Thus, in accordance with the “biological dysfunction” 
position, the origin and justification of this standard must be explicated without 
presupposing unanalyzed norms concerning the “inappropriateness” of the psychological 
or behavioral conditions that the biological entity produces. The second is that whether or 
not an item, X, is dysfunctional should not be determined on purely externalist grounds – 
that is, exclusively by changes in the environment that have no effect upon the 
characteristic structure or activity of X.  
 It will then be argued that any concept of biological function that is that is 
appropriate for the psychiatric context – that is, any notion of function that can fulfill 
both adequacy conditions – must be an etiological one. More specifically, the conditions 
for establishing the claim that “biological item X is dysfunctional because it is not 
performing activity A” must make some reference to X’s (or objects of the same type as 
X) selection history, that is, its actual past history of performing A, where this past history 
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of performing A is partly responsible for the fact that X has been selected for and thereby 
has been maintained in a population to the present day.  A simple example is the 
following: one of the truth conditions for the claim that “the heart is dysfunctional 
because it is no longer circulating blood”, is the fact that one of the reasons that hearts 
have persisted to the present day is that they circulated blood in the past, that this activity 
partly explains why hearts were selected for by natural selection, which, in turn, partly 
explains why most organisms today have hearts. 
However, it will be pointed out that etiological theories of function, as they are 
conventionally articulated, suffer from a significant empirical problem, which is that 
many explications of the concept of biological function assume, either as a matter of 
definition or of empirical fact, that natural selection operating over an evolutionary time 
frame is the only type of “selection process” that there is. The problem that this raises is 
that we often have little or no knowledge about the evolutionary history of the 
psychological mechanisms investigated by psychiatry – despite the speculative claims of 
“evolutionary psychiatry” or “evolutionary psychology” – or even of the evolutionary 
history of their neurobiological correlates.42 This suggests that, in the context of 
psychiatry, the locution that a given part of the brain is “functioning properly”, or 
“malfunctioning”, is not empirically warrantable on the basis of the methods currently 
available to the natural scientist, and must therefore rely on norms of appropriateness that 
are not biologically justified.  
The empirical problem of function ascriptions will be resolved by generalizing the 
notion of a “selection process” embodied in the etiological theory of functions beyond 
natural selection operating at the level of the individual. For example, immunological 
 
42 Thus the dissertation will contain an implicit critique of current “evolutionary psychology” (see e.g., 
Buss [1999]) as well as what refers to itself as “evolutionary psychiatry” (see, e.g., Nesse [1999]; Stevens 
and Price [2000]).   
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selection processes, as well as synaptic selection processes, are two selection processes 
that operate below the level of the individual, and their operation is, in principle, 
empirically discernable by the methods currently available to the natural scientist. 
According to synaptic selectionism, the formation of synaptic structures involves a 
(potentially iterative) competitive process in which, after an initially (partly) random 
proliferation of new synapses, those that are activated are retained and those that are not 
are eliminated. The connection between synaptic selection and natural selection was 
originally proposed by Wilhelm Roux in 1881 (Jacobson [1991, 231]) and has been 
advanced more recently by Jerne (1967), Changeux and Danchin (1976), and Edelman 
(1987), as an alternative to “chemotaxic” theories of synaptic formation, according to 
which pre-existing chemical markers guide the process of axonal growth toward specific 
terminals in the absence of selective activity, and “constructivist” theories, according to 
which synaptic growth is stimulated in a non-selectionist manner by neural activity. To 
the extent that synaptic structure formation can be adequately modeled as a selection 
process then it should be recognized as a function-bestowing process. Moreover, to the 
extent that synaptic selection processes are implicated in mediating specifically 
“psychological” activities such as learning, then this provides a biological reason to 
consider experience as a process capable of bestowing new functions onto biological 
entities. In this way, the array of empirical material that is relevant to establishing claims 
about the biological function of an entity will be extended to include evidence that is in 
principle empirically discernable given existing methods employed in the natural 
sciences.    
Once equipped with a theory of biological function that can specify precisely the 
conditions under which an entity can be dysfunctional, the theory will be applied to 
current research on the biological basis of schizophrenia. It will look at two approaches to 
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schizophrenia in particular – a neurochemical approach and a neurodevelopmental 
approach. It will show that the nature of the neurochemical or neurodevelopmental 
abnormalities that may be associated with schizophrenia do not necessarily imply that it 
stems from a biological dysfunction. It could be that the specific neurobiological 
abnormalities associated with schizophrenia represent a brain that is unable to perform its 
proper function because of abnormal environmental circumstances, or, a brain that is 
functioning normally. Because of the fact that the sorts of considerations that were 
relevant for establishing this conclusion are applicable more generally to biological 
research on mental disorders, then the conclusion should be generalizable. The problem, 
as stated above, is that many psychiatrists simply assume that just because there are 
biological abnormalities associated with mental disorders, that means that they are caused 
by biological dysfunctions. Once this assumption is removed, then there is little warrant 
for claiming that mental disorders are, in fact, caused by biological dysfunctions – 
although the possibility remains that they may be.  
1.5 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
After the introduction (Chapter 1), the purpose of the Chapter 2 is to motivate the 
analysis of the concept of biological function that will occupy Chapters 3 and 4. It will 
describe the historical context that prompted psychiatrists in the 1970s and 1980s to 
critically evaluate the concept of mental disorder and to analyze it in terms of an “internal 
dysfunction”. On this basis it will impose two criteria of adequacy upon the explication 
of any such notion in the psychiatric context.  It will also argue that attempts to analyze 
“mental disorder” along these lines by psychiatrists in the 1970s largely failed to identify 
precisely the nature of the evidence that warrants the ascription of a “dysfunction” to an 
inner state of a person diagnosed as having a mental disorder. The reason for this failure 
is that the concepts of  “function” and “dysfunction” were not adequately defined.  
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Chapter 3 turns to a broad spectrum of current philosophical analyses of 
“biological function” and provides an introduction and overview to that literature. It will 
argue that etiological theories of function are both necessary and sufficient for satisfying 
the two adequacy criteria. 
Chapter 4 will endorse a specific version of the etiological theory as particularly 
appropriate for the psychiatric context. It will argue that the appropriate etiological theory 
should refer to the operation of natural selection, but it will point out that selection 
processes do not only operate over an evolutionary time scale. They also operate over the 
lifetime of the individual. For example, synaptic structures in the brain undergo a type of 
“natural selection”, and because of that, they can have functions, even if they do not 
undergo natural selection in the evolutionary sense. This allows one to provide detailed, 
empirical criteria for deciding whether or not a given synaptic structure has a biological 
function, or whether it is dysfunctional.  
Chapter 5 will argue that current biological evidence concerning the etiology of 
schizophrenia (according to neurochemical and neurodevelopmental models) fails to 
show that it results from a biological dysfunction on the part of the brain (though it may 
have a biological cause). It will conclude the dissertation by suggesting that psychiatric 
disorders in general should not be conceptualized as stemming from biological 
dysfunctions on the part of the brain unless there is specific evidence for this conclusion 
other than the existence of biological abnormalities. Chapter 6 will provide a brief 
discussion of the bearing that this conclusion has for how mental disorders are 
conceptualized, both for the psychiatric practitioner as well as the layperson.  
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Chapter 2: From Mental Disorders to Internal Dysfunctions   
The purpose of this chapter is to motivate the explication of the notion of an 
internal “function” and “dysfunction” – that is, to show why it is important for these 
terms to be defined in the psychiatric context. The first section will provide the historical 
context for the interest taken by American psychiatrists in the 1970s in formally defining 
the concept of mental disorder (Section 2.1). In the 1970s, the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) was beset by two crises concerning its identity as a scientific and 
therapeutic discipline. Both of these crises were clearly exhibited in a series of debates 
that took place within the APA on the psychiatric status of homosexuality (Section 2.1.1). 
As a response to these crises, many psychiatrists came to believe that a definition of 
“mental disorder” would provide a principled set of criteria on the basis of which such 
debates could be rationally resolved. More generally, they believed that such a definition 
would allow mental disorders to be clearly distinguished from socially-disvalued 
psychological or behavioral conditions. In accordance with the medical orientation of 
psychiatry, many psychiatrists attempted to define “mental disorder” partly in terms of an 
“internal dysfunction” on the part of the individual (Section 2.1.2). For example, “mental 
disorder” could be defined, as it is in DSM-III (APA [1980]) and later editions, as a 
psychological or behavioral syndrome that is caused by an internal dysfunction and that 
produces negative consequences for the person who has it. This definition, then, prompts 
the question of what, precisely, an internal “dysfunction” consists of.  
Section 2.2 will provide a philosophical critique of the characterization of “mental 
disorder” that appears in the DSM-III and later editions (Section 2.2.1). It argues that, in 
the absence of any explicit definition of “internal dysfunction”, one has no way of 
assessing whether the definition of “mental disorder” offered can successfully fulfill its 
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purpose of differentiating mental disorders proper from any negatively-valued 
psychological and behavioral condition (Section 2.2.2). This is why it is important to 
define the term. It then identifies two criteria of adequacy that any definition of  
“function” should satisfy if it is to perform the role of delimiting mental disorders from 
other conditions that do not fall under the purview of psychiatry.  
Section 2.3 will examine three different attempts made by psychiatrists to define a 
notion of “dysfunction”: the “biological disadvantage” definition (Section 2.3.1); the 
“operational” definition (Section 2.3.2); and the “evolutionary definition” (Section 2.3.3). 
It argues that the first two definitions fail to satisfy the adequacy criteria, and that 
although the third one does, in principle, satisfy those criteria, its formulation does not 
lend itself to the construction of appropriate empirical indices to warrant its application in 
any given case. Nonetheless, this shortcoming will be rectified in later chapters. This 
critique sets the stage for Chapter 3, which provides a more refined classification and 
analysis of different definitions of “function” and “dysfunction”. 
2.1 HISTORICAL MOTIVATION FOR DEFINING “MENTAL DISORDER” 
This section will describe the historical context of American psychiatry in the 
1970s and the crises of professional identity that it faced. It will explain how and why 
many psychiatrists came to believe that an explicit working definition of “mental 
disorder” would help to resolve those crises. In particular, these crises led to the belief 
that “mental disorder” should be defined partly in terms of an internal dysfunction on the 
part of the individual, where the notion of internal dysfunction was intended to signify a 
non-relational property of a person’s psychological, behavioral, or biological condition 
that is conceptually independent of the undesirable consequences it produces, and that 
falls within the domain of medicine. “Mental disorder” could then be defined in terms of 
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an internal dysfunction that, in turn, produces negative consequences for the person who 
has it.  
These crises of professional identity were amplified by the fact that, 
sociologically, the APA was at a critical juncture with respect to the clinical and 
therapeutic orientation of the psychiatrists that constituted its membership, as well as its 
fundamental approach to mental disorder classification and diagnosis. On the one hand, 
the primarily psychodynamic orientation of the APA constituency was beginning to yield 
to a more biologically and behaviorally oriented constituency (see below). On the other 
hand, the then-most-recent edition of the APA’s official diagnostic manual, DSM-II 
(APA [1968]), was undergoing a substantial reconfiguration in form and content that 
would eventually culminate in the publication of DSM-III (APA [1980]). (See Section 
2.1.2, under “The Charge to Define ‘Mental Disorder’”.) These two transformations are 
not independent of one another, for the APA task force responsible for preparing the 
DSM-III was composed primarily of research psychiatrists with a strong biological or 
behavioral orientation. Consequently, the form and content of the DSM-III reflects this 
orientation in that it introduces explicit and precise membership criteria for each mental 
disorder category and, to the extent possible, these criteria are based on observable 
variables (or at least on those variables that could be easily gleaned from a brief 
psychiatric consultation). These criteria were introduced to replace the sorts of diagnostic 
descriptions found in DSM-II, many of which were couched in the jargon of specific 
psychodynamic etiological hypotheses. Thus the transition from DSM-II to DSM-III 
reflects the broader shift in the professional orientation of the APA. 
2.1.1 Two Crises of American Psychiatry 
Psychiatry is often said to have undergone two crises in the 1970s, an external 
crisis and an internal one. The first is the crisis of legitimation (Moore [1978, 90]; Wilson 
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[1993, 404]). In the heyday of antipsychiatry, psychiatry was often depicted as having the 
tacit function of regulating social deviance under the pretense of being a “medical” 
establishment (see Section 1.2 and references therein on the antipsychiatry tradition). 
This placed its legitimacy as a scientific and therapeutic enterprise into question. Many of 
the challenges to this legitimacy stemmed from the widely shared belief that psychiatry 
possessed no objective and principled basis for distinguishing between disorders and non-
disorders. In the absence of such standards, it was charged, social and political power 
invested in psychiatry could easily lend itself to oppressive ends (Wilson [1993, 404], 
Dain [1994, 430]). Commercially successful films such as One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest, replete with harrowing images of electroconvulsive therapy and the effects of 
lobotomy, served to reinforce this association between psychiatry and violent social 
repression amongst the public in general (Shorter [1997, 275]). Hence the legitimation 
crisis was “external” in that it involved the public and academic perception of psychiatry 
(and of the mental health professions more generally) as having only a dubious 
entitlement to the social and legal authority that it in fact possessed. 
The second crisis concerned the disciplinary position of psychiatry with respect to 
the other mental health professions, and in particular, with respect to clinical psychology. 
Specifically, it concerned the question of how psychiatry should distinguish itself from 
the other mental health professions, both in terms of its object and method.43 Throughout 
 
43 Moore (1978, 87) refers to this as a “jurisdictional” concern; also see Blashfield (1984, 65) on the 
problem of the “professional jurisdiction” of psychiatry. However, phrasing the problem as a 
“jurisdictional” concern is misleading since it suggests that psychiatrists were exclusively concerned with 
defining their special object of treatment and distinguishing it from those treated by clinical psychologists, 
e.g., to claim jurisdiction over the “psychotic” rather than “neurotic” disorders. Most psychiatrists would 
probably agree that what distinguishes psychiatry from clinical psychology is not a different object of 
treatment – since, after all, both are concerned with the treatment of mental disorders. Rather, it consists of 
a different method of treatment – e.g., psychiatrists use those methods that require a medical degree to 
employ successfully. Hence, in the following, the more unwieldy expression, “crisis of disciplinary 
position”, will be used, rather than “crisis of professional jurisdiction”, because the former is broader than 
the latter insofar as it suggests that the problem concerns where psychiatry “fits” into the system of 
theoretical and practical scientific disciplines. 
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the 1970s, the APA was beset by significant internal tension, which can be explained 
partly in terms of its practitioners’ competing conceptions of what sort of discipline 
psychiatry is. In particular, these competing conceptions often placed 
psychodynamically-oriented practitioners in opposition to non-psychodynamically-
oriented (e.g., behaviorally and biologically oriented) practitioners regarding specific 
APA proposals. For example, these differences were reflected in a heated dispute 
concerning the proposal to remove the word “neurosis” from the DSM-III, which was 
slated for publication in 1980. Those behaviorally and biologically oriented psychiatrists 
who opted for its removal argued that the use of “neuroses” to identify a diagnostic class 
involves a commitment to questionable psychodynamic etiological theories and that this 
commitment runs counter to the atheoretical and descriptive spirit of the DSM-III; 
whereas those psychoanalysts who defended its retention believed that the validity of 
those etiological hypotheses had been proven beyond doubt by decades of clinical 
experience (Bayer and Spitzer [1985]). 
This tension was not only internal to the APA. Much more generally, American 
psychiatry (as represented by the APA) as a whole stood in a certain tension with the 
field of psychology (as represented by the American Psychological Association) 
concerning their disciplinary boundaries and areas of relative expertise. By the late 
1970s, clinical psychologists were routinely accusing psychiatrists of illegitimately 
encroaching upon their area of professional expertise by “medicalizing” fairly common 
sources of psychological malaise that one could adequately resolve without having a 
medical degree (e.g., Schacht and Nathan [1977]; Garmezy [1978]; McReynolds [1979]). 
Hence the problem of the disciplinary position of psychiatry constituted a crisis that was 
internal to the mental health professions as a whole in that it involved an attempt to reach 
a consensus amongst psychiatrists of different therapeutic orientations, and more 
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generally, amongst psychiatrists and other mental health practitioners, concerning the 
nature of the conditions that psychiatry has the special responsibility to treat, and the 
methods with which it is especially equipped to treat them. The need for psychiatrists to 
define their area of professional responsibility was particularly pronounced because it 
coincided with the nearly decade-long process of drafting the DSM-III, which was widely 
understood to constitute an “official position statement” of the APA concerning the 
nature of mental disorders.  
On the surface, the two crises are related in the following sense: one plausible 
solution to the legitimation crisis would be to specify explicitly a principled and objective 
set of criteria for delimiting disordered from non-disordered psychological or behavioral 
conditions. For all intents and purposes, this would be tantamount to providing a 
definition of “mental disorder”. One could potentially use such a definition to delimit the 
specific domain of psychiatry and thereby establish the disciplinary position of psychiatry 
within the mental health professions. In other words, one could define “psychiatry” as 
that discipline that has the goal of treating the conditions specified by the definition of 
“mental disorder”. This is, in fact, what politically prominent members of the APA 
attempted to do. The problem with this strategy, of course, is that mental disorders do not 
constitute the exclusive domain of psychiatry. Consequently, even if a consensus were to 
be achieved amongst psychiatrists concerning an appropriate working definition of 
“mental disorder”, such a definition would almost inevitably embody the limitations of 
the way in which psychiatrists tend to conceptualize the object of their field, and for that 
reason would not find general acceptance amongst mental health professionals. This, as 
will be seen, is primarily why the attempt to reach consensus on a definition of “mental 
disorder” did not come to fruition.  
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The debates that erupted in the early 1970s within the APA on the psychiatric 
status of homosexuality clearly exemplify both of these crises. They exemplify the 
legitimation crisis insofar as labeling homosexuality a mental disorder was seen by many 
people as uncomfortably occupying the borderline between science and ideology. They 
exemplify the crisis of disciplinary position insofar as they forced psychiatrists of 
different persuasions to attempt to articulate the concept of mental disorder itself and 
thereby to articulate their contrasting perspectives on the very nature of psychiatry and its 
mission. Hence, the next two subsections will discuss how these two crises manifested 
themselves in the debates on homosexuality and how the debates, in turn, stimulated the 
attempt to provide a rigorous definition of “mental disorder”.  
Homosexuality and the Legitimation Crisis 
The debate within the APA that lasted throughout the 1970s on the psychiatric 
status of homosexuality became the primary symbol of the legitimation crisis, since it 
was easy, although simplistic, to reconstruct the debate as one that opposed psychiatrists 
who were intolerant of difference in sexual orientation (and thereby sought to extend the 
concept of mental disorder to include homosexuality), on the one hand, and gay rights 
activists who sought liberation from the stigmatizing and ideological burden of being 
thought “diseased”, on the other (e.g., see Gold’s contribution to Stoller et al. [1973]).44 
This ongoing debate, moreover, was widely reported in major newspapers given the 
publicity that gay rights activists brought to their cause. Starting in 1970, activists staged 
protests at annual APA conferences and disrupted presentations by psychoanalysts such 
as Charles Socarides and Irving Bieber who strongly advocated the view that 
homosexuality represents the outcome of a pathological form of sexual development 
 
44 Stoller et al. collects a large number of position statements by different psychiatrists and other interested 
parties on the psychiatric status of homosexuality; therefore most of the references will be to that 
collection.  
 56
(Kirk and Kutchins [1992, 82]).  Thus, insofar as the troubling DSM-II (APA [1968]) 
classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder could be held to represent a broad 
consensus amongst psychiatrists, psychiatry appeared to have positioned itself on the 
wrong side of a socially progressive cause.  
The debates on homosexuality, however, were not the only instance in which the 
legitimation crisis publicly came to the fore. Several studies undertaken in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s had the consequence of undermining the public and professional 
confidence in the profession’s ability to identify objectively persons with mental 
disorders. In particular, they suggested that the label of “schizophrenia” had become so 
widely deployed in the United States as to become empty of meaning, and this gave rise 
to the view that such labeling was governed by the arbitrary and subjective whim of its 
individual practitioners. One of these studies in diagnostic reliability (Katz et al. [1969]), 
for example, analyzed differences in diagnostic practices between American and British 
psychiatrists. The researchers presented a filmed psychiatric interview to an audience of 
42 American and 32 British psychiatrists, in which a young woman evinced anxiety and 
depression, and complained of frustration relating to the quality of her career and her 
interpersonal relationships. In response, one third of the American psychiatrists submitted 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia, although none of the British psychiatrists did the same. 
Motivated by such results, a group of researchers initiated the US-UK Diagnostic 
Project (Cooper et al. [1972]; also see Kendell et al. [1971] for a brief overview of 
methods and results) to evaluate systematically such diagnostic differences by comparing 
hospital admission rates as well as through videotape studies of the sort described above. 
According to its authors, the results indicate that:  
 
[T]he concept of schizophrenia held by psychiatrists in the New York area is 
much broader than that held by London psychiatrists and embraces substantial 
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parts of what the latter would regard as depressive illness, neurotic illness or 
personality disorder, and almost the whole of what would be regarded in London 
as mania (Ibid., 124). 
 
At least one of the authors concludes from these results that: 
 
[T]he New York concept of schizophrenia is not a useful one and it likely to 
inhibit fruitful research if it is widely adopted. We say this largely because the 
concept has, through the accretion of subsidiary concepts like schizo-affective 
schizophrenia and pseudoneurotic schizophrenia…become so all-embracing that 
it is close to becoming a synonym for functional mental illness, a sort of 
twentieth-century reincarnation of Zeller’s Einheitspsychose (Ibid., 125). 
 
Interestingly, the most well-known and provocative study that suggested that the 
American concept of schizophrenia was deployed in a haphazard and arbitrary manner 
was much simpler than the US-UK research study. It was conducted by David L. 
Rosenhan, a sociologist, and published in Science in 1973 (Rosenhan [1973]). His 
experiment involved eight normal volunteers who sought psychiatric consultation at 
different times with twelve different hospitals across the US. They falsely reported a 
single symptom: being disturbed by a voice that often repeated a certain phrase, such as 
“dull”, “thud”, or “empty”. They were admitted as patients by eleven of the twelve 
hospitals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (the twelfth admitted one with a diagnosis of 
manic-depressive disorder), and, once admitted, the volunteers no longer made any 
complaints about their putative condition. The volunteers were retained on in-patient 
status from seven to 52 days (the average length of stay being 19 days), and those who 
had been diagnosed with schizophrenia were eventually released with a diagnosis of 
“schizophrenia in remission”.   
The purpose of this research was to show, as Rosenhan provocatively stated it, 
that “we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane in psychiatric hospitals” (Rosenhan 
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[1973, 257]). Rosenhan believed that if psychiatrists could reliably distinguish the “sane” 
from the “insane” then the pseudo-patients would not have been diagnosed as having a 
mental disorder, even if they were to have gained provisional admission.45 Despite its 
methodological shortcomings and rhetorical excesses (see Spitzer [1975]; Millon [1975] 
for criticism of Rosenhan’s study; see Rosenhan [1975] for a reply), the prominence of 
the journal in which the study was published ensured its rapid dissemination amongst the 
educated public. 
Homosexuality and the Crisis of Psychiatry’s Disciplinary Position 
The debates on homosexuality, however, do not merely function as a prominent 
symbol of the legitimation crisis. More importantly, the debates stand as an equally 
salient symbol of the crisis of psychiatry’s disciplinary position, because it forced 
psychiatrists to bring their competing conceptions of what mental disorders are to the 
surface, and to engage explicitly in the attempt to clarify the boundaries of the 
pathological – and, by implication, the nature of the conditions that they have the 
professional responsibility and competence to treat. This can most clearly be seen in the 
various and often incommensurable criteria that were offered by different psychiatrists at 
the time to justify the inclusion, or exclusion, of homosexuality as a distinct diagnostic 
category. 
The difficulty of contriving a principled and explicit set of criteria on the basis of 
which the diagnostic status of homosexuality could be determined is evident from a 
symposium held on the subject at the annual APA conference of May 1973. The 
 
45 Although Rosenhan (1973, 252) acknowledges that such errors of commission (a “false positive” or 
type-II error) are prevalent throughout medicine in general, he argues that the stigma associated with 
mental disorder labeling imposes a responsibility upon psychiatrists to exert finer discrimination in 
diagnosis than their medical counterparts. Thus the issue Rosenhan raises is not so much about diagnostic 
reliability or validity – since after all, the pseudo-patients were recognized, within a relatively short period 
of time, as being symptom-free (Spitzer [1975]) – but rather about the merits of labeling. 
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symposium was organized by Robert Spitzer not only as a response to the highly-
publicized protests that had dogged the conventions for the previous three years, but also 
in response to the growing opposition within the APA itself against the specific labeling 
of homosexuality as a mental disorder. 
 
Participants Reject or Retain Classification Etiological component of definition 
Robert J. Stoller, M.D. Reject Etiological 
Judd Marmor, M.D. Reject Unspecified 
Irving Bieber, M.D. Retain Etiological 
Ronald Gold Reject Unspecified 
Charles W. Socarides, M.D. Retain Etiological 
Richard Green, M.D. Reject Consequentialist 
Robert L. Spitzer, M.D. Reject Consequentialist 
 
Table 2.1:  Outline of positions on 1973 APA symposium on homosexuality. See 
accompanying text for details.  
With respect to the appropriate set of criteria on the basis of which the diagnostic 
status of any putative mental disorder should be evaluated, a significant difference of 
opinion amongst the participants concerned whether etiological considerations are 
relevant to establishing that something is a mental disorder, or only the consequences of 
the condition. In other words, are the details of the biological or psychodynamic process 
that gave rise to the patient’s condition relevant for deciding upon its psychiatric status? 
Or rather, does it suffice that the consequences of having the condition, for the afflicted 
person or his or her social group, are disturbing enough to warrant professional attention, 
regardless of its origin? Although the next four paragraphs will describe the content of 
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the debates, for the purpose of convenient reference, the following table (Table 2.1) 
provides a schematic outline that lists the participants, whether they retain or reject the 
classification, and whether or not etiological elements enter into their conception of 
“mental disorder” (or only consequentialist elements).  
About half of the participants assume that etiological considerations are relevant 
for establishing the acceptability of a diagnostic category. Stoller, for example, argues 
that “homosexuality” is not a legitimate diagnosis because it does not satisfy the formal 
criteria for diagnosis: the existence of a syndrome and a uniform etiology (Stoller et al. 
[1973, 1207]).  It is not a syndrome because there is only a single defining dominant 
feature (sexual preference) and empirical work suggests that there is no uniform 
etiological mechanism. Bieber, on the other hand, argues that the etiology of 
homosexuality is sufficiently uniform to warrant its inclusion. According to Bieber, 
something is a disorder if it involves deviation from a “biological program”. He argues 
for the retention of “homosexuality” on the grounds that humans are “biologically 
programmed for heterosexual development”, that the existence of this “program” is 
supported by empirical research on olfaction, and that this biologically programmed 
behavior is “dislocated” by early childhood pathological family dynamics (Ibid., 1210). 
Socarides also assumes that etiological considerations are relevant by arguing that 
something is a disorder if it represents deviation from a normal psycho-developmental 
trajectory. He argues for the retention of “homosexuality” by offering a psychodynamic 
theory that explains homosexuality as a failure to achieve full individuation from the 
mother in early infancy. He also claims that there are fairly successful treatments 
available for homosexuality, thus tacitly arguing that the existence of a treatment is a 
relevant criterion for inclusion (Ibid., 1212). 
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On the contrary, Green and Spitzer argue for the exclusion of “homosexuality” as 
a diagnostic entity on purely consequentialist grounds. Moreover, both explicitly argue 
that biological or psychodynamic etiology should be irrelevant to disorder classification. 
Green argues by stipulating a set of heuristics that should be employed in any decisions 
about classification. The strongest rationale for the inclusion of a putative disorder is that 
it evinces either “gross social dysfunction” or is associated with an inner emotional 
discord that “reduces the efficiency of behavioral functioning” (Ibid., 1213). Both criteria 
are indifferent to the mechanism by which the psychological condition is produced. He 
argues for the exclusion of “homosexuality” on the grounds that it is not intrinsically 
associated with either. He also argues on methodological grounds that psychodynamic 
theories of causation lend the weakest and most questionable support for the justification 
of disorder classification. 
Spitzer’s attempt to formulate a general definition of “mental disorder” formed 
the basis of his position on the diagnosis of homosexuality.  According to the purely 
consequentialist definition he proposes there, a mental disorder must “either regularly 
cause subjective distress or regularly be associated with some generalized impairment in 
social effectiveness or functioning” (Ibid., 1215). On this basis, he argues that 
homosexuality per se cannot be judged disordered because it is not always associated 
with subjective distress or impairment in social functioning. The irony of this position, 
though, is that if someone does exhibit great subjective distress concerning his or her 
homosexuality, then, according to the definition, the person qualifies as having a mental 
disorder – namely, that of experiencing subjective distress about his or her 
homosexuality. Hence Spitzer’s position was that reference to “homosexuality” should be 
dropped from the official nomenclature and replaced by “Sexual Orientation 
Disturbance”. The latter category should be applied exclusively to homosexuals who are 
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distressed about their homosexual orientation and who seek help in resolving that 
distress.46 One may ask, of course – as many psychiatrists did – why the distress that 
specifically concerns one’s sexual orientation should fall under a distinct diagnostic 
category, rather than a broader and already existing category such as an anxiety disorder 
or phobic disorder. One may also ask why it should not apply more generally to anybody 
that exhibits distress concerning his or her sexual orientation and not merely to 
homosexuals.47 One of the concerns shared by psychiatrists who opposed the original 
classification of homosexuality, such as Marmor and Green, was that the new diagnosis 
would simply reopen the threat of the psychiatric stigmatization of homosexuals. 
Despite the acrimoniousness of the debates, however, there was a single thread of 
agreement that ran throughout them, which is that psychiatry should not contribute to the 
oppression, either legal or ethical, against homosexuals. Thus the crisis of legitimation 
was of ongoing concern for all of the participants. For those psychiatrists opposed to the 
diagnosis, this question of legitimacy became a weapon with which they attempted to 
undermine their opponents’ arguments. Marmor, for example, raises this threat most 
forcefully by claiming that, “it is our task as psychiatrists to be healers of the distressed, 
not watchdogs of our social mores” (Ibid., 1209). Green, similarly, suggests that current 
classification reinforces “legal, religious, and other forms of social discrimination” (Ibid., 
1214). In response, Bieber and Socarides argue that psychiatry has always opposed the 
oppression or stigmatization of homosexuals, and has done so precisely by removing 
 
46 A second round of debates within the APA, which lasted from March 1977 through February 1978, 
concerned the precise content and formulation of the new category (which became “Ego-Dystonic 
Homosexuality” in the DSM-III [APA (1980, 281)]). Unlike the first round of debates, this one was 
carefully guarded from being publicized, and was enacted through a large amount of internal memos and 
letters. (See Bayer and Spitzer [1982] for selected correspondence during this period.) 
47 Both of these alternatives to recognizing a distinct category for homosexuals were proposed by Green 
and Marmor in heated correspondence with Spitzer (Bayer and Spitzer [1982, 36-7]). Spitzer held fast to 
his original proposal, which eventually succeeded – but only for a short time. The category of “Ego-
Dystonic Homosexuality”, which appeared in the DSM-III of 1980, was dropped from the revised edition 
of the DSM-III, the DSM-III-R of 1987 (APA [1987]). 
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homosexuality from the realm of sin (moral realm) or the realm of criminality (legal 
realm) to the realm of disorder (medical realm). According to Bieber, Freud was the first 
to recognize that homosexuality is “a disorder of psychosexual development rather than 
as sinful and antisocial” (Ibid., 1211). Socarides echoes this sentiment in calling for the 
abolishment of legal discrimination against homosexuals: “It is unthinkable that 
homosexuals be persecuted for something over which they have no choice” (Ibid., 1213). 
Such considerations should help to undermine the simplistic conception that those 
psychiatrists who were in favor of retaining the classification should be seen as willing 
agents of social repression. 
The APA Board of Trustees unanimously approved Spitzer’s proposal in 
December 1973, to much publicity (Kirk and Kutchins [1992, 85]), and homosexuality 
was deleted as an independent diagnostic category (and replaced by “Sexual Orientation 
Disturbance”) from subsequent printings of DSM-II.48 It was widely seen as an effective 
“compromise position”: it denies that homosexuality per se is a mental disorder, while at 
the same time it bestows a certain professional recognition and legitimacy upon those 
psychiatrists who wished to continue to offer therapy for distressed homosexuals, and 
who had, perhaps, made it into one of the cornerstones of their clinical practice. From the 
point of view of this chapter, what is important about Spitzer’s definition is that it 
provides a way of resolving, to some extent, the legitimation crisis by offering a 
principled, albeit rudimentary, set of criteria for accepting or rejecting certain proposed 
psychiatric conditions – they must be associated with distress or impairment in 
functioning. At the same time, it represents a fairly atheoretical perspective on “mental 
disorder”, and consequently, remains general enough to avoid interminable disagreement 
 
48 The struggle to delete “homosexuality” from the DSM-II was not completely over. In April of 1974, 
Socarides forced the Board of Trustees to submit their decision to a referendum of the APA membership; 
the APA voted by 58% to 37% to uphold the Board’s decision (Kirk and Kutchins [1992, 88]).   
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amongst psychiatrists of different theoretical persuasions, thus deferring the problem of 
the disciplinary position of psychiatry.49 On the basis of this achievement, Spitzer and 
other psychiatrists began the task of formulating a more precise and rigorous definition of 
“mental disorder” that could be used to help resolve other such disagreements as they 
arose.  
2.1.2 The Task of Formulating and Approving a Definition of “Mental Disorder” 
The 1973 debates directly motivated much of the later interest taken by members 
of the APA to explicitly define “mental disorder”, and to use the definition in such a way 
that disagreements about the psychiatric status of an condition can be rationally resolved 
(Spitzer and Endicott [1978, 15]; Spitzer [1981, 211]; Klein [1978, 41]; Moore [1978, 
87]). However, the task of formulating a definition of “mental disorder” (which had not 
been done in any official APA manual before 1980) had already been a concern of the 
Board of Trustees of the APA from the early part of 1973, prior to Spitzer’s contribution 
to the symposium on homosexuality. The following will provide a historical overview of 
the events that led to the explicit definition of “mental disorder” that appeared in the 
DSM-III of 1980 and later editions of the DSM. In short, the following events took place 
over a seven-year period: the APA task force responsible for drafting the DSM-III was 
charged with the task of formulating and publishing a definition of “mental disorder”; 
among other proposals, Robert Spitzer and Jean Endicott presented, at an APA 
conference, a controversial definition of “mental disorder” according to which mental 
 
49 This fragile consensus did not last for long, although the definition satisfied the original political 
motivation for which it was formulated. Spitzer, in fact, was able to get some additional political leverage 
out of the definition before he abandoned it in favor of a new formulation. He invoked the definition in a 
letter, dated December 29, 1975, to the Committee of Black Psychiatrists to argue that, as against their 
proposal, racism does not qualify as a mental disorder. He writes, “As you know, we are still struggling 
with the problem of defining what is a mental disorder. With our current working definition racism would 
not meet the criteria for a mental disorder since it is only in certain environments that it is associated with 
distress” (Ibid., 102).   
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disorders form a subset of medical disorders; the attempt to subsume mental to medical 
disorders prompted harsh criticism; consequently, the task force voted against the 
inclusion of such a definition in the DSM-III, although they approved a modified 
definition according to which mental disorders stem from “internal dysfunctions” on the 
part of the individual.  
Charge to Define “Mental Disorder” 
In March of 1973, Walter Barton, then chief executive of the APA, sent a memo 
to the chairman of the APA Council on Research and Development informing him of the 
Board’s instruction to appoint a task force to revise the DSM-II and prepare the DSM-III 
(Kirk and Kutchins [1992, 79]). In addition to recommending a more problem-oriented 
and quantitative diagnostic system, the memo also recommends, “the formation of a Task 
Force to Define Mental Illness and What Is a Psychiatrist”, and that this definition be 
used as a preamble to the DSM-III (Ibid., 80). 
In April 1974, the Committee for Research and Development reconstituted the 
Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics (which oversaw the development of the DSM-
III), and appointed Spitzer as its chair. Spitzer was, perhaps, an obvious candidate: he had 
already served as one of the core members of the DSM-II Task Force; he had written or 
coauthored several technical papers on diagnostic reliability; and his reputation for being 
politically astute was solidified due to the initiative he had taken to meet with gay rights 
protesters in 1972 and, on that basis, to organize the 1973 symposium by which the 
debates were, at least temporarily, resolved (Bayer and Spitzer [1985, 188]; [Wilson 
1993, 404]). 
As chair of the Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, Spitzer was able to 
select the core members of the new DSM-III Task Force, which consisted of five 
psychiatrists, two psychologists, and one biometrician (Millon [1986, 38]). The 
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psychiatrists of the Task Force were primarily research-oriented rather than clinically-
oriented, and all of them endorsed the use of “operational” or criterion-based definitions 
for specific disorders which became recognized as one of the primary innovations of the 
DSM-III.50 (See Section 2.3.2 on the philosophical significance of the use of operational 
definitions.) 
The Task Force worked rapidly on the preliminary draft of the DSM-III, which 
was presented to the APA in May of 1975 (Ibid., 40). During the same month, the DSM-
III Task Force also began to attempt a definition of “mental disorder” as per the 
recommendation of the Board of Trustees, and allowed any member of the Task Force to 
submit voluntarily his or her own proposal for approval (Ibid., 45). (The independent 
“Task Force to Define Mental Illness and What Is a Psychiatrist” recommended in 1973 
by the Board of Trustees never materialized.)  
Surprisingly, Spitzer at first did not volunteer the definition that he had attained so 
much political leverage from. This was due, at least in part, to inadequacies that he 
perceived in the original formulation and which he openly shared with other members of 
the APA in a memorandum dated May 28, 1976 (Bayer [1981, 169]). The major 
difficulty was not unrelated to the problem of contriving an adequate formulation of the 
diagnosis that was to replace “homosexuality”. The problem was that there are several 
diagnoses that fall under the sexual deviations (“Paraphilias” in the DSM-III [APA 
(1980, 266)]) that do not typically result in “subjective distress” or “generalized 
 
50 This group is often said to have constituted the core of an “invisible college” (Blashfield [1984, 43]; 
Kirk and Kutchins, [1992, 97]); that is, the members had already been in frequent professional contact with 
one another, they were primarily located at a small number of research universities, and they had co-
authored papers with one another or generously cited other members’ papers in their own work. (The term 
“invisible college” itself alludes to the Invisible College of London and Oxford, the predecessor to the 
Royal Society of London.) Klerman (1978, 105) later referred to this group as the “Neo Kraeplineans” after 
Emil Kraeplin, who had largely initiated and advocated the differentiation and systematic classification of 
mental disorders on the basis of careful clinical and longitudinal observations. The prototype of criteria-
based classification for mental disorders is Feighner et al. (1972). This prototype is developed and 
elaborated in Woodruff et al. (1974) and Spitzer et al. (1975).  
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impairment in social effectiveness or functioning”, such as fetishism, transvestism, and 
voyeurism. Nonetheless, unlike homosexuality, there was a large consensus within the 
APA, and the mental health profession generally, that these conditions are undoubtedly 
mental disorders, regardless of whether they happen to be “ego-syntonic” for their 
bearers and regardless of the level of social adjustment the person may evince (Bayer and 
Spitzer [1982, 33]; Bayer [1981, 169]). Consequently, Spitzer believed that his 
“subjective distress or generalized impairment” criterion was not a necessary condition 
for having a “mental disorder”, despite the fact that he presumably continued to believe it 
to be sufficient.  
When Spitzer eventually returned to the task of formulating a proper definition of 
“mental disorder” (see below), he attempted to circumvent this problem by introducing a 
new disjunct to the “distress or disability” clause, namely, the notion of an “inherent 
disadvantage” (Bayer [1981, 169]). Spitzer adopted the notion of “inherent disadvantage” 
from Kendell (1975b) whose concept of “biological disadvantage” will be described in 
Section 2.3.1. Briefly, according to Spitzer, a psychological condition places its bearer at 
an “inherent disadvantage” if it prohibits the person from satisfying “important 
psychological or biological needs” (that is, it is “disadvantageous”), and that it does so in 
almost every environment (that is, it is “inherent” to the condition rather than relative to a 
specific environment) (Spitzer [1981, 212]; see Spitzer and Endicott [1978, 19-23] for an 
extended discussion of this condition). One important such psychological need is served 
by the “ability to experience sexual pleasure in an interpersonal context” (Spitzer and 
Endicott [1978, 26]). Homosexuality, of course, is not prohibitive in this respect. 
However, many of the paraphilias, such as fetishism and zoophilia, are prohibitive in this 
respect, and “inherently” so – that is, they are prohibitive in almost every conceivable 
environment (Bayer [1981, 169]) to the extent that they do not involve other persons. 
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It hardly need be pointed out that this additional criterion leaves the selection of 
what constitutes an “important biological or psychological need” completely open to the 
interpretation of the individual psychiatrist (Bayer [1981, 169]; Spitzer and Endicott 
[1978, 32]). Spitzer emphasizes this point in a later paper (Spitzer [1981, 212]), in which 
he acknowledges that it constitutes a value judgement on the part of the psychiatrist that 
often cannot  be justified. He also notes that this sort of ad hoc theoretical maneuver gave 
rise to the suspicion among some psychiatrists that the whole project of contriving a 
definition of “mental disorder” would be irrelevant to actual decision–making protocols; 
instead, they believed, decisions would be made, “and then the definition tinkered with to 
justify them” (Spitzer [1978, 16]). 
The first member of the DSM-III Task Force to volunteer a position paper on the 
definition of “mental illness” was Donald Klein (Millon [1986, 44]). Although Klein’s 
initial draft is unpublished, it will be assumed that it is not substantially different from a 
version published in 1978 (Klein [1978]) in an anthology jointly edited by Klein and 
Spitzer. The concept of “illness” presented by Klein has two components. First, there 
must be an “involuntary impairment” of an evolved function; second, this impairment 
must be of sufficient magnitude to elicit the appellation of the “sick role” by the 
individual’s social group (Ibid., 46). This definition will be elaborated and evaluated in 
Section 2.3.3. What is important, in this context, is the medical orientation of the 
definition. Klein proposes the notion of an “involuntary impairment of an evolved 
function” as a way of conceptualizing mental and medical disorders as having the same 
objective basis: according to Klein, mental illness is merely a subset of illness in general 
that “presents evidence in the cognitive, behavioral, affective, and motivational aspects of 
organismal functioning” (Ibid., 70), rather than in the physiological aspects of organismal 
functioning. Moreover, a “dysfunctional state” is explicitly defined there in terms of its 
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etiology, and not its consequences: it consists in “a suboptimal deviation from [an] 
evolutionarily determined process and the result of disease” (Ibid., 51). 
Klein’s proposal was unsatisfactory to the Task Force, which perceived it as 
“overly abstruse and theoretical” (Millon [1986, 44]). Spitzer, in particular, was worried 
that the definition would be accepted by default (in the absence of alternative proposals) 
and hence he, along with Jean Endicott, set to work on a new formulation – a formulation 
that nonetheless incorporates Klein’s emphasis on disorder as deviation from “organismic 
functioning”. The Spitzer-Endicott definition was first presented to the APA in May 1976 
and a version was published in 1977 (Spitzer et al. [1977]).51 A significantly modified 
version of this definition ultimately made it to publication in the DSM-III, in the 
introduction which was authored by Spitzer himself. 
The Spitzer-Endicott Definition of “Mental Disorder” and the “Medical Model” of 
Psychiatry 
The basic elements of the definition that Spitzer had presented in 1973 – that a 
mental disorder must be associated with subjective distress or disability – were retained 
and considerably amplified in the 1976 APA presentation and the 1977 article. According 
to their definition, 
 
[Mental disorders,] in their extreme or fully developed form…are directly 
associated with either distress, disability, or, in the absence of either of these, 
disadvantage in coping with unavoidable aspects of the environment. 
Furthermore, they are not quickly ameliorated by simple nontechnical 
environmental maneuvers or informative procedures and do not have widespread 
social support. (Spitzer et al. [1977, 4]) 
  
 
51 A more elaborate version was published in 1978 (Spitzer and Endicott [1978]), some features of which 
will be critically discussed in Section 2.3.2. 
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Historically, however, the most controversial feature of this article is not the 
definition per se but the claim that mental disorders are a “subset of medical disorders”:   
 
These principles [i.e., criteria for defining “mental disorder”] help to avoid an 
overly broad definition of mental disorders that would view all individual and 
social unrest or problems of living as psychiatric illness, and at the same time 
justify the designation of mental disorders as a subset of medical disorders. (Ibid.) 
  
Note that the justification offered here is a direct response to the two crises 
described earlier, the legitimation crisis and the crisis of the disciplinary position of 
psychiatry. On the one hand, the concern to avoid an “overly broad” definition of mental 
disorder is a reflection of the legitimation crisis, namely, that psychiatry was unable to 
distinguish disorders from “all individual and social unrest” and “problems of living”. 
(The expression “problems in living” was made famous by Szasz [1961], who 
popularized the notion that what psychiatrists refer to as “mental disorders” are, instead, 
rather commonplace “problems in living”. Hence the passage above is a tacit response to 
the antipsychiatric tradition.) On the other hand, the concern to subsume mental disorders 
under medical disorders is a way of affirming the medical orientation of psychiatry and 
thereby attempting to distinguish psychiatry from the other mental health professions; 
hence it constitutes a response to the problem of clarifying psychiatry’s disciplinary 
position. 
The attempt to subsume, at least conceptually, mental to medical disorders 
provokes the question of what a “medical disorder” is. Although Spitzer et al. do not in 
this context provide a definition of “medical disorder”, they do define what they call the 
“medical model” of psychiatry, which they believe psychiatrists ought to endorse.  
According to Spitzer et al., the “medical model” is simply the hypothesis that “there are 
organismic dysfunctions which are relatively distinct with regard to clinical features, 
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etiology, and course” (Ibid., 5). Hence, being the same as, or at least produced by, an 
“organismic dysfunction” is a necessary condition for being a medical disorder and, 
therefore, if the proposed subsumption holds, for being a mental disorder as well.  
A year later, in a revised and slightly more sophisticated version of the article, 
Spitzer and Endicott (1978) work out this way of conceptualizing mental disorders more 
carefully. According to them, a mental disorder is a type of medical disorder the sole 
differentia of which is that the organismic dysfunction that produces it is primarily 
manifested psychologically or behaviorally rather than physiologically. In this respect it 
is, in spirit, almost identical to Klein’s (1978) definition (described above). According to 
Spitzer and Endicott:  
 
A medical disorder is a relatively distinct condition resulting from an organismic 
dysfunction which in its fully developed or extreme form is directly and 
intrinsically associated with distress, disability, or certain other types of 
disadvantage. The disadvantage may be of a physical, perceptual, sexual, or 
interpersonal nature. Implicitly there is a call for action on the part of the person 
who has the condition, the medical or its allied professions, and society. (Spitzer 
and Endicott [1978, 18]) 
 
Note that this definition of “medical disorder” incorporates Spitzer’s “distress or 
disability” criterion from the 1973 APA symposium, with the addition of the concept of 
“disadvantage”. Additionally, it stipulates that the distressing, disabling, or 
disadvantageous condition results from an “organismic dysfunction”. On the basis of this 
definition of “medical disorder”, they define “mental disorder” fairly straightforwardly: 
“A mental disorder is a medical disorder whose manifestations are primarily signs or 
symptoms of a psychological (behavioral) nature, or if physical, can be understood only 
using psychological concepts” (Ibid.). 
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Rejection of the Proposed Definition 
 As noted above, Spitzer and Endicott first presented a version of their definition at 
the APA conference of 1976. This presentation provoked heated criticism, predominantly 
by psychologists affiliated with the American Psychological Association, and primarily 
with respect to the proposed subsumption of mental disorders to medical disorders 
(Millon [1983, 806]). For example, in an article entitled “But is it Good for the 
Psychologists?”, Schacht and Nathan (1977) argue that Spitzer and Endicott’s appeal to 
“organismic dysfunctions” illegitimately abstracts from the environment by placing the 
disorder solely “within” the organism (Ibid., 1023). They also claim that the primary 
function of the locution is to expand the professional jurisdiction of psychiatry and 
diminish that of the other mental health professions (Ibid., 1024). (Garmezy [1978, 6] 
levels a similar charge of “territoriality” against the DSM-III as a whole.) Zubin (1977) 
argues that the most serious flaw with the DSM-III is the “false or at least unproven”, and 
“entirely gratuitous”, assumption that mental disorders are medical disorders (Ibid., 6). 
McReynolds (1979) writes that the “disease conception of behavioral disturbance” 
advocated by Spitzer and Endicott is an example of a once-useful heuristic which “now 
entraps our thinking and limits our research and practice” (Ibid., 125). 
The ensuing correspondence that took place between Theodore Blau, then-
president of the American Psychological Association, and Jack Weinberg, president of 
the APA, reveals the extent of the tension between the organizations that erupted as a 
result of the 1976 presentation and the ensuing 1977 publication of the definition. In a 
letter dated August 8, 1977, Blau expressed his concern with the possibility that a 
definition of “mental disorder” that subsumes mental to medical disorders would be 
published within the DSM-III. In it, he points out that, “[o]f the 17 major diagnostic 
classes, at least 10 have no known organic etiology” (cited in Kirk and Kutchins [1992, 
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112]). Upon receipt, Weinberg passed the letter on to Spitzer and asked him to draft a 
response. Spitzer’s draft was openly combative, and Weinberg largely maintained the 
combative tone in his response to Blau, dated November 3, 1977. After some conciliatory 
remarks to the effect that he would consider publishing a disclaimer along with any 
proposed definition of mental disorder, Weinberg writes:  
 
Where are we to go from here? You can continue to try to convince us that most 
mental disorders in the DSM-III classification are not medical disorders. You will 
not only fail to convince us, but we believe that it is inappropriate for you to 
attempt to tell us how we should conceptualize our area of professional 
responsibility. You can try to convince us that even if we believe that mental 
disorders are medical disorders, we should not explicitly say so in DSM-III. You 
will not convince us of this either. We believe that it is essential that we clarify to 
anyone who may be in doubt, that we regard psychiatry as a specialty of 
medicine. (cited in Ibid., 114) 
  
 Blau responded by arguing that the APA’s attempt to carve out its area of 
professional responsibility seems to exclude the contribution of the other mental health 
services, and, moreover, that it “suggests disdain” for those services: “Using the concepts 
of ‘mental’ and ‘medical’ synonymously or inclusively may exclude or deny the 
promising independent research and service [of those professions]” (cited in Ibid.). Blau 
continues with a more general criticism of the whole project of drafting the DSM-III:  
 
Candidly DSM-III, as we have seen it in its last draft, is more of a political 
position paper for the American Psychiatric Association than a scientifically-
based classification system. To continue to promulgate a classification system that 
does not meet the needs of emotionally troubled persons is not in the best interest 
of society or of either of our professions. (cited in Ibid., 115) 
 
The attempt to incorporate a definition of “mental disorder” within the DSM-III 
was ultimately rejected by a majority vote by the DSM-III Task Force in February of 
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1978. Part of the reason it was rejected was because a liaison committee consisting of 
three psychologists associated with the American Psychological Association had been 
given voting power. Presumably, they shared the critical attitude evinced by the 
American Psychological Association towards the definition (Millon [1983, 806]). In 
April of the following year, however, the Task Force approved a modified version of the 
definition to be inserted in the glossary of the DSM-III (Ibid., 806). Although the version 
that made it to publication in 1980 is not there proposed as a “definition” of “mental 
disorder”, it is proposed as a working characterization that is similar to the earlier 
Spitzer-Endicott definition. (A slightly more elaborate form of the characterization is 
presented in the introduction of the DSM-III itself.)  
Given the Task Force decision, the offending passage that mental disorders are a 
“subset of medical disorders” does not appear. It does, however, specify that a mental 
disorder must stem from a “dysfunction” on the part of the individual – thus invoking the 
conceptual apparatus of the so-called “medical model” described by Spitzer et al. (1977) 
in their contentious paper. The notion of “dysfunction”, however, is left undefined. This 
problem will be returned to in Section 2.2.2, after examining the DSM-III 
characterization itself. 
2.2 “MENTAL DISORDER” IN THE DSM-III 
Spitzer’s introduction to the DSM-III explicitly renounces the attempt to provide 
a definition of “mental disorder”: “…there is no satisfactory definition that specifies 
precise boundaries for the concept ‘mental disorder’” (APA [1980, 6]). Nonetheless, it 
points out that, “it is useful to present concepts that have influenced the decision to 
include certain conditions in DSM-III as mental disorders and to exclude others” (Ibid.). 
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Hence the following should be viewed as a working characterization rather than, strictly 
speaking, a definition of “mental disorder”:52
 
In DSM-III each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically 
significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an 
individual and that is typically associated with either a painful symptom (distress) 
or impairment in one or more important areas of functioning (disability). In 
addition, there is an inference that there is a behavioral, psychological, or 
biological dysfunction, and that the disturbance is not only in the relationship 
between the individual and society. (When the disturbance is limited to a conflict 
between the individual and society, this may represent social deviance, which 
may or may not be commendable, but is not by itself a mental disorder.) (Ibid.) 
 
The characterization provided in the DSM-III-R (APA [1987]) contains some 
minor modifications of the original. It specifies that the syndrome or pattern must 
“currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological 
dysfunction in the person” (Ibid., xxii; emphasis added).53 In addition to excluding 
conflicts between the individual and the society, it also specifies that the syndrome must 
neither be “merely an expectable response to a particular event, e.g., the death of a loved 
one” (Ibid.), nor deviant behavior, “e.g., political, religious, or sexual” (Ibid.).54
There are two points of interest about this characterization that are of central 
importance for motivating the explication of “function” that will be presented in the 
following chapters. The first concerns the prominent use of the notion of a dysfunction on 
 
52 Interestingly, unlike DSM-III, the characterization offered in the revised version of DSM-III, DSM-III-
R, is explicitly offered as a “definition” of the concept (APA [1987, xxii]).  
53 Presumably, this definition would exclude relationship disorders, for example, marital or family 
disorders in which the dysfunction cannot be localized to one or the other member, but describes 
maladaptive patterns of interaction. Widiger and Trull (1991, 115) criticize this restriction, remarking that, 
“the validation of interpersonal and systems models of pathology [is]…hindered by a taxonomy that 
recognizes only organismic dysfunction”. However, Eysenck et al. (1983) question the usefulness of 
assessing disorders in units larger than the individual. 
54 The 10th edition of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), published by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), includes a special mental and behavioral disorder classification (WHO [1992]). 
Published in 1992, it was developed in collaboration with the APA and includes a similar characterization 
(WHO [1992, 5]). 
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the part of the person to establish a contrast with the case of political, religious, or sexual 
deviance, or more generally, (mere) “conflict between the individual and society”. This 
suggests that appeal to the notion of an internal dysfunction is meant to provide an 
explication of the idea that, when an individual has a mental disorder, there is a sense in 
which something has gone wrong within that individual, and thus that the ascription does 
not merely reflect the judgement that the person in question acts, feels, or thinks in ways 
that do not satisfactorily conform to social expectations and values. Spitzer and Williams 
(1982) make this intuition explicit: “The assumption that something has gone wrong with 
the organism…is in the DSM-III expressed in the phrase, ‘there is an inference that there 
is a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction’” (Ibid., 21). Indeed, one would 
expect the authors of the definition to express such a concern with separating mental 
disorders from mere conflicts with social norms, given the legitimation crisis that 
motivated the attempt to formulate the definition in the first place. This raises a problem, 
however, since to oppose “dysfunction” and “deviance” is only to provide a negative 
characterization of “dysfunction”; it does not contribute to providing a positive 
characterization of what constitutes an internal dysfunction as such (Wakefield and First 
[2003, 35]).  
The second point of interest about this characterization is the apparently 
ambiguous appeal to the notion of “functioning”. On the one hand, the first sentence of 
the DSM-III characterization specifies that the syndrome or pattern is associated with 
distress or disability, where “disability” is defined as “impairment in one or more 
important areas of functioning”. On the other hand – and this is supposed to amplify the 
first sentence – the second sentence states that there must also be a “behavioral, 
psychological, or biological dysfunction”. Consequently, disability as “impairment in an 
area of functioning” refers to something other than a “behavioral, psychological, or 
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biological” dysfunction. The revised definition (of the DSM-III-R) clarifies, if not the 
meaning of these terms, that the dysfunction must be “in the person” and that the distress 
or disability must be a “manifestation” of the dysfunction. Hence the DSM-III alludes to 
two different types of “functioning”, and suggests that the relation between the two is a 
causal one: the dysfunction “in the person” causes the “manifest” impairment in an area 
of functioning (“disability”).  
In order to understand this characterization of “mental disorder”, and in particular, 
the concepts of functioning that it embodies, the following two questions should be 
answered: first, how should the notion of “disability” be explicated?; second, how should 
the notion of “dysfunction” be explicated? (It will be assumed, for the time being, that the 
concept of “distress”, while not entirely unproblematic, is conceptually clear enough that 
it does not warrant further consideration here.) 
2.2.1 “Disability” as Failure of Social-Role Functioning 
The notion of “disability” is defined in DSM-III as “impairment in one or more 
areas of functioning”. This gives rise to the question of what constitutes an “area of 
functioning”. Fortunately, this question is not difficult to answer, since the specific “areas 
of functioning” that must be affected in order for something to qualify as a mental 
disorder are typically listed separately for each specific diagnostic category, and are 
either embedded within the formal diagnostic criteria themselves, or in the associated, 
informal description. For example, in the DSM-III, a criterion for Schizophrenic Disorder 
is “deterioration in functioning in such areas as work, social relations, and self-care” 
(APA [1980, 189]). Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity is typically associated 
with impairment in “academic functioning” (Ibid., 42); Avoidant Disorder (labeled 
“Shyness Disorder” in an early draft; see Garmezy [1977, 4]) with “social functioning in 
peer relationships” (Ibid., 55). Typically, however¸ such descriptions are limited to 
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stipulating some degree of impairment in the rather generic category of “social and 
occupational functioning”. Spitzer introduced these “clinical significance criteria” in 
order to remind the clinician to evaluate whether the presenting symptoms are sufficiently 
severe to warrant diagnosis, although he currently doubts their clinical utility (Spitzer and 
Wakefield [1999, 1863]). 
What these listings show is that notion of an “area of functioning” is not 
conceived, as it standardly is in the biological sciences, in terms of the function of a trait, 
or a vital function, such as respiration, metabolism, reproduction, and so on – those very 
general organismic capacities in the absence of which the organism’s survival or 
reproductive ability is impaired. Rather, it is conceived in the sense of a failure to carry 
out certain roles that largely define a person’s contribution to a social group, or that 
constitute the sine qua non of such group participation, such as being a co-worker, a 
friend, a peer, a student, or more generally, being “presentable” to others in the sense of 
maintaining an acceptable level of personal hygiene, dress, and so on (Ibid., 1858). It is 
essentially a relational criterion in that it draws attention to one’s “place” within a greater 
social structure.  
The use of the term “disability”, however, to gloss the notion of “impairment in 
an area of functioning” is misleading, because the notion of a “disability” typically 
implies an involuntary inability to engage in a certain activity. However, the DSM-III 
characterization does not specify whether the impairment is voluntary or involuntary. A 
person who typically does not remain employed for long periods of time, does poorly 
academically, or does not tend to sustain long-term intimate relationships, is not 
necessarily thought to have a “disability”. The person may simply be uninterested in 
maintaining long-term employment, may lack interest in academic achievement, or may 
enjoy variety in his or her romantic relationships. Nonetheless, such a person may 
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correctly qualify as “functioning poorly” in the area of employment or marriage, in the 
sense that the person’s behavior is seen as falling below the widely-shared standards or 
expectations of the community with respect to those institutions. 
Consequently, in the following, the notion of “disability” that appears in the 
DSM-III should be understood as a failure of social-role functioning; in other words, it 
designates unsatisfactory performance with respect to these areas of functioning, where 
“unsatisfactory” refers to the norms of appropriateness that originate within, and possess 
whatever justification they may have by virtue of, the needs and goals of the individual’s 
group. (This is not, of course, to say that the individual in question does not share those 
goals, or that the individual’s inability to function properly is not a significant source of 
personal distress.) Thus it will be considered to be a sociological category. This is in 
keeping with the sociological orientation of Klein’s (1978) definition of “mental illness”, 
and specifically, with his notion that the concept of mental disorder implicitly prescribes 
the “sick role” (along with the waiver of certain rights or the assumption of certain 
privileges that attends to that role), due to a person’s failure to satisfy the responsibilities 
associated with his or her normal social role.  
The interpretation of “disability” as “failure of social-role functioning” implies 
that what the DSM-III characterizes as “social deviance”, or “political, religious, or 
sexual” deviance, is itself a form of “disability” – since social deviance is, by definition, 
deviation from expected or valued social roles and responsibilities. Thus, appeal to the 
“distress, disability, or disadvantage” criterion alone is by no means sufficient for 
defining “mental disorder”, since it is overinclusive – all forms of social deviance may 
fall under “disability”. This raises the problem of what differentiates mental disorder, 
properly speaking, from all such forms of role failure, since the whole project of 
legitimizing the authority invested in psychiatry, and clarifying its disciplinary position in 
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a relatively uncontroversial manner, rests upon such a principled differentiation. This is 
presumably what the concept of an internal “dysfunction” is supposed to accomplish. 
2.2.2 Presence of an Internal “Dysfunction” and the Amplification Problem 
What is it to have an internal dysfunction? Unlike the concept of “disability” as 
failure of social-role functioning, this second criterion is suppose to provide a foundation 
for mental disorder classification that is not relative to the expectations and values of a 
person’s current social environment, and to secure the medical credentials of psychiatry. 
It is surprising, then, that it remains undefined in the DSM-III, given its conceptual 
import. (Wakefield and First [2003, 35] also note that the most serious problem with the 
DSM-III definition is that “there is no explanation or analysis of the critical concept of 
dysfunction”.)  By leaving the term undefined, the authors of the DSM-III, and later 
editions, open themselves to the charge that the term does not in fact amplify the 
definition of “mental disorder”, but rather, merely serves to reify the socially-relative 
nature of (at least some types of) norm-violating behavior by construing it as a non-
relational property of the individual – that is, as an inner mechanism that disposes that 
individual to violate social norms and that falls within the province of medicine. In other 
words, the problem concerns whether the term “dysfunction” is merely a slogan that 
serves to obscure the two crises rather than to offer a substantive solution to them. 
Kendell (1986), whose attempt at a definition of “disease” will be discussed in Section 
2.3.1, raises the same issue in arguing that the DSM’s usage of “dysfunction” does not 
resolve any fundamental problems, but rather, is “vaguely worded [enough] to allow any 
term with medical connotations to be either included or excluded in conformity with 
contemporary medical opinion” (Ibid., 41). 
Thus one is faced with what will be referred to as the amplification problem: 
whether, and how, the concept of an internal “dysfunction” amplifies the definition of 
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“mental disorder”. Solving the problem requires either an explicit definition of 
“dysfunction” or a set of procedures that allow for its reliable determination and by which 
it could be implicitly defined. The amplification problem, then, serves to motivate the 
explication of the concept of an internal “function” and “dysfunction” that will occupy 
the next two chapters of the dissertation.  
Adequacy Conditions on the Definition of “Function” 
 Part of the method that will be used to explicate “dysfunction” in the following 
chapters will involve the evaluation of various definitions that have been proposed in the 
psychiatric and philosophical literature. In Section 2.3, the proposals that will be 
evaluated are those that psychiatrists have offered; in  Chapter 3, they will be primarily 
those of philosophers. However, before presenting and evaluating various such attempts, 
it will be helpful to set forth some of the demands that should be placed upon any 
definition of “function” that is appropriate to the context of psychiatry. These demands 
will take the form of two “adequacy conditions”, that is, rules that inform one as to when 
a proposed definition even qualifies for further consideration. The justification for these 
adequacy conditions is not absolute and historically invariant, but rather, stems from the 
recent social and historical context of American psychiatry itself and the specific 
problems it has confronted as a discipline. To recapitulate, these problems involve the 
attempt to justify the social and political power invested within it (the legitimation crisis) 
as well as the attempt to clarify its area of professional responsibility (the disciplinary 
position crisis). American psychiatry – or at least those prominent representatives of the 
APA upon whom the profession bestowed a disproportionate share of the responsibility 
for articulating its self-conception – attempted to respond to these problems by drawing 
attention to the medical orientation of its practitioners and, on this basis, appealing to the 
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notion of an internal or organismic “dysfunction” to define partly that area of expertise. 
The undefined status of the term gives rise to the amplification problem. 
 Although the crucial definiendum in the following is, of course, “dysfunction” (or 
“malfunction”, etc.) the adequacy conditions presented here will impose constraints upon 
the definition of “function” instead. One a priori justification for this stems from the 
intuition that being dysfunctional represents some type of privation or aberration of 
something’s capacity to perform its normal function and that this dependency relation 
should be reflected in the definition of those terms – the consequence being that 
“dysfunction” should be defined in terms of “function” and not the other way around. A 
more pragmatic justification for this is that most of the relevant conceptual analyses 
offered by philosophers for defining “dysfunction” – many of which will be reviewed in 
Chapter 3 – follow the same procedure. Because of this, by imposing adequacy 
conditions upon “function” rather than “dysfunction” one can appropriately engage with 
that burgeoning literature.  
The first condition of adequacy (CA) on any definition of “function” that is 
appropriate for psychiatry is relatively trivial, given the motivation for its introduction: 
 
CA1: If X has a function – where X is some organ, trait, or part – then X is capable 
of being dysfunctional. 
 
In other words, no concept of function that does not permit the explication and 
applicability of a corresponding concept of “dysfunctional” and not merely “non-
functional” can satisfy the conceptual demands that are imposed upon it. Despite its 
obviousness in this context, this condition of adequacy must be stated explicitly, since 
some prominent explications of “function” do not satisfy this condition. In order to 
satisfy this condition, a definition of “function” must allow a conceptual distinction to be 
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drawn between having a function and performing a function, since presumably, in order 
for a trait to be “dysfunctional”, it must possess a function that it does not perform. For 
example, one biological definition of “function” as “all physical and chemical properties 
arising from [organismic] form [with the exception of those that refer to the organism’s 
environment]” (Bock and von Wahlert [1965, 274]) does not allow this distinction to be 
drawn and hence does not satisfy CA1, since according to this definition, virtually any 
activity of a trait qualifies as its “function”. However, as will be seen, merely allowing 
this distinction to be drawn is not sufficient for defining “dysfunction” (see Section 
2.3.3). For example, something may actively prohibit something else from performing its 
function, and there are good reasons not to say that the latter thing is “dysfunctional” or 
“malfunctioning”, even though it has a function that it cannot perform.  
The second adequacy condition is an extension of the first in the sense that it 
places constraints upon the manner in which something can be “dysfunctional”. This 
adequacy condition, however, is less obvious than the first, so some motivation is 
necessary. Roughly, the idea that motivates the second adequacy condition is that 
whether or not a trait is “dysfunctional” should not depend upon whether someone 
happens to value, or disvalue, the activity of the trait. If this were so then the 
“dysfunction” criterion would not necessarily amplify the definition of “mental disorder”, 
but merely serve to introduce a value judgement concerning the distressing, disabling, or 
disadvantageous condition, in lieu of a designation for the inner cause of the disturbance. 
For this reason, a preliminary – albeit inadequate – attempt to formulate the adequacy 
condition may be the following: 
 
CA2:  Whether or not X is dysfunctional is not determined by changes in the way 
that somebody either values X or values the effects that X produces.  
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For example, if there is a gene that disposes one to homosexual orientation, then whether 
or not the gene’s activity is “dysfunctional” should not depend merely upon changes in 
moral attitudes about sexual orientation. One of the consequences of CA2 is that the 
concept of “dysfunction” should not be an evaluative term in the sense of Hare (see 
Section 1.3). 
However, this formulation introduces an unnecessary restriction, because it does 
not allow for the possibility that a trait could become dysfunctional precisely because 
someone negatively values its activity, and as a consequence, attempts to suppress the 
activity, and thereby interferes with the trait’s normal functioning, and makes it 
dysfunctional. So, for example, suppose that homosexuality is conceived as a 
psychological disposition one of the functions of which is to bring about emotional and 
sexual fulfillment with another person. Suppose, then, that many people come to disvalue 
it, and because they disvalue it, they attempt to inhibit its expression. As a consequence, 
many homosexuals develop certain psychological conflicts about their sexual orientation 
that lead to distress rather than emotional and sexual fulfillment. Insofar as the same 
disposition now produces distress, it may perhaps be said to qualify as “psychologically 
dysfunctional”. In fact, the authors of the DSM-III recognize the possibility that “ego-
dystonic homosexuality” may have such an etiology: “The factors that predispose to Ego-
dystonic Homosexuality are those negative societal attitudes toward homosexuality that 
have been internalized” (APA [1980, 282]).  Hence the second adequacy condition 
should not imply that whether or not something is dysfunctional must be causally 
independent of social values.55
 
55 More formally, the type of situation that should not be excluded on a priori grounds from causing an 
inner “dysfunction” is the following: A person, P, has an inner disposition, D (e.g., homosexual 
orientation), that give rise to behavior B (homosexual behavior); B is disvalued by a person, Q (where P 
and Q may be the same person) and, as a consequence of this negative evaluation of B, Q interacts with P 
and creates a new disposition, D′ (anxiety about homosexual orientation) within P; the interaction of D and 
D′ qualifies as a “dysfunctional” interaction or an internal “dysfunction”. Moreover, one should not 
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The problem with CA2, then, is that it does not specify that changes in the 
functional status of a trait’s activity should not be brought about merely by changes in the 
way that someone values that activity, if such changes do not in have any effect upon the 
characteristic structure or activity of that trait. This lack of specificity can be resolved by 
a revision of CA2 that takes this causal independence into account (although this, too, will 
be abandoned in favor of a different formulation): 
 
CA2′: Whether or not X is dysfunctional is not determined by changes in the way 
that somebody either values X or values the effects that X produces when such 
changes have no effect upon the characteristic structure and activity of X. 
 
The simple justification for CA2′ is that if the notion of “dysfunction” in this 
context is to explicate the intuitive idea that something has gone wrong within an 
individual, then in order for something in the individual to become dysfunctional, 
something within that individual must be affected and not merely something within, say, 
the minds of those within that individual’s group. One of the situations that CA2 
excludes, and that CA2′ permits, then, is that homosexuality might be a manifestation of a 
psychological dysfunction in very homophobic societies, and not in more tolerant 
societies, as a consequence of the way in which negative social attitudes about 
homosexuality are internalized by a person. 
However, CA2′, while adequate to the intuition that motivates it, is unnecessarily 
narrow given the rationale that justifies it. For this rationale supports a much stronger 
adequacy condition, namely, that any change – and not merely one related to social 
attitudes – that has no effect on X should not be able to determine whether or not X is 
 
immediately exclude the conceptual possibility that if the interaction between the components of a system 
is dysfunctional, then the components themselves should be thought of as “dysfunctional”. If this is the 
case, then D in P is now dysfunctional, and if D continues to give rise to B, then B is now caused by an 
internal dysfunction as a result of Q’s negative evaluation of B. 
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dysfunctional. In other words, what should be recognized as the core intuition regarding 
the psychiatric concept of “dysfunction” is not that its ascription should not be relative to 
the values of a social group, but that it must not be “externalistically individuated” – that 
is, the difference between the case in which something within an individual is 
malfunctioning, versus that in which it is not, should not be determined exclusively by 
changes that take place outside of that individual. Rather, it should supervene upon 
changes within the individual himself or herself. 
The concept of “externalism” (as opposed to “internalism”) originated with the 
theory of language associated with Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972), according to which 
the meanings of many of the words that one uses – particularly those of proper names and 
so-called “natural kind” terms – are not determined by the psychological state of the 
speaker (e.g., “what one means by them”) but rather, by features of the social 
environment or natural world that they refer to. This view was elaborated into a theory of 
mind by McGinn (1977) and Burge (1979), according to which the content of one’s 
mental states are determined by features of a person’s social or natural environment, 
regardless of whether or not those features have any actual effect upon the intrinsic 
characteristics of the person’s experience, such as the qualitative features of that 
experience, or upon the structure of the person’s brain or nervous system. A consequence 
of externalism in the philosophy of mind is that, were a person to be transposed from one 
environment to another, the contents of that person’s mental states could change as a 
function of that transposition, even in the absence of any experiential change, or of any 
changes in the world that physically affect that person. The situation is analogous to 
driving a car at a constant speed down a long road with no signs, but where the speed 
limit continues to change – at one moment, one is violating the law; at another, one is 
not; although one’s beliefs and actions can be described as unchanging with respect to the 
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law. It is this sort of externalism that, although appropriate, perhaps, for some aspects of 
language, mind, and the legal status of actions, should not determine whether or not a 
trait is dysfunctional. Rather, for a trait to become dysfunctional, some change must 
occur that affects the characteristic structure or activity of the trait itself.56
Of course, the question of what qualifies as an “internal”, rather than an 
“external”, feature of a person probably does not admit of any precise answer. For 
example, does “internal” simply mean, “beneath, and inclusive of, the skin”? But what 
constitutes the “inside” of the body is typically a function of the type of model that one is 
using to analyze it: an immunological model, for example, will consider many items that 
are “under the skin” to nonetheless qualify as “foreign” to the organism. More 
importantly, a person’s experience is not necessarily physically “localizable” in the same 
way that a person’s organs are, and hence it may be less clear how to draw a precise 
boundary between the “internal” and the “external” in those cases. Finally, there is a 
sense in which, in the case of behavior, the distinction may not be intelligible. For 
example, the category of “job-seeking behavior” relies so heavily not merely upon what a 
person takes himself or herself to be doing, but what other people understand that person 
to be doing, that changes in the latter may altogether change the type of behavior in 
question. 
Nonetheless, in most cases it will be fairly clear whether the model that is used to 
differentiate the dysfunctional from the non-dysfunctional activity of a trait appeals only 
to “external” features of the individual, or “internal” ones as well. For example, a model 
of depression that attributes the dysfunction to lowered serotonin production qualifies as 
 
56 There is perhaps a trivial sense in which no definition of “function” can satisfy this criterion – namely, 
insofar as every physical change in an individual’s environment will presumably bring about some change, 
however minimal, in the physical constitution of the individual, such as a nearby leaf’s disrupting the air 
molecules that affect one’s skin. Therefore, this discussion presupposes that there are some constraints 
upon which sorts of environmental changes suffice to change the “characteristic structure or activity” of a 
trait, and which do not, although these constraints will largely by left implicit. 
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an “internal” model; a model of simple phobia that attributes the dysfunction to a 
repressed, unconscious trauma also qualifies as an “internal” model; but a model of 
schizophrenia that attributes the dysfunction merely to large-scale changes in social 
arrangements, with no implication that such changes interact with the psychological or 
biological profile of those individuals who come to have schizophrenia, would qualify as 
an “external” model. In this context, then, it is not so important to specify rigorously a 
precise boundary between “internal” and “external” changes to a trait as much as it is to 
secure the intelligibility and general applicability of the distinction in the first place. 
Within this consideration in mind, CA2′ will be generalized as follows: 
 
CA2*: Whether or not X is dysfunctional is not determined by any changes that 
have no effect upon the characteristic structure or activity of X. 
 
This generalized formulation has two immediate advantages over its predecessor. 
The first, of course, is that CA2′ follows from it as a special case. The second is that it 
supports the intuition that whether or not a trait is dysfunctional should not merely be 
determined by whether its activity deviates from a statistical norm, for example, from the 
average value of that trait within a population or by the relative frequency of the trait. For 
example, according to Kendell (1975b), Lord Cohen defined illness as a “deviation from 
the normal…by way of excess or defect” (cited in Kendell [Ibid., 309]); Kendell rightly 
points out that the definition is inadequate because it does not distinguish between those 
deviations that are harmful, those that are neutral, and those that are beneficial to their 
bearers. Correspondingly, CA2* does not permit mere statistical deviations from 
normalcy from counting as “dysfunctional”, because one can arbitrarily make the bearers 
of a given trait exceedingly rare, or exceedingly common, depending on the sorts of 
changes one induces in the bearers of variant traits within the population, where the 
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bearers of the one type of trait are isolated from the bearers of the variant traits. This 
implies that although the relative fitness of having that trait can change as a function of 
such purely environmental changes, a trait that is at one time functional cannot be 
rendered dysfunctional by means of such changes. Rather, in order for a functioning trait 
to become dysfunctional, something in the environment would have to interact with it in 
such a way as to actually change its characteristic structure or activity. 
One might argue that CA2* is too broad, because it introduces a conceptual 
distinction between the relative fitness of a trait in its current environment and the 
functional status of that trait. Yet according to one prominent analysis (Bigelow and 
Pargetter [1987]), a trait has a “function” if it is disposed to contribute to the survival or 
reproduction of the organism that possesses it, in that organism’s natural habitat. (See 
Section 3.1.3., under “Fitness-Contribution Theories”.) Now, suppose that one were to 
use this definition to construct a corresponding concept of “dysfunction” – for example, a 
trait is “dysfunctional” if it is disposed to reduce the fitness of the organism possessing it. 
Suppose, furthermore, that one analyses the concept of “disposition” simply in terms of 
relative frequency: for example, if one were to say that trait T is disposed to reduce 
fitness if bearers of T, more often than not, have lower fitness than bearers of a trait 
variant T*. According to this definition, T could be made dysfunctional by changing the 
environment in such a way that bearers of T* proliferate while leaving absolute numbers 
of bearers of T unaffected, thus reducing the relative frequency of T. CA2* disallows such 
changes in the relative frequency of T* from changing the functional status of T’s 
activity. Of course, nothing should prevent one from using “functional” and 
“dysfunctional”, in certain contexts, more or less synonymously with “adaptive” and 
“maladaptive”, or simply, “fitness enhancing” and “fitness reducing”. But that is not a 
definition that is appropriate for psychiatry, where “dysfunction” is often used to 
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characterize a sort of inner state that produces disturbing thoughts, emotions, or 
behaviors, and not a statistical property of populations. 
Given these two conditions of adequacy that will allow for the evaluation of 
proposed definitions of “function” and “dysfunction”, the next section turns to three 
major attempts on the part of psychiatrists to define “dysfunction” (or related terms).  
2.3 THREE PSYCHIATRIC DEFINITIONS OF “DYSFUNCTION” 
Of the three definitions of “dysfunction” (or associated terms) that will be 
presented in this chapter – Kendell’s (1975b) “biological disadvantage” criterion, Spitzer 
and Endicott’s (1978) “operational definition”, and Klein’s (1978) evolutionary definition 
– the first two are purely consequentialist. In other words, they hold that whether or not a 
condition is dysfunctional has to do exclusively with the consequences of the condition 
rather than its causes. The third definition is partly etiological, because it claims that 
whether or not something is dysfunctional has to do with whether or not it deviates from 
an evolutionarily determined process. The first two definitions, moreover, do not satisfy 
CA2*, because in both, the sort of consequences that the definitions pick out are those 
that tend to vary depending upon variation in the physical and social environment of the 
individual, even when this environmental variation has no effect upon the structure or 
activity of the trait itself. This is not to say that no consequentialist definition of 
“function” is capable of satisfying CA2*, but it does provides good evidence that 
consequentialist definitions of “function” will not be suitable to the psychiatric context. 
Section 3.2 will provide a more careful argument for this claim.  
Alternatively, an analysis of Klein’s (1978) evolutionary definition will show that 
definitions based on etiology are capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions. Hence 
this section will provide a motivation for exploring etiological definitions of function in 
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much more detail. This exploration, along with a more elaborate contrast of etiological 
and non-etiological definitions of “function”, will occupy Chapter 3. 
2.3.1 Kendell’s (1975b) Definition of Dysfunction as “Inherent Biological 
Disadvantage” 
Kendell (1975b), like Spitzer and Endicott (1978) and Klein (1978), wants to 
refute antipsychiatric challenges by showing that many of the central disturbances that 
psychiatrists treat do, in fact, qualify as bona fide “illnesses” or “diseases”. (Kendell’s 
interest in this challenge is not surprising given his central role in organizing and 
conducting the US-UK diagnostic study discussed above in Section 2.1.1; see Kendell et 
al. [1971]). His strategy, like that of his American counterparts, is to define “disease” (or 
“illness”) generally and then to show that certain putative mental disorders meet the 
defining criteria. Although his paper does not attempt a definition of “dysfunction”, the 
definition he offers for “disease” (or “illness”) could easily be used to attempt to define 
“dysfunction”, since it is intended to play a similar role in legitimating psychiatry as a 
medical discipline.  
Kendell argues that disease concepts that rely on etiology – for example, the idea 
that diseases are necessarily caused by demonstrable physical lesions – are inadequate 
because there does not appear to be a uniform etiological pattern associated with all 
uncontroversial examples of diseases (Kendell [1975b, 308]). Instead, he elaborates a 
concept introduced by Scadding (1968) that defines disease in terms of its consequences, 
namely, as a statistically abnormal set of organismic characteristics that places its bearer 
at a “biological disadvantage”. Furthermore, Kendell originally defines a “biologically 
disadvantageous” condition as one that reduces fertility or longevity (Kendell [1975b, 
310]) – although he comes to modify this in the course of his argument in order to make 
it more nuanced.  
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On the basis of this definition, his argument that schizophrenia is a disease is 
empirically straightforward. He appeals to post-hospitalization follow-up studies of 
schizophrenic patients to show that those populations, on average, marry less, and have 
fewer children, then the general population. Insofar as schizophrenia can be associated 
with reduced fertility it qualifies as a “disease” in Kendell’s sense. He also argues on the 
basis of intuitive plausibility that homosexuals suffer a reduction in fertility relative to 
their heterosexual counterparts, and therefore that homosexuality is likewise an illness or 
disease (Ibid., 311). He also draws upon evidence that people with bipolar disorder (at the 
time, “manic-depressives”) are more likely to commit suicide than their unafflicted 
counterparts, and that all forms of drug dependence are associated with increased 
mortality, to argue that both conditions qualify as illnesses (Ibid., 312). 
As it stands, Kendell’s analysis cannot qualify as an explication of “dysfunction” 
because it fails CA2*. By equating a dysfunctional trait with a vulnerability to decreased 
fertility or longevity, certain conditions can come to qualify (or be disqualified) as 
dysfunctional owing to changes in features of the environment that have no actual effect 
upon the characteristic structure or activity of the trait itself, and hence his definition 
admits of externalist ascription of “disease”. For example, schizophrenia may come to be 
disqualified as an illness because of an absolute decrease in the reproductive rate of non-
schizophrenic populations from which the former are isolated.57
Kendell does not recognize that his definition admits of externalist ascriptions of 
disease, although he does recognize a different problem, which is that certain conditions 
 
57 A recent film, House of Fools, DVD, directed by Andrei Konchalovsky (2002; Hollywood, CA: 
Paramount Home Video, 2004) suggests a rather extreme, but amusing, thought-experiment. It features a 
mental hospital in the Chechen countryside which comes to be overshadowed by war, and in which, 
presumably, the average life expectancy of the patients comes to surpass that of the soldiers falling in battle 
around them. In doing so, the film raises the question of what “madness” consists of; ironically, according 
to Kendell’s definition, the soldiers would qualify as having illnesses, and the hospitalized patients would 
not. 
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may come to be associated with decreased fertility or longevity – and hence become 
“diseases” in his sense – merely because of the stigmatization associated with the mental 
disorder label, and hence that his definition does not adequately respond to 
antipsychiatrists’ challenges. As Kendell notes, sociologists such as Scheff would argue 
that, “the main reason people labeled as schizophrenics have relatively few children is 
because they are regarded, both by others and by themselves, as lunatics and are less 
likely to marry and have children for this reason…”(Ibid., 313). He also acknowledges 
that because humans are social animals, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate those 
vulnerabilities that are due to negative social attitudes and those that are due to biological 
causes.  
Nonetheless, Kendell maintains that if one wants to figure out whether or not 
something is truly a disease, one must determine that the relative decrease in longevity or 
fertility associated with the condition is not merely caused by the stigmatization 
associated with labeling or by other effects of negative social attitudes about it. Yet, as 
indicated above, the question of whether the vulnerability associated with, for example, 
schizophrenia has a biological or social cause is not the real problem in formulating a 
definition. Rather, the question of definitional adequacy concerns whether the concept of 
dysfunction can be determined on purely externalist grounds. Once it is accepted that the 
core problem is externalism about the concept of dysfunction, the whole challenge of 
attempting to disentangle “merely social” from “exclusively biological” causes of 
vulnerability is irrelevant to the task. Vulnerability alone, whether due to social or 
biological causes, should not be considered to be part of the definition of “dysfunction”, 
although it may qualify as a defeasible indicator for the presence of a dysfunction. 
Nonetheless, because Kendell thinks that mere social factors should be irrelevant 
in determining whether or not something is a “disease”, he attempts to narrow down his 
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definition to exclude them. According to his revised definition of “biological 
disadvantage”, a condition places its bearer at a biological disadvantage not merely if it is 
associated with reduced fertility or longevity; in addition, the cause of this decrease must 
“be innate and not simply one that leads to rejection by others” (Ibid., 314). Thus the 
challenge he poses to those who wish to evaluative the disease status of a condition is the 
following:  
 
The criterion must be, would this individual still be at a disadvantage if his 
fellows did not recognize his distinguishing features but treated him as they treat 
one another? In the case of schizophrenia the argument hinges on whether the 
high mortality and low fertility associated with this condition are innate, or 
whether they would melt away if those whom we call schizophrenics were not 
merely treated like other people but not even recognized as deviant. (Ibid.) 
 
In short, according to Kendell’s revised concept of disease, a disease is a 
condition that places its bearer at an “intrinsic biological disadvantage” (Ibid., emphasis 
added), rather than one due to social causes.  
Kendell’s view faces one of two major problems, depending on how one chooses 
to interpret the concept of “innate” or “intrinsic” that he appeals to. One plausible 
interpretation is that a condition is “innate” if one is born with a predisposition for having 
it. This interpretation is supported by the relevance to his definition of “disease” that he 
attributes to evidence for genetic transmission of schizophrenia. This evidence, he claims, 
“establishes beyond doubt” (Ibid.) that the disadvantage associated with schizophrenia is 
not merely a consequence of the social stigmatization of people with schizophrenia, and 
therefore that schizophrenia is “really” a disease. This interpretation, of course, entails 
that his definition is no longer purely consequentialist but incorporates etiological 
components as well. But even if one sets aside empirical doubts about evidence for the 
genetic transmission of schizophrenia, the problem with this interpretation is that the 
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relevance of this etiological claim to his conclusion has not been established. Even if one 
supposes that schizophrenia is associated with decreased fitness, and that models for 
genetic transmission of schizophrenia are valid, in order to know whether or not 
schizophrenia is a disease one would have to determine the relation between the two. In 
other words, the problem that Kendell poses cannot be resolved by determining whether 
or not schizophrenia has a genetic component. Rather, one must determine why it is 
biologically disadvantageous to have, regardless of its origin. One may be genetically 
disposed to schizophrenia, yet it may be disadvantageous in some environments for 
external reasons, e.g., due to the sort of social stigmatization that he believes should not 
play a role in the determination of disease.  
A second plausible interpretation of “innate” or “intrinsic” is suggested by its 
contrast to “relational”. For example, Kendell uses homosexuality as a paradigm case of a 
condition that is “intrinsically” disadvantageous, presumably for something like the 
following reason: a mere explanation of what homosexuality is should lead one to infer, 
given some very general background knowledge concerning the biological basis of 
reproduction, that a person who exclusively practices homosexuality will not have any 
children. Similarly, from a description of catatonic type schizophrenia, as well as some 
very general background knowledge concerning standard requirements for gaining access 
to food and mates, one can plausibly infer that a person who spends most of his or her life 
in that condition will be at a biological disadvantage, relative to their normal 
counterparts.  
These examples suggest that the notion of an “intrinsic” biological disadvantage 
that Kendell appeals to can be interpreted epistemologically, e.g., in the sense that that 
the condition is biologically disadvantageous is derivable from the definition of the 
condition, in addition to some very basic empirical knowledge about the activities that are 
 96
necessary to one’s survival and reproduction. But is important to point out that 
conceptually, this criterion is still relative to the current environment of the person so 
affected, and hence is capable of being externalistically individuated. There are probably 
very few mental disorders, if any, which absolutely interfere with survival or 
reproduction. The disadvantage remains relative to the survival and reproductive rates of 
individuals within the same population. Hence the distinction between “intrinsic” and 
“relative” biological disadvantage is not a qualitative one.  
This epistemological interpretation of “intrinsic” is also relative to one’s current 
environment in a second way, namely, to the background knowledge that can be 
legitimately included in its assessment. Because it incorporates a reference to the 
background knowledge that one has about a condition, then changes in the amount and 
type of that knowledge can change whether that condition is “inherently” or “not 
inherently” biologically disadvantageous. For example, someone who only knows that 
homosexuality involves a disposition to sexual attraction towards members of the same 
sex cannot derive anything about whether or not homosexuals tend to leave more, less, or 
the same number of offspring as others who are not so disposed. Consequently, on either 
interpretation of “intrinsic” or “innate”, Kendell’s notion of disease as “intrinsic 
biological disorder” does not satisfy CA2* in that it does not exclude externalist 
ascriptions of disease.  
Spitzer and Endicott (1978) suggest a third definition of “intrinsic”, which was 
noted above in Section 2.1.2. According to their definition of “mental disorder”, which 
will be discussed in the next subsection, a disorder must be “directly and intrinsically 
associated with distress, disability, or certain other types of disadvantage” (Ibid., 18). In 
turn, to say that a condition is “intrinsically associated” with these consequences is to say 
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that it is associated with them “in all environments” (Ibid., 19)58. Furthermore, Spitzer 
and Endicott mark the distinction between a “disorder” and a (mere) “vulnerability” 
precisely in terms of whether the condition is disadvantageous in all environments or 
only in some environments. Yet if a “disadvantageous condition” is interpreted as it is in 
Kendell (1975b), as one that reduces one’s chances of survival or reproduction, then the 
concept of a condition that is biologically disadvantageous in all environments would 
seem to be a contradiction in terms, since disadvantage, as noted above, is relative to the 
survival and reproductive rates of other members of the population. Perhaps the locution 
could be interpreted as referring to all and only conditions that are absolutely prohibitive 
of survival or reproduction, such as suicide or infertility. But such an interpretation would 
render entirely questionable the conceptual or clinical utility of the recommendation, 
since very few conditions would meet such stringent criteria. 
Kendell (1986) has come to reject his prior definition of “disease”, and, 
furthermore, argues that at present no adequate definition exists, though that it would be 
desirable to find one in order to resolve diagnostic controversies in a rational manner. In 
criticizing his prior attempt, he offers some fairly straightforward arguments that are 
worth noting here. He suggests that the core concept of disease attempted there rested 
upon the concept of “impairment of function”, and the notion of functional impairment of 
a part of an organism seems to rest upon whether or not it contributes to the functioning 
of the organism as a whole (Ibid., 32). But because organisms are not artifacts, it is 
unclear what their “essential functions” are. In the case of non-human animals, people 
typically suppose that survival and reproduction are essential functions, and therefore that 
the appropriate criteria for evaluating such impairment is a reduction in their chances for 
 
58 The authors qualify this statement to exclude those environments that are specifically created to manage 
or compensate for the condition.  
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survival and reproduction (as in Kendell [1975b]). Humans, on the other hand, are 
inclined to assume that they were “meant” or “designed for” loftier goals, and that: 
 
[W]e were designed to fulfill a far wider and more exalted range of functions than 
merely reproducing the DNA of our germ cells. We believe that we were in some 
sense ‘meant’ to be honest and trustworthy, to form stable, monogamous 
relationships, to be rational and even-tempered, intelligent and sensitive, and that 
any serious lapse from these self-imposed norms is due to a dysfunction or 
disorder of some kind to which we have attached labels like psychopathy, 
character neurosis, dyslexia, and pyromania. (Ibid., 35) 
 
Consequently, the concept of “impairment of functioning” does not provide the sort of 
purely “biomedical” rather than “sociopolitical” criterion of disease that he had wished 
for (Ibid., 25), since Kendell believes that the concept of human functioning it 
presupposes is relative to social ideals concerning human well-being or the “good life”.  
 Even supposing, however, that survival and reproduction are sufficiently 
uncontroversial goals to impute to human beings, he deems his former concept of 
“intrinsic biological disadvantage” to qualify neither as a necessary nor sufficient 
condition of “disease”. He argues against it by invoking intuitively plausible 
counterexamples, rather than by appealing to a small set of principled adequacy 
conditions. It is not sufficient, he claims, because it ignores human volition: a man, for 
example, may choose not to reproduce because he wants to become a monk, thereby 
placing himself at a biological disadvantage. Yet for that reason alone he is not ill. 
Consequently, placing oneself at a biological disadvantage does not suffice for having a 
disease (Ibid.). (Klein [1978, 64] similarly rejects Kendell’s (1975b) definition on the 
grounds that it would make the rational use of contraception a disease.)  On the other 
hand, he claims, being placed at a biological disadvantage is not necessary for having a 
disease, since there are several conditions that are uncontroversially regarded by 
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physicians as diseases, such as psoriasis and chicken pox, which do not necessarily place 
their bearers at a biological disadvantage.  
However, it should be borne in mind that the ability to discover a small set of 
isolated counterexamples to one’s definition should not suffice to invalidate the definition 
or to exclude it from any further consideration. This is particularly true in the case of 
psychiatry, when there are very few uncontroversial exemplars of mental disorders that 
one can reliably invoke. Hence, the analytical strategy followed by this dissertation will 
typically involve, as has been the case in this section, the defense of a small set of 
principled adequacy conditions and the evaluation of proposals on that basis rather than 
the reliance upon the more ad hoc approach exemplified in Kendell (1986). 
2.3.2 Spitzer and Endicott’s (1978) Operational Criteria for “Dysfunction” 
For Spitzer and Endicott (1978), the concept of disorder (whether mental or 
nonmental) includes three main components: an inferred internal dysfunction, negative 
consequences of the condition, and a “call to action”. This call to action is addressed to 
society, to provide medical assistance for people with the condition, and to the individual 
so afflicted, to adopt the “sick role”. These three components, however, are not 
independent of one another in their view. For if the “call to action” is truly warranted, the 
condition must be seen as having negative consequences that stem from an inner 
dysfunction: “Implicit in the call to action is the assumption that something has gone 
wrong within the human organism which has led to negative consequences” (Ibid., 18). 
Hence, similar to the view expressed in Klein’s (1978) analysis of “mental illness” (see 
Section 2.3.3), the presence of an inner dysfunction that produces negative consequences 
is crucial for legitimizing the “sick role”, presumably because it carries the connotation 
that the person in whom the dysfunction resides is not responsible for those negative 
consequences, but rather, is “afflicted” by them – the “patient”, rather than the agent; or, 
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the one who suffers, rather than the one who acts. Consequently, due to its prescriptive 
connotations, the authors recognize the importance of providing some explanation of the 
conditions under which something is considered a dysfunction.  
However, although Spitzer and Endicott provide an explicit definition of 
“disorder” and of “mental disorder” (as cited above in Section 2.1.2), they do not attempt 
an explicit definition of “dysfunction”. Rather, they claim to provide “detailed 
operational criteria” (Spitzer and Endicott [1978, 17]) for applying their definition of 
disorder, and the satisfaction of these criteria is supposed to imply there is such a 
dysfunction. An advantage that they claim to be associated with providing operational 
criteria for their definition is that it allows them to avoid the perplexing and controversial 
task of providing explicit definitions of terms such as “dysfunction”, “maladaptive”, and 
“abnormal”, which often figure into other definitions of “mental disorder” (Ibid., 17). In 
order to evaluate the adequacy of their attempt, then, some elaboration of the notion of an 
“operational definition” is warranted, since, if this can be successfully carried out, then 
the whole project of constructing an explicit definition (one replete with necessary and 
sufficient conditions) for “dysfunction” can be avoided.  
In its classical sense, an “operational definition” for a term is a definition that 
consists of a set of procedures, or “operations”, that any sufficiently informed and 
competent person can perform to determine the applicability of the term (e.g., Bridgman 
[1936]). A conventional example is “length”. On the one hand, one might try to define 
“length” explicitly as, e.g., “a measure of spatial extension”, although, if one were asked 
to define “spatial extension”, one would rapidly end up in very perplexing and 
philosophically controversial territory. Is spatiality a phenomenal concept, a physical 
concept, or something different altogether? An operational definition of the term, on the 
other hand, consists of a set of instructions for determining the length of an object, e.g., 
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“lay a rigid rod of type R end to end along the object in question and count how many 
times you perform this procedure. If you have done this n times, then the length of the 
object is n R’s.” So long as one understands how to carry out the procedure, any further 
conceptual analysis of “length” is unnecessary.  
Furthermore, an operational definition of a term is intended, in the strictest sense, 
to qualify as a definition of the term, rather than, say, a defeasible indicator for the 
applicability of the term. For example, if one were given an operational definition of 
determining the truth of any statement of the form, “Object x is n meters long”, and one 
were to reply by asking, “Yes, but what does it really mean to say that the object 
possesses length, over and above the fact that such an operation yields certain results?”, 
one’s response would be confused or meaningless. The specified procedure completely 
and exhaustively determines the applicability of the term.59
Although the foregoing explanation may seem to belabor the point, it is important 
to clarify precisely the status of the criteria that Spitzer and Endicott offer. For those 
criteria, by their own admission, do not qualify as an operational definition of 
“dysfunction”, but rather, a set of indicators that psychiatrists often take to strongly 
suggest the presence of an organismic dysfunction. Moreover, they are not really 
“procedures” in the narrow sense in which the term is typically used, that is, to stand for a 
series of physical or symbolic manipulations. For although some of their indicators for 
whether or not a person has an inner dysfunction qualify as “procedures” in this sense, 
others demand a more introspective approach on the part of the psychiatrist regarding the 
extent to which he or she is capable of sympathizing with the goals of the person whose 
 
59 One of the main problems with operationalism is precisely the fact that what appears to be a single 
concept, such as weight, may be associated with several different types of quantitative measurements, 
which suggests a difference between the concept itself and its associated measures. The operationalist, in 
turn, typically rejects this appearance of unity, and insists that, e.g., each usage of the expression “weight” 
in “atomic weight”, “weight of a person”, and “weight of a planet”, stands for a different concept. 
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psychiatric condition is under evaluation. Nonetheless, even granting this broad sense of 
“procedure”, two consequences immediately follow concerning their proposal.  
The first is that, since they do not offer a definition of “dysfunction”, operational 
or not, the task of explicating “dysfunction” remains an open one. This is not to say that, 
for all practical purposes, the criteria they propose are insufficient for many of the 
diagnostic and classificatory purposes to which they may be put. It is also not to say that 
a “good science” requires rigorous definitions, operational or not, for all of the terms in 
its specialized nomenclature. Nonetheless, in the absence of such an explication, one 
cannot evaluate the extent to which the use of “dysfunction” in the psychiatric context is 
sufficiently constrained to permit a clear distinction to be drawn between mental 
disorders proper and any significantly socially-disvalued psychological or behavioral 
condition. But drawing this distinction constitutes the motive for explicating the term in 
the first place! 
The second is that, since they rely upon the sympathetic evaluation of the 
consulting clinician in determining whether or not something is a mental disorder, the 
criteria admit of externalist ascription and hence do not satisfy CA2*, since the extent to 
which a psychiatrist is capable of sympathizing with another can change in ways that are 
independent of changes within the other person. This provides a further reason why these 
criteria should not be thought to constitute part of the definition of the term 
“dysfunction”. However, as will be described below, the elaboration of the criteria they 
offer may still be useful in imposing reasonable constraints upon a definition of 
“dysfunction”, and hence they will be elaborated in some detail. 
After providing an explicit definition of “disorder” (quoted in Section 2.1.2) they 
propose four criteria to determine its applicability more precisely and concretely. The 
first criterion (A) specifies that the condition in its developed form must be associated 
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with distress, disability, or disadvantage, in all environments (besides the one specifically 
created to compensate for the condition) (Ibid., 19). This criterion guarantees that the 
condition is associated with the sorts of negative consequences that warrant the sick role. 
They also provide a list of six specific disadvantages (a through f) any of which, they 
claim, is presently considered, “in our culture, as suggestive of some type of organismic 
dysfunction”:  
 
a. Impaired ability to make important environmental discriminations 
b. Lack of ability to reproduce 
c. Cosmetically unattractive because of a deviation in kind, rather than degree, 
from physical structure 
d. Atypical and inflexible sexual or other impulse-driven behavior which often 
has painful consequences 
e. Impairment in the ability to experience sexual pleasure in an interpersonal 
context 
f. Marked impairment in the ability to form relatively lasting and nonconflictual 
interpersonal relationships (Ibid., 20).  
 
The reason that the authors explicitly relativize this list of “disadvantages” to a 
specific culture at a specific time is because they recognize that the types of conditions 
that are recognized as disadvantageous are susceptible to change depending upon the 
importance that a given culture places upon the associated normal behavior. Therefore, 
according to Hare’s distinctions raised in Chapter 1.3, “disadvantage” as they use it is an 
evaluative term. But this implies that its application is subject to change as a function of 
changing values and consequently its ascription is externalist, and hence it does not 
satisfy CA2*. For example, Spitzer recognizes that claiming “impairment in the ability to 
experience sexual pleasure in an interpersonal context” as a significant disadvantage is, in 
part, a politically motivated effort to exclude homosexuality as a mental disorder but 
include fetishism and other forms of sexual arousal that do not involve other human 
beings as mental disorders, and that whether one considers this inability to qualify as a 
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disadvantage is relative to the value one places on the associated ability (Spitzer [1981, 
212]; also see Section 2.1.2 on Spitzer’s introduction of the concept of “disadvantage”). 
Hence criterion (A) does not belong within a definition of “dysfunction”, operational or 
not.   
The second criterion (B) is more interesting in this context because it represents, 
along with the third criterion (C), their attempt to provide more specific indicators for the 
presence of an organismic dysfunction, or to justify the expression that “something is 
wrong within the organism” (Ibid., 26). According to criterion (B), “the controlling 
variables [of the disorder] tend to be attributed to being largely within the organism with 
regard to either initiating or maintaining the condition” (Ibid.). The intuition that this 
criterion is supposed to capture is that nothing has necessarily “gone wrong within” the 
organism if that organism’s disturbing or unusual behavior is merely a response to some 
transitory environmental contingency, or that it is merely due to “noxious environmental 
influences” (Ibid., 28). Puzzlingly, they say that, “the violation of this principle results in 
labeling dissidents in certain countries as mentally ill on the basis of their inability to 
conform to the political and social norms of a particular repressive society” (Ibid.). 
Presumably, their idea is that if one revolts against a repressive society, then one’s 
actions are spawned more by noxious environmental stimuli rather than some inner 
mechanism that disposes one toward exhibiting rebellious tendencies and that it should 
therefore not qualify as stemming from an inner dysfunction. 
The third criterion, (C), is that a condition is not included if the negative 
consequences of the condition are “apparently the necessary price associated with 
attaining some positive goal” (Ibid.). This provision excludes childbirth from qualifying 
as a disorder, as well as the grief following the loss of a loved one, insofar as the pain of 
childbirth is the price one pays for children, and grief is the price one pays for having 
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attachments, and the goals of having children, or emotional attachments to others, are 
positive ones. This criterion captures the intuition that, “when individuals undergo 
deprivation and distress in order to obtain some understandable positive goal, we assume 
that the organism is working and do not infer a dysfunction” (Ibid., 29). However, this 
raises the fairly obvious objection that the distress associated with the pursuit of certain 
goals by a person can, in and of itself, indicate a mental disorder, such as the goal of 
avoiding former friends and loved ones if it is motivated by the unwarranted belief that 
they wish to harm one. Hence the authors point out that, “the distress is less likely to be 
considered as due to a mental disorder to the extent that the positive goal is 
understandable and in keeping with reality” (Ibid., 29). But the fact that this indicator for 
the presence of an internal dysfunction relies upon a person’s capacity – not necessarily 
the one that has the alleged dysfunction – to sympathize with the goals and motivations 
of another implies that the criterion admits of externalist ascription, and hence, like 
criterion (A), if it were to be adopted as a component of an operational definition for 
“dysfunction” it would not satisfy CA2*, in the sense that its applicability can change by 
changing the psychological state of the evaluating psychiatrist, where this change need 
not have any effect on the person whose condition is being evaluated. 
The fourth criterion, (D), states that the condition must be distinct from others in 
at least one of the following variables: “clinical phenomenology, course, response to 
treatment, familial incidence, or etiology” (Ibid.). The purpose of this condition is to 
ensure the applicability of the so-called “medical model” as defined by Spitzer et al. 
(1977), which is the hypothesis that there are “organismic dysfunctions which are 
relatively distinct with regard to clinical features, etiology, and course” (Ibid., 5). 
The main consequence that follows from these considerations about the authors’ 
proposed criteria is that, as noted above, because the criteria consist of defeasible 
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indicators for the presence of an inner dysfunction, it does not qualify as a definition of 
the term, and hence does not satisfy the motivation for explicating the term. Nonetheless, 
the criteria they propose are useful because they express, as a matter of descriptive 
sociology, the sorts of considerations that psychiatrists have implicitly used, and, 
perhaps, continue to use in practice, to infer the presence of a dysfunction. Hence, these 
criteria may be useful for placing some reasonable constraints on any definition of 
“dysfunction” that is suitable for the psychiatric context, namely, that to the extent that 
psychiatrists do implicitly apply these criteria, it ought to make sense of why they do so, 
that is, why they tend to take these criteria as valid indicators for an inner dysfunction. 
That does not mean that a definition of “dysfunction” should assume that these indicators 
really are valid, in the sense that they actually measure the construct their use is intended 
to measure, but that it should make sense out of why they are often thought to be valid. 
For example, by definition, if something within a person is “malfunctioning”, then it is 
not just the case that it is not currently performing its function, but that it is in some sense 
incapable of doing so, even in the range of environments within which, historically, it 
came to possess that function. As a consequence, one would expect Spitzer and 
Endicott’s criterion (B.1) to be a reliable indicator of an inner dysfunction (along with the 
other criteria), namely, that “simple informative or standard educational procedures do 
not lead to a reversal of the condition” (Spitzer and Endicott [1978, 27]). This is because 
the incapacity of a trait to perform its function is not typically a consequence of 
ignorance or mistaken beliefs on the part of the person who possesses the trait, and this is 
often true, in turn, because the historical entrenchment of functional traits should 
guarantee some measure of functional autonomy from the conscious volition of the 
person who possesses them. Wakefield (1993) in an illuminating critique of the same 
article – despite his gratuitous appeals to organismic “design” – makes a similar point 
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about their criterion (B.2), according to which, “nontechnical interventions do not bring 
about a quick reversal of the condition”. As he points out, as a matter of empirical 
contingency, organisms and artifacts “generally function the way they are designed to 
function” (Ibid., 169). As a consequence, “breakdowns in designed functioning are likely 
to be less frequent and their solution is likely to involve specialized knowledge, so the 
appropriate interventions are more likely to be left to a technical elite” (Ibid.). Hence the 
link between being dysfunctional, and requiring technical intervention, though 
contingent, ought to be a reliable one. Moreover, insofar as these criteria are not 
definitional, their practical and clinical utility is not threatened because some of the 
conditions for their satisfaction are externalist (do not satisfy CA2*). 
2.3.3 Klein’s (1978) Evolutionary Definition of “Dysfunction” 
One of the recurring themes within the foregoing definitions of “dysfunction” is 
that having a dysfunctional condition (disease, disorder, etc.) depends upon the 
consequences that the condition produces, rather than its history or causes. One of the 
reasons for these attempts to construct consequentialist definitions of “dysfunction” is 
that in most cases, the etiology of the mental disorder is unknown, and hence if the 
definition had to rely on etiology, the warrant for applying the term would be 
questionable. Even where etiology is known, however – as in the case of substance-
induced delirium – or when plausible theories exist to account for the origin of the 
disorder, the diversity of known or plausible causes does not seem to fit any unique or 
well-defined pattern that could be encompassed by a single definition. (This was the 
rationale behind Kendell’s [1975b] restriction to consequences.) For some disorders, such 
as bipolar disorder – at least if one judges by the relative efficacy of pharmacological 
intervention in ameliorating them – some biological etiology appears plausible; for 
others, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or adjustment disorder, the etiology 
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is almost, as a matter of definition, “psychological” in that it refers to the manner in 
which an agent interprets, or gives meaning to, his or her experiences.60 This multiplicity 
of etiological patterns also holds true for nonmental medical disorders as well, some of 
which stem from a determinable lesion, some from the presence or absence of a specific 
protein, and others from a quantitative deficit of a vital nutrient.  
Nonetheless, consequentialist definitions of “dysfunction” are also problematic, 
since the sorts of consequences that a condition gives rise to, and, more importantly, how 
those consequences are interpreted and valued, are often so contingent upon the specific 
environment within which the afflicted person finds himself or herself that, in the final 
analysis, whether or not the condition qualifies as dysfunctional (disordered, etc.) need 
not be determined by, or supervene upon, changes that take place within the individual 
himself or herself. 
The approach taken by Klein (1978) differs from the foregoing attempts in that it 
is explicitly etiological in character (although it does contain some consequentialist 
components). Reading him generously, he defines the “function” of a trait in terms of its 
evolutionary history, and specifically, in terms of its selection history. Then he defines 
“dysfunction” as a suboptimal deviation from this function. Hence, for a trait to be 
dysfunctional it must be unable to perform the activity for which it is an adaptation.  
Two features of this definition should be remarked upon. The first is that the 
etiological approach exhibited by Klein’s definition reveals an interesting conceptual 
relation between two apparently disparate facets of the prior, consequentialist, attempts to 
define “dysfunction”. The first facet is that although they both proved inadequate because 
they failed to satisfy CA2*, nothing was stated concerning whether or not they satisfy 
 
60 This does not, of course, mean that psychological and biological models are mutually exclusive or that 
disorders do not emerge from the interaction of several types of processes; see Bolton (2003) for discussion 
and references on the interaction between biological and psychological causes of PTSD. 
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CA1. The reason for this is that neither Kendell (1975b) nor Spitzer and Endicott (1978) 
attempt to define the corresponding concept of “function”. They both, as it were, skip 
ahead to define its negative counterpart, “dysfunction”, directly, rather than to build upon 
the intuition that being dysfunctional involves a privation or aberration of normal 
functioning, and that its definition should reflect this dependence relation. The second 
feature of these attempts is that both are motivated by despair of finding any unique 
etiological pattern which can encompass all of the diverse ways in which something 
within the organism can “go wrong”, and hence conclude that etiological definitions will 
be hopelessly inadequate to the task. Yet if the problem of defining “dysfunction” is 
transformed into the problem of defining “function”, and if the former is defined in terms 
of the latter, there need not be any unique etiological account of the way in which a 
functional trait becomes “dysfunctional”. An organ, for example, can “malfunction” 
because of a lesion, a microbial infection, or by a deficit of some vital nutrient – so long 
as any of these causes impede its normal function from being carried out, it can rightly be 
called “dysfunctional”.  
The second major feature of the etiological approach exhibited by Klein’s 
definition is that it is, in general, capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions (despite 
the fact that one of the elements of Klein’s particular formulation appears to fall afoul of 
CA2*, as will be discussed below). On the one hand, it is capable of satisfying CA1. As 
noted above, in order for a definition of “function” to lend itself to a corresponding 
definition of “dysfunction”, it must allow a conceptual distinction to be drawn between 
having a function and performing a function, since being dysfunctional involves having a 
function that one cannot perform. If the function of a trait is determined by its history – 
for example, that for which it is an adaptation – then whether or not a trait has a function 
is conceptually independent of whether it is currently capable of performing that 
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function. Another way of putting the point is that having a function supervenes upon 
one’s history, and performing a function upon one’s current structure and activity.  
 On the other hand – though this is more problematic – it is capable of satisfying 
CA2*, since whether or not a trait is dysfunctional depends upon whether or not it is 
impeded in performing the activity for which it is an adaptation, and this often, although 
not always, supervenes upon “inner” changes – namely, either those involving the 
material of which the trait is composed (assuming it to be a physical trait), the way in 
which that material is structured, or the way in which that structure physically interacts 
with other structures within the same organism. For example, if the function of the heart 
is to beat, then whether or not it is dysfunctional is determined, at least in part, by 
whether or not it is beating, and this capacity trivially supervenes upon the heart’s 
activity and structure rather than external factors such as changes in social attitudes about 
hearts.  
It is arguable that, in some cases, according to this definition, a trait becomes 
dysfunctional exclusively as a consequence of “external” factors and hence does not 
satisfy CA2*. For example, it may be that the function of sperm is to fertilize ova, and 
that a given sperm is impeded in its capacity to do so because of a woman’s use of oral 
contraception, in which case the sperm cannot perform its function even though no 
structural change distinguishes it from a functional sperm. Nonetheless, it is not as 
conceptually difficult to restrict the etiological definition of “function” in such a way as 
to exclude such counterexamples, as it is to restrict the consequentialist definitions in a 
similar manner. In fact, the purpose of Chapter 3 is to argue that of the major explications 
of “function” that have been proposed by philosophers, only etiological accounts are 
capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions. This claim is not, of course, equivalent to 
the claim that it is not possible for a non-etiological account of function to satisfy both 
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adequacy conditions or that non-etiological accounts do not have the “conceptual 
resources” to do so, but it will provide compelling evidence for the latter.  
What follows is an overview of Klein (1978), an elucidation of the main problems 
it confronts, and potential solutions to those problems. For Klein, like Spitzer and 
Endicott (1978), the notion of a mental disorder incorporates two different components 
that stand in a certain relation to one another. The first component is a sociological one: a 
person with a mental disorder occupies the “sick role”. The sick role can be self-ascribed 
or assigned by others. The second is that there is an involuntary impairment in 
organismic functioning (Klein [1978, 70]). Again, like the DSM-III characterization, this 
impairment is thought of as a property of the individual that is not relative to the 
individual’s current social environment. The relation between the two, however, is not a 
causal one; rather it is a legal or ethical one: the involuntary impairment (or organismic 
dysfunction) legitimately entitles a person to occupation of the sick role.  
The position of the “sick role” within the hierarchy of social roles will be briefly 
outlined. A “socially-defined role” implies a “system of rights and duties” that “defines 
the expectations regarding the action of others toward you and vice versa” (Ibid., 42). 
Role relationships can be “exploitative” or “fair”, the latter implying reciprocal exchange 
of benefits. One type of exploitative social role is the “exempt role”, in which the person 
exempts himself or herself (or is exempted by others) from normal obligations and duties. 
The occupation of the exempt role can be legitimate or parasitical. The “sick role”, then, 
is a type of legitimate exempt role, and the legitimacy of occupying the sick role is 
bestowed by involuntary impairment. 
What is interesting about Klein’s definition is that it approaches the notion of a 
mental disorder from the standpoint of a problematic claim to exemption from reciprocal 
rights and duties. In other words, Klein conceives of the clinical decision procedure in 
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psychiatry not as the attempt to differentiate between mental disorder and mere “social 
deviance”, but the attempt to differentiate legitimate and parasitical claims to the exempt 
role. Both of these roles entail exploitative role relationships. The import of this 
perspective is that regardless of whether the person in question truly has a mental 
disorder, or merely exhibits failure of social-role functioning, the behavior that 
eventuates in clinical psychiatric consultation is exploitative and therefore ought to be 
changed. 
Klein observes that it is problematic to define “disease”, “illness”, or “disorder” 
merely in terms of its undesirable clinical manifestations, since what are considered to 
constitute “undesirable manifestations” tend to vary with the values and ideals of a given 
social group. At the extreme, the person who accepts this analysis of “illness” would have 
to accept Sedgwick’s (1973) conclusion that, “there is no mental or physical illness in 
nature…The human evaluation of certain conditions and being deviant and undesirable 
leads to their segregation as states of illness” (cited in Klein [1978, 45]). The problem 
with Sedgwick’s conclusion, however, is that it misses the “necessary crucial inference” 
behind the attribution of illness, namely that “something has gone wrong [within the 
individual], not simply that something is undesirable” (Ibid., 46). Thus, the problem that 
Klein confronts is that of defining a concept of disease that is conceptually independent 
of all and any of its negatively-valued consequences: 
 
[C]an one define disease in a fashion conceptually independent of illness? Is there 
a positive, scientifically definable criterion for pathogenic process or disease? Can 
one distinguish an abnormal disease state from simple biological variation without 
using illness as a necessary condition? Unless we can do this we will not be able 
to meet Sedgwick’s criticism that all illness and disease categories fundamentally 
represent nothing but arbitrary social evaluation. How do we know that something 
has gone wrong? (Ibid., 49) 
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 Such a concept of disease, Klein thinks, is available, and can be drawn from “the 
systematic implications of modern biology” (Ibid., 45). Specifically, the inference that 
“something has gone wrong” within the person can be justified through evolutionary 
reasoning. Insofar as organismic forms are adapted, through natural selection, to perform 
certain functions that contribute to their survival and reproductive capacity, then a 
dysfunctional condition can be equated with the incapacity of a trait to perform the 
activity that it was selected for. More precisely, a dysfunctional state is “a suboptimal 
deviation from [an] evolutionary determined process” (Ibid., 51).  
 There are two problems that arise with his formulation of his position. The first is 
that, although he states that evolutionary theory is relevant to the determination of 
function, he never provides an explicit definition of “function”, and hence his usage 
allows for multiple cogent interpretations. For example, he writes that, “species develop a 
variety of ancillary biological equipment and practices, through variation and selection, 
fulfilling specific adaptive functions” (Ibid., 50). These adaptive functions include, for 
example, energy gathering, information gathering, and others which, typically, “serve an 
overall organismal goal of survival” (Ibid., 51).  One plausible interpretation of his usage 
of “function” that this passage suggests is that the function of a trait should be defined in 
terms of its evolutionary history. According to this etiological definition, a trait currently 
has the function of performing an activity only if the activity of that trait has, historically, 
been selected for by natural selection over other variants of that trait. Consequently, such 
function ascriptions involve commitments to hypotheses concerning actual historical 
circumstances. 
Yet his comment is also consistent with a different definition of “function”, 
according to which the function of a trait merely consists in its capacity to satisfy a 
specific biological need, such as energy gathering, that can be determined independently 
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of any knowledge about the actual course of evolution. Certainly, traits that contribute to 
such vital activities more efficiently or effectively than others will tend to get selected 
for, and they may be adaptations themselves, yet this would be a contingent rather than a 
necessary consequence of the fact that it serves an adaptive “function”. 
 This second interpretation of “function” is suggested by the importance that Klein 
places upon adopting an “engineering perspective” for the determination of function, and 
specifically, for the determination of a trait’s “optimal functioning”: “With growing 
biological knowledge, we will be able to make more and more exact statements 
concerning optimum part and integrative functioning from an engineering point of view” 
(Ibid., 52).  This suggests that, conceptually, a trait performs an adaptive function insofar 
as, from an engineering point of view, it exemplifies “good design” for satisfying a given 
biological need, rather than because it has been selected for that activity.  
The reason that the distinction between these two different concepts of “function” 
is important to emphasize in this context is that it critically determines the extent to 
which the definition of function satisfies CA1, and, by extension, CA2*, in a fairly non-
problematic manner. For, as noted above, the evolutionary definition of “function” 
clearly and non-problematically satisfies CA1, since the criteria for having a function and 
performing that function are different: the first relies on evolutionary history; the second 
on current structure and dynamics. It is unclear how this distinction would be made given 
the second definition of “function” – according to which something must exhibit “good 
design” for a specified task – since the latter suggests that something has a function only 
insofar as it regularly or typically does contribute to satisfying some biological need. 
This, in turn, suggests that the criterion for functioning well versus being dysfunctional 
would require a statistical component, e.g., a token of a given biological type would be 
dysfunctional only if it is not performing the activity that the vast majority of tokens of 
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that type perform in a manner that exemplifies good design from an engineering point of 
view. Yet this criterion would fail CA2*, since, as noted above, statistical abnormality is 
an externalist criterion for marking the distinction between a dysfunctional and non-
dysfunctional token of a trait.  
Despite the ambiguity in its formulation, then, it will be assumed that Klein 
proposes an etiological definition of function. This is also consistent with a much later 
article by Klein (Klein [1999, 423]), in which he largely endorses Wakefield’s (1992a; 
1992b) “harmful dysfunction” analysis of disorder (see Section 1.3) according to which a 
“disorder” is a “harmful dysfunction”, and “dysfunction” is analyzed etiologically, as a 
deviation from an evolutionarily determined function. Insofar as it is etiological, Klein’s 
definition of function satisfies CA1.  
However, his formulation, as it currently stands, does not clearly satisfy CA2*. 
This is because he defines “dysfunction” as a suboptimal deviation from an evolutionarily 
determined process, and hence its application presupposes an assessment of “optimal 
functioning”. Yet according to Klein, standards of optimal functioning are relative to the 
specific environment of the organism: “Optimum functioning can be defined only with 
regard to specified environments” (Klein [1978, 52]). For example, he writes, “it seems 
evident that certain physiological functions are optimum and adaptive to the Arctic but 
would be suboptimum and maladaptive for the tropics, e.g., spheriodal versus elongated 
body” (Ibid.). But in the absence of a specific criterion by which “optimal” functioning 
can be determined, one cannot evaluate whether or not this standard satisfies CA2*. For 
example, if the optimal level of functioning for a given trait of a given individual is 
determined by the range of variation that is actually exhibited across the population in 
question, then the assessment of optimal functioning admits of externalist elements and 
hence does not satisfy CA2* – since whether or not something within the individual is 
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functioning “optimally” depends upon what the other individuals are doing. But if the 
range of variation in performance according to which “optimal” can be identified is not 
determined by the range of performance actually exhibited by the members of a given 
population, then the basis for this standard of optimal performance must be specified. 
Although Klein recognizes that this relativization to the environment “makes for 
great complexity” (Ibid.), he does not think that it essentially undermines the definition 
since merely relativizing standards of “optimal functioning” to the current environment is 
different from reducing function ascriptions “to the arbitrary category of pure 
idiosyncratic evaluation” (Ibid.). Certainly, Klein is correct that being environmentally-
relative is not the same as being subjective. Yet unless the environmental changes have 
an effect upon the characteristic structure or activity of the trait in question, then the 
claim that a given trait’s activity is dysfunctional admits of externalist determination, and 
that is what his definition must avoid.  
Of course, this inability to satisfy CA2* is not an insurmountable problem for 
etiological dysfunction ascriptions as such, but only for Klein’s proposal. For example, 
one can define a “dysfunctional” trait as one that is incapable of performing its function 
even in those environments within which it came to possess that function. (This is 
precisely the strategy that will be adopted in the next chapter.) This modification prevents 
a functional trait from becoming “dysfunctional” merely because the bearer of the trait in 
question has been placed into an environment to which it is not habituated.61 This 
definition of “dysfunction” has the advantage that it can distinguish a dysfunctional trait 
from one that is incapable of functioning merely because it is within a highly abnormal 
environment. Moreover, this supports the intuition expressed in Spitzer and Endicott 
 
61 That etiological function ascriptions should be relativized to the “normal” environment of the trait, 
where this norm is determined by the range of environments within which the trait came to possess the 
function, is made explicit in Millikan (1984, 33). 
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(1978) that one should distinguish between the case in which something is really “going 
wrong within” the organism and the case in which the abnormal trait activity is a 
response to “noxious environmental stimuli”. Finally, this restriction is consistent with 
Klein’s own qualification that a trait should not be considered “dysfunctional” if its 
suboptimal performance according to one criterion is a result of the fact that it is actively 
compensating for impairment of a different trait (Klein [1978, 52]) since this suboptimal 
performance on one criterion may be a highly adaptive response to an abnormal 
environment. In other words, supposing a trait to be unable currently to perform its 
function, the judgement that the trait is “dysfunctional” involves, in addition, a negative 
answer to the counterfactual question: given the current structure and activity of the trait, 
were it to be situated in its normal environment, would its still be incapable of performing 
its function? Note that the concept of “environment” here refers not only to the external 
environment of the organism that bears the trait but also to the internal physiology of the 
organism within which the functional item is embedded. 
Many of these modifications to the etiological definition of function that Klein 
proposes will be elaborated and defended in detail in the following chapters. The purpose 
of its introduction here is to suggest the rich conceptual resources that etiological theories 
of function permit in satisfying the two adequacy conditions that have been imposed 
upon any definition of “function” that is relevant to the psychiatric context. In the next 
chapter, etiological and non-etiological definitions of “function” (and “dysfunction”) will 
be elaborated and a more rigorous analysis of the extent to which etiological definitions 
of function uniquely satisfy both adequacy conditions will be provided.  
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Chapter 3: From Internal Dysfunctions to Etiological Functions 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the etiological theory of function is 
uniquely capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions outlined in the previous chapter 
(Section 2.2.2). The first adequacy condition (CA1) is that any definition of function must 
lend itself to constructing a corresponding definition of “dysfunction”; the second (CA2*) 
is that it must do so in such a way that the difference between a dysfunctional and non-
dysfunctional entity is not determined by externalist criteria. According to the etiological 
theory of function, to ascribe a function to an entity is to say something about its history; 
specifically, it is to provide an explanation for how that type of entity came to exist, or 
why it continues to exist. The next chapter will defend the appropriateness of a specific 
version of the etiological theory of functions, namely, the “strong persistence-based 
etiological theory”, according to which the function of an item is that effect that it was 
selected for by some selection process and which thereby explains the persistence or 
reproduction of that type of entity within a population of such entities.  
The first section (Section 3.1) will provide an overview and taxonomy of current 
philosophical theories of function (that is, explications of what “function” means). At the 
most general level, there are two main theories of function: those according to which the 
function of an entity is determined exclusively by its causal history (etiological) and 
those according to which it is determined, in part, by the consequences that the entity 
produces (consequentialist). Within each of these categories there are several 
subdivisions that depend upon the precise way in which the term is defined.  
The taxonomy that will be presented will not be complete in the sense of 
categorizing all possible theories of function. For example, one could invent a theory of 
function according to which the function of an entity is determined by history, yet the 
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past events that determine the function have no causal relationship with the currently 
existing entity. The taxonomy that will be presented will have no category for such a 
theory. This is because the only reason that theories of function that refer to past events 
are contrived is because they are intended to be explanatory, and so it is not clear what 
would motivate a theory of function that refers to past events that do not explain the 
present existence of the entity. 
 The second section (Section 3.2) will argue that the etiological theory of function 
is uniquely capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions. It will do so by showing that 
the consequentialist theories outlined in Section 3.1 violate one or the other conditions, 
and that etiological theories are consistent with both. It will not provide a deductive 
argument that it is not possible for a consequentialist theory of function to satisfy both 
adequacy conditions, but rather, it will argue for this claim by showing that well-
developed consequentialist attempts to define “dysfunction” fall afoul of one or the other 
adequacy conditions. In some sense, the arguments presented in this chapter merely 
represent a systematization of those presented in the previous chapter (Section 2.3). 
 Are etiological definitions of “function” in general more appropriate for scientific 
activity than other types of definitions? As noted in the first chapter – and as will be 
noted below – different uses of the notion of function seem to exist even within biology. 
The viewpoint adopted in this dissertation, then, is a broadly pluralist one: different 
concepts of function may be appropriate for different contexts. Although this chapter 
argues that etiological definitions of function are necessary and sufficient for satisfying 
the two adequacy conditions specified in the previous chapter, it does not discuss here 
whether fulfilling these two adequacy conditions is in any ultimate sense desirable or 
good. This issue will be raised again in the concluding chapter.  
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3.1 TAXONOMY OF THEORIES OF FUNCTION 
As noted above, there are two main approaches to defining “function”: those that 
assume that function ascriptions explain how that type of entity came to exist 
(etiological), and those that assume that function ascriptions refer only to the 
consequences that the entity produces (consequentialist). Etiological theories are often 
called “backwards-looking” theories and consequentialist, “forward-looking” theories. 
However, since a theory can be both “backwards” and “forward” looking, the following 
taxonomy will label as “etiological” all theories that contain only etiological criteria – 
that is, those that refer exclusively to history – and it will label “consequentialist” all 
theories that contain any consequentialist criteria (even if they contain some etiological 
criteria as well).62 In the first subsection (3.1.1), the problem context that historically 
motivated the analysis of function statements will be presented, and it will be shown how 
this context motivates the two main types of analyses that are present in the literature. 
The second subsection (3.1.2) will classify etiological theories; the third subsection 
(3.1.3) will classify consequentialist theories.  
To render the terminology uniform, the following terms will be used throughout: 
an activity may be the function of an entity. Although “entity” usually connotes a spatio-
temporally discrete object, the term will be used broadly to refer to activities or qualities 
as well. This breadth is important because it avoids placing any prior restrictions upon 
permissible subjects of function ascriptions. Hence one may say that the heart (a spatio-
temporally discrete individual) has the function of beating (an activity), or that the 
 
62 This convention is the opposite of that utilized in a recent survey of functions (Garson [forthcoming]), in 
which “etiological” refers to all theories that contain any etiological component, and “consequentialist”, 
only consequentialist components. This is because, in that context, the focus was on explanation; as long as 
a theory has any etiological component it is explanatory. In this context, the emphasis is on normativity, 
and, as will be argued in Section 3.2.1, if a theory of function contains any consequentialist criteria then it 
cannot be normative in the required sense – that is, it cannot define “dysfunction” in a way that satisfies 
both conditions. 
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heart’s beating (an activity) has the function of circulating blood (another activity), or 
that dark coloration (a quality) has the function of predator avoidance (an activity). This 
entity (whether a thing, an activity, or a quality) is usually a part of a system, but it may 
not be. Occasionally, in the biological context, trait will be used synonymously with part, 
and the individual that possesses the trait the bearer of the trait or the trait-bearer. 
3.1.1 The Problem-Context for Explications of Function  
A simple example of a function statement can serve as an introduction to the main 
problem that such statements confront. Suppose one asks the following question: “Why 
do polar bears have dense, water-repellent fur?” A common answer might be, “Because 
fur of that sort helps the polar bear to retain heat”. Intuitively, this appears to be a 
plausible explanation for the fact that polar bears have dense, water-repellent fur. This 
sort of explanation is often glossed by the statement that, “The function of dense fur in 
polar bears is to retain heat”. Yet it is problematic because the explanation for dense fur 
refers to an event (heat retention) that dense fur is responsible for bringing about. Causal 
explanations, at least since the advent of modern science, are constrained by the principle 
that a temporally prior event explains a temporally posterior event, and not vice versa. 
Hence it appears that functional explanations cannot be causal explanations for the 
existence or form of a trait (the problem of “backwards causation”). This gives rise to the 
question of what, if anything, function ascriptions explain.  
Explanations that account for the existence or form of an entity by referring to one 
of the consequences it produces are called teleological explanations, from the Greek word 
telos, meaning “goal” or “end”. Hence function ascriptions are often thought to be a type 
of teleological explanation; if this is true, then what has been said, historically, of 
teleological explanations can equally well be said of function ascriptions. Given the 
problem of backwards causation, any plausible account of “function” must either explain 
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how it can be that the effect produced by a kind of entity can have causal relevance to the 
existence of the entity, or dissolve the misleading appearance that function ascriptions are 
teleological explanations at all. Etiological approaches to function adopt the former route; 
consequentialist approaches the latter.  
Intuitively, one might motivate either of the two main approaches to function by 
considering the following question: what distinguishes a function of an entity from a 
mere effect that it produces? To take a trite, but useful, example, why is it said that the (or 
a) function of the heart is to pump blood, rather than to make throbbing sounds? Two 
different answers present themselves as initially plausible: 
 
(i) according to the etiological view, what distinguishes the function of an 
entity from a mere effect is that the capacity of the entity to perform that 
function explains “why it is there” in that system. For example, it is the 
capacity of windshield wipers to remove water from windshields that 
explains why they are on car windshields; i.e., why manufacturers place 
them there. Similarly, it is the fact that hearts have been selected for 
because they pumped blood that explains why, presently, creatures with 
hearts exist. Therefore, in conformity with the logic of teleological 
explanation, it is true to say that the heart’s capacity to pump blood 
explains why hearts currently exist. However, supposing that the heart was 
not selected for because of the beating sounds that it makes, there is no 
sense in which the heart “is there” because of its capacity to make such 
sounds;63 
 
63 There are, of course, exceptional cases in which it can be said that the heart’s beating sounds explain 
why it is there. For example, if the beating sounds made by a person’s heart alert a doctor to a potential 
heart problem that is thereby remedied, then one can say that the heart sounds saved the person’s life and 
therefore they partly explain why the person continues to exist, and hence why the heart continues to be 
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(ii) according to the consequentialist view, the function of the heart is to pump 
blood, rather than to make noise, because the heart’s pumping blood 
contributes to some important activity of the system within which it is 
contained, and heart sounds do not. In this case, pumping blood 
contributes to circulation and this, in turn, to the survival of the organism. 
This solution corresponds to the view that the function of an entity consists 
in a (special sort of) consequence that it produces, and has nothing to do 
with the cause or origin of the item itself. 
3.1.2 Etiological Theories of Function 
There are two main versions of the etiological approach: one which refers to the 
reasons that motivate a purposeful being to create a functional object 
(“representationalism”),64 and one that refers to the natural history of the functional 
entity, independently of the notion of representation. (The latter is typically referred to as 
“etiological”, although “etiological”, properly speaking, could refer to either view; in the 
following the latter will simply be referred to as “non-representational theories of 
function”.) These views will be elaborated in turn. 
Representationalist Theories of Function 
If one takes an artifact as the paradigmatic case for analyzing “function”, then the 
most obvious way for something to come to possess a function is for somebody – an 
intelligent being – to create it for a purpose. Hence the function of the hammer is to strike 
nails because striking nails is the purpose people have in mind when they manufacture 
 
there. Does that mean that that person’s heart comes to have the function of making throbbing sounds? 
These sorts of cases will be described in greater detail below. 
64 Although “representationalism” may not seem to be the most accurate title for this view, what is central 
to the view, as will be suggested below, is that it makes some reference to a prior representation 
(presumably on the part of an intelligent agent) of the functional activity.  
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them, and that purpose explains “why they are there”: that is, why hammers exist, or why 
they have the form they do (large metal head with firm non-slip handle), or why they are 
located where they are (in the toolbox next to the nails).65 This basic observation 
underlies what one can call “representationalist” theories of function, according to which, 
if the function of X is Y, then a representation of X’s doing Y is part of the cause of X’s 
existence, form or location. This solves the problem of “backwards causation”, insofar as 
the effect does not produce the cause, but a prior representation of the effect produces the 
cause. 
To the extent that, in order for a “representation” to exist, it must exist within, or 
have been created by, a mind, representationalist theories are also mentalistic (Bedau 
[1990]). However, this mentalistic view of function does not appear to be compatible 
with a modern scientific worldview. This leads to the following question: can there also 
exist non-mentalistic representational theories of function, where representation is 
analyzed without appeal to minds? Although it may be possible to define a non-
mentalistic concept of “representation”, this possibility will not be broached any further 
in this dissertation, mainly because it would involve very similar conceptual issues: for 
example, should the definition of “representation” be an etiological one, or a 
consequentialist one? 
Non-Representationalist Theories of Function 
Whereas representationalist views resolve the problem of backwards causation by 
seeking the origin of the functional entity in a prior mental representation, non-
representationalist views seek to explain why such entities currently exist on the basis of 
entities of the same type that existed in the past and that, by virtue of producing the effect 
 
65 Wright (1973, 158) remarks that the informal locution, “why it is there”, captures all of these senses. In 
Chapter 4, the precise explanandum of functional statements will be specified: a function ascription 
explains the non-zero frequency of an entity within a population (Griffiths [1993, 415]). 
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in question, were able to persist over time or to reproduce their kind. Hence, the function 
of an entity is that effect that entities of its kind produced in the past that contributed to 
the persistence and reproduction of that entity or type of entity. Thus, non-
representationalist theories solve the problem of backwards causation by invoking a 
“cyclical” dimension:66 X did Y at time t0, and as a consequence, X persisted until t1, or X, 
by virtue of doing Y, was able to produce entities of the same type as X that exist at t1. 
Such cyclical modes of reproduction are sometimes referred to as “consequence-
etiologies” (Wright [1976, 116]), in that one of the consequences that the functional item 
produces figures into an etiological account of why it continues to exist at a later time. 
The most obvious example of a natural process that generates consequence-
etiologies is natural selection, since the differential reproduction of traits that have higher 
relative fitness than alternative traits explains the maintenance of the former within a 
population of reproducing entities. To the extent that a trait is selected for, then one can 
say that the reason it exists at present is that ancestral tokens67 of that trait produced a 
consequence in the ancestral environment that bestowed a fitness advantage upon the 
organisms that possessed it, and (assuming the trait to be heritable) led to its maintenance 
in the population, thus explaining “why it is there”. 
Several biologists throughout the twentieth century have drawn attention to the 
connection between teleological statements and natural selection, and stated explicitly 
that the existence of natural selection can justify the use of teleology in science.68 Perhaps 
the earliest reference comes from the neuroscientist Charles Sherrington, in his The 
 
66 It is “cyclical” in the sense that the activity of an entity contributes to its own maintenance and hence 
allows that entity to continue performing that activity, which continues to contribute to its maintenance, and 
so on.  
67 A “token” is philosophical jargon for an instance of a kind; a “type”, for the kind of thing of which it is 
an instance. 
68 Lennox (1993) argues that Darwin implicitly uses teleological terms such as “end” and “purpose” to 
refer to the outcome of selection processes (Ibid., 415),  though he never explicitly states this fact of his 
usage.  
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Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1906). In that work, Sherrington pauses to 
reflect on his oft-repeated use of teleological terms such as “purpose”, and his 
considerations suggest strongly that he identifies the purpose of a reflex with what it was 
selected for: 
 
That a reflex action should exhibit purpose is no longer considered evidence that a 
psychical process attaches to it; let alone that it represents any dictate of “choice” 
or “will”. In light of the Darwinian theory every reflex must be purposive. We 
here trench upon a kind of teleology…The purpose of a reflex seems as legitimate 
and urgent an object for natural inquiry as the purpose of the colouring of an 
insect or a blossom. (Ibid., 235-6) 
 
 The ethologist Konrad Lorenz makes a similar remark in his 1963 book, On 
Aggression:  
  
If we ask “What does a cat have sharp, curved claws for?” and answer simply “To 
catch mice with,” this does not imply a profession of any mythical teleology, but 
the plain statement that catching mice is the function whose survival value, by the 
process of natural selection, has bred cats with this particular form of claw. 
Unless selection is at work, the question “What for?” cannot receive an answer 
with any real meaning. (Lorenz [1966 (1963), 13-4]; cited in Griffiths [1993, 
412]) 
 
 The evolutionary biologist George Williams also emphasizes this point: “The 
designation of something as the means or mechanism for a certain goal or function or 
purpose will imply that the machinery involved was fashioned by selection for the goal 
attributed to it” (Williams [1966, 9]).69
 None of these figures, however, state why they believe that explanations based on 
natural selection fit the pattern of teleological explanations – they simply express, as it 
 
69 It is ironic that the etiological theory was primarily developed by biologists, since one of the main 
arguments against the etiological analysis is that it does not correspond to actual biological usage! 
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were, the basic intuition that they do without articulating its rationale. Perhaps the first 
attempt to justify explicitly this view is in the work of the evolutionary biologist 
Francisco Ayala (1968; 1970) who points out that, in a selectionist explanation, an effect 
that an entity produces figures into an explanation of why that type of entity currently 
exists, and this, by definition, constitutes a teleological explanation. As he points out, a 
teleological explanation is one in which “the presence of an object or a process in a 
system is explained by exhibiting its connection with a specific state or property of the 
system to whose existence or maintenance the object or process contributes” (Ayala 
[1970, 8]). Thus, he draws the conclusion that “the adaptations of organisms…are 
explained teleologically in that their existence is accounted for in terms of their 
contribution to the reproductive fitness of the organism” (Ibid., 9). Wimsatt (1972) 
provides a comprehensive philosophical analysis of the logical structure of function 
statements and argues that insofar as function statements are construed as teleological 
explanations, selection processes are the only known and plausible way in which such 
statements can be justified: “[T]he operation of selection processes is not only not special 
to biology, but appears to be at the core of teleology and purposeful activity wherever 
they occur” (Ibid.,13).70 More famously, Wright (1973, 161; also cf. Wright [1972]) 
defines “function” in terms of these consequence-etiologies and argues that natural 
selection can justify function statements (Ibid., 159).71
 
70 However, he hesitates to build this insight into a conceptual analysis of “function”, since he comes up 
with counter-examples that purport to show that being selected by a selection process is, strictly speaking, 
neither necessary nor sufficient for having a teleological function (Wimsatt [1972, 15-16]). Moreover, as 
will be discussed in detail in Section 4.1.5 (under “Wimsatt’s (1972) Formulation of SPE”), the concept of 
selection is comprehensive enough to allow forms of selection other than natural selection operating over 
an evolutionary time scale, such as immunological selection, synaptic selection, and some forms of learning 
by positive and negative reinforcement.  
71 Wright (1973), like Wimsatt (1972), does not define “function” explicitly in terms of selection, but 
claims that having been selected for, in fact, suffices for having a function. 
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 Several different theories of function stem from this basic insight, and much of 
the philosophical literature on functions consists in the attempt to ramify, extend, and 
qualify this basic insight. Although it is impossible to exhaustively summarize this 
literature in a brief space, there are two salient distinctions that can be helpful in mapping 
the space of non-representational etiological theories (see Table 3.1), thus creating four 
different etiological explications of, “the function of X is Y”. Furthermore, there are at 
least two additional variables that one may choose to introduce (that is, in addition to X 
and Y), thus generating a potentially limitless number of different etiological theories (see 
Table 3.2). Each of the two major distinctions will be elaborated in turn; then the two 
additional variables will be introduced. The breadth of possible theories that can be 















Weak Etiological Strong Etiological 
Reproduction-based Buller (1998; 2002) 
Neander (1983; 1991a; 
1991b) 
Millikan (1984; 1989a; 
1989b) 
Brandon (1990) 
Griffiths (1992; 1993) 
Godfrey-Smith (1994) 
Mitchell (1993; 1995) 
Allen and Bekoff (1995a; 
1995b) 
Schwartz (1999) 
Persistence-based Wright (1973; 1976) Wimsatt (1972) 
Table 3.1:  Four types of etiological theory. (See accompanying text for details.) 
 
First Distinction: Weak vs. Strong Etiological Theories 
 A distinction that will be useful in the dissertation is that between “strong” 
etiological theories (SE) and “weak” etiological theories (WE), which has been implicit 
in much of the literature but only clearly articulated by Buller (1998; 2002). According to 
SE, a function of a trait is an effect that, in the past, the trait was selected for by natural 
selection. This is the theory of function that was presented earlier, and is sometimes 
called the “selected effects” theory (e.g., Neander [1991a]). Some version of it is 
probably the most widely held theory of “function” amongst philosophers (Neander 
[1983; 1991a; 1991b]; Millikan [1984; 1989a; 1989b; 1993]; Brandon [1990]; Griffiths 
[1992; 1993]; Godfrey-Smith [1994]; Mitchell [1993; 1995]; Allen and Bekoff [1995a; 
1995b]; Schwartz [1999]). 
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 According to WE, the function of a trait is an effect that, in the past, contributed 
to the reproduction of its bearer and thereby contributed to its own reproduction, 
regardless of whether it was selected for – that is, regardless of whether the requisite 
variation existed upon which selection could act, or whether existing variation was 
correlated with differential reproduction. Another way of formulating the distinction is 
that SE emphasizes the contribution of a trait to differential reproduction; WE 




Temporal Restriction (T): 
Recent Selection Necessary No Temporal Restriction 
System Restriction (S): 
Selection over Organisms 
 
Neander (1983; 1991a; 
1991b) 
No System Restriction Griffiths (1992; 1993) Godfrey-Smith (1994) 
Millikan (1984; 1989a; 
1989b) 
Brandon (1990) 
Mitchell (1993, 252; 1995) 
Schwartz (1999) 
 Table 3.2:  Addition of system and temporal variables to strong reproduction-based 
etiological theories. (See accompanying text for details.) 
 A simple example drawn from Dover (2000, 41) can help to clarify the 
distinction. Suppose that, in a small population, genetic drift carries an allele to fixation 
at t0. Although that allele has a phenotypic effect, it did not confer any fitness advantage 
on its possessors. Now suppose that, at t1, the environment changes in such a way that 
                                                 
72 Buller (2002, 230-33) points out that it is not uncommon for philosophers to vacillate between SE and 
WE. 
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possession of the allele becomes necessary for survival. Even though all of the 
individuals within the population have the allele – so there is no selection for it – they all 
would have perished at t1 had any of the alternate alleles available at t0 gone to fixation. 
Thus, at t2, it can be said that one of the reasons that the allele currently exists is because 
it produces the effect in question. In this sense the scenario satisfies the pattern of 
teleological explanation. But since selection did not enter the scenario, SE does not 
bestow a function upon the trait, since at t1, the requisite variation did not exist upon 
which selection could act, and at t0, the differential reproduction of alleles was not 
correlated with differential fitness. Hence, the weak etiological theory is clearly more 
liberal with respect to the range of evolutionary mechanisms that it considers relevant to 
function ascriptions, yet it still permits teleological explanation. Schlosser (1998, 323) 
and Sarkar (2005, 18), for example, argue that selectively-neutral traits should be able to 
have functions, especially since they are capable of playing important roles in survival 
and reproduction. 
 
Second Distinction: Reproduction-based vs. Persistence-based Theories 
This second distinction, like the first, is implicit in much of the literature although 
attention is rarely brought to it. It is typically assumed that in order for a part of a system 
to have an etiological function, that type of part must have contributed to the persistence 
or reproduction of ancestral systems, and thereby contributed to its own intergenerational 
reproduction via the mechanisms of heredity. This assumption is virtually taken for 
granted in much of the literature when SE is adopted, since it is often accepted that by 
definition, natural selection involves the differential reproduction of traits (e.g., Lewontin 
[1970, 1]). Hence, according to reproduction-based accounts, the function of an entity 
consists in doing whatever it was that prior tokens of that same type of entity did that led 
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to their reproduction (typically by contributing the persistence or reproduction of the 
containing system). 
 According to persistence-based accounts, the function of a given token of an 
entity consists in doing whatever it was that that token did that contributed to its 
persistence over time, whether or not it contributed to its intergenerational reproduction. 
Many biological traits contribute to their own persistence; in fact, any trait that 
contributes to the survival of the trait-bearer, where the survival of the trait-bearer is 
necessary for its own continued existence, fits this pattern. Thus, to take an example from 
Wimsatt (1972, 43; see fn. 64 of that paper), the heart beats; in beating it circulates the 
blood, which strengthens, among other things, the rib cage, which protects the heart. Thus 
the heart, by beating, actively contributes to its own persistence over the lifespan of the 
individual.73 The notion that in order to have a function, a part need only contribute to its 
own (intragenerational) persistence, and not necessarily to its (intergenerational) 
reproduction, is central to McLaughlin’s (2001) theory of function. Dretske (1988, 98-
101), as well, suggests that an entity can come to possess a function by doing something 
that leads to its “recruitment” within a system, even if it is the only instance of its kind 
and is not hereditary. 74
 
73 Certainly, one could say that a non-beating heart also persists (Sarkar, pers. comm.). Yet one may 
reasonably withhold the function of persisting to a non-beating heart because, in a sense, it is not “doing” 
anything to contribute to this persistence. Contrast this with the cells that make up the non-beating heart, 
which “do” something to contribute to their own persistence, insofar as the metabolic processes they carry 
out ensure their continuation, at least for a short time, after the heart stops beating.  
74 In the following, the expression “persistence-based accounts” will be used broadly to include 
reproduction-based accounts as well. Consequently, according to a persistence-based view, in order for an 
entity to have a function it must have contributed to its own persistence or reproduction. This is useful 
because it permits the persistence-based theory to assign functions to entities or processes (such as 
childbirth) that decrease the chances that an individual organism will persist while increasing the chances 
that it will reproduce. Sarkar (2005, 18) introduces a similar distinction with the concepts of “broad-sense” 
and “narrow-sense” function (see Section 3.1.2, under “Fitness-Contribution Theories”). Something has a 
broad-sense function if it contributes to the persistence of the system in which it is contained, and a narrow-
sense function if it contributes to the fitness of that system. 
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 The two distinctions that have been introduced – that between strong and weak 
etiological theories, and that between the reproduction-based and persistence-based 
theories, crosscut one another, creating four different theories. (See Table 3.1.) A strong 
reproduction-based etiological theory (SRE) is one according to which, in order for an 
entity to have a function, it must have been selected for by natural selection operating 
over a population of reproducing entities (it must have undergone differential 
reproduction). A strong persistence-based etiological theory (SPE) is one according to 
which, in order for an entity to have a function, it must undergo differential persistence, 
rather than differential reproduction. Dawkins (1989 [1976], 12) discusses such cases 
under the rubric of “survival of the stable” rather than “survival of the fittest”: for 
example, atoms that tend to fall into stable patterns tend to outlast those that do not (Ibid., 
13). Hence, this constitutes a form of selection that operates over molecular structures. In 
other words, selection does not only operate over populations of reproducing entities, but 
over entities that, by virtue of differences in their ability to utilize environmental 
resources, persist for different periods of time.  
 It might be thought that differentially persisting entities that are not capable of 
some form of reproduction would be fairly biologically uninteresting because (so the 
argument might go) they are incapable of giving rise to complex adaptive structures (as 
natural selection operating over reproducing entities does), and hence biological 
“functions” should not be assigned to such entities. Yet one paradigmatic example of 
such a complex adaptive system – the mature synaptic structure of the brain – is partly 
due to selection processes that operate over neural projections that are themselves 
incapable of reproduction. Synaptic structure is often the result of differential retention or 
amplification of different synapses on the same target neuron, instead of their differential 
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reproduction (Changeux and Danchin [1976]; Edelman [1987]).75 Hence, SPE assigns 
functions to unique, non-hereditary structures, and SRE does not, or at least not without 
some refinement. Neural selection processes will be described in more detail in Chapter 
4.76
A weak reproduction-based etiological theory (WRE) is one according to which, 
in order for an entity to have a function, ancestral tokens of that entity must have done 
something that contributed to their own reproduction, even if they were not selected for. 
Buller (1998; 2002), as described above, presents such a theory. A weak persistence-
based etiological theory (WPE) is simply one according to which something comes to 
have a function because, in the past, it did something that contributed to its own 
persistence over time: each individual’s heart, as pointed out above, satisfies this 
ascription because it contributes to the survival of the system which it in turn depends 
upon for its continued persistence. Wright’s (1973) explicit definition of function 
qualifies as a WPE account (see Chapter 4.1.2 for the shortcomings of this account). 
These four theories will be evaluated in Chapter 4, and the choice of a strong persistence-
based theory of function will be defended (Section 4.1.5). 
 
Two Additional Variables: System and Temporal Variables 
 Note that, although all four categories afforded by the rudimentary taxonomy of 
Table 3.1 are filled, there is a significant imbalance in the existing literature, in that the 
majority of attempts fall under SRE. Nonetheless, there are significant discrepancies 
 
75 Also see Darden and Cain (1989), who formalize a concept of “selection” which is more general than 
that presented in Lewontin (1970) in order to permit such phenomena to qualify as undergoing “natural 
selection”. However, Darden and Cain’s analysis purchases this generality at the price of invoking the 
problematic concepts of “benefit” and “suffering” (Ibid., 116). See pp. 122-23 for their application to 
Edelman’s theory of neuronal group selection. 
76 Wimsatt (1972, 14-15) clearly intends this general notion of selection in his theory of function, since he 
argues that any explanation that appeals to “blind variation and selective retention” is teleological, and he 
regards trial-and-error learning procedures as a type of selection (see Section 4.1.5, under “Wimsatt’s 
(1972) Formulation of SPE”).  
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between these attempts. This suggests that the taxonomy presented is too coarse-grained, 
and a more fine-grained classification would be useful in articulating the space of 
etiological theories further. This space can be sufficiently articulated for the present 
purpose by relativizing function ascriptions to two additional variables. Until this point, it 
has been assumed that there were only two relevant variables in the definiendum,77 “The 
(or a) function of X is Y” – namely, the entity that possesses the function, X, and the 
functional effect that it produces, Y. It was assumed that all other variables could be left 
implicit. Two additional variables will be introduced, a system variable, S, and a temporal 
variable, T (see Table 3.2).78
The first variable that will be introduced, S, describes the system of which the 
functional entity is a part, thus yielding the “elementary sentence” for function that will 
be analyzed here: “The function of X in S is Y”. There are three reasons for relativizing 
the function ascription to the system of which the entity is a part. The first is that one 
fairly common intuition about functions – at least in the case of natural functions – is that 
only parts of systems can have functions, and not systems taken as wholes.79 The human 
 
77 “Definiendum” refers to the term to be defined; “definiens” the expression used to define it. Compare 
“explanandum”, the phenomenon to be explained, and “explanans”, the theory doing the explaining.  
78 Wimsatt (1972, 32) presents a much more structured definition, where the function of an entity is 
explicitly relativized to a behavior of that entity, a system, an environment, a purpose, and a theory. The 
reason he incorporates all of these additional variables is that he wants the function of an entity to be 
uniquely determined once those variables are specified (Ibid., 33). However, in this dissertation there is no 
insistence that the function of an entity must be uniquely determined (see Section 5.1, which accepts a 
fundamental indeterminacy in function ascriptions). Hence many of these additional variables will not be 
explicitly incorporated into the definition of “function” presented here.  
79 Wright (1973, 145) objects to this relativization of function to systems, primarily on the basis of his 
consideration of artifact functions. A watch, for example, has a function, but it is not clear that this function 
is relative to any system of which it is a part. One should say, rather, that the watch has a function for a 
system – namely, the person who uses it or benefits from it. But this introduces new and potentially 
troublesome concepts, namely, the idea of functioning for and the idea of benefit. Perhaps one could extend 
the concept of “system” to allow the person wearing a watch to constitute the relevant system of which the 
watch is a part. Nissen (1997, 37), however, argues that such a move generates bizarre counterexamples, 
since it imposes no principled restrictions on what constitutes a “system”: for example, Mr. Smith can use a 
rock as a paperweight, but it seems bizarre to relativize the function of the rock to the “Smith-rock” system 
of which it is a part. Perhaps Godfrey-Smith’s (1994, 349) insistence that (biological) functions can only be 
ascribed to parts of “biologically real systems” (see below) can help to impose such a restriction. On the 
other hand, it is arguable that functions are not always ascribed to “parts” of systems that they subserve 
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digestive system has a function – to absorb nutrients and eliminate wastes – but humans 
as such, considered as autonomous units, do not have functions. However, if a human 
being is conceived of as occupying a place within a larger system, such as an ecosystem, 
then he or she may be said to have a function – e.g., the production of soil nutrients and 
carbon dioxide. The function of an entity, then, and even whether or not it can be said to 
have a function, seems to depend crucially on the sort of system of which the entity is 
considered a part. Thus, this dependence should be reflected by the introduction of an 
additional variable, S, to represent the system of which the item is a part – or at least, of 
the system which the item was once, in the past, a part.80  
A second reason that functions should be relativized to systems becomes evident 
if one adopts some version of the strong etiological (SE) theory, since selection involves 
the propensity of a trait to contribute to the differential survival or reproduction of an 
inclusive system, as a consequence of which it, being heritable, ensures its representation 
in future generations. Moreover, even though WRE does not appeal to selection, 
nonetheless, it appeals to a trait’s contribution to the reproduction of some inclusive 
system, and hence it retains the reference to the system of which the entity is a part.81
The third, most important reason that the etiological theory should relativize 
function ascriptions to systems is that there is no unique type of system that a trait must 
contribute to in order to be maintained within a population.82 A nucleotide segment, for 
example, can be maintained by natural selection because it contributes to the fitness of 
the chromosome in which it resides, the individual organism in which the chromosome 
 
even in the biological realm. For example, the galls that grow on oak trees have a function for the gall 
wasps that produce them, and not for the oak tree (Griffiths [1993, 416]).  
80 This qualification would allow, e.g., transplanted organs to retain their functions after being removed 
from the donor.  
81 Recall that “part” is here being used in a sufficiently broad sense to include not only spatio-temporally 
discrete objects but also activities and qualities.  
82 Obviously if there were such a unique system one would not need to relativize the function ascription to 
a variable, but simply incorporate a reference to that system within the definition.  
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resides, or that organism’s group. Thus selection operates at several levels (Lewontin 
[1970]). More importantly, the same trait may make conflicting contributions at different 
levels. A central example of such conflict is meiotic drive (or segregation distortion), 
which refers to any process that causes certain alleles to be overrepresented in the sex 
cells. Chromosomes that carry segregation distorter (SD) genes appear to operate by 
doing something to sabotage the homologous chromosome, disrupting normal sperm 
development for the homologue (Crow [1979, 138]). Consequently, segregation 
distortion increases the fitness of the SD chromosome, although it can decrease the 
fitness of the organism. In Drosophilia melanogaster, for example, males that are 
heterozygous for SD have fewer functional sperm than those that do not carry the SD 
chromosome, and under certain experimental conditions this can lower the fly’s fitness 
(Ibid., 137); those which are homozygous for the SD genes are sterile.  
Similarly, Darwin speculated that sterility in worker ants, while decreasing the 
fitness of sterile individuals, could increase the fitness of the group to which their labor 
contributes:  
 
[S]ome insects and other articulate animals in a state of nature occasionally 
become sterile; and if such insects had been social, and it had been profitable to 
the community that a number should have been annually born capable of work, 
but incapable of procreation, I can see no especial difficulty in this having been 
effected by through natural selection.  (Darwin [1998 (1859), 352])83
 
When selection processes are described in the context of evolutionary biology, it 
is often assumed that the relevant level of selection is the organism. This familiarity has 
led some philosophers to explicitly restrict the type of system over which the function-
 
83 The explicit specification of the system-level over which selection processes are operating will be crucial 
in the following chapter, which describes neural selection theories, in which selection operates at the level 
of synapses (or more accurately, neural projections), neurons, and groups of neurons, and has important 
implications for the formation of mature synaptic networks. 
 138
                                                
bestowing selection process can act to the organism. For example, Neander (1991a) 
defines “function” in the following terms: 
 
It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which 
items of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and 
which caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be 
selected by natural selection. (Ibid., 174) 
 
Buller (1998) incorporates a similar restriction into his initial formulation of 
WRE:  
 
A current token of a trait T in an organism O has the function of producing an 
effect of type E just in case past tokens of T contributed to the fitness of O’s 
ancestors by producing E, and thereby causally contributed to the reproduction of 
Ts in O’s lineage. (Ibid., 507)84
 
The analyses offered by Brandon (1990, 192-3), Griffiths (1993), and Godfrey-
Smith (1994) explicitly eschew such a restriction on the type of system over which the 
function-bestowing selection process can act. Recognizing the plurality of such levels, 
Godfrey-Smith incorporates into his analysis the qualification that the functional entity 
must reside within a larger “biologically real system” (Ibid., 349) and that the entity must 
have been selected for due to a positive contribution to the fitness of this system (also cf. 
Griffiths [1993, 416]). 
 The second variable that function statements will be relativized to is the temporal 
variable. If a trait has a function because of the fitness contribution it made in the past, 
then how recently in the past must it have so contributed in order to retain its function? 
Should the function ascription be relativized to some specific time span, T?  
 
84 Later in the same article, however, he points out that this restriction to organisms just represents the 
paradigm case, and that “the weak theory [i.e., WRE] can attribute functions within any type of system that 
biological theory finds it necessary to represent as possessing fitness” (Ibid., 516). 
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 Perhaps the most obvious motivation for imposing such a restriction is to allow 
for the possibility of vestiges, what are often said to be functionless. But if they are 
adaptations, then their past contribution to the fitness of ancestral systems figures into a 
complete explanation of why they still have a non-zero frequency in the present 
population. Therefore, without imposing any temporal restrictions on the explication of 
“function”, it is not clear how that explication can capture the idea that a heritable trait, 
though it once possessed a function, no longer does, but has been retained because the 
relevant mutations that would have allowed it to atrophy or be replaced never arose. The 
rudimentary ocular cyst of the cave-dwelling fish, Phreatichthys andruzzii, is not a 
dysfunctional eye, but a functionless vestige – even though at some point the organ had 
been selected for because of sight.85 This suggests that the elementary statement of the 
function ascription should read, “The function of X in S relative to T is Y”. 
Another case which supports the need for introducing temporal restrictions on 
function ascriptions is the case of functional co-option, in which a trait that initially 
spread within a population by selection for one of its consequences eventually came to be 
maintained by selection for something else, or in which a trait that was initially not 
selected for at all came to be selected for in a new environment – such as feathers, which 
were initially selected for because of insulation and only later because of flight. Gould 
and Vrba (1982) introduce the well-known distinction between adaptation and exaptation, 
which partly overlaps the distinction made above. A trait is an adaptation if it was “built 
by selection for its current role” (Ibid., 6), and an exaptation if it was later “co-opted” for 
a useful role that it was not originally selected for. Such cases are ubiquitous in the 
biological world and render problematic any simplistic attempt to infer the selective 
 
85 Interestingly, Phreatichthys andruzzii is not actually anopthalmic (born without eyes); rather, eye 
development begins very shortly after egg laying, and eye degeneration occurs after about 36 hours and is 
complete within one month (Berti et al. [2001]). 
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history of a trait from its current contribution to fitness. Any etiological theory must 
possess the resources to conceptualize such transitions appropriately. 
There are three main approaches to instantiating the temporal variable on function 
ascriptions. One approach requires that, in addition to its past activity, a functional trait 
must presently be capable of performing its function. A second approach requires that, in 
order to have a function, the trait must have contributed to its own reproduction in the 
recent evolutionary past, even if it is not currently capable of performing that function. A 
third approach requires that, in order to have a function, the trait must have contributed to 
its initial spread within a population, regardless of what it did to contribute to its recent 
maintenance and regardless of its present activity. This approach would relativize the 
function ascription to the early history of the trait, that is, the time period shortly 
following its introduction into a population. Each of these three approaches will be 
described in turn.   
One fairly obvious way of resolving the problem of vestiges is to restrict function 
ascriptions to those traits that are presently capable of producing the same effect that, in 
the past, made a positive contribution to fitness. Wright (1973; 1976) presents such a 
solution by formulating a “tenseless” explication of function that, in its generality, 
implies that the part in question is still capable of performing the function for which it 
was once selected. (Wright’s definition of “function” will be evaluated in Chapter 4.1.2. 
It constitutes a version of WPE.) According to his explication, “the function of X is Y” 
means that, “X is there because it does Y” and that “Y is a consequence of X” (see Wright 
[1973, 161; 1976, 81]). Clearly, the purpose of Wright’s fairly general analysis is to 
present the idea of a “cyclical” causal process, in the sense specified above (see fn. 66).  
The statement that “X is there because it does Y” in the first condition refers, as it were, to 
a universal generalization about things of type X, namely, that they are capable of doing 
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Y, regardless of time, place, or circumstance. In other words, the implication is that X is 
there (presently) because things of type X are capable of doing Y (as a universal 
generalization). This has the consequence that if something was initially selected for 
because of some effect but is no longer capable of producing it, then it would not have 
that function because that statement would be false of it. Thus, among other things, his 
explication of function ascribes to X the current capacity of doing Y. Hence, according to 
the use of “etiological” and “consequentialist” defined above, Wright’s theory, strictly 
speaking, is a consequentialist one, because it entails that X must currently be capable of 
contributing to Y.  
 Kitcher (1993) presents a similar restriction. In order for a trait to have a function, 
not only must selection be partly responsible for maintaining the trait in the recent past, 
but it must continue to do so: “The function of X is Y only if selection of Y is responsible 
for maintaining X both in the recent past and in the present” (Ibid., 387). He argues that 
this restriction allows a theory of function to enjoy the benefits associated with both the 
etiological approach and the consequentialist approach, since it allows function 
statements to perform a dual role: they can explain why an entity has been maintained in 
a population, and they sketch a prediction about how that entity will continue to be 
maintained in that population in the future (Ibid., 386).86
 
86 Unfortunately, by combining both views his theory enjoys the benefits of neither – at least relative to the 
narrowly-defined purpose of this dissertation. The reason is the following. One major argument for 
consequentialist theories of function is that they are held to be in better accord with actual biological usage 
(see Section 3.1.3). When evaluating the function of an entity, practicing biologists primarily look towards 
the current capacities of that entity, and, more specifically, its current role in contributing to fitness, rather 
than its historical contribution. But this admitted benefit of consequentialist theories is lost if one insists 
that function ascriptions incorporate some etiological component, since it entails that standard biological 
practice does not suffice to warrant function ascriptions. Similarly, one major argument for etiological 
theories of function is that they make sense of the normative component that function ascriptions often 
carry – that is, if something has a function it can fail to perform that function. But by insisting that if an 
entity has a function then it must currently contribute to fitness disallows such a normative component, or 
at least, it is not normative in the sense that it satisfies both adequacy conditions CA1 and CA2* outlined in 
Chapter 2.2. (The claim that consequentialist theories cannot be normative in this sense will be defended in 
Section 3.2.1.) Walsh (1996, 564; see fn. 15 of that paper) makes a similar point about how Kitcher’s 
(1993) “mixed” approach loses benefits associated with either.  
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A widely accepted approach amongst philosophers of biology is that which 
identifies the function of a trait with what it was selected for in the recent evolutionary 
past (Griffiths [1992, 1993]; Godfrey-Smith [1994]), even if that trait is currently unable 
to perform the function. But how should such a temporal unit be estimated? For it must 
specify a unit of time that allows one to decide how long a trait can be maintained within 
a population without contributing to its own maintenance before becoming a vestige. 
Griffiths (1992) defends a version of SRE according to which the trait in question must 
have contributed to its maintenance in a population during the last “evolutionary 
significant time period” for that trait, and he defines an evolutionarily significant time 
period for a trait, T, as a time period during which, given the mutation rate at the loci 
controlling T and the population size, one would have expected some regression 
(atrophy) of T were it not making some contribution to fitness (Ibid., 128). Godfrey-
Smith (1994), while introducing the expression “modern history theory of functions”, 
leaves the determination of such a unit implicit. 
Godfrey-Smith (1994) argues that the modern history approach, in addition to 
resolving the problem of vestiges, can help to bridge the apparent gap between etiological 
theories of function and actual biological usage (see Section 3.1.3). As he points out 
(Ibid., 351), according to an influential set of distinctions introduced by Tinbergen 
(1963), the field of behavioral ethology is largely concerned with four questions 
concerning behavior: its (proximate) causation, its survival value, its evolution, and its 
ontogeny (Ibid., 411). In Tinbergen’s usage, “survival value” is synonymous with 
“function”, and explicitly separated from the question of evolution, and in particular, 
from the selective history of a behavior (Ibid., 423). This suggests that in behavioral 
ethology, “function” is often taken to be a purely consequentialist notion (but see the 
quote from Lorenz [1966 (1963)] above, which suggests a pluralism of function concepts 
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within ethology). Although the modern history approach does not, of course, allow 
“function” to be severed from “history”, it does allow the preservation of a four-part 
distinction which is created by dividing the category of “evolution” into two parts: that 
concerning the initial spread of the trait within the population, and that concerning its 
recent maintenance in the population (Godfrey-Smith [1994, 356]). If one assumes a 
correlation between current survival value and recent selection, then a rough extensional 
correspondence between the two classifications could be maintained.  
However, Schwartz (1999) questions whether such a correlation can be assumed. 
Certainly, if something currently possesses survival value, then unless it is a novel trait, 
one can safely assume that it did something in the recent past that contributed to the 
reproduction of ancestral organisms and hence helps explain its maintenance in the 
population. But that does not provide reason to believe that it underwent selection in the 
recent past. Consequently, Schwartz relaxes this restriction on the modern history view of 
functions, arguing that if a trait was selected for at any time in the past because it did F, 
and if it recently contributed to survival or reproduction by doing F, then it should be 
said to have the function F, even if it did not undergo selection for F in the recent past 
(Ibid., S219).  
An alternative to restricting the function of an entity to what it was selected for in 
recent history would be to restrict the function of an entity to what it was originally 
selected for, that is, to whatever explains its initial spread within a population (assuming 
that natural selection accounts for its initial spread). In this case, the temporal variable 
would be indexed to the early history of the trait. This is the option explored by Gould 
and Vrba (1982). Their argument begins by defining “function” in terms of “adaptation” 
(Ibid., 5), and then defining “adaptation” in a very restricted sense to describe what a trait 
was selected for upon its initial appearance (as opposed to “exaptation”, which describes 
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how traits are later co-opted for different uses) (Ibid., 6).87 However, although this 
distinction between “adaptation” and “exaptation” may be useful,88 it is not clear what 
motivates their narrow restriction of functions to adaptations, especially because it leads, 
by their admission, to claims that seem so contrary to typical biological usage – for 
example, that the function of feathers is not flight, since they appear to have originally 
been selected for because of insulation (Ibid., 7).89
With the introduction of the system variable, S, and the temporal variable, T, a 
more refined classification of SRE theories can be provided (Table 3.2). In particular, the 
introduction of those variables helps to articulate the space of those theories that appeal to 
natural selection operating over reproducing populations – although, in principle, 
analogous distinctions could be raised for any version of the etiological theory of 
functions.  
3.1.3 Consequentialist Theories of Function 
Despite the plurality of etiological theories, and despite the attempts to render 
etiological theories more consistent with modern biological usage, it is often pointed out 
that typically, when biologists seek to determine the function of an entity, they look to 
some subset of current dispositions or capacities of the entity rather than to the fossil 
record (Amundson and Lauder [1994]; Godfrey-Smith [1994, 351]; Walsh [1996, 558]; 
 
87 Gould and Vrba use the term “aptation” to be neutral between an “adaptation” and “exaptation” (Ibid.). 
88 Though see Reeve and Sherman (1993), who question its utility in the practice of evolutionary biology.  
89 Allen and Bekoff (1995a), however, argue that the distinction between “adaptation” and “exaptation” 
conceals a very important teleological distinction, namely that between “function” and “design”. Unlike the 
concept of function, which can be used broadly to encompass whatever a trait was selected for, the concept 
of design should only be applied to that subset of functions that partly explain the structural modification of 
a trait over time (1995a, 615). They point out that, often, what something is an “adaptation” for (in Gould 
and Vrba’s sense) is often what it is “designed” for, and that “exaptations” will often correspond to traits 
which merely have “functions” but were not designed, since they did not undergo any structural 
modification. Buller (2002), however, argues that the distinction between “function” and “design” is 
unprincipled, because whether something is designed for X, or merely has the function of performing X, 
often depends upon purely conventional decisions about how selection pressures should be individuated. 
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Schlosser [1998, 304]; Wouters [2003, 658]; Sarkar [2005, 18]; Griffiths [2005]). 
Although, as noted in Section 3.1.2, biologists sometimes do use “function” more or less 
synonymously with “adaptation”, in many contexts “function” is tied more closely to the 
current survival value of a trait, regardless of its origin. For example, as noted above, 
Tinbergen (1963) equates “function” with “survival value”, and explicitly separates 
questions of function from those of evolution (Ibid., 423). Mayr (1961), similarly, 
distinguishes “functional biology” and “evolutionary biology”, arguing that the former is 
concerned with the realm of “proximate causes” and the latter, “ultimate causes” of an 
entity or process, whereas, according to etiological theories, “function” typically 
describes the realm of ultimate causes. For Mayr, “functional biology” primarily 
describes “how” something works and not “why” it is there, although the scientific utility 
of any absolute distinction between “how” and “why” questions has been criticized 
(Sarkar [2005, 19-20]). 
Even more broadly, “function” is often used to characterize the entire range of 
activities that a part of a system is capable of performing (e.g., the sense in which 
“function” is opposed to structure). For example, the evolutionary morphologists Bock 
and Von Walhert (1965) define the function of an entity simply as “all physical and 
chemical properties arising from its form” (Ibid., 274), provided that these properties are 
not relative to the environment. Amundson and Lauder (1994) argue that this more liberal 
usage is standard in anatomy, comparative morphology, and physiology. This makes the 
use of function statements in those disciplines heavily dependent upon the interests of the 
investigator, since without at least imposing a pragmatic restriction on the appropriate use 
of function statements, virtually every structure in the natural world can be said to 
possess a “function”.  
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These examples suggest that despite the modifications that can be imposed on the 
etiological theory, it does not adequately capture the majority of biological usage.90 Thus, 
some argue, functions, whatever else they may be, must be thought of as current 
dispositions of traits, and if this is incompatible with the view that present-tense function 
ascriptions constitute explanations for the current presence of a trait in a population, then 
one must reject the explanatory status of function ascriptions. 
As noted above, consequentialist theories of function almost invariably conceive 
of the function of an entity as consisting in its contribution to something else. Insofar as 
functions, in the biological context, are typically ascribed only to parts of systems (rather 
than the system as a whole), then, according to consequentialist theories, the function of 
an entity consists in its contribution to some property or capacity of a more inclusive 
system – e.g., the contribution of a trait to the fitness of the organism. Hence, in the 
following, consequentialist theories will be classified in terms of the sort of system 
property or capacity which performance of the function contributes to.91 Four such 
 
90 It is peculiar that Neander (1991a) defends SRE as an accurate conceptual analysis of modern biological 
usage, given that it is often argued that it fails precisely as such an explication. Her article does not respond 
to that challenge. However, whether that challenge is ultimately successful depends on what, precisely, an 
explication of “function” is intended to accomplish, and on whether a discernable plurality of function 
concepts exists even within biological usage. Millikan (1989b), for example, argues that her explication is 
not intended as a conceptual analysis of modern biological usage, but as a theoretical definition, in the 
same sense in which “being H2O” constitutes a theoretical definition of “water”. Schwartz (2004) goes 
further by emphasizing the stipulative and constructive roles of philosophical definitions of “function”, 
arguing that such definitions constitute explications of biological usage, rather than conceptual analyses or 
theoretical definitions. According to Carnap (1950, see Chapters 1 and 2), philosophical explication 
involves the replacement of a vague concept by a precise one, and hence it often entails making distinctions 
that did not previously exist in the scientific context in question. It has the character of a proposal, to be 
accepted or rejected on pragmatic grounds. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, this dissertation 
adopts a pluralistic view, in that the concept of function it proposes is only intended to be appropriate for 
the biological perspective in psychiatry (its explication being guided by the two adequacy conditions 
outlined in Section 2.2), regardless of whether it is appropriate for other biological usages.   
91 It is not always the case that consequentialist theories define the function of an entity in terms of its 
contribution to something else. As noted above, according to Bock and von Wahlert’s (1965) liberal 
conception, the function of a structure consists of more or less the totality of effects produced by its 
structure. In this theory there is no sense in which a function contributes to anything else, much less a 
containing system. By the same token, it is not always the case that, when a functional entity does 
contribute to a system, that system is its own inclusive system. This is most obviously true in the case of 
artifacts (see fn. 79). 
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theories will be presented: interest-contribution theories, goal-contribution theories, 
good-contribution theories, and fitness-contribution theories. These are all separable in 
principle, although in practice they may identify the same “functions”. Moreover, this list 
is not intended to be exhaustive – certainly, one can imagine other such theories, or 
variations on those listed. However, this classification fairly adequately spans the range 
of those that have actually been proposed.  
Unlike the case of etiological theories, there are very few salient distinctions with 
which to articulate the space of consequentialist theories in any principled way. One 
salient distinction would classify consequentialist theories into substantive and 
methodological approaches. A substantive approach to function is one that is essentially 
concerned with a problem of demarcation. There are two levels to this demarcation 
problem. The first-level demarcation problem is that of distinguishing between the sorts 
of systems the parts of which can have functions from those that cannot. Why are 
functions typically assigned to the parts of an organism, and not to a pile of rocks? Once 
such a system is selected, the second-level demarcation problem concerns assigning 
functions to certain effects of a trait, and not others. Why does the kidney have the 
function of extracting waste from the blood, rather than supporting hard calcium 
formations along its inner wall? Clearly, strong etiological theories of function are 
substantive theories, since they require any system that can have functions to be capable 
of undergoing selection (first-level demarcation), and they distinguish a function of a trait 
from a mere effect in terms of its role in that selection process (second-level 
demarcation).  
In contrast, a methodological approach to function is one that elaborates the 
distinct manner in which scientists theorize about, analyze, or explain systems that are 
believed to have functions. They are concerned more with a style of analysis that might 
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be called “functional analysis” (e.g., Hempel [1965 (1959)]; Cummins [1975; 1983]) 
(although one that should not be confused with a branch of mathematical physics that 
goes by the same name!) “Methodological” questions will be characterized in more detail 
below.  
In the following, what will be referred to as interest-contribution theories 
constitute methodological approaches to function, because the activities that are 
considered to possess functions are determined by the interest of an investigator and 
hence by their relevance to a specific explanatory context. Virtually no substantive 
constraints are imposed upon what sort of entity can have a “function”. The remainder – 
goal-contribution, good-contribution, and fitness-contribution theories – constitute 
substantive approaches, because their primary objective is one of demarcation.92 This list 
is not intended to be exhaustive, but representative of the range and variety of 
contribution-based theories that are available. 
Methodological Approaches to Function 
Methodological features of functional explanation in biology have not received 
nearly the attention by philosophers of science that substantive features have. For 
example, how do scientists identify the relevant “parts” of a system when assigning 
functions to them, and in what way is this identification guided by prior assumptions 
about what the system (as a whole) is doing (Kauffman [1970])? Functional analysis 
often depicts the relevant activities of the system hierarchically: various subsystems 
contribute to the capacities of more inclusive systems, which, in turn, contribute to the 
capacities of even more inclusive systems. What sorts of assumptions govern the 
 
92 The claim that goal-contribution theories are “substantive” in this sense is controversial; because one of 
the main problems that such theories have confronted is the problem of vacuousness – namely, that all 
systems can be seen as goal-directed and hence it does not actually achieve any demarcation (see below, 
under “Goal-Contribution Theories”). 
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construction of such hierarchies (Craver [2001]; Wimsatt [2002])? Clearly, functional 
analysis is concerned with systems that can be said to have something like “modular” 
design. If so, what concept of modularity is operative? (Cummins [2002, 158-9] points 
out that functional analysis presupposes that the parts of the system in question can, in 
principle, be replaced by functional equivalents, and this seems tantamount to imputing a 
type of modularity to that system.) 
These sorts of questions illustrate the point that methodological and substantive 
questions are not entirely separable, since the methodological assumptions inherent in 
functional analysis place restrictions upon the sorts of systems that can have functions or 
that are appropriate subjects of functional analysis. For example, an object with a fairly 
homogenous constitution – that is, with little internal differentiation – could not satisfy 
any assumptions about modularity or hierarchical organization and hence it would be 
inappropriate to assign functions to its parts. (However, it could be said to have a 
function as a part of a larger system.) Similarly, according to Cummins’ (1975; 1983) 
usage of “functional analysis”, phenomena that can be explained by straightforward 
subsumption under a physical law, such as the capacity of a falling body to accelerate, or 
that of a submerged object to displace water, are not appropriate subjects of functional 
analysis. Therefore, these methodological assumptions already entail some substantive 
commitments, at least in terms of the first-level demarcation problem.  
 
Interest-Contribution Theories 
The most general contribution-based theory is the interest-contribution view, 
according to which the function of an entity consists, roughly, in its contribution to 
maintaining some property of a system that is of interest to an investigator or to a group 
of investigators. Put simply, to say that, “the function of polar bears’ dense, water-
 150
repellent fur is to retain heat” implies that heat retention is a capacity that the speaker or 
investigator or group is interested in, and the dense, water-repellent fur is capable of 
contributing to heat retention. In this sense, there is nothing mysterious about function 
ascriptions, since they do not imply that heat retention explains the presence of fur; 
rather, they merely imply the commonplace fact that the presence of fur explains heat 
retention. Another way of stating the idea behind the interest-based approach is that some 
reference to the interest of the investigator is necessary for establishing the truth-
conditions of any particular function ascription.  
 The most well-known proponent of this theory is Cummins (1975; also see 1983; 
2002) – so well-known, in fact, that such functions are often simply referred to as 
“Cummins functions” (Millikan [1989a]; Godfrey-Smith [1993]), or even “C-functions” 
(Walsh and Ariew [1996]). Because Cummins’ view explicitly relativizes the 
appropriateness of function ascriptions to their role in a specific explanatory context, it 
can be called a methodological approach. Similar views that emphasize the explanatory 
or pragmatic context of function ascriptions are held by Hempel (1965 [1959]), Lehman 
(1965), Prior (1985), Amundson and Lauder (1994), Hardcastle (1999; 2002), Davies 
(2001), and Craver (2001). 
Because of the fact that, according to these views, functions are only limited by 
the interests – epistemic or pragmatic – of the investigator, they are often accused of 
overbreadth. On the one hand, “functions” could be ascribed throughout the non-organic 
world. For example, a particular arrangement of rocks can have the “function” of 
contributing the widening of a river delta downstream from it (Kitcher [1993, 390]), and 
clouds can have the function of promoting vegetation growth (Millikan [1989b, 294]). On 
the other hand, functions can be applied to entities that are clearly malfunctioning or 
maladaptive; as Cummins himself points out, the appendix keeps people vulnerable to 
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appendicitis but it sounds strange to call this one of its functions (Cummins [1975, 752]) 
– even though medical researchers are clearly interested in providing an analytical 
account of how this takes place! 
Of course, one may wish to accept a fairly liberal construal of “function”, 
according to which the parts of molecules, cloud formations, or volcanoes have the 
“functions” of contributing to some natural processes (e.g., Amundson and Lauder [1994, 
346-7; see Section 4.1). Some scientists, in fact, may find nothing particularly 
counterintuitive about this usage (Sarkar [pers. comm.]). However, the relevant question 
in this dissertation is not whether there exists some concept of function according to 
which clouds can legitimately have the “function” of promoting vegetation growth – as 
noted in the introduction, this dissertation adopts a pluralistic standpoint on concepts of 
function. The real question is whether such a liberal construal of “function” is appropriate 
to the context of psychiatry, where the concept of function must support a corresponding 
concept of “dysfunction”. From this perspective, it seems counterintuitive, or at least 
highly anthropocentric, to say that clouds are “dysfunctional” when they do not 
contribute to vegetation growth. This point will be raised again in the next chapter (see 
Section 4.1.2., under “Intuitive Implausibility of WPE”). 
Substantive Approaches to Function 
As noted above, goal-contribution, good-contribution, and fitness-contribution 
theories are “substantive” in that they seek to delineate a certain type of system that is an 
appropriate subject of functional analysis (first-level demarcation) and they seek to 
justify why certain ascriptions of functions to its parts are correct, and others incorrect 
(second-level demarcation). All three substantive  contribution theories entail, for 
example, that a stick pinned to a rock and stuck in place by its own backwash does not 
have a “function”, but they disagree as to why this is so: a stick being pinned to a rock 
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does not contribute to any system goals; it does not contribute to the good of anything; or 
it does not contribute to the fitness of any system. Similarly, they all entail that the 
function of the kidney is to extract water from the blood, but disagree as to why this is so: 
because that is the kidney’s specific contribution to the goal of the water-regulatory 
system; because it contributes to the organism’s good; or because it contributes to the 
organism’s fitness. Certainly, one can imagine other such contribution theories, or 
variations on those existing. Each theory will be described briefly in turn.  
 
Goal-Contribution Theories 
According to goal-contribution theories, the function of a part of a system consists 
in its contribution to a goal of that system. The notion of a “goal” or of a “goal-directed 
system” occupied a significant place in philosophical approaches to teleology from the 
1940s through the early 1970s (Rosenblueth et al. [1943]; Sommerhoff [1950; 1969]; 
Braithwaite [1953]; Nagel [1953; 1961]; Beckner [1969]; Manier [1971]). However, it 
largely fell out of favor among philosophers of biology in the early 1970s, partly owing 
to the predominance of evolutionary considerations within that tradition and partly owing 
to internal conceptual shortcomings (Wimsatt [1972, 20-22]; Ruse [1973, 181-190]; Hull 
[1974, 109-111]). In short, a goal-directed system is one that exhibits a capacity to attain 
a specific value for some system variable, or to maintain the variable within a range of 
values, in the face of environmental perturbation, via the existence of compensatory 
activity operating amongst the system’s parts.93 The maintenance or attainment of a given 
value for the system variable is considered the goal of the system, and the specific 
contribution of a part of the system to that goal is considered to be the function of that 
part (Boorse [1976, 77]; Nagel [1977, 297]). Thus any system may have several goals; 
 
93 Such systems are often controlled by “negative feedback”, but need not be; see below. 
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additionally, any sufficiently complex system can be analyzed as a hierarchy of goal-
directed systems.  
Two exemplary cases of “natural” purposiveness largely inspired this approach to 
teleology: homeostatic mechanisms drawn from physiology and servomechanisms that 
constitute the subject matter of cybernetics. As an example of the first type of 
mechanism, the percentage of water in the blood remains at around 90% throughout an 
individual’s lifetime. This is because if it drops far below this level, the muscles increase 
the rate at which they infuse the blood with water; if it rises far above this level, the 
kidneys increase the rate at which they extract water from the blood. In this manner, the 
constancy of the water level of the blood is not a static phenomenon; it is actively 
maintained via compensatory mechanisms that operate throughout the body in the face of 
perturbation. Servomechanisms, such as heat-seeking missiles, exhibit a similar capacity 
to actively maintain a specific trajectory in the face of perturbation, and to adapt that 
trajectory to the moving position of the target. The oft-repeated slogan that goal-directed 
systems exhibit “plasticity” and “persistence” (e.g., Nagel [1977, 272]; Enc and Adams 
[1992, 650]) captures two central features of the concept of goal-directedness. On the one 
hand, such systems exhibit plasticity in that the same effect can be reached from a 
number of initial systemic configurations and by virtue of a number of different 
mechanisms or pathways. On the other hand, such systems persist in their course of 
action to the extent that they have the ability to attain or maintain a course of action in the 
face of environmental perturbation.94  
 
94 It is sometimes argued that the goal-supporting account does not allow one to determine a system goal, 
and consequently, that this goal must be arbitrarily stipulated (Wimsatt [1972, 20-22]; Schaffner [1993, 
367-8]; Schlosser [1998, 327]). However, the above examples show this claim to be inaccurate. In the 
homeostatic case, that maintaining the water content of the blood at around 90% qualifies as a “goal” of the 
system is a consequence of the definition of “goal”, in addition to a rudimentary understanding of 
physiology. It need not be arbitrarily stipulated. 
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The concept of goal-directedness has often been analyzed narrowly in terms of 
negative feedback, since such systems are capable of exhibiting self-regulation 
(Rosenbleuth et al. [1943]; Manier [1971]; Adams [1979]; Faber [1984]). In short, a 
“feedback” system is one such that a portion of that system’s output is passed, or “fed 
back” into that system as input (but see Wimsatt [1971] for criticism of the concept of 
“feedback”). Feedback which tends to reduce or stabilize output is “negative”; feedback 
that increases output is “positive”. However, theories of goal-directedness that emphasize 
the compensatory and self-regulatory activity of systems are not necessarily tied to 
negative feedback. Hull (1973) points out that a system can exhibit the plasticity required 
to be goal-directed without being guided by negative feedback. For example, if the 
kidney does not succeed in ridding the body of excess water, then sweating may do so, 
but the different responses are not obviously regulated by negative feedback, but by the 
utilization of alternative pathways (Ibid., 110-111). (Nagel [1953, 211], Sommerhoff 
[1969, 198-9], and Schlosser [1998, 309], also point out limitations of the negative 
feedback model for analyzing goal-directedness.) 
Recently, Schlosser (1998) adopted some of the basic insights from the goal-
supporting theory while rejecting its association with negative feedback (Ibid., 309) – 
although, strictly speaking, his theory should not be conflated with a goal-contribution 
view. According to his view, if a state or property of a system has a function then there 
exists a set of circumstances under which it is necessary for its own “re−production” – 
that is, its trans-generational reproduction or intra-generational persistence (Ibid., 326). 
However, in order to avoid the Boorse-type counterexamples described above, he 
stipulates that the system in question must be capable of complex self−re−production – 
that is, the system must be capable of re−producing the state in different ways, depending 
upon the environmental circumstances (Ibid., 312). Hence his view incorporates the 
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plasticity criterion associated with goal-supporting theories while leaving indeterminate 
the mechanisms by which this plasticity is realized. Section 4.1.2 will elaborate and 
criticize Schlosser’s notion of “complexity”.  
Two main problems afflict goal-contribution theories, the “problem of 
vacuousness” and the “problem of goal-failure”. The problem of vacuousness stems from 
the fact that the standard characterization of a goal-directed system as one that exhibits 
“plasticity and persistence” with respect to a given end is not sufficient for imposing a 
substantive distinction between different types of systems, for almost all systems can be 
described as seeking an equilibrium state which can be reached from different initial 
states and in different ways (Wimsatt [1971]; Woodfield [1976]; Nissen [1980-81]; 
Bedau [1993]). A pendulum swinging to a state of rest, a ball rolling from the top of a 
bowl to the bottom, and an elastic solid returning to its original condition after the 
imposition of tension would all represent goal-directed systems. Consequently, unless 
one specific mechanism, such as negative feedback, is included within the definition, it is 
difficult to exclude such counterexamples. Sommerhoff (1950, 86), and Nagel (1977, 
273), attempt to exclude such systems by imposing an independence condition on the 
variables, which roughly states that all of the controlling variables must be independently 
manipulable; Schlosser (1998) attempts to do so by incorporating the “complexity” 
criterion stated above. 
The problem of goal-failure stems from the fact that most explications of goal-
directedness have tacitly or explicitly assumed that the supposed goal-directed behavior 
is successful, and as a consequence it is not clear how to explain the intuition that a non-
conscious entity can have a goal and yet fail to satisfy it (Scheffler [1966 (1958)]; 
Beckner [1959]; Hull [1973]). Manier (1971, 234) and Adams (1979, 506) address this 
problem by arguing that what makes a negative feedback system “goal-directed” is not 
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that it actually achieves its goal, but that it is governed by an internal representation of 
the goal-state. This, however, raises the additional onus of providing a naturalistic 
account of “representation”. 
 
Good-Contribution Theories 
The core idea behind the good-contribution view of functions is that in order for 
an entity to possess a function, performance of that function must (usually or typically) 
have a beneficiary. It must be useful for, beneficial for, or otherwise represent a “good” 
for some agent or system. This type of teleology is fairly evident in the world of artifacts, 
because artifacts are produced for a purpose and hence for an end deemed useful or 
beneficial by someone, and hence is closely associated with the mentalistic view 
described in Section 3.1.2.  
However, this doctrine is not identical with the mentalistic view that all function 
ascriptions presuppose the existence of minds, because it is not incoherent to ascribe 
“interests” or “goods” to biological entities that cannot be said to possess the sort of 
mental life required by mentalism. For example, it is often said that natural selection 
preserves traits that are “beneficial” to their bearers. In fact, sometimes when a 
philosopher presents a theory of function according to which the function of an entity 
consists in its contribution to fitness, what is really intended is that the entity has a 
function only insofar as fitness is “good for” or “useful for” its bearer. Clearly, these 
theories are evaluative in the sense of Hare, as described in Section 1.3, in that any 
intelligible function ascription presupposes an act of commendation on the part of the 
person who utters it – i.e., that life is preferable to death, or that survival and reproduction 
are good things. 
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Canfield (1964), for example, defines the function of an entity simply as some 
useful contribution it makes to a system: “A function of I (in S) is to do C means I does C 
and that C is done is useful to S” (Ibid., 290). However, he argues, in the biological 
context usefulness can be translated in terms of a trait’s making a contribution to the 
survival or reproductive capacity of its bearer (Ibid., 292). Sorabji (1964) also expounds a 
good-contribution theory, and he argues that Plato and Aristotle hold such a view. Ayala 
(1970) amends his etiological analysis by incorporating the concept of “utility” into his 
account: a feature of a system is “teleological” if it possesses “utility for the system in 
which it exists and such utility explains the presence of the feature in the system” (Ibid., 
45). Thus, in the terminology adopted here, Ayala’s position is, strictly speaking, a 
consequentialist one.  
Presumably, one of the main advantages of such a view is that it appears to bridge 
the divide between natural functions and artifact functions, for, whereas artifact functions 
are “useful” by virtue of conscious design, natural functions are “useful” by virtue of 
their fitness contribution. In other words, the same concept is instantiated differently 
depending on the context, and hence there is no deep conceptual discrepancy between the 
usages. However, a significant problem with the good-contribution view is that it does 
not allow functions to be distinguished from “fortuitous benefits” or “lucky accidents”. 
Frankfurt and Poole (1965), for example, criticize Canfield (1964) because heart sounds 
sometimes do have good consequences for fitness by alerting a physician to a potential 
life-threatening ailment, yet it does not have this as a function. (Wright [1973, 145-6] and 
Bedau [1992, 787] also raise this problem.) One solution to this would be to incorporate a 
statistical component: in order to have a function, the activity in question must usually, or 
typically, contribute to some good. But as Millikan (1984, 29) famously points out, 
statistical normalcy is not a reliable guide to functionality, since the probability that a 
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given sperm will actually fertilize an egg is extremely low, yet fertilization is without 
doubt the function of sperm. Most sperm are quite literally good for nothing. Finally, of 
course, accepting something like the good-contribution view would most likely spell the 
death of the project of “naturalizing teleology”, since the ascription of function would be 
explicitly value-relative, and values are notoriously difficult to situate within the natural 
world.95
Bedau (1992, 794), like Ayala (1970), suggests the possibility of a theory of 
biological teleology that conjoins the etiological view and the good consequence view 
and that would ameliorate the problem of fortuitous benefits. According to this view, a 
trait would come to possess a function because its persistence is partly explained by its 
contribution to a beneficial consequence (increased fitness). However, he does not go so 
far as to offer an unqualified endorsement of this view, since the goodness of the result 
(increased fitness) does not itself perform an essential explanatory role in the etiology of 
the trait, but is only, as it were, externally linked to that explanation (Ibid., 801-2). 
McLaughlin (2001), however, develops a view according to which, in order to have a 
function, a trait must have produced a beneficial consequence that contributed to its own 




The basic, unqualified idea behind fitness-contribution theories is that the 
function of a trait consists in its contribution to the fitness of the organism (or, more 
generally, to the fitness of the biological system of which it is a part). Thus, according to 
this view, the ascription of a function to a trait does not explain why that trait currently 
 
95 As such, it also seems to entail the peculiar consequence that if widespread attitudes about the value of 
survival were to change – that is, if humanity were placed in such a bleak situation that survival itself 
became a burden rather than a benefit – then function ascriptions would no longer be true!  
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exists, although ascription of a function to ancestral tokens of a trait can play a role in an 
explanation for the current persistence of that trait. Fitness-contribution views are 
proposed by Canfield (1964), Lehman (1965), Ruse (1971, 1973), Bechtel (1986), 
Bigelow and Pargetter (1987), Horan (1989), Walsh (1996), and Wouters (2003, 2005a, 
2005b) (although, as pointed out above, Canfield [1964] accepts this view insofar as he 
defines function in terms of utility and believes that the fitness contribution made by a 
trait is “useful” to the organism). Sarkar (2005, 18) presents a generalization of this view, 
according to which a part of a system must merely contribute to the persistence of its 
containing system in order to have a function, and not necessarily to the reproduction of 
that system. This would allow functions to be assigned to the parts of, e.g., sterile 
organisms (see Section 3.1.2., fn. 74). 
One problem with this unqualified view is that, in principle, fitness assignments 
can vary wildly depending upon fluctuations in the current environment, but function 
assignments tend to be relatively stable. For example, even traits that are, on average, 
adaptive in a given environment can, in certain environments, become maladaptive. But it 
is not said that in such an environment the trait no longer has a function, but that it is 
unable to perform its function.  
Such counterexamples suggest that such function ascriptions should be relativized 
to a “normal” or “average” environment, in order to exclude abnormal or transient ones. 
This recognition led Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) to propose that a trait has a function 
when it bestows a survival-enhancing propensity on the organism that possesses it, in that 
organism’s natural habitat (Ibid., 192). Thus, their definition of function introduces a 
counterfactual element – if the trait were in its natural habitat, then it would, ceteris 
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paribus, contribute to the fitness of its bearer. Yet this introduces further problems. 
Obviously, the “natural habitat” for an organism is not necessarily the organism’s current 
habitat. But if not, then what constitutes an organism’s natural habitat? One candidate for 
the natural habitat of an organism is that habitat in which it has, historically, flourished 
(Millikan [1989b, 300]; Mitchell [1993, 258-9]; Godfrey-Smith [1994, 352]; Walsh 
[1996, 562]). But then the propensity theory of functions is rendered perilously close to 
some version of the etiological theory, since its incorporation of a historical component 
violates the spirit of the “forward-looking” view they endorse.96  
Walsh (1996; also see Walsh and Ariew [1996]) attempts to eliminate the problem 
of specifying the organism’s natural habitat by proposing a “relational theory” of 
function, according to which this fitness contribution must be relativized to a specific 
“selective regime”, which may have occurred in the past or the present. Hence, in his 
view, there are no functions simpliciter; in order to assign a function one must state 
precisely the nature of the environment within which the trait contributes to fitness. A 
problem with this view is that, as noted above, traits that are typically adaptive may 
become maladaptive in unusual environments, in which case it is often said that the trait 
is unable to perform its function. However, according to this view, one would have to say 
that, relative to the unusual environment, the trait simply does not have the function in 
question. 
 
96 However, this move would not, strictly speaking, make the view into an etiological one, since the 
historical dimension it introduces is not necessarily part of an explanation for the existence of anything. 
(Boorse [2002, 86; see fn. 26 of that paper] makes the point that introducing a historical dimension into the 
analysis of function does not entail introducing an etiological element; his view will be expounded in 
Section 3.2.1, below.) 
 161
A similar problem stems from the following consideration. In order to estimate 
the contribution of a trait to fitness, one must compare the average fitness of organisms 
that possess the trait with the average fitness of those that do not. But if no variation for 
that trait currently exists – such as the human kneecap – then it is not clear what to 
compare its performance with (Frankfurt and Poole [1965, 71-2]; Wimsatt [1972, 55-61]; 
Millikan [1989a]; Godfrey Smith [1994, 352]). One possibility would be to compare it 
with the variation that existed at an earlier time. But again, this brings the propensity 
theory closer in spirit to the etiological view.  
Wouters (2003, 2005a, 2005b) proposes a version of the fitness-contribution view 
according to which, in order to have a function, a trait must confer a biological advantage 
upon its possessor, relative to some actual or counterfactual set of variants. This resolves 
the problem insofar as one must explicitly stipulate the range of variation in question. 
Moreover, he argues that this reflects standard practice within some fields of biology. In 
optimality models of adaptation, for example, the relevant range of alternatives (the 
“phenotype set”) is typically derived from biologically-informed assumptions about what 
is physically, ecologically, or physiologically possible (Parker and Maynard Smith [1990, 
27]; also see Wouters [2005a, 43]). However, merely stipulating the range of variants in 
question seems to introduce an element of arbitrariness into function ascriptions. Relative 
to one hypothetical set of variants, a trait has a function; relative to another set, it does 
not. Clearly, something more substantive should be said about how this range of variation 
can be determined in a biologically plausible manner.  
As noted above, the main advantage of contribution-based theories is that they are 
more consistent with the majority of biological usage. Moreover, given the difficulty of 
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inferring the evolutionary history of a trait from its current activity, it makes the practice 
of ascribing functions much more amenable to empirical testing. However, these theories 
appear to deprive functions of two of the properties that have, historically, been 
associated with their use and that continue to be associated with them. The first is that 
they are explanatory in the sense that they specify an efficient cause for the current 
existence of the trait. What this means is not that the fact that a trait had a function in the 
past explains its current existence, but a trait’s having a function explains its current 
existence. The second is that they are normative. On the etiological view, the distinction 
between functioning properly, malfunctioning, and inability to function due to an 
abnormal environment, is rendered tolerably clear: because of the fact that function is a 
historical concept, something can have a function without being able to perform it. It is 
controversial whether these distinctions can be drawn clearly within consequentialist 
theories; though it has been argued that consequentialist views can sustain normative 
interpretations of function (Wimsatt [1972, 47]; Walsh [1996, 568]; Schlosser [1998, 
327]).  
These considerations reinforce the value of adopting a pluralistic and context-
dependent approach to analyzing “function”. In other words, it is not so important to 
define what “function”, as such, means. It is more important to be able to evaluate, for 
any given scientific usage, what inferences that particular usage is intended to support or 
is capable of supporting, and then to specify which concept of function most adequately 
permits those inferences to be drawn. This dissertation argues that in biological 
psychology, any theory of function must be normative in a non-externalist manner, and 
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that only etiological theories satisfy those constraints. This will be shown in the next 
section. In other disciplines, these conditions need not be so restrictive. 
3.2 UNIQUENESS CLAIM FOR ETIOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
The purpose of this section is to argue that etiological theories of function are 
uniquely capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions CA1 and CA2*.97 What this 
means is that consequentialist accounts of function violate one or the other conditions, 
and that the etiological theory is consistent with both.98 The first part of the section 
(Section 3.2.1) shows that consequentialist theories – or at least those that have been 
presented in the literature – cannot satisfy both conditions. This does not mean that it is 
impossible for a consequentialist theory to do so, but that two well-developed attempts to 
define “dysfunction” from a consequentialist perspective fail. The second part of the 
section (Section 3.2.2) will show that etiological theories can. It will do this by using the 
etiological theory to construct a definition of “dysfunction”, and then showing that this 
definition satisfies both conditions. 
3.2.1 Consequentialist Theories Violate Adequacy Conditions 
This subsection will show that consequentialist theories of function are incapable 
of satisfying both adequacy conditions. The argument will not proceed, theory by theory, 
to show that each theory violates one or the other condition. Rather, it will use the 
distinction drawn above between methodological and substantive approaches to show that 
 
97 Although representationalist etiological theories are also capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions, 
that will not be established here. The argument that will be presented only applies to non-representationalist 
forms, because it relies crucially on a stipulative definition of a “normal environment for a trait’s 
functioning” that does not necessarily apply to artifacts. 
98 Clearly, if a theory does not satisfy CA1 then it cannot satisfy CA2* either.  
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whichever one is selected, a concept of function that satisfies both adequacy conditions 
cannot be defined within that approach.  
Methodological Approaches Violate Adequacy Conditions 
 As noted above, interest-based contribution theories are methodological. In the 
following, Cummins’ (1975) analysis will be taken as representative of this approach and 
criticized. It will be argued that it cannot satisfy CA2*. However, the criticism will 
clearly apply to all methodological approaches as such. 
On the face of it, the functions bestowed by Cummins-style functional analysis 
cannot satisfy CA1 for the following reason. If an entity is dysfunctional then it is not 
performing one of its functions. This implies that it does not perform some activity that 
plays a salient role in the context of an analysis of some system capacity. But it is 
capable, of course, of performing some activity, and this activity could, in principle, play 
a salient role in the context of an analysis of some other system capacity – other than the 
one that is currently the subject of interest. In Cummins’ account, relative to the capacity 
of an individual to experience excruciating pain, the function of the kidney is to support 
calcium formations along its inner wall. Whether or not harboring kidney stones is the 
function of the kidney, then, depends upon one’s explanatory interest. This suggests that, 
though a concept of dysfunction can be defined for this methodological approach, it is a 
relative, and not an absolute, concept. (That Cummins-functions are capable of defining 
“malfunction” in this interest-relative way was noted by Godfrey-Smith [1993, 200], and 
Hardcastle [2002, 152]).  
The problem with methodological approaches to function, then, is not that they 
cannot satisfy CA1, but that they cannot satisfy CA2*, since being picked out as a salient 
feature within the context of a functional analysis of a system capacity qualifies as an 
externalist criterion. This is because, whether or not an activity of a trait is so picked out 
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depends upon epistemological considerations that do not necessarily have any effect upon 
the characteristic structure or activity of the trait itself. The peripheral capillaries 
contribute to both the circulatory system and to the thermoregulatory system, and will 
consequently be ascribed different “functions” depending on which system is selected; 
nonetheless, the capillaries continue to dilate and contract, regardless of whether a 
scientist prefers to analyze its activity in relation to the circulatory system or the 
thermoregulatory system. Hence, changes in the focus of scientific interest qualify as 
external to the system in which that interest is taken. This suggests that if one is to 
construct an adequate concept of “dysfunction”, one will have to appeal to substantive, 
and not methodological, concepts of function. 
Substantive Approaches Violate Adequacy Conditions 
Goal-contribution, good-contribution, and fitness-contribution theories represent 
substantive approaches. Other contribution theories have been mentioned – persistence-
contribution theories, for example. Presumably, one could find other plausible 
contribution theories. Consequently, owing to the open-ended plurality of such theories, 
the strategy that will be pursued here will not consist in enumerating the problems that 
each type of substantive contribution theory faces when it comes to defining 
“dysfunction”. Rather, it will be to criticize two very general, theory-independent 
methods that advocates of substantive contribution theories have used to explain the 
possibility of dysfunction.  
The general problem that consequentialist theories face is this: in order to have a 
function, a part must contribute in the appropriate way to the specified outcome. But by 
definition, if a part is dysfunctional it cannot so contribute. Therefore, the function of a 
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part cannot simply consist in its contribution to the specified outcome.99 There are two 
ways in which consequentialist theories have attempted to avoid this problem. The first is 
to define the function of an entity in terms of a statistical measure taken over the 
activities or capacities of a class of entities of the same type. The second is to define the 
function of an entity in terms of its disposition to perform the activity in question. The 
statistical account will be given first, then the dispositional account. Both will be shown 
to violate CA2*, since, in order to evaluate whether a given token of a trait is 
dysfunctional or non-dysfunctional, the statistical account essentially relies upon what 
other tokens are doing, and the dispositional account is forced to identify the distinction 
between a dysfunctional and non-dysfunctional trait with that between being adaptive and 
being maladaptive, which may admit of purely externalist determination.  
 
Statistical Account of Function 
A statistical account of function is one that defines the function of a given token 
of a type in terms of a statistical measure taken over entities of that same type. An 
example of such an account, suggested above (see Section 3.1.3, under “Good-
Contribution Theories”), is the identification of the function of a trait with that activity 
that frequently contributes to the good of a containing system. Clearly, such an approach 
can satisfy CA1, for, since it assigns a function to an entity on the basis of what other 
entities do (in addition, perhaps, to its own activity), it allows an entity to have a function 
without being able to perform it. Wimsatt (1972), Boorse (1975; 1976; 1977; 2002), 
Walsh (1996), and Walsh and Ariew (1996) all appeal to a statistical norm in order to 
explain the possibility of non-performance of a function. 
 
99 Certain philosophers who hold a consequentialist theory, such as Davies (2000), Boorse (2002, 89), and 
Wouters (2005b, 128), simply deny that an entity can have a function that it cannot perform and hence they 
reject the concept of “dysfunction” altogether (see fn. 100). 
 167
                                                
Boorse, for example, includes a statistical component within his goal-contribution 
account of function, according to which the function of an entity consists in its species-
typical contribution to a goal. In physiology, this “goal” is identified with survival and 
reproduction; hence, “the specifically physiological functions of any component are…its 
species-typical contributions to the apical goals of survival and reproduction” (1975, 57; 
also see 1976, 77; 1977, 556). Hence, a token can make a one-time, accidental 
contribution to survival without that contribution constituting its function (1977, 556-
557). Moreover, this definition also allows for an entity to have a function without being 
able to perform it.100 He also extends the notion of a “species-typical contribution to 
survival and reproduction” to include not only what is typical for the present moment, but 
what has been typical over a longer time period that also includes the past. This explains 
the possibility of pandemic diseases, that is, diseases that bring about functional 
impairments in the majority of present tokens of a trait (Boorse [2002, 99]). For example, 
one explanation for the rapid decline of the Cascades frog, Rana cascadae, and the 
Boreal toad, Bufo boreas boreas, in Oregon appeals to the recent increase in ultraviolet B 
radiation, which appears to affect immune response and hence render larvae more 
susceptible to a regional fungus (see Sarkar [1996] on recent anuran declines). Even 
though this susceptibility may appear “normal” if one considers only the present time (if 
the majority of such anurans are affected) it is highly unusual or abnormal if one 
considers a longer time scale that extends into the past.  
Similar to Boorse, Walsh (1996; also see Walsh and Ariew [1996]) defines the 
function of an entity, relative to an environment, in terms of the (positive and significant) 
contribution it makes to the average fitness of individuals with that trait: “The/a function 
 
100 Boorse, however, does not offer a definition of “dysfunction”; in fact, he rejects the idea that something 
can possess a function that it is constitutionally unable to perform (2002, 89). Instead, he uses his definition 
of “function” to define “disease” as the reduction of a functional ability below typical efficiency (1977, 
562). Hence, this dissertation puts his concept of function to a use that goes against his express intent.  
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of a token of type X with respect to selective regime R is to m iff X’s doing m positively 
(and significantly) contributes to the average fitness of individuals possessing X with 
respect to R” (Walsh [1996, 564]). (By “selective regime” he refers to all environmental 
factors that potentially affect an individual’s fitness [Ibid.]). On this basis, he explicitly 
defines “malfunction” in terms of the inability to make this contribution: “Those 
individuals whose x’s can’t do m suffer a fitness decrement, on average. Their tokens of 
X malfunction (no matter what else they are capable of doing)” (Ibid., 568).101
Note that both of these statistical approaches resolve the problem mentioned 
above (Section 3.1.3, under “Good-Contribution Theories”) that, from a statistical point 
of view, a given individual that has a function may have a very low probability of 
actually performing that function – such as the probability that a given sperm will 
fertilize an ovum. The reason that it avoids this problem is that it does not define the 
function of a trait in terms of what that trait frequently does, but in terms of what it 
frequently does when its activity contributes to fitness (Boorse [2002, 93]). In other 
words, to evaluate the function, F, of a trait, T, one must calculate the number of times in 
which T’s doing F contributes to fitness over the number of times in which T’s doing 
something contributes to fitness. If one restricts one’s attention to those individual sperm 
 
101 The purpose of Walsh’s relativization to a selective regime is to allow his theory to remain neutral 
between “backwards-looking” and “forward-looking” accounts of function: if the relevant environment is a 
past one, then function statements help to explain the current maintenance of a trait in a population; if the 
relevant environment is the present one, then the account is a consequentialist one (Ibid., 570). He believes 
that, like the etiological theory, the relational theory allows function statements to be explanatory (Ibid., 
571) as well as normative (Ibid., 586), but that since it is not inherently historical it is more consistent with 
biological usage (Ibid., 558). However, as noted above (see Section 3.1.3, under “Fitness-Contribution 
Theories”), it is important to make a distinction between the claim that a function that a trait had in the past 
helps explain its current maintenance, and the claim that a trait’s presently having a function helps to 
explain its current maintenance. Unlike the etiological view, the relational view cannot account for this 
latter fact; hence, according to the relational view, the present-tense ascription of a function does not 
explain anything. Similarly, the purpose of this section is to show that, to the extent that it permits the 
concept of dysfunction to be defined, then the relational view is normative, but it is also externalistic in that 
it violates CA2*. 
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that have contributed to fitness, the vast majority have done so by fertilizing ova, and 
hence that constitutes its function.   
Of course, this solution allows for vagueness: how high must this proportion be? 
On the one hand, the function of a trait cannot simply be defined as whichever one of a 
trait’s activities most frequently contributes to fitness, since this does not allow a trait to 
have more than one function unless it performs each of its functions with equal 
frequency. The medulla oblongata regulates breathing by monitoring CO2 and stimulating 
the diaphragm and intercostal muscles; it also induces vomiting. Both are performed over 
the course of a normal life and both are essential to survival, yet the medulla contributes 
to fitness much more frequently by regulating breathing than by initiating vomiting. 
Nonetheless, both contributions are equally considered its “functions”. On the other hand, 
it seems arbitrary to specify a given probability, p, and stipulate that the trait must 
perform the activity more frequently than p. This is especially so because some traits that 
typically contribute to fitness by performing an activity m may also have the function of 
performing another activity m* in rare or exceptional circumstances – as noted above, the 
frequency with which the medulla contributes to fitness by initiating vomiting is 
extremely low compared to the total number of occasions in which it contributes to 
fitness, so it does not seem that from a biological point of view there are any principled 
reasons for imposing an absolute limit on this proportion. But this problem of vagueness 
is not restricted to fitness-contribution theories. It is faced by etiological theories as well 
– for example, how often must a trait have contributed in the past to the relative fitness of 
individuals possessing it before it is “selected for”?102 There does not seem to be a non-
arbitrary answer to this question.  
 
102 Boorse (2002, 71) points out that, contra Millikan (1993, 35-39), to say that a trait was “selected for” 
does not eliminate the vagueness in specifying the number of past generations over which its activity must 
have conferred a relative fitness advantage upon its bearer in order for it to have a function. For example, if 
there was only a single occasion in which a trait variant allowed its bearer to reproduce more effectively 
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In the present context, the statistical approach faces a much more important 
problem than vagueness. Because it defines the concept of “dysfunction” in terms of the 
species-typical contribution of a trait, it admits of externalistic ascription – that is, the 
difference between a trait’s being dysfunctional and being non-dysfunctional does not 
necessarily supervene on the characteristic structure and activity of that trait. In order to 
show this, one must construct a scenario in which a given token, t, of a trait type, T, is 
unable to perform the activity, F, that constitutes T’s species-typical contribution to 
fitness – rather, t does F* instead, which contributes to fitness very rarely. In this 
environment, t is “dysfunctional”. Then, one changes the environment in such a way that 
F is no longer associated with a fitness advantage, but the fitness of the organism 
possessing t is unaffected, as is t’s characteristic structure and activity. By doing this, one 
increases the number of cases in which T contributes to fitness by doing F* over the total 
number of cases in which T contributes to fitness, and hence T loses the function F, and 
gains the function F*. As a consequence t is no longer dysfunctional, but its characteristic 
structure and activity have remained unaffected by this transition. The trait variant has 
gone from being dysfunctional to non-dysfunctional simply by altering the fitness of a 
different variant. A very similar problem was encountered in the context of the previous 
discussion of Kendell’s (1975b) concept of disease as “biological disadvantage” (Section 
2.3.1). Consequently, statistical approaches to function are not capable of satisfying 
CA2*. 
 
Dispositional Account of Function 
 
 
than the bearer of another, then one would not say that it came to possess a “function”. So how many 
generations are required before a trait has been “selected for”?  
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Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) present a dispositional approach to function. Even 
though they advocate a variant of the fitness-contribution theory, the criticism that 
follows can be extended to the other substantive contribution theories as well. According 
to their definition of function, “something has a (biological) function just when it confers 
a survival-enhancing propensity on a creature that possesses it” (Ibid., 192). More 
precisely, they define “function” counterfactually, and relative to the natural habitat of 
the organism, for reasons explained above (Section 3.1.2, under “Fitness-Contribution 
Theories): a function “would give a survival-enhancing propensity to a creature in an 
appropriate manner, in the creature’s natural habitat” (Ibid., 193). A “propensity” is a 
type of disposition that is manifested probabilistically, and will be described in more 
detail below.  
Note that the disposition to survive is not a property of the functional entity itself, 
but of the organism: given the way the entity is structured, if the organism were in its 
natural environment, the entity would bestow a disposition to survive upon the organism. 
A short explanation of the concept of a disposition (and that of a propensity) is warranted 
for the sake of criticizing their position. 
A paradigmatic example of a dispositional property is the solubility of salt. To say 
that salt is soluble is to say, among other things, that if salt is placed in water, then (all 
things being equal) it will dissolve. Moreover, the reason salt is soluble is that it has a 
polar molecular structure. When immersed, the hydrogen end of the water molecule 
attaches to the chloride atom, and the oxygen end the sodium atom. This breaks the 
sodium chloride bond. Dispositions are not de novo properties of complex systems; 
rather, they supervene upon the structure of those systems (Prior et al. [1982]). 
This example illustrates two properties of dispositions. The first is that they can 
only be defined relative to a given set of circumstances. Often, in addition to the 
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circumstances that are explicitly specified in the definition (water-immersion) there is a 
ceteris paribus clause that places additional, implicit restrictions on those circumstances. 
For example, salt will not dissolve if the water is saturated, or if a non-soluble container 
protects it, and so on. For the present purposes it is irrelevant how many such conditions 
must be included in the set of circumstances, or whether the number of such conditions is 
even finite. 
Note, however, that dispositions are not relative in the sense that whether or not 
an entity has the disposition depends upon whether it is presently within the 
circumstances in question. Salt is soluble even if it is never placed in water. This is 
crucial for understanding why Bigelow and Pargetter define functions as dispositions. It 
allows something to have a function even if it cannot perform it, in the same way that salt 
has a disposition even if it cannot manifest it (Bigelow and Pargetter [1987, 193]). Hence, 
their definition can satisfy CA1. 
The second property is that something has the disposition it does because it has 
the structure it does. The solubility of salt, as noted above, is a consequence of its 
molecular structure: it supervenes on this structure. A detailed knowledge of the structure 
that explains the disposition clearly enhances the explanatory power of dispositions. In 
fact, when no knowledge of the structure of the entity with a disposition is possessed, 
explanations that appeal to dispositions are often suspected of being vacuous. The classic 
example of a vacuous explanation is taken from Molière’s seventeenth-century parody, 
Le Malade Imaginaire. When asked why opium puts people to sleep, the learned doctor 
explains that opium has a virtus dormitiva, the Latin phrase for “sleep-causing power”. 
This is not unlike explaining why the glass broke by saying that it is fragile.  
Regardless, it is irrelevant for the present purposes whether appealing to a 
disposition without structural knowledge is or is not explanatorily vacuous. What matters 
 173
                                                
in the present context is that, to ascribe a disposition, D, to an entity of type X is to imply 
that for all entities, X, that have D, there exists a structure, S, such that X has S and, 
because X has S, if X is placed in environment E, then (ceteris paribus) it will manifest D. 
103 (This is not intended as an analysis of “disposition”.) 
A “propensity” is a probabilistic, or variable-strength, disposition. Presumably, 
propensities are correlated with frequencies, in the sense that, if things of type X have a 
higher propensity than things of type Y to manifest a disposition, D, under conditions C, 
then Xs will manifest D under C more frequently than Ys will manifest D under C. One 
might question, however, whether or not “propensity” is a very useful concept. This is 
because whether or not an object manifests a disposition is usually thought to be 
completely determined by its structure and its environment. If salt is placed in water, and 
all of the implicit ceteris paribus conditions are met, then it will dissolve. It will not 
“probably” dissolve if these conditions are met; it will definitely dissolve. To say that salt 
will probably dissolve could only mean that one does not know if all of the relevant 
circumstances actually hold. However, propensities are useful for describing the 
dispositions of genuinely indeterministic phenomena, such as the decay time of some 
sub-atomic particles. In principle, two identical radioactive atoms placed in two identical 
environments can decay at different times.104 If this phenomenon is inherently 
indeterministic then there does not exist an exhaustive description of its structure and 
environment from which the time of decay can be determined; hence, one can only 
attribute a propensity to it.  
 
103 Note that this condition is consistent with the possibility that dispositions are multiply realized; that is, 
that there is no unique structure that must be associated with a given disposition.  
104 According to an influential definition of “fitness” (Mills and Beatty [1979]) the fitness of an individual 
organism consists in its propensity to leave a given number of offspring (Ibid., 275). They interpret this 
propensity as its expected number of descendents in an environment (hence it is not a probability but an 
expectation). This interpretation should not be taken to imply that the number of offspring an organism 
leaves is genuinely indeterministic. Consequently, their definition could, in principle, be redefined in terms 
of dispositions rather than propensities. 
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On Bigelow and Pargetter’s account, as noted above, the disposition is not 
ascribed to the functional entity itself, but to the organism: a trait has a function if it 
bestows upon the organism a disposition to survive in that organism’s natural habitat. 
Presumably, this implies that a trait, T, has a function when the organism has a structure, 
S, (which includes possession of T, along with other species-normal parts and processes) 
such that, if the organism is placed in environment E, namely, its natural habitat, then 
(ceteris paribus) it will survive. Contrary to appearance, this statement does not imply the 
strong claim that the organism with the trait in question will always survive in its natural 
habitat. In order to define a concept of “dysfunction”, then one must ask: on the 
dispositional view, under what conditions will a functional trait fail to contribute to 
survival? There are four possible conditions:  
 
(i) the organism is in E and possesses S, but some condition left implicit in the 
ceteris paribus clause is not satisfied – for example, a new predator is introduced 
into the habitat. However, for the purpose of defining “dysfunction”, this 
possibility may be ignored, since, in principle, one can simply interpret E broadly 
to include the ceteris paribus condition;105
 
(ii) the organism is in E (construed broadly to include the ceteris paribus 
condition) and possesses S, but since a propensity, unlike a disposition, is 
 
105 Of course, one might not, in a given case, know what ceteris paribus condition went unfulfilled, and 
hence one may not be able to render it explicit. The point, however, is that whether or not an entity is 
dysfunctional should not be determined by whether or not the organism failed to survive in its natural 
habitat because an unknown ceteris paribus condition was violated. The reason is that whether or not a 
given ceteris paribus condition is known is an epistemological concern – that is, it is relative to the 
knowledge that is available to one – and hence if it were used to define the difference between a 
dysfunctional and non-dysfunctional token of a trait, the definition of “dysfunction” would be an externalist 
one, since the characteristic structure and activity of a trait is not necessarily affected by how much 
information a person has about it.  
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probabilistic, the organism may still fail to survive. This option entails that 
whether or not an organism survives in its natural habitat is genuinely 
indeterministic. But imputing the sort of indeterminacy found in the quantum 
realm to the organismic realm is physically implausible. It would entail that, given 
two identical organisms in two identical environments, one might live and the 
other die. Although it is possible, such a scenario is so unlikely that a concept of 
“dysfunction” defined on its basis would be vacuous; 
 
(iii) the organism does not have S. But if the organism does not have the requisite 
structure, then it does not possess the disposition in question, since disposition 
supervenes on structure. Consequently, the trait in question is not able to bestow a 
survival-enhancing disposition upon the organism, and hence, by definition, it 
does not have a function; 
 
(iv) the organism is not in E (construed broadly to include the ceteris paribus 
condition). According to this option, even if the structure S does bestow a 
survival-enhancing disposition upon the organism, the current environment of the 
organism is not such as to allow the disposition to be manifested. A glass is 
fragile even if never struck; an organism is disposed to survive even if it is not in 
an environment conducive to the manifestation of that disposition.  This last 
alternative will be used in the following to define a concept of “dysfunction”, 
which will be shown to violate CA2*. 
 
One could define a concept of dysfunction on the basis of (iv) in the following 
way: a trait is dysfunctional if it bestows a survival-enhancing disposition upon the 
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organism, but the current environment of the organism is not such as to allow the 
disposition to be manifested. The problem with this formulation is that it violates CA2*, 
since it permits the distinction between dysfunctional and non-dysfunctional token of a 
trait to be determined by factors that do not affect the characteristic structure or activity 
of the trait itself. An example will illustrate this. 
One of the optic fibers of the frog, Rana pipiens, is differentially sensitive to the 
presence of flies in its environment (Lettvin et al. [1959]). In fact, any appropriately 
positioned small dark moving object will cause the frog to strike in the direction of that 
object. Suppose that there are two frogs, one of which is placed in its natural environment 
and the other in an artificial environment filled with small moving black objects that are 
all coated with a lethal poison. In both habitats, the characteristic structure and activity of 
the optic nerve are exactly the same in each frog: the optic nerve carries information 
about small dark moving objects to the superior colliculi, which guides the motor 
response to the position and direction of the stimulus. However, the latter environment is 
not one in which the survival-enhancing disposition it bestows upon the organism can be 
manifested; consequently, according to the definition of “dysfunction”, the optic nerve of 
the first frog is functional and that of the second is dysfunctional. This violates CA2*. 
One might object that this example does not violate CA2*, since the differences in 
the frogs’ environments will eventually have an effect on the characteristic structure and 
activity of their respective optic nerves: eventually, the second frog will consume a 
poisoned object and die, and the first frog will consume a nutrient-rich fly and live. But 
the fact that the eventual outcomes of the two scenarios will diverge is not relevant for 
CA2*, since the dispositional account of dysfunction allows one to say that the optic 
nerve of the second frog is dysfunctional even before any relevant physical changes take 
place that would distinguish them. The optic nerve of the second frog becomes 
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dysfunctional as soon as that frog is placed within the artificial environment, because at 
that time the frog is no longer in an environment in which the survival-enhancing 
disposition can be manifested. What this suggests is that the dispositional account of 
dysfunction is more closely related to biological usage of the term “maladaptive”, which 
often simply means that, in a specified environment, a trait is fitness-reducing. But as 
noted in Section 2.2.2, this is an externalist concept. 
Note, finally, that the dispositional account of dysfunction has a very 
counterintuitive consequence, although one that does not technically violate either of the 
adequacy conditions: it does not allow one to say that an entity is malfunctioning in the 
case where a structural anomaly prevents it from performing its function. Suppose, as in 
the famous experiments of Sperry (e.g., Sperry [1944]) the optic fibers of a toad are 
severed, the toad’s eyes are rotated 180 degrees, and the optic fibers are allowed to 
regenerate. As is well-known, the initial point-to-point mapping of connections is 
restored after regeneration, such that the toad’s visual field is inverted both horizontally 
and vertically. As a consequence, the toad always flicks its tongue in the direction 
opposite that of the lure. But in this case, the structure of the optic nerve is simply no 
longer such as to bestow a survival-enhancing disposition upon the organism: “When the 
lure was held above the head and a little caudad to the eye the animals struck downward 
in front of them and got a mouthful of mud and moss” (Ibid., 63). Therefore, it is neither 
functional nor dysfunctional, since it cannot be said to have a function at all.  
Similarly, if acute heart failure in an individual is brought about by stenosis of the 
mitral valve (formed by irregular hardening of the flaps of the mitral valve, which 
restricts the flow of blood from the left atrium to the left ventricle) the heart cannot be 
said to “malfunction”, since it no longer bestows a survival-enhancing disposition upon 
the organism, or at least not to the same degree as in its absence. Neander (1991a, 183) 
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makes this point in arguing that Bigelow and Pargetter’s theory cannot define 
“malfunction” since, in paradigmatic cases of malfunctioning, the trait in question loses 
its ability to confer a survival-enhancing disposition upon the organism and hence does 
not have a function. As has been argued here, their theory can define “malfunction”, but 
only for the case in which the environment does not permit the manifestation of the 
disposition, rather than that in which the structure changes in such a way that it cannot 
perform the activity. The notion of a “malfunction due to structural anomaly”, according 
to the dispositional approach, is a contradiction in terms.106
3.2.2 Etiological Theories Can Satisfy Both Adequacy Conditions 
The purpose of this section is to argue that non-representational etiological 
theories are capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions. In order to show this, it will 
use the etiological theory as the basis for a definition of “dysfunction”, and it will show 
that this definition implies the truth of both adequacy conditions. The remainder of the 
dissertation will be concerned with extending the definition, resolving some conceptual 
problems with it, and showing how it applies to cases of interest in psychiatry.  
According to the definition that will be presented here, to say that an individual 
entity, x, is dysfunctional with respect to function F, means:  
 
(i) the function of x is F; 
(ii) x is not able to perform F; and 
 
106 Their definition, then, is contrary to the one that will be presented in the following section (Section 
3.2.2), in which an entity can only be dysfunctional when its structure is such as to prevent it from carrying 
out its function, rather than when the environment is not a permissive one. In the definition that will be 
presented here, “dysfunction due to an abnormal environment” is a contradiction in terms. See Section 5.1, 
where the distinction between being functional, dysfunctional, and unable to function due to an abnormal 
environment, will be elaborated and illustrated. 
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(iii) if x is not in the normal environment for its functioning, then if x were in the 
normal environment for its functioning, x would not be able to perform F.  
 
Like Bigelow and Pargetter’s (1987) definition of “function”, there is a 
counterfactual element; that is, there is a reference to what would be the case were the 
entity in its normal environment. This, however, raises the onus of defining “normal 
environment for an entity’s functioning”, which was not attempted in the previous 
section. The etiological definition of a normal environment for an entity’s functioning 
will allow the satisfaction of CA2*, which has remained elusive so far. 
That the etiological theory of functions satisfies CA1 is easy to show, as indicated 
in the previous chapter, in relation to Klein’s (1978) definition of “function” (Section 
2.3.3). Since the etiological theory defines the function of an entity in terms of its history, 
then whether or not something has a function is independent of whether it is currently 
capable of performing its function, and hence it allows something to have a function 
without being able to perform it. Another way of putting this point is that having a 
function supervenes on history alone; performing a function supervenes only on the 
current structure and environment of the functional entity.  
The argument for why etiological theories satisfy CA2* is slightly more complex, 
but can be briefly summarized before it is elaborated in more detail. It rests upon two 
premises: a definition of a “normal environment for an entity’s functioning” and a 
determination claim. First, the concept of a normal environment for an entity’s 
functioning is defined as that environment within which past instances of the trait 
performed the activity that thereby came to constitute its function. This is the approach 
taken by Millikan (1984, 33-4). Second, it is assumed that the activity of an entity is 
determined by its structure and its environment. These two premises entail that if 
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something is unable to perform its function, then either its structure diverges from that of 
its progenitors, or its environment diverges (or both). If the environment diverges, then, 
by definition, the trait is not in its normal environment; but if it is the case that, were it in 
its normal environment, it would still not be able to perform its function, then its 
structure must diverge from that of its progenitors (since, by definition, the environment 
is the same). But then the only way of changing the functional status of an entity from 
dysfunctional to non-dysfunctional is to change its structure, and this is an internal 
change. Therefore it satisfies CA2*. This argument will be elaborated in more detail 
below. 
The first premise involves the definition of “normal environment for an entity’s 
functioning”. The definition of “dysfunction” given above specifies that if an entity is not 
in the normal environment for its functioning at the time of the ascription then it must be 
the case that the entity would still be incapable of performing its function even if it were 
in that environment (condition [iii]). The concept of “normal environment for an entity’s 
functioning” is here defined simply as any one out of the range of environments within 
which the entity’s progenitors performed the activity that currently constitutes its 
function, and in which those performances were fitness enhancing. The reason that the 
Arctic Circle, rather than the San Diego Zoo, constitutes the “normal environment” 
within which the functioning of the polar bear’s dense, water-repellent fur can be 
assessed is because that is the environment in which, in the past, those properties 
contributed to heat retention and thereby explain its current existence.  
Consequently, the notion of a “normal environment for an entity’s functioning” is 
a retrospective, historical one.107 This approach to defining the concept of normal 
 
107 This is not to imply that the concept of “normal environment for a trait’s functioning” as defined here 
accurately reflects most biological usage. All that is necessary is that there exists a well-defined reference 
environment in relation to which functional activity of an entity – whether it is dysfunctional or non-
dysfunctional – can be assessed. 
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environment was proposed by Millikan (1984, 33-34). She first defines the concept of a 
“Normal explanation” for the functioning of a trait. This is an explanation of how the trait 
has typically, historically, performed the activity that currently constitutes its function. It 
specifies the relevant structural features of the trait, and the relevant environmental 
conditions. The environmental conditions that are appealed to in a Normal explanation 
constitute “Normal conditions” for a trait’s functioning. 
Clearly, as she points out, Normal explanations can be more or less “proximate”. 
One can describe a “Normal condition” for the heart’s functioning as one in which 
oxygen is present in the organism’s atmosphere. One can also describe this environment 
much more specifically as one in which the lungs deliver oxygen to the heart via the 
pulmonary vein. The latter explanation is more “proximate” than the former since it 
explains how the oxygen in the atmosphere comes to have an effect upon the heart. 
Although the conditions under which a trait can dysfunction are only well-defined 
by constructing a well-defined normal environment, it is important to note that the normal 
environment for a trait is not necessarily the same as the normal environment for the 
trait-bearer (e.g., the organism). (Walsh [1996, 563] draws attention to this ambiguity in 
Bigelow and Pargetter’s [1987] usage.) The normal environment for a functional trait 
consists in the (more) proximate physical environment that provides that trait with the 
materials that, in the past, contributed to that functional ability. For example, a normal 
environment for the human heart is not the normal environment for the person, but 
rather, the environment that consists in a supply of blood from the vena cava, the 
modulation of the heart rate by norepinephrine and acetylcholine from the sympathetic 
and vagal nerves, respectively; a supply of oxygenated blood from the pulmonary vein; 
and so on. If the lungs are not supplying oxygen to the heart, then the heart is not in its 
normal environment, even if the organism that possesses the heart can be said to occupy 
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its own normal environment – that is, even if there is oxygen present in the organism’s 
atmosphere. By the same token, if the lungs are supplying oxygen to the heart, then (all 
things being equal) the heart is in its normal environment, even if there is no oxygen in 
the atmosphere. For example, the heart of astronaut receiving an artificial oxygen supply 
is in the normal environment for its functioning. Clearly, this notion of a more or less 
“proximate” normal environment for the heart’s functioning needs to be rendered more 
precisely, but this suffices for the present.  
With the concept of the “normal environment for an entity’s functioning” in 
place, one can now show how the proposed definition of “dysfunction” satisfies CA2*. It 
will be assumed that the activity, A, of a functional entity, x, is determined by its 
structure, S, and its environment, E. What this means is that S and E determine A.  Now, 
suppose that an entity of the same type as its progenitors cannot perform the activity that 
its progenitors performed and that thereby constitutes its function. By the determination 
claim, this implies that one of the following three cases holds:  
 
(1) x’s structure is different from that of any of its progenitors that performed A, 
but its environment is the same as one of its progenitors (¬S & E). But if x’s 
structure is different and the environment is the same, then x is unable to perform 
its function in its normal environment and is therefore dysfunctional – it satisfies 
all three conditions; 
 
(2) x’s structure is the same as that of one of its progenitors, but its environment is 
different from that of that progenitor (S & ¬E). But if only x’s environment is 
different, then x is in an abnormal environment; since its structure is the same, 
then were x to be placed in its normal environment (that environment within 
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which its structurally similar progenitor performed its function) it would be able 
to perform the activity in question. Consequently, merely being placed in an 
abnormal environment cannot satisfy (iii) of the definition of “dysfunction”; 
 
(3) x’s structure and environment are different from the structure and environment 
of any of its progenitors (¬S & ¬E). But if both x’s structure and x’s environment 
are different, then x is in an abnormal environment and one would have to assess 
whether it would still be able to perform its function in the normal environment. If 
its structure varies such that it could not perform its function, even if it were to be 
placed in its normal environment, then it is dysfunctional. 
 
The following table (Table 3.3) illustrates the four possible circumstances for a 
trait’s functioning. The most important point about Table 3.3 is that the only context in 
which an entity can be dysfunctional is that in which its structure diverges from that of 
ancestral tokens that performed that activity. Whether or not it inhabits its normal 
environment is irrelevant for the evaluation of its functional status. Consequently, the 
only way to change an entity from being dysfunctional to being non-dysfunctional is by 
changing its structure and not merely its environment.  But structural changes are changes 
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Table 3.3 Cases under which an entity can be dysfunctional. (See accompanying text 
for details.) 
The argument given above is fairly simplistic. One obvious objection is that, 
strictly speaking, at any moment, the current environment of a trait, and the current 
structure of that trait, are different from that of every other moment. What are the identity 
conditions for “sameness of structure” and “sameness of environment” over time? 
Although perhaps this objection cannot be answered in a sufficiently precise sense, one 
plausible answer involves the claim that past tokens of a trait that currently has a function 
have been able to perform the activity in question over a range of environments. A 
migrating Monarch butterfly, for example, samples a range of temperatures, foliage 
types, and sources of nourishment. Therefore, even if the current environment of a given 
Monarch butterfly is, with respect to its precise specification, completely different than 
any that have been encountered before, nonetheless, one can say that, so long as the 
values of the variables that are used to define the environment fall within the range that 
has been established historically, then those traits that evolved in the context of migration 
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will be in the normal environment for their functioning.  This is not to say that the answer 
is entirely satisfactory. Nonetheless, vagueness can only be eliminated to a certain extent. 
One cannot but tolerate some measure of vagueness.  
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Chapter 4:  From Etiological Functions to Selection Processes 
The previous chapter argued that etiological theories of function are uniquely 
capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions. However, the first section (Section 3.1) 
showed that there are many types of etiological theories, and they differ in their 
substantive consequences. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to evaluate the four basic 
etiological theories – weak persistence-based (WPE), strong persistence-based (SPE), 
weak reproduction-based (WRE), and strong reproduction-based (SRE), and justify the 
selection of the strong persistence-based etiological theory as particularly appropriate for 
the psychiatric context. According to SPE, the function of an entity consists in the 
activity that, in the past, contributed to the differential persistence or reproduction of that 
entity or type of entity. 
The first section (Section 4.1) will clarify the logical relations between the four 
theories, assess some of their contrasting consequences, and argue that SPE satisfies 
important desiderata that a theory of function appropriate to the psychiatric context 
should possess. However, it will point out that other theories, particularly WRE, may be 
more appropriate in other scientific, and especially biological, contexts. This 
consequence shows that SPE is of limited value for explicating a concept of function that 
is applicable to the whole of biology; in other areas of biology, such as evolutionary and 
molecular biology and ecology, WRE (or a non-etiological theory) may be more 
appropriate. This conclusion reinforces the value of a pragmatic and discipline-specific 
approach to analyzing and refining the concept of function. 
The second section (Section 4.2) will present the idea that individual learning 
(Section 4.2.1) and synaptic structure formation (Section 4.2.2) are mediated, to some 
extent, by selection processes. These selection processes are analogous to the operation of 
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natural selection in the evolutionary context and they ensure the differential persistence 
of certain cognitive or neurological structures. According to SPE, this implies that it is in 
some cases appropriate to assign functions to some learned dispositions and synaptic 
structures. This confirms the appropriateness and empirical relevance of SPE in the 
context of psychology and neuroscience and hence, by extension, to psychiatry. This 
section will not claim that selection processes mediate all learning or synaptic structure 
formation, but that the prevalence of selection processes in those realms implies that SPE 
is widely applicable to them. 
Two conclusions will be drawn from the foregoing considerations. The first is that 
the empirical problem that is often raised with the etiological theory of function – that is, 
that there are insurmountable problems to testing function ascriptions empirically – is 
only a problem if “selection processes” are restricted to those that operate over an 
evolutionary time-scale (see Section 4.1.4 for an elaboration of this claim). The claim that 
selection processes mediate the formation of many learned dispositions and neural 
structures is empirically testable even if it is technically very difficult to test in a given 
case. The second conclusion is that the mere fact that a given psychological or behavioral 
condition is in some sense maladaptive in a given environment (in the sense that it 
reduces fitness in that environment) does not allow one to infer that that condition stems 
from an internal dysfunction (in the sense defined in the previous chapter, namely, it is 
unable to perform its function even in the normal environment for its functioning). This is 
because even learned dispositions or synaptic structures that are currently maladaptive 
may have been formed, in part, by selection processes, and hence they may be 
functioning normally relative to the environment in which they were selected, or unable 
to function due to an abnormal environment. This conclusion raises the level of evidence 
that would be required to substantiate the claim that a given psychological or behavioral 
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condition stems from an internal dysfunction. Chapter 5 will apply the notion of function 
developed here to examples from current psychiatric research on schizophrenia.  
4.1 FOUR TYPES OF ETIOLOGICAL THEORY 
This section will begin by providing a schematic overview of the logical relations 
between the four types of etiological theory (Section 4.1.1). Since all four theories that 
will be evaluated satisfy both of the adequacy conditions (CA1 and CA2*) (Section 3.3), 
there is no question of privileging any one of the four theories on that basis. Rather, the 
justification for choosing SPE will rely partly on methodological grounds, partly on 
grounds of intuitive plausibility, and partly on pragmatic grounds. Section 4.1.2 will 
illustrate the shortcoming of WPE on intuitive grounds; Section 4.1.3 will discuss the 
shortcoming of WRE on pragmatic grounds, and Section 4.1.4 the shortcoming of SRE 
on largely methodological grounds. Section 4.1.5 introduces and defends the 
appropriateness of SPE on all three grounds.  
4.1.1 Logical Relations between the Four Theories 
For the sake of convenient reference, the four theories may be schematically 
recapitulated as follows:  
 
(i) Weak Persistence-Based Etiological Theory (WPE): The function of an entity 
consists in that activity that, in the past, contributed to the persistence or 
reproduction of that entity or type of entity; 
 
(ii) Weak Reproduction-Based Etiological Theory (WRE): The function of an 
entity consists in that activity that, in the past, contributed to the reproduction of 
that entity or type of entity; 
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(iii) Strong Persistence-Based Etiological Theory (SPE): The function of an entity 
consists in that activity that, in the past, contributed to the differential persistence 
or reproduction of that entity or type of entity; 
 
(iv) Strong Reproduction-Based Etiological Theory (SRE): The function of an 
entity consists in that activity that, in the past, contributed to the differential 
reproduction of that entity or type of entity. 
 
These four theories can be arranged into a hierarchy of generality. There are two 
important relations to consider. First, and trivially, “reproduction-based” theories are less 
general than “persistence-based” theories, but this is simply an artifact of the way 
“persistence-based theory” is defined (see Section 3.1.2, under “Second Distinction: 
Reproduction-based vs. Persistence-based Theories”, and especially fn. 74 of that 
chapter). It is defined disjunctively, as a theory according to which the function of an 
entity consists in the activity that, in the past, contributed to the (differential) persistence 
or reproduction of that entity or type of entity. Consequently, a reproduction-based 
theory is a type of persistence-based theory.  
Second, strong etiological theories are less general than weak etiological theories. 
According to a strong theory, if an entity has a function then, in the past, it contributed to 
the differential persistence or reproduction of that type of entity and thereby to its own 
differential persistence or reproduction; according to a weak theory, if an entity has a 
function then it (merely) contributed to the persistence or reproduction of that type of 
entity. Clearly, if something contributes to the differential persistence or reproduction of 
an entity it contributes to the persistence or reproduction of that entity. Consequently, a 
strong theory is a type of weak theory.   
The following figure (Figure 4.1) illustrates the relations of generality that obtain 
between the four theories, where an arrow goes from one theory to another if the first is 
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ill here include the empirical adequacy and relevance of the definition of 
discipline it is intended to be useful for.  
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and so on. In the following, the methodological maxim that will find application 
is that, all else being equal, more general theories of function are preferable to less 
general theories, because the most general theory builds in the fewest potentially 
questionable assumptions. Hence, given that all four theories of function satisfy 
the conditions of adequacy that were presented in the previous two chapters, then 
the most general theory that satisfies those conditions should be accepted. 
However, the other two grounds must qualify this maxim; 
 
(ii) “grounds of intuitive plausibility” refer to fairly coarse and very general 
intuitive assessments of the correctness or incorrectness of function ascriptions. 
For example, though WPE is the weakest theory (and hence should be privileged 
according to the first ground) it will be argued that WPE is too inclusive because 
it can ascribe functions to purely physical properties such as mass as such (e.g., in 
the sense of, “the function of an object’s mass is to make it subject to gravity”), 
and it can ascribe functions to ubiquitous non-biological structures such as a pile 
of rocks or a fallen stick. This seems counterintuitive if the definition of function 
is to lend itself to a corresponding notion of “dysfunction”.109 Clearly, such 
intuitive judgments can be problematic and controversial, and they are subject to 
modification when other desiderata are brought to bear upon them. For example, 
philosophers used to argue on intuitive grounds that any acceptable theory of 
function must apply equally to artifact functions and to biological functions (e.g., 
Wright [1973, 143]; Boorse [1976, 77]; see Lewens [2004, 11-16] for discussion). 
However, today very few philosophers believe that an adequate theory of 
 
109 Suppose a little rock holds up a big rock in a fast-moving stream, as a consequence of which the little 
rock is held in place. Even if there is some concept of “function” according to which one can plausibly 
attribute to the little rock the “function” of holding up the big rock, it seems counterintuitive to say that the 
little rock becomes “dysfunctional” if the large rock falls off of it.  
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biological function must account for the ascription of functions to artifacts (e.g., 
Godfrey-Smith [1993, 347]). In other words, philosophical intuitions about the 
adequacy of such definitions changed over time as a consequence of the fact that 
other sorts of desiderata came to bear on the problem of explicating “function” – 
for example, that of constructing a theory of function that would be appropriate to 
the context of evolutionary biology.  
More typically, philosophers may agree that a given sort of example is 
counterintuitive but disagree as to its significance. Amundson and Lauder (1994), 
for example, argue that despite the fact that the ascription of functions to rock 
formations, fallen sticks, or other ubiquitous non-biological phenomena is 
counterintuitive, it should not undermine the acceptance of their theory of 
function, which essentially amounts to an interest-based consequentialist theory 
that they believe to be useful in the context of evolutionary morphology (Ibid., 
346-7). Since evolutionary morphologists are not interested in rock formations, 
then, they argue, the fact that a theory of function that morphologists find useful 
ascribes functions to rock formations is irrelevant. In this case, although 
Amundson and Lauder admit to sharing the intuitions in question, they argue that 
pragmatic factors (adequacy of a theory of function for a specific disciplinary 
context) take precedence over intuitive factors. 
Nonetheless, the position that will be adopted in this dissertation is that 
while intuitions, taken apart from all other considerations, cannot be 
determinative for selecting an appropriate theory of function, they can be 
influential. Their clearest influence shows itself in the following consideration: of 
two theories of function, if one of them violates fairly common and very general 
intuitions about usage, and another does not, then in the absence of strong 
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pragmatic or methodological grounds for rejecting the latter, the latter should be 
accepted over the former because it more accurately reflects the usage that it is 
attempting to capture; 
 
(iii) “pragmatic” grounds for accepting a theory of function are those that refer to 
the pragmatic goals or aims that such a theory is intended to satisfy as a basis for 
selecting one theory over another. The aim of the following analysis is to provide 
a theory of function that is appropriate to the psychiatric context, and in 
particular, to the cognitive, behavioral and neurobiological research that is central 
to that field. Clearly, disciplines such as neurobiology and cognitive science are 
central to contemporary psychiatry; consequently, if a theory of function permits 
function assignments to be made in those fields in ways that largely conform to 
practice, then that theory of function should be privileged over others that do not, 
despite the fact that the theory may be inadequate in other fields, and hence fail 
the methodological test of generality.  
 
 The reason for elaborating these three “grounds” for selecting a theory of function 
is that each has some argumentative role to play in the selection of SPE as particularly 
appropriate to the psychiatric context. According to the first ground, the most general 
theory should be selected; this methodological criterion gives preference to WPE, since, 
as depicted in Figure 4.1, WPE is the most general such theory. However, according to 
the second ground, WPE violates very general intuitions about the appropriateness of 
function ascriptions (it is over-inclusive) and the other three do not – or at least, not to the 
same extent. Therefore, on grounds of intuitive plausibility, one should reject WPE. On 
methodological grounds, then, one should select either SPE or WRE over SRE, because 
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SPE and WRE are the next most general theories. (This option is usually overlooked in 
discussions of function.) The final selection of SPE over WRE is ultimately based on 
pragmatic grounds.  
Interestingly, the ensuing discussion will suggest a fairly intriguing division of 
labor: while SPE can often be found adequate for neurobiology and some aspects of 
cognitive psychology, it is inadequate for some aspects of evolutionary and molecular 
biology and ecology for which WRE is adequate, and vice versa. This is because, on the 
one hand, SPE can be applied to non-reproducing populations that typically undergo 
selection, and important aspects of synapse formation and individual learning fall under 
this category.  On the other hand, WRE can be applied to reproducing populations that do 
not undergo selection, and such populations play an important role in evolutionary and 
molecular biology and ecology. This point will be elaborated in Section 4.1.3. 
4.1.2 Inadequacy of WPE on Intuitive Grounds 
As noted above (see Figure 4.1), WPE is the weakest, that is, the most general 
theory of function, and hence includes all of the phenomena that are captured by the other 
three. WPE simply entails that the function of an entity consists in that activity that, in the 
past, contributed to the persistence or reproduction of that entity or type of entity. This 
suggests that WPE should be privileged on methodological grounds because it is the most 
general theory that is compatible with CA1 and CA2*. However, it has often been argued 
that WPE is too inclusive – it awards “functions” to phenomena in ways that are 
intuitively implausible. The following section will first discuss the intuitive inadequacy 
of WPE (for reasons that have long been pointed out in the literature) and then it will 
examine two attempts to modify WPE in ways that exclude some of those 
counterintuitive consequences. The first attempt is to restrict functions to those activities 
that have, in the past, contributed to their own persistence by contributing to the 
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persistence of the system in which they are embedded. The second attempt is to restrict 
functions to those activities that have, in the past, contributed to their own persistence in 
a sufficiently “complex” manner. Both will be rejected, leaving either WRE or SPE as 
the next most appropriate theory of function.  
Intuitive Implausibility of WPE 
One way of illustrating the intuitive implausibility of WPE is to present a specific 
WPE view and show how it leads to the problem in question. The classic exposition of 
WPE is Wright (1973; 1976). To quote from this influential explication of “function”:  
 
The function of X is Z means   
(a)  X is there because it does Z,  
(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there.  (Wright [1973, 161]) 
 
In the artifact context, X’s form can be explained by the fact that someone 
recognized that form to have a certain capacity (Z), and produced it for that reason, 
thereby fulfilling the first premise. In the biological context, if X was selected for by 
virtue of one of its effects, Z, and this selection process partly accounts for its present 
existence, then it will be true to say that  “X is there because it does Z”, thereby also 
satisfying the first premise. If X’s being there allows it to continue to do Z, then the 
second will be fulfilled as well. Clearly, the purpose of Wright’s fairly general analysis is 
to present the idea of a “cyclical”110 causal process, one that incorporates both natural and 
artifact functions. His is clearly a weak etiological theory since there is no explicit 
specification that X must have been selected for doing Z. Moreover, it is a persistence-
based theory, since his formulation is compatible with the possibility that doing Z merely 
 
110 In the sense defined in fn. 66. 
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allowed a specific token of X to persist, or that doing Z allowed one token of X to 
reproduce, creating a new token of X. 
But Wright’s general definition is also satisfied by processes that, intuitively, one 
would not want to ascribe functions to, such as the sort contrived by Boorse (1976) in his 
critique of Wright. Suppose, for example, that a hose in a laboratory springs a leak, and 
thereby emits a noxious chemical, and any scientist that attempts to seal the hose gets 
knocked unconscious by the chemical it emits. Thus it can be said that the leak in the 
hose contributes to its own persistence by knocking out anyone that comes close enough 
to fix it (Ibid., 72). Strictly speaking, one must say that the leak is there because it knocks 
out scientists, and that knocking out scientists is a consequence of its being there. But it 
seems counterintuitive to say that knocking out scientists is the function of the leak – 
again, supposing that the relevant notion of “function” can support a corresponding 
notion of “dysfunction”. Similarly, obesity can contribute to a sedentary lifestyle, which 
in turn can reinforce obesity. Thus it is possible to explain a person’s current obesity in 
terms of one of the consequences his or her obesity produced in the past that contributes 
to its own persistence (Ibid., 75-6). Yet, like the hose example, it is counterintuitive to 
suggest that the function of obesity is to contribute to a sedentary lifestyle. Bedau (1992, 
786) uses an example of a stick floating down a stream that brushes against a rock and 
gets pinned there by the backwash it creates, and thus is responsible for perpetuating its 
current position, to make the same point. Clearly, trivial examples from the natural world 
as well as from the realm of artifacts can be multiplied indefinitely. 
Boorse’s counterexamples have been influential in shaping the development and 
refinement of etiological theories of function, since it has led many to accept that having 
been selected for by natural selection, rather than merely having contributed to the 
continuation of one’s present state, is a necessary condition for having a function (see, 
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e.g., Neander [1983, 103]; Millikan [1993, 34-6]; Boorse himself [1976, 76] suggests this 
possibility but rejects it). This is tantamount to moving directly from WPE to SRE, some 
version of which, as noted above (see Section 3.1.2) is probably the most widely held 
theory of “function” amongst philosophers. Obesity, though it secures its own persistence 
by contributing to a sedentary lifestyle, is in no sense selected over some other 
phenotypic trait because it contributes to a sedentary lifestyle. Similarly, the leak in the 
hose is not there because it, rather than something else, proved to be more effective in 
knocking out scientists. However, the logical schema described in Figure 4.1 also shows 
that it is not necessary to accept SRE simply in order to avoid the problems associated 
with WPE. Instead, one could accept WRE or SPE instead. However, before rejecting 
WPE outright, one should examine the possibility that it can be modified or finessed. 
Below, two different attempts to modify WPE will be presented, and both of them will be 
shown to be inadequate to their original aim. 
First Attempt: Contribution to Persistence of Containing System 
Godfrey-Smith (1993, 198-199; 1994, 348-350), following Millikan (1984), 
restricts functions to entities that undergo some form of reproduction or replication. 
Consequently, he offers a reproduction-based view and not a persistence-based view. 
However, some of the additional restrictions he places on his theory can be applied to the 
persistence-based theory as well.  
After restricting functions to the parts of reproducing entities, Godfrey-Smith 
(1994, 348) comes up with additional counterintuitive consequences for his view. 
Segregation-distorter (SD) genes, as noted in Section 3.1.2 (under “Two Additional 
Variables: System and Temporal Variables”), guarantee the overrepresentation of their 
chromosome in the gamete pool by “sabotaging” sperm containing the homologous 
chromosome. This constitutes a form of selection operating at the level of alleles. 
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However, Godfrey-Smith claims that it seems counterintuitive to say that disrupting 
meiosis should be considered the function of the SD genes (Ibid.). To ascribe a function 
to SD genes merely by virtue of the fact that they do something which contributes to their 
reproduction in succeeding generations would be as counterintuitive as saying that people 
have functions because they do things that contribute to their reproduction in future 
generations. He claims that the reason it seems counterintuitive is that the SD genes 
guarantee their own reproduction without contributing to the fitness of a larger system in 
so doing: “One way to exclude both people as bearers of functions and also exclude 
disruption of meiosis as a function of segregation distorters is to stipulate that (i) the 
functionally characterized structure must reside within a larger biologically real system, 
and (ii) the explanation of the selection of the functionally characterized structure must 
go via a positive contribution to the fitness of the larger system” (Ibid., 349). According 
to Godfrey-Smith, the difference between these intuitively implausible cases of function 
ascriptions, on the one hand, and intuitively plausible ones, on the other, is that in the 
latter, the functional entity contributes to the fitness of the system that contains it and 
thereby indirectly contributes to its own reproduction over time.  
Even though Godfrey-Smith requires that an entity must contribute to the fitness 
of the larger system in order to have a function, perhaps it would suffice for saving WPE 
to require merely that, in order to have a function, an entity must have contributed to the 
persistence of a system of which it is a part, and thereby to its own persistence over time.  
This relativization of function ascriptions to parts of systems would not imply that 
the only relevant biological “system” is the individual – i.e., the organism. Godfrey-
Smith (1994, 394), like Griffiths (1993, 416) points out that selection operates on several 
different levels, and that functions can be assigned by virtue of the fact that an entity 
contributes to the reproduction of some containing system, even if not the organism. For 
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example, Godfrey-Smith (1994, 349-350) accepts that the component parts of SD genes 
can have the function of contributing to the differential reproduction of the chromosome 
itself.111
Can this additional criterion be invoked to resolve the Boorse-style 
counterexamples? One might be tempted to say that a stick that is pinned in place by its 
own backwash does not constitute a part of a larger system the persistence of which it 
contributes to, and hence it does not have a function. One might also say of obesity that, 
because it does not contribute to the persistence of the obese individual – in fact, to the 
extent that obesity is detrimental to one’s health, it guarantees its own persistence at the 
cost of the persistence of the individual – then it, too, does not have a function. However, 
there are two problems with the use of this relativization to resolve Boorse’s 
counterexamples. The first is that equally implausible natural examples can be derived 
which clearly fit the pattern of explanation that is being demanded. Godfrey-Smith (1993, 
198) uses the example of a small rock that holds up a large rock in a fast-moving stream. 
The small rock holds up the large rock, in the absence of which the small rock would be 
washed away. Hence it purchases it own persistence by contributing to the persistence of 
a larger system of which it is a part, but, unless it functions as an artifact – i.e., someone 
placed it there for a reason – it seems strange to say that the little rock has 
“malfunctioned” if it is ultimately washed away.  
More problematically, however, the part/whole distinction is always relative to a 
method of analysis. What one considers a “part” of a system, versus the “whole” system, 
depends largely upon conventional and pragmatic choices about how to analyze it. 
Certainly, it seems strange to say of a stick that is pinned in place by its own backwash 
 
111 His rationale, however, for attributing functions to the parts of the SD gene, and not the SD gene itself, 
is puzzling. SD genes ensure their overrepresentation in the gamete pool by increasing the fitness of the 
chromosomes that contain them. In sabotaging the homologous chromosome, then, the SD genes contribute 
to the fitness of a containing system, and hence should possess a function on his view. 
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that it is a “part” of a larger system the persistence of which it contributes to. But why 
should it seem strange? The structure composed of the stick, the rock that it is pinned to, 
and the backwash that keeps it in place, constitutes a “system” of which the stick is a 
“part”, and the persistence of which it contributes to. By the same token, the stick itself 
may be seen as the “whole” system of which the parts of the stick are components, and by 
virtue of which each of the parts have functions. Consequently, the part/whole distinction 
cannot be used to draw a substantive distinction between those entities that can and those 
that cannot be said to possess “functions”, that is, in resolving the first-level demarcation 
problem (see Section 3.1.3). 
Second Attempt: Complex Contribution to Self-Persistence  
Schlosser (1998) attempts to resolve the problem of overbreadth by restricting 
functions to parts of “complex self-re-producing systems” (Ibid., 305) (see Section 3.1.3, 
under “Goal-Contribution Theories”, for a brief discussion of his view). First, his notion 
of “self-re-production” will be explained, and then his notion of “complexity”. His 
attempt will then be criticized as inadequate to the task. 
A system is a “self-re-producing” one if it undergoes a series of state-transitions 
that ensures the recurrence of certain states (Ibid., 311). For example, the earth’s circling 
the sun, or a swinging pendulum, are fairly simply self-reproducing systems because they 
undergo a cyclical series of state transitions, in which a given state (e.g., position of the 
planet at a given time) is necessary for the next state (its position at a later time), which, 
in turn, is necessary for the recurrence of the original state. (Schlosser [Ibid., 305] uses 
the hyphenated expression “re-production” to signify the recurrence of a given state or 
event over time; hence, the “re-production” of a state can refer either to the intra-
generational persistence of a state within an entity or the trans-generational reproduction 
of that state through the transmission of hereditary material from parent to offspring. 
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Hence, “re-production” simply means the same as what has been referred to in this 
dissertation as “persistence or reproduction”.) He observes that traits that have 
“functions” are typically those that are, under some circumstances, necessary for their 
own re-production. For example, in certain circumstances (e.g., in an environment with 
predators), some feature of a trait (e.g., a pattern of wing coloration) is necessary for 
bringing about a certain activity (predator avoidance through camouflage). This activity, 
in turn, is necessary for the reproduction of that same pattern of wing-coloration in the 
descendents of that organism (that is, insofar as avoiding predators is necessary under 
some circumstances for allowing the organism to survive long enough to leave 
descendents that inherit that pattern of coloration). Hence, Schlosser claims that in order 
to have a function, a trait must be part of a “self-re-producing” system and that 
circumstances must exist under which it can perform an activity that is necessary for its 
own re-production.  
Schlosser’s theory of function is a persistence-based theory because it permits an 
entity to have a function merely by contributing to its own persistence. It is also a weak 
theory because it does not require that an entity must have been selected for in order to 
possess a function (Ibid., 323). Consequently, Schlosser endorses a weak persistence-
based theory of function. Although Schlosser’s theory is a consequentialist one, it could 
easily be transformed into an etiological theory if it were accepted that the relevant 
“contributions to self-re-production” are partly explanatory for why the trait in question 
currently exists. If one were to make this transformation then his view would constitute a 
version of WPE. 
As a version of WPE, however, it inherits the problems that were raised above in 
relation to Wright’s (1973) theory, namely, the Boorse-style counterexamples that 
trivialize the view. Schlosser recognizes, for example, that if “being necessary under 
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some circumstances to one’s own self-re-production” were sufficient for having a 
function, then one would have to say that the function of the planetary orbit is to re-
produce itself, or the function of the displacement of the pendulum from the vertical 
position is realignment with the vertical position, or the function of obesity is to 
contribute to a sedentary lifestyle (Schlosser [1998, 311]). Consequently, Schlosser 
restricts the type of systems the parts of which can have functions to complex self-re-
producing systems. A complex self-re-producing system is one that “does not [merely] 
pass through simple cycles of states, but instead can re-produce a certain state via 
different sequences of state transitions depending on the environmental conditions” 
(Ibid., 312). Attributing complexity to a system, then, implies that the system must be 
able to exhibit some plasticity or variability in the re-production of a state. However, this 
complexity criterion must be analyzed more precisely in order to evaluate whether it 
successfully resolves the counterexamples that it is intended to resolve. 
In his formal definition of “function” (Ibid., 315), complexity is defined as an 
attribute of the relationship between a functional trait, X, the activity, F, which constitutes 
its function, and the re-production of X at a later time. In other words, the system itself is 
not explicitly designated in the formal definition, but only the relations between the 
functional entity and its functional effect. According to his definition:  
 
Fc is a function of Xc(t) iff: 
 for a certain period of time t0 < t < t + x + y < t0 + T 
  
(1) X (t) is directly causally necessary to establish F (t + x) (under certain 
circumstances c1) 
(2) F(t + x) is indirectly causally necessary to establish X (t + x + y) (under 
certain circumstances c2) 




In the following, in order to minimize the proliferation of variables, the following 
convention will be utilized: X1 refers to the presence of X at time t1; F2 refers to the 
functional activity that X1 produces at time t2, and X3 refers to the recurrence (re-
production) of X at time t3, where t1 ≤ t2 < t3 and all three temporal moments fall within 
some interval T; c1 refers to a circumstance under which X1 is necessary for F2, and c2 
refers to a circumstance under which F2 is necessary for X3.  
“Complexity”, then, describes the way in which X1 produces F2 or the way in 
which the performance of F2 ensures the re-production of X3. The notion of complexity 
will first be defined informally, then formally. 
Informally, if one of these two relationships is “complex”, then it must be the case 
that either: (i) under different circumstances, there are correspondingly different activities 
that X1 must perform in order to produce F2; or (ii) under different circumstances, there 
are correspondingly different consequences that F2 must produce in order for X3 to be re-
produced. Formally, if one of these two relationships is “complex”, then, it must be the 
case that there exists a set of different circumstances C (where ci ∈ C, i = [1, 2, …, n], 
and n ≥ 2), such that either: 
  
(i) if ci ∈ C and cj ∈ C (i ≠ j) then there is an activity, F1i, such that under ci, X1 
must do F1i in order to do F2, and there is an activity F1j, such that under cj, X 
must do F1j in order to do F2, and F1j is not the same type of activity as F1i; or 
 
(ii) if ci ∈ C and cj ∈ C (i ≠ j) then there is an activity, F2i, such that under ci, F2 
must do F2i in order to do X3, and there is an activity F2j, such that under cj, F2 
must do F2j in order to do X3, and F2i is not the same type of activity as F2j.  
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An example of a trait that exhibits complexity in performing its function comes 
from an examination of the mechanism of color change in cuttlefish (order Sepiida) and 
other Cephalopod mollusks, one of the functions of which is camouflage (crypsis) 
(Fogden and Fogden [1974]). Each chromatophore – pigment-filled cell – in the cuttlefish 
is surrounded by muscle cells, and is capable of rapid contraction and relaxation. In a 
relaxed state, the pigment in the cell is centrally concentrated and unobtrusive; when the 
muscle cells contract, the chromatophore is flattened in such a way that the pigment 
expands, thus permitting rapid color changes in response to environmental variation. 
(Since each chromatophore is separately controlled, the cuttlefish is capable of generating 
a vast diversity of complex cryptic patterns.) It seems clear that each chromatophore (X1) 
has the function of crypsis (F2), and since each chromatophore is, at the very least, 
capable of two different states – relaxation and contraction – each of which contributes to 
crypsis, then it can be said to perform its function in a complex manner. More precisely, 
there exist some circumstances, c1a, under which relaxation (F1a) is necessary for crypsis 
(F2); there exist other circumstances, c1b, under which contraction (F1b) is necessary for 
crypsis (F2), and there exist circumstances, c2, under which crypsis is necessary for the 
reproduction of the cuttlefish and hence the reappearance of chromatophores in 
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Figure 4.2: Example of complexity in the relation between X1 and F2. Here, there are 
two different circumstances, c1a and c1b, such that in c1a, X1 must perform 
F1a in order to perform F2, and in c1b, X1 must perform F1b in order to 
perform F2. The relationship between F2 and X3 may itself be simple or 
complex; that is, there need only be a single set of circumstances c2 under 
which F2 is necessary for X3. 
However, there are other traits that plausibly have functions but that are not 
capable of complexly producing their functional effect. Unlike the cuttlefish, the cryptic 
properties bestowed by the melanic form of the peppered moth (Biston betularia) are 
produced in a fairly simple (non-complex) manner (Kettlewell [1974]); since the moth 
cannot change color during its lifetime, the relation between black coloration and crypsis 
cannot be brought about by multiple different pathways. In other words, for the moth, it is 
not the case that under different circumstances, there are different activities that X1 can 
perform in order to produce F2. However, even though the relation between black 
coloration and crypsis is not complex, the relation between crypsis (F2) and the 
reproduction of black coloration in succeeding generations (X3) may itself be complex. 
For example, the crypsis (F2) afforded by black coloration enables the peppered moth to 
engage in one of several different activities that are necessary for the reproduction of the 
trait in its descendents. Under certain circumstances c2a – those in which it is necessary to 
gather food in order to survive, for example – crypsis (F2) allows the moth to gather food 
(F2a) and thereby contributes the re-production of black coloration (X3). Under other 
circumstances c2b – those in which it is necessary to find mates in order to reproduce, for 
example – crypsis (F2) allows the moth to seek mates (F2b) and thereby contributes to the 
re-production of black coloration (X3). Hence the relation between the initial token X1 of 
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Figure 4.3: Example of complexity in the relation between F2 and X3. Here, there are 
two different circumstances, c2a and c2b, such that in c2a, F2 must perform 
F2a in order for X3 to be re-produced, and in c2b, F2 must perform F2b in order 
for X3 to be re-produced. The relationship between X1 and F2 may itself be 
simple or complex; that is, there need only be a single set of circumstances 
c1 under which X1 is necessary for F2. 
This way of defining complexity excludes some trivial cases. For example, a non-
coding segment of DNA cannot be said to have the “function” of serving as a template 
for its own reproduction. For although the presence of a non-coding segment of DNA at 
time t1 (X1) is necessary for it to serve as a template for its own reproduction at time t2 
(F2), it is not the case that there exist different circumstances under which that segment 
must perform correspondingly different activities in order to serve as a template for its 
own reproduction. Moreover, even though its capacity to serve as a template for its own 
reproduction at t2 (F2) is necessary for its reappearance in descendent organisms at time t3 
(X3), it is not the case that there exist different circumstances under which F2 must 
produce correspondingly different consequences in order to ensure its subsequent 
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appearance in future generations (X3). The only activity that F2 allows it to perform is 
entering into a gamete that will ensure its intergenerational transmission. There is not an 
additional set of circumstances under which, for example, it specifies a protein that 
performs a significant role in the development of the organism and thereby contributes, 
indirectly, to its intergenerational reproduction.112
 On similar grounds, one could not say of a stick that is pinned to a rock because 
of the backwash it creates that it exhibits “complexity” in creating that backwash and 
hence perpetuating its own position. In order to claim that the function of the stick’s 
position is to create a backwash, one would have to say either that there are different 
circumstances under which the stick must perform correspondingly different activities for 
creating a backwash, or that there are different circumstances under which the presence 
of backwash will produce correspondingly different consequences that ensure the 
persistence of the stick. But one can say neither of those things. The stick “re-produces” 
its position in a simple and non-complex way.113  
However, the restriction of functions to complex self-re-producing systems is not 
sufficient for guaranteeing the appropriateness of function ascriptions, since there are two 
types of counterexamples to his view. The first are counterexamples that satisfy the 
scheme described in Figure 4.2. Although Schlosser states that his definition of 
complexity excludes obesity from having the function of producing a sedentary lifestyle 
(Ibid., 319), it is unclear why one would consider the cyclical relationship between 
obesity and a sedentary lifestyle to be “non-complex” in his sense. On the one hand, 
obesity contributes to fatigue, which contributes to a sedentary condition. On the other 
 
112 What is referred to as “junk DNA” – the vast stretches of non-protein-coding DNA segments once 
thought to be without function – is now suspected to code for RNA segments with crucial regulatory 
functions (e.g., Mattick [2004]). 
113 This claim depends, of course, on how finely the situation is analyzed. To this extent, the relation 
between complexity and simplicity is relative to a method of analysis, like the relation between parts and 
wholes.  This point will be raised at the end of the section. 
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hand, obese people often feel anxious about the prospect of strenuous activity and hence 
devise various means to avoid engaging in it. Thus, the relation between obesity and a 
sedentary lifestyle can be wrought by anxiety in addition to fatigue. Hence there are 
different circumstances under which obesity (X1) produces a sedentary lifestyle (F2): 
under some circumstances, c1a, obesity is necessary for the production of fatigue (F1a), 
under other circumstances, c1b, obesity is necessary for the production of anxiety (F1b), 
and both fatigue and anxiety contribute to a sedentary lifestyle. In turn, a sedentary 
lifestyle reinforces obesity. According to Schlosser’s view, then, obesity has the function 
of producing a sedentary lifestyle. 
A well-documented psychiatric example of such a “complex self-reproducing 
system” involves the complex cyclical relation between panic, on the one hand, and 
mistaken beliefs about bodily sensations, on the other, although it would be both 
counterintuitive, as well as contrary to psychiatric usage, to suggest that panic has the 
function of producing mistaken beliefs about bodily sensations. One theory of panic 
stems from the realm of cognitive behavior therapy. According to this theory (Clark 
[1986; 1997]) a panic attack is typically initiated by a stimulus that is perceived as 
threatening. This gives rise to a state of apprehension, which, in turn, gives rise to bodily 
sensations (such as increased heart rate or dizziness). These bodily sensations are then 
misinterpreted in a “catastrophic” fashion, that is, as a signal of immanent bodily danger 
(heart attack, death, etc.), which incites a full-blown panic response – a sudden onset of 
intense fear and discomfort. Although panic attacks are not uncommon – according to 
community surveys, between 7 and 28 percent of the general population will experience 
at least one panic attack (Clark [1997, 126]) – it is much less common for a person to 
experience recurrent panic attacks. In the latter case, the condition constitutes “panic 
 209
disorder” (APA [2000, 433-441]) which affects about 3-5 percent of the general 
population (Clark [1997, 126]; see Wittchen and Essau [1991]).  
There are at least two cognitive mechanisms that appear to contribute to the 
recurrence of panic attacks (Clark [1997, 125]). First, people who have experienced a 
panic attack may become frightened of re-experiencing the bodily sensations which have 
been misinterpreted, and as a consequence become more vigilant in monitoring bodily 
sensations. This has the consequence of allowing them to notice sensations of which they 
were previously unaware, and hence can magnify the potential for a renewed attack. 
Second, people with panic disorder may systematically avoid situations that induce the 
sensations believed to be linked with the (imagined) bodily danger. For example, they 
may avoid strenuous activity out of the fear of re-experiencing sensations believed to be 
associated with imminent danger. One consequence of this, however, is that the person 
avoids precisely those situations that would have the effect of disconfirming the false 
beliefs about his or her condition. For example, if a person avoids jogging because he or 
she comes to believe that jogging may bring about a heart attack, then he deprives 
himself of many occasions to realize that it will not do so (Ibid.; also see Salkovskis 
[1991]). 
The recurrence of panic attacks, then, illustrates succinctly Schlosser’s (1998) 
concept of “complex self-re-production”; in fact, it fits the model outlined in Figure 4.2. 
Under certain circumstances, a panic attack can bring about hypervigilance to one’s own 
bodily sensations, which, in turn, reinforces one’s mistaken beliefs and hence increases 
the probability of a renewed panic attack. In other circumstances, a panic attack can bring 
about avoidant behavior, which has the effect of preventing the disconfirmation of the 
mistaken beliefs, thereby reinforcing them and preparing the person for future attacks. 
Hence, according to Schlosser’s view, panic attacks have the function of reinforcing 
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mistaken beliefs that are necessary for its re-production. This is counterintuitive, as well 
as contrary to psychiatric usage.114  
The second type of counterexample involves systems that satisfy the scheme for 
complexity described in Figure 4.3 but that do not have functions. It was noted above that 
by providing crypsis, black coloration enables the peppered moth to engage in any one of 
a large number of different activities that are necessary for its survival and reproduction. 
But other properties – such as the property of having mass, or solidity, or coloration, also 
fit this scheme. Clearly, the possession of mass subjects the organism to gravity, which is 
necessary, under different circumstances, for the organism to be able to engage in any 
one of the diverse activities that lead to its survival or reproduction. But it seems 
counterintuitive to say that these purely physical properties have the function of doing so. 
As Williams (1966) points out, the ability of a flying fish to return to water is necessary 
 
114 Schlosser (pers. comm.) denies that the example of obesity is a serious problem for his view. In his 
view, the appropriateness of function ascriptions is a matter of degree, and is proportional to the number of 
different pathways by which a trait can contribute to its own re-production. Hence, the fact that the relation 
between obesity and a sedentary lifestyle can be mediated by two series of state transitions rather than 
merely one makes it only slightly less trivial to ascribe a function to obesity than it would be to ascribe a 
function to junk DNA, which can only reproduce itself by a single pathway: “Trivial cycles only become 
slightly less trivial if they are supported by two alternative trajectories than merely one [since] they are still 
a far cry from a living system with its exuberant complexity” (Ibid.). Moreover, he adds that since living 
systems, with their exuberant complexity, have evolved from simpler, non-living systems, one should not 
expect an unambiguous dividing line to separate appropriate from inappropriate function ascriptions (Ibid.) 
Clearly, the adequacy of Schlosser’s response hinges on the assumption that there are no more than two, or 
at least a very few, circumstances, in which, e.g., obesity leads to a sedentary lifestyle or panic to mistaken 
beliefs. However, the relation between obesity and a sedentary lifestyle can be as complex as the 
techniques of avoidance that the human mind is capable of contriving. Under one circumstance (e.g., 
embarrassment about physical appearance), obesity is necessary for producing aversion to, say, purchasing 
a membership at a gym; under another (e.g., fear of excessive perspiration), obesity is necessary for 
producing aversion to, e.g., staying outdoors for long periods of time; under a third (e.g., production of 
fatigue), obesity is necessary to bringing about the early cessation of strenuous physical activity, and so on. 
Clearly, one could continue to generate such scenarios, and hence an arbitrarily large number of 
independent trajectories can mediate the relation between the two, making the relation between obesity and 
a sedentary lifestyle complex to an arbitrarily large degree. The same can be said of the relation between 
panic and mistaken beliefs. Moreover, if, according to Schlosser, one’s warrant for asserting a function 
statement is proportional to the complexity of the function relationship, then one would have greater 
warrant for saying that the function of obesity is to contribute to a sedentary lifestyle than that the function 
of black coloration on Biston beularia has the function of predator avoidance, since, as shown above, the 
relationship between the latter two events can be viewed as a relatively simple one.  
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for its survival, but functions are not typically assigned to properties that “achieve the 
mechanically inevitable” (Ibid., 11-12). Consequently, imposing the “complexity” 
criterion alone does not appear to be sufficient for making the substantive distinction 
between the sorts of entities that can have functions and those that cannot.115
Another way of formulating this criticism of Schlosser’s theory is to point out that 
the distinction between complex and non-complex systems – like that between parts and 
wholes – is always relative to a method of analysis. Consequently, whether or not a given 
trait possesses a “function” comes to depend, on his view, upon the level of detail with 
which one describes the phenomenon in question. Hence, like Godfrey-Smith’s (1993; 
1994) attempt, it cannot be used to draw a substantive distinction between those entities 
that can and those that cannot possess functions. 
Perhaps other modifications could be imposed in order to produce an adequate 
version of WPE; however, at this point it may be useful to explore the other three 
etiological theories. Although, as noted above, the failure of WPE led many philosophers 
to accept SRE, there are two other, commonly-neglected, options available, WRE and 
SPE. In the following three subsections, the rationales that motivate WRE, SPE, and 
SRE, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each view, will be assessed.  
4.1.3 Inadequacy of WRE on Pragmatic Grounds 
One solution that has been proposed to the problem of triviality is that in order for 
an entity to have a function, it is not sufficient that it contributes to its own persistence, 
but that it contributes to its own reproduction by contributing to the persistence or 
reproduction of the system that contains it (Millikan [1993, 32-35]; Godfrey Smith [1993, 
 
115 Schlosser (pers. comm.) points out that, e.g., the property of having a particular mass can have a 
function, but that is not the point at issue. Rather, the problem is that the rationale that leads to ascribing a 
function to a particular mass can also be used to ascribe a function to mass as such, which is 
counterintuitive.  
198-199]; [1994, 348-350]). This move is tantamount to making the transition from WPE 
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(1993, 198-199), as noted above, in a discussion of the Boorse-
argues that the reason that the structures in question – such as the 
p the big rock – do not have functions is because they do not 
uction of the containing system. By holding up the large rock, the 
 in place; but this merely contributes to the indefinite persistence 
rather than the multiplication of like structures. Hence, Godfrey-
’s (1984) view that functions can only be defined for entities that 
ively established families” (Ibid., 18) – roughly, for entities that 
y broad sense of the term, “copies” of one another, or that are 
ies.116 For Millikan, to say that an individual, Y, is a reproduction 
ual, X, is to say that, (i) X and Y share some property, P; (ii) there 
 
 intends this notion of a “reproductively established family” (Ibid., 18) to be 
 to cultural as well as biological forms of transmission: “Tokens of a specific 
 in a culture (i.e., not independently derived), household screwdrivers (the same 
r and over) and various tokens of the same word are members of first-order 
amilies”, as are sentences that exemplify “the same syntactic form” (Ibid., 23). 
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is a set of natural laws, or laws derivable from those natural laws, that entail that if X had 
differed in certain ways with respect to P, Y would have differed with respect to P, and 
(iii) X’s having P causes Y to have P.117
Although, in the initial presentation of her view, Millikan (1984) does not discuss 
Boorse’s counterexamples, and hence does not motivate her theory of function on that 
basis, in a later presentation she exploits Boorse’s counterexamples in order to motivate 
SRE. Millikan (1993) begins her discussion of function by tentatively accepting Wright’s 
WPE view, and observing that “anything that cycles will fit [Wright’s view]” (Ibid., 33). 
For example, “stages of an idling motor; the positions, vector velocities, and 
accelerations of the planets; the various stages of the earth’s water cycle; and so forth will 
have functions by this definition” (Ibid., 34). To resolve these problems, she introduces 
the restriction that the functional entity must be part of a reproductively established 
family; that is, the production of the entity must have involved “reproduction or copying 
of its functional features” (Millikan [1993, 34]). By restricting function ascriptions to 
entities that are capable of reproduction, Millikan implicitly (and, as will be seen, only 
tentatively) accepts a version of WRE.  
Buller (1998; 2002) is also led to endorse a version of WRE; however, rather than 
reaching it by strengthening WPE to exclude counterexamples, he weakens SRE in a way 
that he thinks preserves the core insight of the etiological view but that does away with 
some unnecessary restrictions that are associated with SRE (see discussion of Buller’s 
[1998] view in Section 3.1.2, under “First Distinction: Weak vs. Strong Etiological 
Theories”). He correctly points out that the rationale for SRE is that it supports the 
intuition that to attribute a function, F, to a trait, T, of an organism, O, is, in part, to 
 
117 Presumably, clause (iii) of the definition is intended to exclude Y from being a “copy” of X if X is like Y 
because they were both molded from a common template, or if Y had P before X had P. For example, two 
items from the same assembly line are not “copies” of one another but of the same template (Ibid., 21), 
even though the two items would satisfy clauses (i) and (ii) of the definition. 
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explain why T currently exists. More precisely, it is to say that T’s doing F in organisms 
like O figures into a complete explanation for the current presence or distribution of Ts in 
the population of organisms. If T has been selected for because of its capacity to do F, 
then clearly, T’s doing F will figure into a complete explanation for why T is there. 
However, Buller goes on to argue that as long as ancestral tokens of T did F, and T’s 
doing F contributed to the survival and reproductive capacity of O’s ancestors, and T is 
heritable, then the fact that ancestral tokens of T did F must figure into a complete 
explanation for why O has T, even if T was never selected for. It does not appear that 
reference to selection, that is, the differential fitness bestowed upon O’s ancestors by T, is 
required of a theory of function in order for it to possess the same type of explanatory 
power possessed by SRE. 
There are at least three advantages to accepting WRE. First, in addition to 
preserving the explanatory power of SRE, WRE avoids many possible counterexamples, 
in addition to those of Boorse. For example, as noted in the previous section (Section 
4.1.2), the property of possessing mass as such is not the sort of property that one 
attributes a function to. Nonetheless, an organism’s possessing mass is required in order 
for it to perform any of the activities required for survival and reproduction. 
Consequently, if all that is required for a property to have a function is that that property 
contributed in some manner to an organism’s reproductive capacity, and thus ensured its 
own reproduction in future generations, then it seems that one would have to attribute a 
function to mass. However, Buller (1998) points out that in order for a trait to be 
hereditary, it must be capable of variation within a population. Since organisms do not 
vary with respect to whether or not they possess mass, then mass is not hereditary and 
hence does not have a function (Ibid., 517-518) – although, as noted in fn. 115, one might 
attribute a function to having a certain mass rather than another.  
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 Second, as noted earlier, WRE allows traits that were not selected for to have 
functions, and this is clearly more consistent with biological usage than the view that the 
function of an entity consists in a selected effect. Since an entity need not have undergone 
selection in order to have a function, then functions can be awarded to traits that, for 
example, have gone to fixation by virtue of genetic drift or that are the inevitable 
consequences of a developmental constraint, but that nonetheless contribute to their own 
reproduction.  
 Third – though this point is actually a generalization of the second point – WRE 
permits the assignment of functions in biological contexts where selection is not 
operative at all. For example, the “functional approach” to ecology examines the 
ecosystem roles that are performed by groups of organisms (Cummins [1988, 254]). 
These “functional groups” are usually composed of diverse biological taxa that have 
shared characteristics, such as morphological and behavioral mechanisms of food 
acquisition (e.g., leaf shredding, particle filtration, etc.), or a shared position within a 
trophic structure (e.g., autotrophs, decomposers, and consumers) (Naeem and Li [1997, 
508]). The shared characteristics that define a functional group are identified by virtue of 
their role in maintaining some complex ecosystem property, such as ecosystem stability 
or resilience. Such groups are said to have a “function”, even though there is no clear 
sense in which one functional group of organisms has been “selected for” this activity 
over another group. Pâslaru (2005) uses this point to argue against the applicability of the 
etiological conception of function in the ecological context and to endorse the 
appropriateness of Cummins’ contribution-based account instead. 
 However, the contribution of a functional group to an ecosystem property is often 
only the first stage in a cyclical process that concludes by supplying the functional group 
itself with the material it requires for its own reproduction. For example, the carbon cycle 
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involves the decomposition of cellulose by microorganisms such as the bacterium genus 
Streptomyces, which produces CO2; once produced, CO2 is absorbed by primary 
producers, which are consumed and which, in turn, produce cellulose for Streptomyces 
(Meyer [1993]). Hence not only does Streptomyces contribute to a complex capacity of 
an ecosystem, but in doing so it contributes to its own reproduction. This constitutes a 
“consequence-etiology” in Wright’s (1976, 116) sense, namely, in that an activity of 
Streptomyces figures into a complete account of its own continued presence in an 
ecosystem. Furthermore, since the production of CO2 contributes to the reproduction of 
the Streptomyces in addition to its persistence, then WRE allows the assignment of a 
function to an individual Streptomyces bacterium itself.118
 Moreover, as an etiological theory, WRE easily allows function ascriptions in 
ecology to possess normative content, in that it allows parts of ecosystems to malfunction 
or fail to function. That function statements in ecology may lend themselves to normative 
usage is apparent from Meyer’s remark that microorganisms can fail to function: 
“Human, animal, and plant life on Earth would soon come to an end if the physiological 
groupings of microorganisms…did not function properly or became extinct” (Ibid., 68).  
According to WRE, since producing CO2 is what Streptomyces did in the past that 
accounts for its own continued existence, it has this as a function even if it is not 
currently capable of performing that function, and hence it is capable of malfunctioning. 
 
118 This function ascription, however, may raise a potential problem of ambiguity if one is not careful to 
specify the system-level in relation to which the function is being identified. For, on the one hand, one can 
say that the function of Streptomyces’ cellulose-digesting exoenzyme is the breakdown of polymers into 
smaller units capable of digestion by the microorganism. This is the function of the exoenzyme relative to 
the individual bacterium.  On the other hand, one can impute the function of cellulose breakdown to the 
bacterium itself, relative to the ecosystem as a whole. As Meyer (1993) states, “The function of 
microorganisms…is to break down the bodies of plants and animals into simpler substances” (Ibid., 90); he 
adds that this contributes to the functioning of the ecosystem, thus clearly relativizing the function to the 
ecosystem: “A main function of microbial activity thus is to complete the cycle of chemicals through 
individual ecosystems and the ecosphere as a whole” (Ibid., 90-91). Consequently, the same activity – 
breakdown of polymers into monomers – can have a function relative to the organism, the ecosystem, or 
both. 
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By contrast, Pâslaru’s (2005) purely consequentialist attempt to account for the normative 
role of function statements within ecology is relatively strained; he defines “malfunction” 
in terms of a similarity relation between a malfunctioning and functioning item.119 
Consequently, Pâslaru’s concept of “malfunction” is an externalist one, because whether 
an entity is malfunctioning or not depends upon the availability or presence of functional 
tokens that are sufficiently similar to it. 
 WRE, however, has an important disadvantage which entails that it must be 
rejected in this context. WRE does not assign functions to entities that are not capable of 
reproduction. As noted in Section 3.1.2 (under “Second Distinction: Reproduction-based 
vs. Persistence-based Theories”), one of the main advantages of SPE is that it applies to 
complex adapted systems that are neither heritable nor capable of reproduction, such as 
the unique synaptic structure of the brain of a mature individual. WRE also does not lend 
itself easily to the ascription of functions to learned dispositions, while SPE does. One, 
albeit limited, behaviorist model of learning is that learning consists in the differential 
reinforcement of behavioral dispositions owing to the different consequences that they 
produce. Consequently, SPE can assign functions to these sorts of learned dispositions 
and WRE cannot, since dispositions do not “reproduce” within an individual. These 
points will be raised below (Section 4.1.5) to argue for the appropriateness of SPE in the 
psychiatric context. Consequently, to accept WRE as an adequate normative theory of 
function would not permit functions to be assigned to any but reproducible traits, and this 
would exclude a large range of possible cases in the neuroscientific and psychological 
contexts. 
 
119 Roughly, according to Pâslaru’s view, an entity, x, within an ecosystem is malfunctioning when it is 
structurally incapable of performing some activity, A, which some other entity, y, is able to perform; where 
y has a “pattern of previous performances” of A; and where x is similar to y but for this structural 
divergence that accounts for its inability. 
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On these grounds, there appears to be an impasse, assuming that one is committed 
to an etiological theory of function. On the one hand, one can accept WRE on the 
grounds of its appropriateness to certain biological contexts such as evolutionary biology 
and ecology, and reject SPE. In this case, as pointed out by Godfrey-Smith (1993, 199), 
one excludes many functions from the neurobiological and psychological realms.  On the 
other hand, one can accept SPE on the grounds of its appropriateness for certain 
neurobiological and psychological contexts, and reject WRE. But in the latter case, the 
function of an item consists in a selected effect, and consequently, if a trait has not 
undergone selection of any sort than it cannot have a function. But that is clearly 
inadequate to the context of evolutionary and molecular biology as well as ecology, as 
noted above. This suggests the possibility that a unified etiological theory of function 
might not be possible or useful even in the field of biology, and the final choice between 
SPE and WRE will have to be made on pragmatic and discipline-specific grounds.120
4.1.4 Inadequacy of SRE on Methodological Grounds 
According to SRE, in order for an entity to have a function, it must have 
contributed to the differential persistence or reproduction of that entity or type of entity. 
This, as noted above (see Section 3.1.2, under “First Distinction: Weak vs. Strong 
Etiological Theories”) is probably the most widely-held theory of function amongst 
 
120 One could argue that this disunity constitutes a good reason for rejecting the etiological theory 
altogether. However, two points can be raised against this rejection. The first is that the same plurality 
affects consequentialist theories as well. For example, if one accepts a consequentialist theory that 
identifies the function of a system part with the activity that contributes to the reproduction of the whole 
system, then it is not clear that one can assign functions to ecosystems or impute functions to entities that 
do not undergo reproduction. On the other hand, if one merely imputes functions to anything that 
contributes to the persistence of a system, then one cannot resolve the Boorse-style counterexamples raised 
earlier. These problems are by no means specific to the etiological view. The second point is that, as noted 
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, etiological theories are uniquely capable of satisfying both adequacy conditions for 
a theory of function that permits the construction of a non-externalist definition of “dysfunction”, and non-
etiological theories are not. Thus, even if the theory of function that is eventually accepted as appropriate 
for the psychiatric context is not consistent with the majority of biological usage, then this fact would only 
go to show that the explanatory and inferential context of psychiatry is sufficiently distinct that a theory of 
function suitable to this context will not be suitable to all biological contexts. 
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philosophers. Although the paradigm case of a process that satisfies SRE is natural 
selection operating over a population of reproducing organisms, in principle, the theory 
can allow any selection process that operates over a population of reproducing entities to 
bestow functions onto those entities. The purpose of this section is to show that SRE is 
unnecessarily restrictive, and that the arguments that have been adduced in its favor are 
unconvincing. Moreover, in the absence of any convincing arguments for accepting such 
a restrictive theory of function, it must be rejected on the methodological ground that the 
most general etiological theory that satisfies the adequacy conditions CA1 and CA2*, and 
that is consistent with the other two grounds, should be accepted. 
The fact that one can accept an etiological theory of function while rejecting SRE 
undermines one criticism that has been made against etiological theories of function in 
general, which stems from the observation that claims about the selective history of a 
given trait, and more generally, about the evolutionary history of that trait, are often very 
difficult to establish empirically (Gould and Lewontin [1979]).121 This is particularly true 
when the claim in question concerns the evolutionary history of psychological traits, or 
even of their neurobiological correlates (Lewontin [1998]). Consequently, if, in order to 
assign a “function” to a given trait, one must establish that the trait has been selected for 
because of one of the activities that it produced in the evolutionary past, then many 
claims about the functions of traits would be almost impossible to establish empirically, 
and hence they would be irrelevant to much of actual scientific practice (Amundson and 
Lauder [1994, 356-61]; Schlosser [1998, 323-4]; Wouters [2005b, 144]). This 
epistemological problem has often been raised, in particular, against Wakefield’s (1992; 
 
121 When selection acts on sub-organismic levels, for example, in immunological selection, synaptic 
selection, or some forms of learning that can be modeled in terms of selection, claims about the selective 
history of a trait lend themselves much more easily to empirical testing. Hence this criticism cannot be 
applied to all types of selection processes, but only to those that appeal to the operation of selection over an 
evolutionary time-frame. 
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1993; 1999a) attempt to define a notion of “mental disorder” on the basis of an 
etiological concept of “dysfunction”.122 However, since having been selected for by 
natural selection over an evolutionary time-frame is not a necessary condition on 
etiological function ascriptions, this criticism itself does not hold.123
As noted above, Millikan (1993) invokes Boorse’s counterexamples for the 
purpose of rejecting Wright’s (1973) WPE view, and she shows how restricting function 
ascriptions to reproducing entities excludes many of those systems from having 
“functions”. Thus, as pointed out above, she formally moves from a WPE view to a WRE 
view (see Figure 4.4). However, she does not offer an unqualified endorsement of WRE; 
in fact, she rejects it in favor of SRE. This is tantamount to making two transitions: one 




122 See McNally (1994, 205); Lilienfeld and Marino (1995, 413); Sadler and Agich (1995, 226-7); Sadler 
(1999, 435); Kirmayer and Young (1999, 449); Woolfolk (1999, 660); Bolton (2001, 198-9); Murphy and 
Woolfolk (2001, 245). 
123 Interestingly, proponents of “evolutionary psychiatry” – a branch of evolutionary psychology that deals 
specifically with the evolutionary background of mental disorders – often claim that mental disorders 
represent the “normal” functioning of evolved mechanisms that have been placed in abnormal 
environments, rather than the failure of evolved mechanisms to perform their selected functions (e.g., Nesse 
and Williams [1994, 209]; Stevens and Price [1996, 35-38]; Nesse and Williams [1997, 2-3]; Cosmides and 
Tooby [1999, 453-454]). In other words, there exists a “mismatch” between the environment in which 
human mental capacities evolved and the dictates of modern society, rather than a biological dysfunction or 
purely internal breakdown of evolved mental faculties. Depression, for example, is seen by evolutionary 
psychiatrists as an adapted response to being the “loser” of within-group bids for power, but one that is no 
longer adaptive in today’s competitive workplace (Price et al. [1994]). Anxiety is seen, to a large extent, as 
an adapted response to a hostile and predatory environment that no longer exists (Marks and Nesse [1994]). 
Mental disorder, so the idea goes, is an inevitable byproduct of the too-rapid emergence of modern society 
with its novel selection pressures. Like the epistemological argument, this “mismatch” argument has often 
been brought to bear against the attempt to define mental disorder in evolutionary terms (see Lilienfeld and 
Marino [1995, 416]; Lilienfeld and Marino [1999, 408-409]; Richters and Hinshaw [1999, 442]; Woolfolk 
[1999, 662]; Bolton [2000, 148]; Bolton [2001, 194]; Murphy and Stich [2000, 81-84]; Murphy and 
Woolfolk [2001, 244]). However, this dissertation takes no position on the evolutionary context of mental 
disorders, and remains agnostic about the evolutionary history of human mental faculties. However, one 
important consequence of the “mismatch” argument, which will be elaborated in the conclusion of this 
chapter, is that one cannot reliably infer from the fact that a psychological or behavioral condition is 
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this conclusion is not required by her definition of a “copy”, and in fact, it only emerges 
from a rather strained and artificial interpretation of that definition. According to that 
definition (see Section 4.1.3), the position of the earth would presumably be the property, 
P, that is reproduced from year to year; hence, the earth itself at a given moment would 
be the individual, X, which is a copy or reproduction of the earth at an earlier moment, Y. 
In other words, in order for her counterexample to work, the earth would have to be a 
“copy” of itself, and not the position of the earth from one year to the next. This is an 
unacceptable consequence for a definition of “copy”. One fairly obvious way of avoiding 
this problem would be to specify explicitly that in order for an entity, X, to be a “copy” of 
an entity, Y, X and Y must be different entities. On this reading, the position of the earth is 
not a property that can have a function because it is not a property of something that 
undergoes reproduction. 
Her second argument against WRE involves an appeal to the vagueness that she 
believes afflicts WRE and not SRE. Suppose one accepts WRE. Then, clearly, in order 
for, e.g., a trait, T, of an organism, O, to have a function, F, it is not necessary that in 
every single one of O’s ancestors that had T, T must have performed F. This would 
exclude virtually every trait from having a function unless that trait has been, historically, 
absolutely required for the reproduction of each member of that lineage. Yet for T in O to 
have a function, it is also clearly not sufficient that in only one of O’s ancestors that had 
T, T performed F. This would bestow functions upon every heritable trait that has, at 
some point or another, performed a useful effect – for example, one would have to assign 
the function of holding up glasses to the human nose.124 Clearly, one must implicitly 
draw a dividing line between all and one. But how can it be non-arbitrarily drawn? 
 
124 Note that while it may seem appropriate to say that the nose functions as an eyeglasses-holder, it does 
not seem appropriate to say that a function of the nose is to hold up glasses. As Wright (1973, 147) points 
out, there appears to be a difference between attributing a function to an entity and claiming that an entity 
functions as something: the latter admits of much broader usage.  
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Millikan argues that natural selection can provide a non-arbitrary discrimination: “The 
place the line is naturally drawn…is where natural selection draws it. Only if an item or 
trait has been selected for reproduction, as over against other traits, because it sometimes 
has a certain effect does that effect have a function” (Ibid., 36). But this conclusion is 
simply mistaken. As noted in Section 3.2.1 (under “Statistical Account of Function”, in 
particular, fn. 102 of that chapter), a similar vagueness afflicts the concept of having been 
selected for itself. If, in a given generation, n, there is at least one organism, O, having a 
heritable trait T, and at least one organism, O*, that does not have T, and having T 
allowed O to leave more offspring than O* in that generation, should T count as having 
“undergone selection” for doing F? Invoking differential reproduction does not provide 
the non-arbitrary dividing line that Millikan expects it to. Consequently, to the extent that 
the elimination of vagueness is an important desideratum for a theory of function to 
possess, then all etiological theories of function that have been examined fall short of this 
desideratum. It may be more reasonable, then, simply to reject the view that a theory of 
function must eliminate all sources of vagueness.125
 
125 Godfrey-Smith (1993; 1994) also embraces a version of SRE, but for reasons that are less clear, and 
which, in fact, run counter to his express intent. As noted above (Section 4.1.3), he notes that Boorse’s 
counterexamples afflict WPE, and he resolves them by endorsing WRE. He then simply endorses SRE 
without any further argumentation. For example, after endorsing Millikan’s (1984) restriction of functions 
to entities that are part of “reproductively established families”, he points out that Millikan herself requires 
not only that the entity is part of a reproductively established family, but that the entity must have been 
selected for (1993, 199). He does not criticize this view nor provide any motivation for it; shortly 
thereafter, he endorses the view, at least for the purpose of discussion: “In this article I will assume that an 
explicit appeal to selection processes and reproductively established lineages is appropriate [for assigning 
functions to entities]” (Ibid.). In an article written in the following year, Godfrey-Smith (1994) draws 
attention to Boorse’s counterexamples, tentatively accepts WRE, and then points out that intuitively, one 
would not want to ascribe functions to people, to the chromosomes that carry SD genes, or to other entities 
that did not, in the past, contribute to the fitness of a larger system (1994, 349; also see Section 3.1.2, under 
“Two Additional Variables: System and Temporal Variables” for a discussion of this point). He goes on to 
equate fitness not merely with the reproductive propensity of that larger system (e.g., expected number of 
offspring) but the relative reproductive propensity of that system. This implies that if a trait possesses a 
function then it was selected for (Ibid., 350). But this view is unnecessarily strong. As noted above (Section 
4.1.2), one could prohibit the ascription of functions to, e.g., the whole organism (considered as an 
autonomous unit) by restricting function ascriptions to parts of systems that merely contributed to the 
reproduction of some containing system and not to the differential reproduction of that system. Like 
Millikan’s theory, this move altogether ignores the logical possibility of SPE or WRE. 
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As an etiological theory, then, SRE should be rejected on methodological 
grounds. Restriction of functions to the outcome of selection processes operating over 
reproducing entities is not necessary for preserving the normative and explanatory 
content of function ascriptions. 
Before moving on to discuss SPE, one final argument against SRE should be 
noted. So far, the argument in this section has been that selection operating over a 
population of reproducing entities is not necessary for the ascription of functions to 
entities, though it has been assumed to be sufficient. Bedau, however (1991; 1993) has 
argued that selection is not sufficient for assigning functions to entities because it faces 
an insurmountable problem of overbreadth. But clearly, if SRE suffers overbreadth, then 
all of the other etiological theories must suffer overbreadth, since, as the least general 
theory of function (see Figure 4.1), all functions that SRE assigns are also assigned by the 
other three theories. Hence, if one accepts this criticism then one must reject all four 
etiological theories as insufficient for defining “function”. 
Bedau (1991; 1993) uses the example of crystal growth and reproduction to 
provide what he takes to be a counterexample to SRE. He argues that clay crystals 
undergo a form of natural selection – characterized by heritable variation associated with 
differential fitness – but that it seems counterintuitive to assign functions to the parts of 
crystals. Clay crystals, he points out, are composed of ordered layers of molecules, and 
crystal growth consists in the addition of new layers. When they reach a certain size, 
crystals cleave and break into smaller pieces that, in turn, continue to grow through the 
addition of new layers of molecules. Hence, crystals can be said to undergo a type of 
“reproduction”. Environmental conditions can affect the structure of a crystal’s molecular 
lattice, creating new variations on this structure. Since new layers of crystals tend to 
reproduce the geometrical arrangement of earlier layers, these variations tend to be 
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propagated throughout the growth process. When the crystal cleaves into smaller pieces, 
these smaller pieces may retain the variant structures, which therefore continue to 
propagate. Hence, crystal reproduction also exhibits a type of “inheritance”. Most 
importantly, variation in the molecular lattice structure can affect many other physical 
characteristics of the crystal, such as its shape, growth rate, density, and cleavage 
conditions. These physical characteristics affect the rate at which crystals possessing a 
variant structure proliferate and disperse in a population; hence, one can assign a 
“fitness” value to different such structures. Populations of crystals, then, undergo natural 
selection, since such populations possess the characteristic of hereditary variation that is 
correlated with differential fitness (Lewontin [1970, 1]). However, Bedau argues that it is 
counterintuitive to ascribe functions to the parts of crystals (Bedau [1991, 654]).  
He goes on to suggest that the reason this claim seems counterintuitive is that clay 
crystals are not living. The reason that functions are typically only ascribed to the parts of 
living things, he continues, is because living things can be said to possess a good, namely 
the continuation and propagation of their own existence and that of their kind (Bedau 
[1992, 801]; see also Fulford [1999, 416-7], who also appeals to non-biological examples 
to undermine a non-evaluative notion of function, and McLaughlin [2001, 181-2], who 
also uses the crystal example for a similar end). What this intuition reveals, according to 
Bedau, is that all function assignments possess an implicit evaluative element – that is, 
the function of an entity consists, in part, in its present or past contribution to some good. 
But this conclusion would not bode well for the attempt to construct a theory of 
function that satisfies CA1 and CA2*. The reason is that, if the notion of function is 
evaluative in Hare’s sense (as described in Section 1.3), then any intelligible function 
ascription presupposes an act of commendation on the part of the person who utters it. In 
other words, to say that the function of X is Y is to say that X’s doing Y has a good 
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consequence – typically associated with survival or reproduction – and hence to endorse 
a set of values concerning the nature of the good, or the nature of individual well-being. 
Consequently, the warranted ascription of “function” would depend centrally upon the 
attitude of the speaker; hence, whether or not something can be said to possess a 
“function” would depend partly upon whether people who assign functions to entities 
conceive of survival and reproduction as good things. 
However, there are two responses one might make to this suggestion. The first is 
to reject the validity of the counterexample by accepting, in accordance with SRE, that 
clay crystals do possess functions. This is Millikan’s (1993) response. As she claims, the 
clay crystals discussed in Bedau’s example certainly possess functions; however, they do 
not possess biological functions. As noted above (Section 4.1.3; fn. 116), in her view 
there exists a unified notion of function that applies to artifacts, behaviors, social 
institutions, and biological structures. She argues that the counterintuitive appearance of 
Bedau’s example stems from the fact that he is mistakenly attributing to the parts of the 
crystal biological functions – which, by definition, they cannot possess. However, there is 
no reason it cannot possess a more generic type of function: “….if crystals can have 
functions, as well as learned behaviors, artifacts, words, customs, etc., that is fine by me” 
(Ibid.; see fn. 7 of that text).126 Sarkar (2005) offers a similar response, claiming as a 
virtue of his theory of function (see Section 3.1.2, fn. 74) that it can apply to inanimate 
entities. In his view, this should be seen as a welcome result, given that “there is no 
principled distinction between living and nonliving matter” (Ibid., 40; see fn. 57 of that 
text).  
 
126 Millikan also argues that it does not seem counterintuitive to ascribe functions to viruses, even though 
they do not necessarily qualify as “living”; consequently it does not seem to be the case that functions are 
only ascribed to living entities (Ibid.). 
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A second response is to accept the validity of the counterexample, and hence that 
a non-evaluative, purely etiological theory is insufficient for defining “function”. 
However, even if one does not accept that the etiological theory is sufficient for defining 
“function”, one can argue that it is necessary for defining “function”. This argument 
would proceed in two steps. The first step of the argument is to assume that the concept 
of function possesses an evaluative element, but to argue that this evaluative element is 
also, by itself, insufficient for defining “function”. As argued in Section 3.1.3, under 
“Good-Contribution Theories”, the view that the function of an entity consists in that 
activity that contributes to some systemic good cannot alone distinguish the function of 
an item from a fortuitous benefit that it produces. The function of the nose is not to hold 
up glasses, even if holding up glasses represents a good for the individual. The second 
step is to argue that the insufficiency of a purely evaluative theory of function can or 
should be resolved by incorporating an etiological element into one’s definition of 
function. For example, one would argue that the reason that the nose does not have the 
function of holding up glasses is because, even though holding up glasses is a good 
consequence of possessing a nose, the capacity of the nose to hold up glasses does not 
explain the current presence of noses. As noted above, Ayala (1970), Bedau (1992, 799), 
and McLaughlin (2001, 168) all present such a “mixed” or hybrid etiological-evaluative 
view according to which the function of an entity consists in that activity that, in the past, 
contributed to some systemic good (e.g., survival or reproduction) and, as a consequence, 
explains the (differential) reproduction or persistence of that entity or type of entity. 
The standpoint of this dissertation is that the notions of function and dysfunction 
are not evaluative, and that Bedau’s counterexample is not alone a persuasive reason for 
accepting an evaluative notion of function. However, even if one finds his 
counterexample persuasive, as long as one accepts that any adequate theory of function 
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must possess an etiological component – at least as a necessary condition – then the 
central claim of this dissertation remains unaffected, for the following reason.  According 
to this dissertation, the available evidence concerning the neurobiological basis of 
schizophrenia provides little reason to suppose that this etiological condition on the 
concept of function will be fulfilled. As a consequence, the claim that schizophrenia 
stems from a dysfunction on the part of the brain is unwarranted. Therefore, even if one 
wishes to supplement the concept of function by introducing an evaluative element, in 
addition to the etiological element, the claim that schizophrenia stems from a dysfunction 
on the part of the brain will remain unwarranted. Consequently, for the purpose of the 
dissertation, it ultimately may not matter whether one accepts an evaluative or non-
evaluative definition of “dysfunction”, as long as one accepts that an etiological 
component is a necessary condition for such a definition.127
4.1.5 Adequacy of SPE on All Three Grounds 
According to SPE, in order for something to have a function, it must have 
contributed to the differential persistence or reproduction of that entity or type of entity. 
With few exceptions, the logical possibility of SPE has been ignored in discussions of 
etiological theories of function. This is most likely due to the fact that natural selection is 
often thought to operate exclusively over reproducing entities, and hence that any strong 
theory of function must be identical to SRE. However, as pointed out in the previous 
section, synaptic structures, as well as some learned dispositions, are partly formed by 
 
127 Wakefield (1999b, 470-1) essentially makes this same argument in response to Fulford’s (1999) claim 
that the notion of a consequence-etiology is not sufficient for defining function (Ibid., 416), and that some 
prescriptive element is necessary to that definition (Ibid., 417). Wakefield argues that even if some 
prescriptive component is a necessary condition on the analysis of “function” – and hence that function is 
an evaluative concept – so long as some reference to a selection process is also a necessary condition on 
this analysis, then the implications of the analysis are largely unaffected with respect to the sort of 
biological evidence that would be required to warrant the inference that a trait is functional (or 
dysfunctional).  
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selection processes that operate over non-reproducing entities, and that bring about the 
differential persistence of those entities. 
There are three advantages associated with accepting SPE. First, SPE resolves the 
Boorse-style counterexamples. As noted earlier (Section 4.1.2, under “Intuitive 
Implausibility of WPE”), none of Boorse’s counterexamples illustrate a selection process. 
For example, although obesity contributes to a sedentary lifestyle and thereby to its own 
persistence, obesity was not selected over some other trait because it contributed to a 
sedentary lifestyle. Similarly, the leak in the hose is not there because it, rather than 
something else, proved more effective in knocking out scientists. Because SPE excludes 
Boorse’s counterexamples, it is more intuitively plausible than WPE. Second, SPE is 
more general than SRE because it does not contain as many unmotivated restrictions. 
Hence, it is consistent with the methodological bias toward making the fewest number of 
potentially questionable assumptions. Third, and most importantly, it permits functions to 
be assigned to unique, non-reproducing structures, and hence is more compatible with the 
ascription of functions in the context of psychology and neuroscience. (Section 4.2 will 
be devoted to demonstrating the empirical plausibility of this claim.)  Hence it better 
satisfies the pragmatic motivation of the dissertation. 
The remainder of this section will show that SPE, or theories of function very 
similar to it, has played an important role in philosophical understanding of the relation 
between teleology and learning. SPE was first formulated in its full generality by 
Wimsatt (1972), but it also plays a role in some earlier and later attempts to characterize 
the purposeful character of learning and synaptic structure. Thus, the purpose of this 
section is to establish the philosophical precedents for SPE. 
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Wimsatt’s (1972) Formulation of SPE 
The first explicit and comprehensive statement of SPE is Wimsatt (1972), 
although this theory is foreshadowed in earlier philosophical approaches to teleology (see 
below). In that paper, he makes the claim – one that is familiar by now – that natural 
selection can ground teleological explanations for the current existence of certain traits:  
 
The class of functions of biological adaptations comprises exactly those functions 
and some of those adaptations…whose existence, presence, and form are 
purportedly explained (in some sense) by evolutionary theory through the 
operation of natural selection…Explanations of the above type are teleological 
explanations. (Ibid., 7-8) 
 
However, Wimsatt is clear that “selection” does not only operate over 
reproducing entities; it also serves to bring about the differential reinforcement or 
persistence of non-reproducing entities within a system. His paradigm example is 
learning. At the most abstract level, he claims, all learning can be modeled as the 
outcome of selection processes:128
 
In each case [of learning] there are two correlative processes involved in 
selection, aptly named ‘blind variation’ and ‘selective retention’ by 
Campbell…The concept of progress through trial and error is virtually 
synonymous with ‘blind variation and selective retention’, as progress is 
presumably the result of those two processes as reflected in what is selectively 
retained as the agent or system progresses through a number of trials…[T]here is 
good reason to say that all problem-solving behaviour has a basic trial and error 
character. (Ibid, 14) 
 
According to Wimsatt, then, what makes a learned disposition “purposeful” is the 
same as what makes a biological adaptation “purposeful”, namely, that the current 
 
128 See below, which argues that this claim is implausible: there are types of learning which do not appear 
to involve any process analogous to natural selection.  
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existence of the structure is partly explained by a selection process, rather than by any of 
the consequences that the structure currently produces: “[T]he operation of selection 
processes is not only not special to biology, but appears to be at the core of teleology and 
purposeful activity wherever they occur” (Ibid., 13). 
The idea that learning is a teleological process, that is, the view that what makes a 
learned disposition purposeful is the historical process that produced it, rather than the 
future consequences it brings about, had been proposed earlier by Mace (1949 [1935]) 
and Scheffler (1966 [1958]). It has also been proposed in some recent approaches to 
teleology, in particular, by Godfrey-Smith (1992) and Papineau (1994). Although all four 
of these philosophers either implicitly adopt SPE, or some theory of function very similar 
to it, none of them succeed in grasping SPE in its full generality, or in clearly separating 
WPE and SPE in the context of learning.129 By presenting their views, then, one can more 
clearly delineate the precise content of SPE theories. 
Teleology and Learning 
Mace (1949 [1935]) holds that learned behaviors constitute paradigmatic 
teleological phenomena, and claims to show that their purposeful character can be 
defined without appealing to the presence of conscious intentions. Since Mace defines a 
“teleological system” as one that is “constructed by a teleological process” (Ibid., 535), 
his analysis is an etiological one – it involves an appeal to the history of the system. 
Clearly, the weight of his analysis rests upon his explication of “teleological process”.  
To illustrate a teleological process, Mace refers to an ethological example that can 
be characterized by Thorndike’s “law of effect” (Thorndike [1911, 244]). According to 
 
129 As Buller (1998) has pointed out, many philosophers have vacillated between strong and weak 
etiological theories; this is all the more tempting when the strong and weak etiological theories are applied 
to learning, since the distinction between the mere reinforcement of a learned disposition and the 
differential reinforcement of that disposition is not as obvious as the difference between the reproduction of 
a trait and its differential reproduction.  
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this law, in a given situation, those behavioral responses that are followed by a reward (or 
“satisfaction”) will be more likely to recur in that type of situation, those followed by 
“discomfort” will be less likely to recur, and the likelihood of recurrence will be 
proportional to the intensity of the reward (or “discomfort”). The analogy between the 
law of effect and operant (or instrumental) conditioning is clear, with “satisfaction” and 
“discomfort” replaced by “positive” and “negative” reinforcement. Like operant 
conditioning, the law of effect characterizes learning as a selection process in which 
behavioral patterns from a pre-established repertoire are differentially reinforced by 
virtue of their relative performance on some common criterion.130
Mace’s definition of “teleological process” simply generalizes the form of this 
process. What is crucial to a teleological process, Mace argues, is the presence of a 
condition E, and a set of possible actions, such that those actions which increase the 
probability of E tend to be continued or repeated, and those that decrease E discontinued, 
as a result of which the former are “stabilized” and the latter “eliminated” (Ibid, 535-
6):131 “Any train of actions conforming to this description would, I think, be commonly 
described as a conative or teleological process” (Ibid., 536). Hence, by appealing to a 
selection process to define “teleological process”, Mace implicitly accepts a version of 
SPE. Interestingly, Mace does not extend this generalization to cover other biological 
phenomena, such as evolution by natural selection, that would also fall under his schema. 
Hence, unlike Wimsatt (1972), Mace does not recognize the generality of his definition.  
 
130 In fact, B. F. Skinner, in his seminal Science and Human Behavior (1953), notes the analogy between 
natural selection and operant conditioning: “We have seen that in certain respects operant reinforcement 
resembles the natural selection of evolutionary theory. Just as genetic characteristics which arise as 
mutations are selected or discarded by their consequences, so novel forms of behavior are selected or 
discarded through reinforcement” (Ibid., 430). (Also see Skinner [1981], for a short article devoted to an 
elaboration of this analogy.) 
131 Mace introduces other conditions that, from the point of view of this dissertation, are extraneous. 
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Scheffler’s article (1966 [1958]) is primarily written for the purpose of criticizing 
existing goal-contribution theories of teleology, specifically, those of Rosenbleuth et al. 
(1943) and Braithwaite (1953) (see Section 3.1.3., under “Goal-Contribution Theories”). 
His own etiological analysis stems from that criticism. According to the “cybernetic” 
account of teleology, proposed in Rosenbleuth et al. (1943), a behavior qualifies as 
purposeful if it is governed, in part, by a negative feedback process that ensures the 
attainment or maintenance of some goal-state.132 For example, a homing torpedo is 
controlled, in part, by acoustic signals from the object that it eventually destroys. A 
problem with such theories, Scheffler points out, is the “problem of the missing goal-
object”; that is, there are instances of purposeful behavior that are not, in fact, controlled 
by the putative “goal-object” (Scheffler [1966 (1958), 52]). For example, if an infant 
cries for his or her absent mother, this behavior is clearly purposeful, but it is not 
governed by any signals from the “goal-object”, namely, the mother. Similarly, if a rat 
depresses a lever in order to obtain food, but the food box is empty, then the behavior is 
still teleological even though it cannot be controlled by signals emitted from the non-
existent food. According to Scheffler, the problem of the missing goal-object suggests 
that what makes the behavior purposeful is not that it is presently controlled by a 
feedback mechanism but that, in the past, the behavior in question was associated with 
some reward and thereby came to be reinforced, and that this history of reinforcement 
explains its current manifestation. The reason the infant’s crying qualifies as a purposeful 
act, he states, is that:   
 
Having initially cried as a result of internal conditions C, and having thereby 
succeeded in attaining motherly solace, representing a type of rewarding effect E, 
 
132 In the following, the “cybernetic” account of teleology will refer to that version of the goal-contribution 
account that explicitly refers to the operation of a negative feedback process (see Section 3.1.3; under 
“Goal-Contribution Theories”).  
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the infant now cries in the absence of C, and as a result of several past learning 
sequences of C followed by E. The infant’s crying has thus been divorced from its 
original conditions through the operation of certain of its past effects. (Ibid., 53) 
 
 Moreover, he points out that such an account of purposefulness allows 
teleological explanation to be “explanatory” – in the causal sense, where the explanans 
temporally precedes the explanandum – while permitting an apparent reference to a 
future effect of the behavior, thus resolving the problem of backwards causation:  
 
The apparent future-reference of a teleological description of this present interval 
is thus not to be confused with prediction...Rather, the teleological statement tells 
us something of the genesis of the present crying...Such an account is perfectly 
compatible with normal causal explanation. (Ibid.) 
 
 Thus, Scheffler’s rationale for proposing an etiological account of teleology in 
the context of learning is identical to Ayala’s (1968; 1970) and Wimsatt’s (1972) later 
rationale for endorsing an etiological account of function in the evolutionary context, 
namely, that it resolves the problem of backwards causation by introducing a 
consequence-etiology.  
Strictly speaking, however, since there is no reference to selection in Scheffler’s 
account, it qualifies as a version of WPE, rather than SPE. For example, the fact that the 
infant’s crying was reinforced because, in the past, crying attracted its mother, does not 
imply that there existed a set of variant behavior patterns culled from a pre-established 
repertoire (e.g., grasping, making sucking motions, etc.) that were discontinued because 
they failed to attract its mother. Just as an entity can reproduce without undergoing 
differential reproduction, something can be reinforced without being differentially 
reinforced. However, if one amends Scheffler’s suggestion to require that the infant’s 
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crying must have been reinforced over some variant behavior, one would have an SPE 
view.  
Perhaps the only recent attempts to characterize learning as a teleological process 
are those of Godfrey-Smith (1992) and Papineau (1994). (This exposition will first 
describe Papineau’s view because it is more developed.) Papineau begins his argument 
by adopting the premise that natural selection can be thought of as a source of “design” 
(Ibid., 77) – though one that clearly does not require the existence of a “designer”. He 
then argues that individual learning should also be thought of as a source of “design”, 
because it, too, involves a form of selection. The neuronal mechanisms that mediate 
learned dispositions, he claims, have been selected for because of their capacity to 
produce the disposition in question: “I take it also that this neuronal mechanism was 
selected (reinforced, developed) because it produced that [disposition]” (Ibid., 78). Thus, 
Papineau echoes Wimsatt’s (1972) reasoning that it is the selective character of learning 
that underlies its ability to produce purposeful structures.  
Godfrey-Smith (1992) endorses a similar viewpoint, and argues that it is the 
selective character of learning which allows one to assign functions to learned 
dispositions: “It is important that the selective approach [to defining “function”] is in no 
way tied to the genetic kind of biological evolution…A selective basis for functional 
characterization is available whenever learned characters are maintained within the 
cognitive system because of their consequences” (1992, 292). Both Godfrey-Smith and 
Papineau, then, clearly state that they recognize a formal analogy between natural 
selection and learning in the context of teleology. However, neither fully draws out the 
consequences of this analogy. This is because neither of them recognizes a distinction 
between the claim that a given neural connection is “reinforced”, “developed”, or 
“maintained” by virtue of one of its consequences, and the claim that the connection is 
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selected for – that is, reinforced over some other connection. (Section 4.2.2 below will 
clearly illustrate the difference between these two scenarios in the neurobiological 
context.) Hence, neither clearly distinguishes between SPE and WPE.133
The shortcomings with Papineau’s (1994) and Godfrey-Smith’s (1992) attempts 
to tie together natural selection and learning suggest the need for formulating more 
explicitly what is required of a process in order for it to qualify as a “selection process”. 
This will be particularly crucial for sifting through the range of theories – both in 
psychology and neurobiology – that purport to be “selection” theories. As will be shown 
in Section 4.2.1, and as opposed to Wimsatt’s assessment, not all learning can be 
modeled as a selection process. Similarly, as will be shown in Section 4.2.2, and as 
opposed to a remark made by Crick (1989) that “almost everybody’s theory could be 
called a theory of synaptic selection” (Ibid., 247), not all processes of synapse structure 
formation are selection processes either. An evaluation of selection processes in learning 
and neurobiology will be important, then, for assessing the nature and scope of selection 
in these fields and hence the applicability of SPE as a useful notion of function for these 
fields.  
4.2 SELECTION PROCESSES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROBIOLOGY 
This section will present a brief overview and critical assessment of two claims. 
The first claim is that learning involves a selection process (Section 4.2.1); the second is 
 
133 The fact that Godfrey-Smith (1992) does not clearly distinguish between WPE and SPE becomes 
evident in later articles that are devoted more specifically to teleology in the evolutionary context. After 
noting the Boorse-style counterexamples that afflict WPE, he rejects WPE in favor of WRE, thus ignoring 
the logical possibility of SPE. Although he deems this move to WRE necessary for avoiding those 
counterexamples, he notes that it is unfortunate, because, by restricting “functions” to entities that are 
capable of reproduction, it breaks the connection between teleology in the context of learning and 
neuroscience, on the one hand, and evolutionary biology, on the other. For example, he points out that it 
entails the rejection of Dretske’s (1988) theory of function, which is explicitly formulated to be consistent 
with usage in the neuroscientific context. The fact that the distinction between SPE and WPE was not 
clearly made, however, prevented him from observing that WRE is not necessary for resolving Boorse’s 
counterexamples. 
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that synapse formation involves a selection process (Section 4.2.2). This exploration will 
be useful for evaluating the conditions under which the claim that a given structure or 
disposition has undergone selection – and hence that it has a function – can be 
empirically tested. Two conclusions will be drawn from the considerations raised in this 
section. The first is that, although evaluating the empirical claim that a given neural 
structure or learned disposition has undergone selection may be technically difficult, 
there is no principled difficulty of the sort that affects the attempt to reconstruct the long-
term evolutionary history of a trait. Hence, SPE avoids the insurmountable empirical 
problems that afflict SRE (see Section 4.1.3). The second conclusion that will be drawn is 
that one cannot infer from certain maladaptive consequences of a psychological or 
behavioral pattern or process that it stems from an internal dysfunction. Since some of 
these patterns or processes may be produced by learned responses or neural structures, 
they may represent the outcome of a selection process, and hence, from the point of view 
of SPE, they may represent instances of proper functioning rather than malfunctioning. 
This consideration raises the level of evidence that would be required in order to warrant 
the claim that a given psychological or behavioral condition stems from an internal 
dysfunction.  
4.2.1 Learning as a Selection Process 
 The observation that underlies Wimsatt’s (1972) version of SPE is that there 
exists an analogy between learning and natural selection. That some forms of learning are 
analogous to selection processes is not at issue – as noted in the previous section (Section 
4.1.5, under “Teleology and Learning”), the differential reinforcement (amplification or 
extinction) of learned dispositions brought about by positive and negative reinforcement 
exhibits all of the characteristics of a selection process. Hence, if there is a problem with 
characterizing learning as a selection process, it is not that examples will fail to be found. 
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Rather, it is that all learning may appear to have a selective character, and this would 
trivialize the substantive content of the analogy. 
 An example of the way in which the notion of selection can be overgeneralized to 
include all forms of learning can be seen in Herbert Simon’s (1969) The Sciences of the 
Artificial. Simon argues that, in its most general form, all human problem solving 
consists of a mixture of trial-and-error exploration and some form of feedback. Moreover, 
he explicitly draws the analogy to natural selection:  
 
Human problem solving, from the most blundering to the most insightful, 
involves nothing more than varying mixtures of trial and error and selectivity. We 
do not need to postulate processes more sophisticated than those involved in 
organic evolution to explain how enormous problem mazes are cut down to quite 
reasonable size. (Ibid., 99) 
 
Wimsatt (1972) was clearly influenced by this text when he wrote that “[T]here is good 
reason to say that all problem-solving behaviour has a basic trial and error character” 
(Wimsatt [1972, 14]).  
The psychologist Donald Campbell – one of the founders of evolutionary 
epistemology – has taken this selectionist perspective to extremes, thereby illustrating the 
risk of trivializing the analogy. Throughout several articles that span many decades (e.g., 
Campbell [1956; 1960; 1974; 1988]), Campbell argues that the two-fold process of “blind 
variation and selective retention” is at work at all levels of biological, psychological, and 
social development – for example, in locomotion, perception, imitative behavior, 
language, and even the process of scientific theorizing. In summarizing his view, he 
writes, “Human knowledge processes, when examined in continuity with the evolutionary 
sequence, turn out to involve numerous mechanisms at various levels of substitute 
functioning, hierarchically related, and with some form of selective retention process at 
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each level” (Campbell [1974, 419]).134 Cziko (1995), similarly, develops a “universal 
selection theory” that postulates the operation and efficacy of selection processes at all 
levels of biological and social organization.  
 Nonetheless, however instructive the analogy may be, it seems to become more 
tenuous as one moves up the scale of psychological and sociocultural development. For 
example, is the “natural selection of scientific theories” a metaphor or a fact? Thagard 
(1988, 101-11), for example, criticizes the analogy between theory selection and natural 
selection on three grounds. First, the generation of variation (new theories) is not “blind”, 
since new theories are usually formulated for the purpose of solving a specific problem 
(Ibid., 106).135 Secondly, unlike natural selection in the biological realm, where criteria 
for differential reproduction are always susceptible to change as a function of the 
changing environment, the differential survival of scientific theories is partly based on 
“global” criteria, that is, criteria that hold sway throughout the scientific community, such 
as simplicity, predictive or explanatory power, theoretical fruitfulness, and so on. This 
allows a concept of “progress” to be defined for scientific theories that is undefined in the 
biological realm (Ibid., 108). Finally, there is no obvious parallel to genetic transmission. 
In science, “preservation is by publication and pedagogy, not by any process resembling 
inheritance” (Ibid., 109).136
 
134 Campbell attributes the specific analogy between the process of scientific theorizing – in which 
“unsuccessful” hypotheses are discarded and “successful” ones propagated – and biological evolution 
through natural selection to Karl Popper. As Popper writes, “The method of trial and error is not, of course, 
simply identical with the scientific or critical approach – with the method of conjecture and refutation. The 
method of trial and error is applied not only by Einstein but, in a more dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba 
also” (Quoted in Campbell [1974, 416]). 
135 Also see Amundson (1989, 427) for a similar criticism.  
136 Hull (1988), however, defends the analogy between the dissemination of a scientific theory and genetic 
transmission. In the biological case, for example, genes may serve as “replicators” and organisms, 
“interactors”; in the scientific case, theories and methods are the “replicators” and the scientists themselves, 
the “interactors” (Ibid., 139-143). It is the scientists rather than the theories, therefore, that “compete for 
success” in Hull’s view. He also argues that although the intentional and progressive character of science 
makes it disanalogous with biological evolution, it does not for that reason make it non-selectionist (Ibid., 
145-147).  
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 Consequently, in order to ensure the usefulness of the concept of selection in the 
context of learning, it is necessary to show that the concept is, in fact, discriminating – 
that is, that it can only be applied to certain learning processes and not others. Perhaps the 
best way to show its usefulness, then, is to reveal its limitations. Although this section 
will not delve very deeply into different theories of learning, it will at least set up a very 
general contrast between theories of learning that involve selection and those that do not, 
and hence preserve some non-trivial and substantive content to the claim that learning 
can be a selection process.  
As noted earlier, the most obvious type of learning that can be modeled as a 
selection process is learning that is mediated by positive and negative reinforcement. 
Skinner (1981) addresses this analogy between natural selection in the context of 
biological evolution and operant conditioning, and claims that the pivot of the analogy is 
that both processes involve “selection by consequences”; that is, in both processes, the 
consequences of a disposition affect its chances of being differentially retained or 
perpetuated. But clearly, not all forms of learning can be modeled in this way! The most 
obvious and uncontroversial example of a non-selective learning process is classical 
conditioning. In classical conditioning, the “conditioned stimulus” (e.g., a tone) is paired 
with an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food); by being presented to a subject 
simultaneously or in short succession, the conditioned stimulus comes to elicit the same 
response (e.g., salivation) as the unconditioned stimulus. However, salivating in response 
to a tone is in no sense “selected over” some other response (e.g., barking) because it, 
rather than the other, was more effective at procuring food. This is because the item that 
qualifies as a reinforcer in this example (food) is not withheld in the absence of 
salivation, and hence even if the subject were to have produced varying behaviors, there 
is nothing analogous in this model to the differential fitness of a behavioral response. 
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Observational learning (or imitative learning) provides another example of a 
learning process that does not necessarily involve selection. In observational learning, a 
disposition can be acquired through the observation of a model and the retention of 
certain details of the modeled behavior. In this situation, learning occurs even if the 
modeled behavior is not immediately reproduced by the learner. But if the behavior is 
learned before it is reproduced, then this form of learning does not involve reinforcement 
by the consequences of the learner’s behavior. As Bandura et al. (1961) point out, 
“Unless [behavioral] responses are emitted…they cannot be influenced…Indeed, social 
imitation may hasten or short-cut the acquisition of new behaviors without the necessity 
of reinforcing successive approximations…” (Ibid., 580).137
Despite its limitations, the process of “blind variation and selective retention”, 
abstractly understood, clearly does play a role in certain aspects of learning and therefore 
possesses a legitimate sphere of application in that realm. Although operant conditioning 
is not successful as a complete account of human cognitive development, nonetheless, the 
role of positive and negative reinforcement cannot be excluded from any such complete 
account, especially as the mechanisms of positive and negative reinforcement become 
better characterized on the neurobiological level.138
According to SPE, if a disposition is retained by virtue of a selection process, then 
it comes to possess an etiological function – namely, the function of doing whatever it did 
that led to its differential reinforcement. But this observation has critical consequences 
for the practice of psychiatric diagnosis and classification. In particular, it entails that the 
 
137 However, the same authors raise the possibility that, between the observation of the model and the later 
reproduction of the behavior, the imitator may reinforce the behavioral pattern covertly, by, for example, 
anticipating the pleasure to be gained from carrying out the imitated behavior (Ibid.). Perhaps one might 
allow this type of learning to involve a form of “selection”, but one in which certain behavioral patterns are 
reinforced because of their imagined consequences rather than their actual consequences. It is not clear 
whether the concept of selection should be applied to this process. 
138 See, e.g., Kelley and Berridge (2002) for an overview of neurobiological theories of reward and 
motivation. 
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fact that the psychological or behavioral consequences of a given disposition may be, in 
some sense, “maladaptive” in a given environment does not imply that the disposition 
itself is dysfunctional, or that it stems from an internal dysfunction. Rather, given the 
learning history that explains how that disposition came to be maintained or reinforced, 
the consequences may instead represent the normal or proper functioning of the 
disposition. In the latter case, one may intuitively not want to diagnose the presence of a 
disorder.  
A simple example, elaborated by the developmental psychopathologists Richters 
and Cicchetti (1993), serves to illustrate the point.139 The diagnostic criteria for conduct 
disorder (APA [2000, 93-99]) include aggression, deceitfulness, and rule-violation. 
(Conduct disorder is primarily diagnosed of children or adolescents; antisocial 
personality disorder is reserved for adults, but many of the diagnostic criteria are shared 
by both categories.) As Richters and Cicchetti (1993) point out, if a child or adolescent 
expresses antisocial behavior patterns, such as anger, defiance, and oppositionality, this 
may suggest the presence of a dysfunction, but it may also implicate a developmental 
context in which those behaviors and attitudes were differentially reinforced. In light of 
that context, the behaviors in question may appear “normal” or “functional” for that 
context:  
 
[S]ome children might develop antisocial behavior patterns in the absence of 
internal dysfunctions; their conduct problems instead may be caused entirely by 
extrinsic, environmental factors. An obvious example of this might be children 
raised in criminogenic neighborhoods and/or families and those who engage in 
antisocial, even criminal, actions because those are the behaviors modeled, 
expected, and/or rewarded by the major influences in their environments. (Ibid., 
15) 
 
139 Although see Wakefield’s (1992b, 242) discussion of conduct disorder, and Agich’s (1994, 242-44) 
discussion of antisocial personality disorder. Both discussions make the point that behavioral criteria alone 
are insufficient to distinguish between disorder and non-disorder. 
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However, if a child evinces these behaviors as early as preschool, and they do not appear 
to be “engendered or reinforced by inconsistent or deviant parenting” (Ibid., 18), then one 
would be much more inclined to diagnose a mental disorder. 
The above considerations on the notion of function can provide some theoretical 
structure to support the intuition that the diagnosis of a mental disorder in the first case 
(that in which the behavior was reinforced) is not warranted, but that it may be warranted 
in the second case, even though both children exhibit many of the defining criteria of 
conduct disorder. In the latter case, according to SPE, the problematic behavior 
represents the proper or normal functioning of a learned disposition that, unfortunately, 
may produce maladaptive consequences.  
The possibility that the apparently maladaptive consequences of a disposition do 
not necessarily allow one to infer the presence of an internal dysfunction is not a novel 
result of the foregoing analysis of “function”. In fact, it is implied by the so-called 
“mismatch” argument raised above (see fn. 123, this chapter). According to this 
argument, some of the characteristic psychological conditions studied in 
psychopathology, such as anxiety or depression, are simply the inevitable consequences 
of the normal operation of evolved psychological mechanisms that were selected for in 
ancestral environments but produce untoward consequences in the modern social context. 
The foregoing considerations on the nature of learning merely provide further support for 
this distinction. Hence, they raise the standard of evidence that would have to be 
marshaled in order to show that a given psychological or behavioral condition stems from 
an internal dysfunction. However, the example of conduct disorder also illustrates that 
just because a condition does not stem from an internal dysfunction does not mean that it 
is any less meritorious of social concern, psychological counseling, or corrective 
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treatment. A similar conclusion will be drawn for the neurobiological context in the 
following section.  
4.2.2 Synaptic Structure Formation as a Selection Process 
If selection processes are operative at the neurobiological level, then there exists 
warrant for assigning etiological functions to that level – that is, to structures that may be 
unique, non-heritable, and capable of functional reorganization in response to novel 
environmental demands. As Richters and Hinshaw (1999) point out – though without 
offering any well-defined theory of function – the vast extent of neuronal plasticity in the 
developing brain implies that the brain may acquire novel functions during epigenetic 
development and hence that neuronal functions should be defined with respect to “both 
the evolutionary history of the species as well as the ontogenetic shaping influences of 
each individual’s experience” (Ibid., 441).  
There are three reasons to delve into “neural selection” theories. First, the 
application of etiological theories of function in the neurobiological context is as yet 
poorly understood – as noted above, both Papineau (1994) and Godfrey-Smith (1992) 
attempt to apply etiological theories in this realm, yet without adequately working 
through the consequences of the position. Second, given the increasing relevance of 
neurobiological results to the psychiatric context, it becomes imperative, from the 
perspective of this dissertation, to state precisely the conditions under which a neural 
structure can be said to be “dysfunctional”. This requires stating explicitly, and in an 
empirically testable manner, the conditions under which it comes to possess a “function”. 
Third, in the neurobiological context, “learning” is often used very broadly to refer to 
more or less permanent, activity-dependent changes in synaptic structure. Hence, in some 
sense, this section does not represent a departure from the foregoing considerations on the 
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nature of learning, but an extension of those considerations into the neurobiological 
context.  
This section will begin by explicating the difference between selective and non-
selective (e.g., “constructive”) types of synaptic structure formation. It will then establish 
the empirical warrant for considering neural selectionism to be a widely-applicable 
through not universal theory of synaptic structure formation. Although there is much 
debate concerning the ubiquity of neural selection, there is no doubt about its existence or 
significance as an important mechanism of activity-dependent synaptic structure 
formation. 
Selection and Construction 
There are two types of processes that account for the mature synaptic structure of 
the brain and nervous system: “activity-independent” and “activity-dependent” processes. 
To say that a neuron’s pattern of connectivity – that is, its pattern of divergence (the set 
of neurons it innervates) and its pattern of convergence (the set of neurons that innervate 
it) – is “activity-independent” is to say that this pattern is not based on the activation of 
that neuron – i.e., the production of electrical potentials and the release of 
neurotransmitter by that neuron. To say that the pattern is “activity-dependent” is to say 
that the pattern is based, in part, on the frequency and pattern of neural activation itself. 
“Neural selection” and “neural construction” refer to two types of activity-dependent 
processes. 
An example of a theory according to which synaptic structure formation is largely 
due to activity-independent processes is the chemoaffinity hypothesis associated with the 
work of Roger Sperry. According to the chemoaffinity hypothesis, each neuron possesses 
a specific chemical “marker”, established genetically or in the early stages of neural 
development, and that neuron is guided to a specific target that bears an identical or 
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complementary such marker (e.g., Sperry [1951; 1963]; also see Meyer [1998]). This 
theory was originally formulated on the basis of research, described in the previous 
section (see Section 3.2.1, under “Substantive Approaches Violate Adequate 
Conditions”), on the effects of the ablation of retinotectal connections in the frog. As is 
well-known, in the mature frog, the original topographic mapping is eventually 
reconstituted despite gross alterations in the position or structure of the retina (Sperry 
[1944]). This suggests that each retinal ganglion neuron bears the chemical trace of its 
original position on the tectum and uses this trace to re-innervate that position. This 
research had the broader implication that the retinotectal pattern of connectivity is largely 
invariant and not subject to extensive modification by experience. (See, however, Meyer 
and Sperry [1976, 113], for an acknowledgement of the role of activity in bringing about 
the competitive elimination of certain synapses and hence “fine-tuning” the pattern of 
connectivity.) 
A second type of theory that holds synaptic structure formation to be an activity-
independent process represents a variation on the strict chemoaffinity hypothesis. It holds 
that this chemical signal or “marker” is not unique to a given neuron but to a class of 
neurons, and that the affinity between an innervating neuron and its target exhibits 
gradation in strength (Meyer and Sperry [1976]). This latter theory helps to account for 
the ubiquitous plasticity found in the developing brain, which is difficult to account for 
on the strict chemoaffinity hypothesis (see, e.g., Gaze et al. [1963; 1965] for some of the 
initial research on the retinotectal projection in Xenopus laevis embryos that disconfirmed 
the strong chemoaffinity hypothesis; also Gaze and Sharma [1970] on similar work with 
goldfish; see Gaze [1974] for a succinct review). A third type of theory that characterizes 
synaptic structure formation as an activity-independent process refers to the role of purely 
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mechanical constraints, such as substrate guidance, for explaining the initial pattern of 
connectivity (e.g., Scholes [1979]). 
Clearly, activity-independent neural processes do not generally lend themselves to 
neural selection, since, assuming that each neuron is able to locate its target in an 
accurate manner, such processes do not generate substantial variation in the pattern of 
connections over which selection could then act. However, selection could perform some 
role in the differential strengthening and weakening of synapses. For example, if several 
different neurons converge on a given target neuron, the chemoaffinity theory may allow 
certain synapses to be strengthened, and others weakened, owing to differences in their 
activity. Moreover, as Sperry notes (see above), if these activity-independent processes 
are “error-prone”, then that leaves some scope for selection processes to “fine-tune” the 
initial pattern of connectivity. 
Activity-dependent processes are those in which the mature pattern of 
connectivity is partly due to the activation of the neurons involved. As noted above, in 
the neurobiological context, “learning” is often used very broadly to refer to such 
activity-dependent changes in synaptic structure. Learning, in this sense, involves a 
relation of dependence or interaction between neural activity and neural structure: 
activity partly determines structure. But how, precisely, does neural activity determine 
structure? Two very general views have emerged that attempt to answer this question, 
“neural selectionism” and “neural constructivism”. 
Neural selectionism construes synaptic structure formation in terms of a two-
stage, iterated process (Changeux and Danchin [1976]; Changeux [1985]; Edelman 
[1978; 1987]; Gazzaniga [1992]).140 The first stage corresponds to the activity-
 
140 It is more accurate to denote the theory described immediately below as “synaptic selectionism”, 
because the unit of selection is taken to be the synapse itself, rather than the entire neuron, or even groups 
of neurons. These latter two types of selection, however, will be described in more detail in the next sub-
section, “Evidence for Neural Selection”.  
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independent formation of synapses (synaptogenesis). This produces an initial pattern of 
connectivity. This process is, to a large extent, both random and exuberant. That is, this 
process creates a large repertoire of synaptic variation, much of it non-adaptive. The 
second stage corresponds to the reduction of variation via the competitive elimination of 
certain synapses.141 This latter stage is an activity-dependent process. Certainly, 
selectionists accept the fact that throughout life, neurons are capable of branching and 
extending new axons or dendrites (projections). Synaptogenesis is not entirely arrested 
after the first stage. However, they consider the further branching and growth of new 
projections, after this initial round of competitive elimination, to represent a re-iteration 
of the first stage of activity-independent, random, and exuberant growth.  
The analogy between natural selection and neural selection is fairly strong. It rests 
upon an analogy between a population of neurons that innervate the same target neuron, 
and a population of reproducing organisms in a given environment. The first stage 
corresponds to “blind variation”, and the second, differential fitness. Presumably, in the 
second stage, the differential retention of projections on a given target is a consequence 
of the fact that the variant projections possess a differential capacity to access and utilize 
some common resource that is necessary for their continued retention on the target 
neuron, such as a trophic substance supplied by the target neuron, or merely physical sites 
upon which to form synapses (these hypotheses will be explored below).142
 
141 More accurately, the differential retention of certain synapses over others is due to their differential 
capacity to utilize some common resource. As pointed out by Lewontin (1970, 1) not all natural selection 
can be modeled as a type of “competition”. For example, if there are two strains of bacteria in a test tube 
that have different rates of reproduction, then one strain will become more frequent, and the other less so, 
even if there is nothing corresponding to a limiting resource over which the two must “compete”. Although 
the notion of competitive elimination will be applied throughout subsequent discussion, this qualification 
should be kept in mind.  
142 Hence neural selection satisfies Lewontin’s (1970, 1) criteria for a selection process (also see Darden 
and Cain [1989, 121-123], who make this connection). 
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The second main position on how neural activity translates into neural structure is 
called “constructivism”. According to constructivism, synaptogenesis itself is often an 
activity-dependent, non-selective process (e.g., Purves [1994]; Purves et al. [1996]; 
Quartz and Sejnowski [1997]). Hence, constructivism emphasizes the role that neural 
activity plays in the formation of new synapses, rather than (or in addition to) the 
elimination of existing synapses. For example, suppose that neuron A synapses onto 
neuron B. The activation of B by A may trigger the growth and extension of new 
dendrites on B and new axon terminals on A. This would increase the number of new 
synapses between A and B in an activity-dependent manner. Moreover, this is not a 
selection process, since it involves a mere proliferation of new synapses, rather than the 
differential proliferation of new synapses. These newly formed neural projections may 
also branch, extend, and form synapses with neighboring neurons. In this case, the joint 
activity of A and B promotes the formation of new synapses in the absence of selection. 
Hence, constructivists view neural growth in terms of the gradual, progressive, and 
activity-dependent elaboration of novel synaptic structures and circuitry, rather than the 
elimination of “excess” circuitry. 
This does not imply that constructivists deny altogether the existence of selective 
elimination of existing synapses. They acknowledge that the constructive formation of 
new synapses is partly stochastic and “error-prone”, and hence will require the selective 
elimination of useless or maladaptive connections (Purves [1994, 68]; Quartz and 
Sejnowski [1997, 550]) However, the “directed” quality of synapse formation minimizes 
the need for a consequent phase of selection. 
In short, according to selectionism, synapse formation is profligate and “blind”, 
thus maximizing the need for selection processes to reduce this abundance by preserving 
those connections that are in some sense “adaptive”. It assumes that activity-independent 
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neural processes have produced the repertoire of variation over which selection will act. 
A representative quote nicely summarizes this perspective: “To learn is to stabilize 
preestablished synaptic combinations, and to eliminate the surplus” (Changeux [1985, 
249]). According to constructivism, synapse formation is parsimonious, in that it extends 
and reinforces active neural projections in a way that is sensitive to the functional 
demands of the system. This minimizes the necessity for selection processes to reduce 
variability. Purves (1994) gives a fairly clear statement of this viewpoint: “Whatever its 
cellular and molecular basis turns out to be, activity-dependent growth provides a richer 
and more consistent framework for thinking about neural development than the now 
popular idea that we start life with an initial excess of connections and then select from 
this surfeit by competitive mechanisms akin to natural selection. Rather, the brain builds 
the circuitry it needs during its progress to maturity” (Ibid., 93-4). 
The distinction between neural selectionism and neural constructionism illustrates 
the distinction between SPE and WPE as alternate etiological theories of function. 
According to selectionism, neural activity brings about the differential reinforcement or 
retention of synapses through the elimination of specific synapses. According to 
constructionism, neural activity primarily extends and reinforces existing patterns of 
connectivity through the progressive elaboration of projections. However, since it does 
not typically involve selection, it explains the reinforcement and development of 
synapses without appealing to the differential reinforcement or development of synapses. 
The failure to make this distinction is precisely the difficulty alluded to above in relation 
to Papineau’s (1994) and Godfrey-Smith’s (1992) attempts to explicate a theory of 
function that would be appropriate for neural development as well as biological 
evolution. Hence, if one accepts SPE, then mechanisms of neural construction, since they 
only involve the uniform strengthening of synapses or the elaboration of existing 
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projections, cannot bestow novel functions onto the neural structures that it creates. Only 
the mechanisms of neural selectionism that bring about new patterns of connectivity via 
the differential retention of synapses can qualify as bestowing novel functions onto the 
structures that it creates. 
There exist well-documented cases of both types of processes – selective and 
constructive – in the brain, and to this extent there is no genuine dispute between 
constructivists and selectionists with respect to whether either type of mechanism exists. 
In fact, in most cases that will be discussed in the next section, both processes are at work 
concurrently. The debates, then, involve the relative prominence of one mechanism over 
the other. Some selectionists, such as Changeux (1985; 1997), Edelman (1978; 1987), 
Gazzaniga (1992), and Sporns (1997a; 1997b), argue that virtually all synaptic structure 
formation is selectionist in character, while those such as Purves (1994), Purves et al. 
(1996), and Quartz and Sejnowski (1997), emphasize its constructive character. Katz and 
Shatz (1996), LeDoux (2002), Black and Greenough (1986; 1997), and Elliott and 
Shadbolt (1997) emphasize the concurrent operation of both processes and do not argue 
that one of them is more ubiquitous than the other, but that both are complementary or 
even inextricable from one another.143
Evidence for Neural Selection 
There are three different types of “neural selection” depending on what neural 
structure qualifies as the unit of selection – that is, the unit that is differentially retained 
 
143 Black and Greenough (1986) propose this “conciliatory” position in their definition of two types of 
learning, “experience-expectant” and “experience-dependent”, where the former refers to the learning of 
general information available to most members of a species, and the latter to the learning of idiosyncratic 
information. They suggest that the former type of learning is mainly implemented by neural selection 
processes involving the activity-independent proliferation and activity-dependent elimination of specific 
connections, and that the latter is implemented by constructive processes that involve activity-dependent 
growth and extension of new synapses. Bolhuis (1994, 37-9), however, challenges the claim that these two 
types of learning can be related in any simple way to specific neural mechanisms. 
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or reproduced through selective activity. Selective activity may operate over the synapse 
as the unit of selection, the neuron itself as the unit of selection, or groups of neurons as 
the unit of selection. Each of these possibilities will be described below, although the 
main emphasis will be on synaptic selection. 
 
Synaptic Selection 
The initial evidence for synaptic selection came from studies of the 
neuromuscular junction in mammals. At birth, each muscle fiber is typically innervated 
by more than one motor neuron. Over the course of several weeks, innervating motor 
neurons retract and a one-to-one pattern of connectivity emerges between motor nerve 
and muscle fiber (see Purves and Lichtman [1980] for an early review of this research; 
also see Figure 4.6).  In skeletal muscle of newborn rats, for example, each muscle fiber 
is innervated by two or more neurons; within two weeks after birth each fiber is 
innervated by only a single neuron (Brown et al. [1976]). However, the number of 
existing motor neurons remains constant during this period. This indicates that the net 
loss of innervating axons is not due to the death of motor neurons but the retraction or 
withdrawal of all but one axon (Ibid.). Similarly, submandibular (submaxillary) ganglion 
cells of newborn rats are innervated by an average of five neurons, and within five weeks 
the one-to-one pattern of connectivity is established (Lichtman [1977; 1980]).  
 
 
Figure 4.6:  Innervation of skeletal muscle of newborn rats. The first panel depicts the 
multiple innervation of muscle fibers by motor neurons; the second panel 
depicts the one-to-one pattern of connectivity that emerges by two weeks 
after birth. Redrawn from Purves and Lichtman (1980, 155).  
The authors of the studies referred to above proposed that a competitive 
mechanism is involved in this eliminative process, and speculated as to the nature of this 
competition. One such mechanism would involve the production of some trophic material 
that is synthesized or made available in limited quantities by the target neuron, that is 
necessary for the maintenance of the innervating axons, and that is taken up by the 
innervating axons by a retrograde transport mechanism (Brown et al. [1976, 420]; 
Lichtman [1977, 173-4; 1980, 129]; Purves [1977, 38-39]; Purves and Lichtman [1978, 
848-851]). (See the next subsection, “Selection of Neurons”, on the role of neurotrophins 
such as nerve growth factor [NGF], or brain-derived neurotrophic factor [BDNF], in 
preventing naturally occurring neural cell death, and for the possible role of the 
neurotrophins in synaptic selection). In the case of the neuromuscular junction, any 
“trait” of the synapse that bestows upon the axon a differential capacity to uptake this 
trophic substance would give that synapse a competitive advantage in the selection 
process, and hence, according to SPE, would come to possess the function of doing so.  
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However, it is important to point out that this eliminative mechanism or selection 
process is not without its “constructive” and non-selective counterpart in the 
neuromuscular junction. This corresponding constructive mechanism is attested to by the 
fact that in rat submandibular ganglion cells, the net decrease in the number of 
innervating axons is followed by an increase in the growth and extension of new axon 
terminals on the remaining axon (Lichtman [1977, 173]; Purves and Lichtman [1978, 
830]). These proliferating axon terminals form additional synapses with the target neuron 
such that there is no net reduction in total synapse number. This wave of synaptogenesis 
appears to be dependant on neural activation and hence represents a paradigm form of 
neural constructivism. However, this is a case of neural constructivism that is perfectly 
compatible with neural selectionism and, in fact, presupposes its operation.  
In the central nervous system, the neural process that best illustrates and supports 
this competitive model of synaptic structure formation involves the development of 
ocular dominance columns in the primary visual cortex of mammals. In mature 
mammals, retinal ganglion cells (RGC) from the retina extend axons to the lateral 
geniculate nucleus (LGN) in the thalamus; these are called “retinogeniculate” projections. 
LGN neurons, in turn, send axons to layer IV of the primary visual cortex (area 17); these 
are called “geniculocortical” projections. In some mammals, geniculocortical axons from 
the LGN form an alternating series of eye-specific “stripes” or “columns” in layer IV 
called “ocular dominance columns”. Although the majority of layer IV neurons respond 
in some degree to visual stimulation of either eye, cells that occupy the same ocular 
dominance column respond preferentially to stimulation of the same eye. The formation 
of these columns appears to fit the two-stage selectionist model that begins with 
exuberant and random growth, and is followed by the competitive elimination of certain 
synapses. 
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This competitive model of ocular dominance formation was first suggested by 
experiments carried out by David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel in the 1960s (Wiesel and 
Hubel [1963]; Hubel and Wiesel [1965]). The initial set of experiments suggesting this 
result simply consisted in depriving newborn kittens of visual stimulation in one eye 
(monocular deprivation) for the first few months of life, and recording electrical activity 
from single cells in the visual cortex (Wiesel and Hubel [1963]). In non-deprived 
newborn kittens, most of the cells in layer IV of the visual cortex are responsive to visual 
stimulation from either eye – more specifically, about 80% of those cells are “binocularly 
driven”, although a small proportion are exclusively responsive to stimulation of one eye 
or the other. Hubel and Wiesel then compared normal kittens with monocularly-deprived 
kittens, and found that in the latter, the vast majority of cells respond exclusively to 
stimulation from the non-deprived eye alone – they are “monocularly-driven”. This 
comparison suggested that the poverty of connections to the deprived eye came about by 
the selective loss of connections that were present at birth, rather than the failure of those 
connections to develop normally in the first place. In other words, normal visual activity 
appears to “sustain” or “validate” preexisting connections rather than to create them. This 
is in accordance with an activity-independent model of synaptogenesis.  
But how does this relate to the notion that there exists an active “competition” 
between neurons? Unlike kittens that have undergone monocular deprivation, kittens that 
have been exclusively dark-reared for the first several months of life appear to retain the 
same degree of binocularity as normal kittens. This implies that the results of the 
monocular-deprivation experiments cannot merely be explained by the assumption that 
connections from the deprived eye degenerate as a function of disuse. Rather, it implies 
that there exists some active “competition” between the neural connections from the 
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deprived eye and the non-deprived eye (Ibid., 1015) – that is, the loss of connections 
from one eye is a function of the activation of the other eye. 
These results were confirmed by a second set of experiments, in which Hubel and 
Wiesel (1965) induced strabismus – nonparallel visual axes – in newborn kittens by 
severing the extraocular muscle of a single eye. This ensures that the visual signals 
produced by the two eyes are asynchronous or uncoordinated. The result was that most 
neurons in the visual cortex responded exclusively to one eye or the other, but not both. 
Only about 20% of visual neurons were responsive to both eyes, rather than the 80% in 
normal kittens (Ibid., 1058). This suggested that when confronted with asynchronous 
patterns of activity, a cortical neuron eventually comes to “favor” the input from one eye 
over the other: “These results suggest that strabismus caused cells to shift in their ocular 
dominance, a given cell coming to favor more and more the eye that dominated it at birth, 
ultimately losing all connections with the nondominant eye” (Ibid., 1058). This result 
again supported a “competitive” model of ocular dominance formation.  
Moreover, they found that the ocular dominance profile of one cell is not 
completely independent of its neighbor, but that cells with the same profile tend to cluster 
together in groups (Ibid., 1056), that is, ocular dominance columns. Hubel and Wiesel 
(1972) later exhibited these ocular dominance columns anatomically in the Macaque 
monkey by inducing lesions in the LGN that affected only the input from a single eye and 
then applying a staining method to the visual cortex that selectively stains degenerating 
geniculocortical axons. The effect of monocular deprivation on the relative width of 
ocular dominance columns can also be visualized by using autoradiography, through the 
transport of a radioactive material that has been injected into a single eye (Hubel et al. 
[1977]). Rakic (1976) used this method to demonstrate that, in the fetal Rhesus monkey 
brain, geniculocortical axons are diffusely distributed and intermixed in the visual cortex, 
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and that segregation of these axons into ocular dominance columns begins in the second 
half of gestation. Thus, much of the activity that drives the segregation of ocular 
dominance columns in the monkey stems from spontaneously-evoked retinal and 
thalamic activity and not from postnatal visual experience (see Katz and Shatz [1996] for 
discussion). 
The existence of an eliminative process is given further confirmation by 
visualization of individual geniculocortical axons. As Antonini and Stryker (1993a) 
show, upon subjecting newborn kittens to monocular deprivation, the retraction and 
elimination of geniculocortical projections is initiated very rapidly; within 6-7 days after 
monocular deprivation, geniculocortical axons controlled by the deprived eye are shorter 
in length and have fewer branches than those controlled by the non-deprived eye. 
Interestingly, the length and branch number of geniculocortical axons controlled by the 
non-deprived eye are longer and have more branches than those of a normal kitten (Ibid., 
1820). This suggests that ocular dominance formation is not merely controlled by a 
selection process, but by a “constructive” process as well, which involves the activity-
dependent branching and growth of new axon terminals as well as the retraction and 
elimination of others. If there were no activity-dependent growth, then one would expect 
geniculocortical axons controlled by the non-deprived eye to have the same length and 
branch number as those of normal kittens. On the basis of their work, Antonini and 
Stryker (1993b) embrace the conciliatory view that “normal development [of ocular 
dominance columns] thus appears to involve both selective elimination of widely 
extended branches and considerable growth and elaboration” (Ibid., 3572).  
Thus, in this case as well as in others that will be examined, selection processes 
and constructive processes should be seen as complementary forms of synaptic structure 
development. At the very least, the development of ocular dominance columns suggests 
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that activity-independent growth and selective elimination of axons may be followed by 
the activity-dependent and non-selective proliferation of the axon terminals of those 
axons that have been retained. From the point of view of this dissertation, so long as a 
selection process plays some role in the development of a given neural system, then one 
can ascribe functions to features of individual neurons and groups of neurons in that 
system, even if constructive processes play a significant role in the further development 
of the system. 
All of the examples that have been described so far concern the competition 
between the axons of different neurons that innervate the same target, and they all 
illustrate and confirm the selectionist hypothesis of an initial, diffuse, and semi-random 
proliferation of synapses followed by selective synapse loss via axonal retraction. These 
examples, however, suggest that the dendrites of target neurons function as more or less 
passive recipients of this competitive process. However, the selectionist hypothesis can 
equally well be applied to the competitive stabilization and elimination of dendrites 
through their differential retraction following an initial, random, and diffuse phase of 
dendritic branching and synaptogenesis with innervating neurons. (See Wong and Ghosh 
[2002] for review and discussion.) 
For example, the dendrites of retinal ganglion cells (RGC) in mammals, which 
form the optic nerve that leads from the retina to the lateral geniculate nucleus in the 
thalamus, undergo an activity-dependent segregation that is similar to that involved in the 
formation of ocular dominance columns. Initially, RGC dendrites extend diffusely 
through the inner plexiform layer (IPL) of the retina. Shortly after forming synapses with 
afferent bipolar cells, RGC dendrites begin to segregate into two distinct sublayers of the 
IPL, one more proximal and one more distal to the RGC soma. The dendrites that occupy 
the more proximal layer are innervated exclusively by ‘ON’ bipolar neurons (those that 
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are differentially sensitive to the onset of light), and those that occupy the more distal 
layer are exclusively innervated by ‘OFF’ neurons (those that are differentially sensitive 
to the offset of light). This segregation is mediated by glutamate activity, as shown by the 
fact that glutamate blockage prohibits this stratification and leaves many neurons 
innervated by both ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ bipolar cells. For example, in cat retinas, after 
blockage of glutamate activity, about 40% of RGCs remain innervated by both types of 
bipolar cells, and hence respond equally to the onset and offset of light (Bisti et al. 
[1998]). Wang et al. (2001) provides further evidence for the initially diffuse spread and 
innervation of RGC dendrites in ferret retinas. The segregation of RGC axons in the 
lateral geniculate nucleus seems to follow a similar pattern of exuberant, activity-
independent growth and subsequent elimination (see Lichtman et al. [1999, 570-3] for a 
summary). 
A similar selectionist account of dendrite development has been given for the one-
to-one pattern of connectivity established between the axon terminals of sensory 
olfactory receptors and the dendrites of mitral cells in the olfactory bulb of the opossum, 
Monodelphus domestica. Between 5 and 15 days after birth, mitral cell dendrites undergo 
a diffuse and uniform proliferation toward the dorsal surface of the olfactory bulb, where 
they form synapses with the bulb-shaped axonal terminals – the “glomeruli” – of 
olfactory neurons. By day 15, most of the dendrite branches of each mitral cell have 
retracted, forming a primarily one-to-one pattern of connectivity with the glomeruli 
(Malun and Brunjes [1996]). Purves (1994), however, describes how the development of 
the glomeruli themselves, in the mouse olfactory bulb, is characterized by a progressive 
growth of existing glomeruli and a gradual addition of novel glomeruli, rather than their 
selective elimination. Unlike the dendrites of mitral cells, nothing in glomeruli 
development appears to correspond to “an excess of modular circuitry that is 
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subsequently reduced”, but rather, “the persistent growth, and, in some cases addition, of 
complex neural circuitry” (Ibid., 43). Hence, selectionist and constructionist mechanisms 
appear to exhibit a type of “division of labor” in the olfactory bulb, where dendrite 
specification involves selection processes and axonal specification involves constructive 
processes. This illustrates a case in which selection and construction processes may be 
compatible with one another.  
The formation of dendritic shape, arborization, and stabilization exemplifies not 
only selective but constructive mechanisms as well. That is, dendrite branching, growth, 
retention, and retraction involve not only the activity-dependent elimination of 
“exuberant” growth but the activity-dependent induction of novel growth as well. (See 
Wong and Ghosh [2002] for review and discussion.) For example, Sin et al. (2002) 
examine the effects of visual stimulation on the growth of dendrites of tectal neurons in 
the frog. After depriving tadpoles of light for four hours, they exposed them to bright 
light for four hours. In vivo time lapse imaging reveals the growth and extension of new 
dendritic arbors – thus confirming the constructivist hypothesis of activity-dependent 
growth – as well as the selective stabilization of existing dendrites. They also show that 
the dendritic growth is mediated by the neurotransmitter glutamate, and by calcium-
dependent signaling mechanisms. This is indicated by the cessation of dendrite growth 
upon application of antagonists for the post-synaptic NMDA receptor. (Also see Rajan 
and Cline [1998], who use time lapse imaging to examine dendrite growth and show a 
role for NMDA glutamatergic activity in dendrite growth.) The influx of calcium through 
voltage-gated calcium channels (VGCC) also suffices to induce dendrite growth, as 
shown by the fact that blockade of VGCCs inhibits dendritic branching (Chevaleyre et al. 
[2002]). 
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Hence, while appreciating the role of selection processes in synaptic structure 
development, the notion of a universal or generalized neural selectionism must be 
tempered by an acknowledgement of the extent of activity-dependent growth of dendrites 
and hence a lessening of the explanatory role of selection mechanisms. 
 
Selection of Neurons 
“Selection of neurons” refers to selection processes that operate over the entire 
neuron itself, that is, those that involve the differential persistence or reproduction of 
neurons rather than synapses. The existence of one type of selection of neurons appears 
to take place during neural cell death, which refers to a specific stage of early embryonic 
development in vertebrates (see, e.g., Cowan [1973; 1978]; Oppenheim [1991]; Johnson 
and Deckworth [1993]; Pettmann and Henderson [1998]). Neural cell death, or 
apoptosis144, appears to involve, in part, a selection process in which neurons “compete” 
for a limited field of innervation or for a limited number of trophic resources. Some of 
these resources may act to suppress the genes involved in naturally occurring or 
“programmed” cell death (Albright et al. [2000, S20]).   
Neurogenesis in vertebrate embryos involves a phase of neural proliferation and 
migration followed by a period of widespread cell death. The generality of this 
phenomenon was first identified by Hamburger and Levi-Montalcini (1949), who 
observed motor neuron degeneration in the spinal cord of the normal chick embryo. 
Neural cell death is widespread and occurs in most types of neurons (Cowan [1973], 
Oppenheim [1991]). For example, up to 40% of the motor neurons in the chick spinal 
cord undergo cell death (Hamburger [1975]). In the avian nervous system, cell death 
 
144 The term “apoptosis” was coined by Kerr et al. (1972, 241) to distinguish normal or “programmed” cell 
death from pathological cell death (necrosis) due to, e.g., lesion or infection.  
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affects 40% to 75% of all neurons, and appears to be distributed evenly across most 
neural cell types (Cowan [1978, 165]).  
The primary function of neural cell death appears to be a quantitative one, which 
matches the size of a given group of neurons with the size of its innervation field, that is, 
the population of target neurons or receptors that the group innervates (Cowan [1973]). 
This is suggested by the long-attested fact that increasing the size of the innervation field 
through limb transplantation has been shown to increase the number of motor neurons, 
and decreasing this field through limb extirpation decreases it (Detwiler [1936]; also see 
Hollyday and Hamburger [1976]).  In addition to this quantitative function, it may also 
serve to eliminate some connections that have been formed by “developmental errors”. 
For example, Clarke and Cowan (1975; 1976) injected a retrograde tracer, horseradish 
peroxidase (HRP), into the eye of the chick embryo and showed that a small number of 
neurons in the ipsilateral, rather than contralateral, isthmo-optical nucleus were labeled 
with HRP. About 80-90% of these labeled neurons die in early development, suggesting 
that neural cell death performs the qualitative function of eliminating neurons that 
innervate the “wrong” eye (Clarke and Cowan [1976, 144]). Hughes (1965, 31) also 
suggests that neural cell death performs this qualitative function.  
The quantitative function of neural cell death may be mediated by a “competitive” 
mechanism. One fairly simple theory is that neurons that successfully innervate a target 
neuron are preserved, and those that fail to innervate die. Hamburger (1958) suggests 
such a mechanism when he writes that “The quantitative relationship between the number 
of motor neurons and the size of the peripheral field of innervation is established by a 
selective survival of those neurons which find an adequate peripheral milieu, and the 
degeneration of all others” (Ibid., 399; quoted in Oppenheim [1981, 85]). However, 
retrograde labeling techniques have shown that neurons that successfully innervate their 
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target are also subject to cell death (Clarke and Cowan [1975; 1976]). Hence, the 
selection criterion cannot simply consist in whether or not a neuron innervates a target. 
This suggests the possibility that, like synaptic selection, a competitive process that 
involves many different neurons at the site of innervation, and that involves the uptake of 
a diffusible trophic substance, mediates cell death (Cowan [1973; 1978, 166]). For 
example, nerve growth factor (NGF), a protein originally isolated from snake venom, was 
found to contribute to the survival of sympathetic and sensory ganglia in vitro (Cohen 
and Levi-Montalcini [1956]; Levi-Montalcini and Cohen [1960]), and was later found to 
occur naturally in rat sympathetic target tissue (Ebendal et al. [1980]). Since that time, 
many different neurotrophins, or secreted factors that promote the survival of neurons, 
have been identified (Walicke [1989]; Huang and Reichardt [2001]).  
Neurotrophins are currently believed to sponsor the survival of neurons not by 
enhancing cell metabolism, but rather by suppressing a set of genes that are responsible 
for apoptosis. The evidence for this claim originated from studies on invertebrates. In C. 
elegans, about 10% of somatic cells undergo apoptosis, which is precisely timed and 
largely independent of cellular interaction (Yuan and Horvitz [1990]). Two genes in 
particular, ced-3 and ced-4, are specifically relevant to promoting cell death, and a third 
gene, ced-9, appeals to repress or inhibit the activity of ced-3 and ced-4. After the 
removal of NGF from embryonic rat cells in vitro, neural death was prevented by the 
addition of inhibitors of macromolecular synthesis, indicating that gene expression is 
necessary for cell death and hence that neurotrophins play a role in suppressing this gene 
expression. Similar experiments were carried out in an in vivo context with similar results 
(Oppenheim et al. [1990]; see Johnson and Deckworth [1993] for discussion). Since then, 
two types of specialized synaptic receptors have been found that chiefly interact with 
neurotrophins (see Purves et al. [2004, 553-554], for an overview of these results). 
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To the extent that neural cell death is mediated by a competitive mechanism, it is 
not known precisely what variable feature of a neuron gives it a “selective advantage”, 
that is, what trait confers differential survival onto a given neuron. This is determined by 
what, precisely, the “limiting factor” may turn out to be. On the one hand, according to 
what might be termed the “production hypothesis” (Oppenheim [1989, 253]), 
neurotrophins such as NGF are synthesized in limiting quantities. Hence, any mechanism 
that promotes the differential uptake and retrograde transport of neurotrophins may be 
“selected for”, in that it not only increases intracellular availability of those 
neurotrophins, but also depletes extracellular sources and thereby deprives other neurons 
of trophic support (Davies et al. [1987, 358]; Bothwell [1995, 245]). On the other hand, 
according to what might be called the “access hypothesis” (Oppenheim [1989, 254]), it is 
not limited synthesis per se which drives competition but limited access to neurotrophins 
because of a limiting number of available synaptic sites on a target neuron. According to 
this hypothesis, neural cell death is a result of a competition for space.  
Neural cell death is an example of the differential retention of neurons; hence, 
according to SPE, neurons that survive this developmental stage can be said to possess 
the function of doing whatever it was that contributed to their differential retention. Is it 
also possible to speak of the differential reproduction of neurons or neural types, in 
addition to their differential retention? Although it was once widely held that 
neurogenesis only occurs during a unique developmental stage and that it does not 
continue into adulthood, it has been shown recently that neurogenesis does take place 
throughout life in some areas of the brain, in particular, the hippocampus (for a recent 
review see Gould et al. [1999a]). This raises the possibility that neurons themselves may 
undergo a selection process involving the differential reproduction of neuron types in 
addition to their differential retention. For example, hippocampal-dependent learning 
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tasks, such as those involved in spatial orientation, have been shown to preserve newly-
generated hippocampal granule cells from degeneration in mature rats (Gould et al. 
[1999a; 1999b]), and hence their survival appears to be dependent in part on their 
contribution to the learning task. This does not, however, imply that hippocampal granule 
cells are selected for, that is, that they are reproduced over some other type of cell 
because they, rather than that other type of cell, contribute to the learning task in 
question.   
 
Neural Group Selection 
A third theory of neural selection that has been proposed is the idea that selection 
processes operate over large groups of neurons; hence the expression “neuronal group 
selection” that appears in the subtitle of Edelman’s (1987) book-length presentation 
(Edelman [1978; 1987]; Edelman and Finkel [1984]; Edelman and Tonini [2001]; also 
see Rosenfield [1986] for a review of several of Edelman’s main articles and 
presentations on the subject). According to this view, one outcome of normal 
developmental processes is the construction of large repertoires (“primary repertoires”) of 
neural groups, each group consisting of 50 to 10,000 neurons. Each group in the 
repertoire exhibits a different internal pattern of connectivity but responds in various 
degrees to the same stimulus pattern (hence they exhibit “degeneracy”). All groups in the 
repertoire are “isofunctional” because they share a similar response profile, but they are 
“nonisomorphic” because they differ structurally (Edelman [1978, 64-65]). This set of 
groups constitutes a primary repertoire over which selection acts. The neural group that 
responds most specifically to the stimulus pattern that defines the repertoire is 
differentially strengthened (that is, its intraspecific pattern of connections is 
strengthened).  Presumably, the intraspecific pattern of connections obtaining within 
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every other group is weakened, or, supposing that each group can belong to more than 
one repertoire, it takes part in a different selection process defined by another stimulus 
pattern. The important point is that the environment does not directly induce novel brain 
structures but selects from among preexisting configurations. As Edelman (1978) writes, 
“‘Selection’ implies that after ontogeny and early development, the brain contains 
cellular configurations that can already respond discriminatingly to outside 
signals…These signals serve merely to select among preexisting configurations of cells 
or cell groups in order to create an appropriate response” (Ibid., 54). 
As yet, there is little neurobiological evidence for the existence of neural group 
selection, at least if “neural group selection” is taken to represent a qualitatively different 
phenomenon than synaptic selection or selection of neurons.145 Moreover, it is often 
charged that Edelman, the main proponent of the view, does not as yet adequately 
explicate the theory itself, despite a large number of semi-popular writings on the subject. 
This lack of clarity is evidenced by the fact that at least three noteworthy and competent 
neuroscientists admit their failure to completely comprehend the details of the view 
(Barlow [1988]; Purves [1988]; Crick [1989])! 
Malfunctioning and Maladaptive Neural Circuitry 
The conclusion that should be drawn from this section is that synaptic structures, 
the components of neurons, and perhaps neurons themselves, can have functions, and 
these functions can emerge as a result of ontogenetic development, that is, by virtue of 
the processes that explain how the specific structures come to be developed, reinforced, 
and retained over time. From the perspective of the dissertation, the importance of neural 
selection processes is that they permit well-defined empirical conditions to be specified 
 
145 In a more recent presentation of his view, for example, Edelman seems to collapse entirely the 
distinction between “neural group selection” and synaptic selection, by invoking evidence of the latter to 
prove the existence of the former (see Edelman and Tonini [2001, 84]). 
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that can warrant the ascription of functions – and hence dysfunctions – to synaptic 
structures. 
However, as was pointed out in the last section and will be reiterated here, just 
because a neural structure is in some sense “maladaptive” or unable to perform the 
function for which it was selected, does not imply that one can attribute to that specific 
structure an internal dysfunction. For example, as noted above (under “Synaptic 
Selection”), normal visual experience in mammals brings about the segregation of retinal 
ganglion cell (RGC) dendrites. One layer of dendrites is innervated by ‘ON’ bipolar cells, 
and the other layer by ‘OFF’ bipolar cells. This allows the visual cortex to respond 
differently to the onset and offset of light. At birth, however, the neurons are spread 
diffusely and hence respond equally well to both the onset and offset of light. Now 
suppose that as a consequence of, e.g., exclusive dark-rearing, the normal visual activity 
that brings about segregation does not take place. Clearly, such a configuration would be 
maladaptive in normal environments, since it reduces the individual’s discrimination 
capacity. However, according to SPE, one should not say of such RGCs that they are 
dysfunctional even though they fail to perform their species-typical function of 
responding differentially to the onset or offset of light. This is because the selection 
process that bestows this function upon a given neuron has been prevented from taking 
place, and hence, with respect to discriminating the onset or offset of light, those neurons 
do not yet possess a function (or, they are unable to perform their function due to an 
abnormal environment). This implies that from the perspective of SPE, in order to show 
that a given neural structure is malfunctioning, one must do more than to show that this 
structure is either maladaptive, atypical, or both maladaptive and atypical. This raises the 
level of evidence that would be needed to show that a given neural structure is 
dysfunctional with respect to some capacity. 
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This chapter brings to a close the “conceptual” part of the dissertation. That is, up 
until this point the dissertation has largely been concerned with analyzing and selecting a 
concept of function that would be appropriate to the psychiatric context – though 
empirical considerations have been relevant to that selection. Equipped with a 
satisfactory definition of “function” and “dysfunction”, the next chapter turns to 
examples from current biologically-oriented psychiatric research and seeks to answer the 
following question: does empirical warrant exist for the claim that schizophrenia stems 
from a biological dysfunction on the part of the brain or nervous system?  The argument 
will be that it does not.  
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Chapter 5:  Schizophrenia and the Dysfunctional Brain 
 
In some ways schizophrenia can be understood as a disorder of meaning. It is an 
illness that transforms the commonplace into the supernatural. A radio 
announcer’s mundane chatter turns into cryptic but strikingly personal references 
aimed at the listener. Newspaper headlines no longer disclose the private failings 
of politicians and film stars; they communicate the inner life, the biography, of 
the person with schizophrenia. To the delusional mind, the eyes of strangers in the 
street confirm conspiracies, challenge secrets, and dispute innocence. Dates in 
calendars now signal calamities or ratify mythologies. Coincidence is 
misinterpreted as causation; the irrelevant shouts with significance. What was 
once trivial is now monumental. The illness appears to construct meaning where 
there is none and to do so with such virtuosity that psychosis has been mistaken 
for creativity. Then, after the storm, a strange reversal often takes place: the 
madness recedes and leaves a profound vacancy of meaning in its wake. It leaves 
a mind of impoverished thought, diminished action, empty language, and sparse 
emotion, a mind devoid of imagination and interest. It is as though the very 
intensity of psychotic experience both generates and then extinguishes all 
meaning. (Heinrichs [2001, 119]) 
 
The previous four chapters were primarily concerned with the conceptual 
question: what does it mean to say that a given biological process or entity is 
dysfunctional? More importantly, it asked: in the context of biological approaches to 
psychiatry, which concept of “function” should one invoke when one claims that a given 
mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, stems from an inner dysfunction on the part of the 
brain and nervous system? This chapter turns from theory to application, and evaluates 
whether the claim that schizophrenia stems from an internal dysfunction on the part of the 
brain or nervous system is warranted. The conclusion will be that it is not. These 
considerations suggest that the notion that psychiatric disorders, by and large, stem from 
biological dysfunctions, should be treated with suspicion.  
However, this does not mean that is conceptually or physically impossible that 
schizophrenia can be traced to a neurobiological dysfunction. In fact, this chapter will 
 270
provide a precise description of various scenarios that would warrant the claim that a part 
of the brain is dysfunctional in schizophrenia. However, it will also provide a precise 
description of scenarios that would warrant the claim that, in fact, nothing in the brain is 
dysfunctional in schizophrenia, but that the diverse neurobiological abnormalities 
associated with schizophrenia represent, instead, a brain that is functioning normally or 
that is unable to function due to abnormal environmental circumstances. The fact that 
there is currently insufficient evidence to distinguish between the two types of scenarios 
implies that the claim that schizophrenia stems from a biological dysfunction is currently 
unwarranted. Hence, this dissertation does not attempt to deny evidence for the existence 
of neurobiological differences between people with schizophrenia and people without, 
but rather to reinterpret the significance of those differences.  
In contemporary biological approaches to psychiatry it is rarely questioned that 
schizophrenia stems from a neurological or biological “dysfunction”. This dysfunction is 
often characterized by colorful and imaginative locutions: The Broken Brain is the title of 
a recent book on schizophrenia (Andreasen [1984]), perhaps to signify the author’s view 
that the schizophrenic brain is not, as it were, in “good working order” and needs to be 
“fixed”. More eloquently, Heinrichs (2001) describes schizophrenia as the product of a 
“neurochemical tempest”: “Is schizophrenia really a kind of biological tempest, where 
tides of neurotransmitters crest and recede? Do substances with cryptic and 
unpronounceable names play havoc with patches of protein called receptors, and do they 
upset chemical balances in regions of the brain that control thought, feeling, and 
movement?” (Ibid., 181). Here, neurotransmission in schizophrenia is likened to a 
malevolent storm at sea, which reflects, and explains, the uncontrollable and chaotic 
“storm” of thoughts and feelings associated with schizophrenia. This, again, reflects the 
view that “all is not as it should be” in the schizophrenic brain.  
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Such expressions permeate not only literature for popular audiences, but scientific 
literature on schizophrenia as well. It is unusual to read a scientific article on the 
biological basis of schizophrenia that does not at some point characterize the 
schizophrenic brain as beset by a neurobiological “dysfunction”, “failure” “disability”, 
“aberrance”, “malfunction”, “deficit”, or “excess”. All of these are clearly normative 
terms: they imply a norm, or standard, in relation to which the activity of the brain is 
assessed as deviant. Moreover, this deviance is not merely statistical, but normative in the 
proper sense, because it supports the notion that the schizophrenic brain is 
malfunctioning or dysfunctional and not just different or unusual. The assumption that 
the brain of the schizophrenic patient is in some sense not working “as it ought” or “as 
nature intended”, then, is central to biological approaches to psychiatry. Tacitly or 
explicitly, much biological research in psychiatry is fueled by the desire to identify what, 
precisely, has “gone wrong” in the schizophrenic brain, or how, precisely, nature has 
“erred” in those brains.  
This assumption appears to be confirmed by the fact that biological research has 
been successful at uncovering diverse biological disparities between the brains of 
schizophrenic patients and those of normal controls. Although there is no single anomaly 
that is sufficient or necessary for schizophrenia – that is, there does not exist some 
biological abnormality that all and only persons with schizophrenia possess (Heinrichs 
[2001, 249]) – there are nonetheless promising results that suggest that, in at least some 
cases, some of the abnormal and disparate schizophrenic symptoms such as delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganized speech or behavior, affective flattening or avolition (APA 
[2000, 312]), may be associated with genetic and neurobiological abnormalities. Hence, 
while there may be no unique biological index of schizophrenia, the diverse evidence of 
biological discrepancies cannot simply be ignored.  
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 However, one cannot validly infer from the claim that a distinct biological 
abnormality has been discovered among a given subgroup of schizophrenics, to the claim 
that the abnormality represents a biological dysfunction. The fact that something is 
different or unusual does not mean it is dysfunctional! Left-handedness is statistically 
unusual but is probably not the result of a dysfunction, even if it has a distinct biological 
cause. Moreover – as noted in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2, under “Malfunctioning and 
Maladaptive Neural Circuitry”) – even if this biological abnormality produces a 
behavioral or psychological consequence that is maladaptive, unfortunate, or 
inopportune, this does not mean that it is dysfunctional. It is unfortunate that childbirth is 
often painful but that does not mean that normal childbirth is caused by a dysfunction of 
the female reproductive system. Left-handedness is statistically unusual, biologically 
driven, and negatively valued in many parts of the world, but that does not imply that 
anything has “gone wrong” in the left-handed individual. By similar reasoning, it is 
maladaptive for a person to suffer hallucinations or delusions, but that does not mean that 
the production of hallucinations is the result of some dysfunction. That represents a 
further claim for which independent empirical evidence must be adduced. 
More importantly, even if something is unable to perform the function that it has, 
that does not imply that it is dysfunctional. If one binds a person’s legs with rope, that 
person’s legs will be unable to perform their natural function of walking – but that does 
not mean those legs are dysfunctional. Rather, they are simply prevented from 
performing their function by unusual environmental circumstances. More generally, for 
any given biological entity, X, and any function, F, the functional status of X with respect 
to F does not merely fall under one of two categories – functional or dysfunctional – but 
rather, one of four different categories: X has the function F and is capable of performing 
this function (functioning properly); X has the function F but is unable to perform F due 
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to an abnormal environment (unable to function due to abnormal environment); X has the 
function F but is unable to perform F where this inability is not due to an abnormal 
environment (dysfunctional); and X does not have the function F (without function). All 
four of these possibilities will be examined in more detail using a simple neurobiological 
example (Section 5.1). This chapter will argue that the existence of biological 
abnormalities associated with schizophrenia does not imply that something in the 
schizophrenic brain is specifically dysfunctional, rather than functioning properly or 
unable to function due to an abnormal environment.  
 This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section (Section 5.1) will 
provide an analytic schema that defines the “four categories of functioning” noted in the 
previous paragraph. It will use the fairly straightforward example of the vertebrate 
neuromuscular junction (NMJ) to show how given abnormalities and diseases of the NMJ 
can illustrate all four of these functional categories. This classification will be essential 
for evaluating the evidence from schizophrenia research.  
 The second section (Section 5.2) will begin with a brief introduction to 
schizophrenia, and then will examine two different, fairly popular neurobiological 
approaches to the etiology of schizophrenia, the neurochemical approach and the 
neurodevelopmental approach. The neurochemical approach to schizophrenia seeks the 
root abnormality of schizophrenia in neurotransmitter systems such as the dopamine 
system or in the abnormal relation between different such systems. Specifically, the 
dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia will be examined, according to which certain 
symptoms of schizophrenia are the result of the abnormally high availability of 
dopamine. It will be argued that even in those cases in which such an abnormality exists, 
it is probably wrong to claim that the dopamine system itself is dysfunctional with respect 
to the regulation of dopamine. Rather, it may represent a case in which the dopamine 
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system is unable to perform its function due to an abnormal environment that is 
associated, potentially, with an abnormality in a different transmitter system. This implies 
that the fact that a biological system is abnormal does not mean that it is dysfunctional.146
The neurodevelopmental approach to schizophrenia seeks the root cause of 
schizophrenia in an early developmental abnormality, such as a pregnancy or birth 
complication, or an abnormality in an ongoing developmental process, that interferes 
with normal development in such a way as to produce unusual neurobiological 
characteristics. Various versions of the neurodevelopmental hypothesis of schizophrenia 
will be examined. It will argue that on some versions, it would be wrong to say that 
schizophrenia stems from a neurodevelopmental dysfunction. Rather, one would have to 
say that in the case of schizophrenia, developmental abnormalities in the brain represent a 
plastic response of the brain to an abnormal formative environment, and not a 
dysfunction. However, on other versions of the hypothesis, it would be correct to say that 
schizophrenia stems from a neurodevelopmental dysfunction. Since the correct 
neurodevelopmental hypothesis is currently unknown (assuming that one of them is 
correct), then whether or not schizophrenia stems from a neurodevelopmental 
dysfunction is also currently unknown. This reinforces the point that one cannot validly 
infer the presence of a biological dysfunction from a biological abnormality. 
5.1 FOUR CATEGORIES OF FUNCTIONING 
This section will review the definition of “dysfunction” presented in Chapter 3 
and show how it permits four different categories of functioning to be defined. For the 
sake of convenience they will be termed “functional”, “unable to function due to 
abnormal environment”, “dysfunctional”, and “without function”. A fairly simple 
 
146 See below (Section 5.1), which recapitulates the difference between an entity’s being “dysfunctional” 
and merely being “unable to perform its function due to an abnormal environment”.  
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example using the neuromuscular junction (NMJ) will be given to illustrate each of these 
categories. This section will allow one to classify the psychiatric examples that will be 
presented in Section 5.2 accordingly. For example, according to the dopamine hypothesis 
of schizophrenia, it should allow one to judge whether the dopamine system in the 
schizophrenic brain is “functional”, “unable to function due to an abnormal 
environment”, “dysfunctional”, or “without function” with respect to the regulation of 
dopamine. 
To recapitulate the definition of “dysfunction” presented in Chapter 3 (see Section 
3.2.2), to say of an individual entity, X, that it is dysfunctional with respect to some 
activity, F, means that:  
 
(i) the function of X is F; 
(ii) X is not able to perform F; and 
(iii) if X is not in the normal environment for its functioning, then if X were in the 
normal environment for its functioning, X would not be able to perform F. 
 
 As noted there, this definition rests crucially on the notion of a “normal 
environment for an entity’s functioning”. The importance of this notion is that something 
is not dysfunctioning simply because it is unable to perform its proper function, but 
because it is unable to perform its proper function in the normal environment for its 
functioning. As defined there, a “normal environment for an entity’s functioning” refers 
to any one out of the range of environments within which the entity’s ancestral 
progenitors147 performed the activity that currently constitutes its function, and in which 
those performances were fitness enhancing. For example, if one of the functions of legs is 
 
147 The “ancestral progenitors” of a token of a trait within an individual refers to the same trait in that 
individual’s ancestors.  
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to walk, but someone cannot walk because his or her legs are bound with rope but 
otherwise normal, it would be appropriate to say that the person’s legs are not really 
“dysfunctional”, but rather, that they are unable to function because they are in an 
abnormal environment. The view that the function of an entity is relative to some notion 
of a “normal environment” is fairly standard in philosophical discussions of etiological 
function (e.g., Millikan [1984, 33-4]), even if it is left implicit. 
 On the basis of this definition, at least four categories of functioning can be 
defined. More precisely, for any given entity, X, and a given activity, F, one can define 
four different relationships between X and F:  
 
 (I) Functional: X has the function F and X is able to perform F;  
(II) Unable to Function Due to Abnormal Environment: X has the function F 
and X is not able to perform F because X is not in the normal environment 
for its functioning; 
(III) Dysfunctional: X has the function F, X is not able to perform F, and if X is 
not in the normal environment for its functioning, then if X were in that 
environment it would not be able to perform F; and 
(IV) Without function: X does not have the function F. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, this definition of “dysfunction” implies that if X is 
dysfunctional with respect to F, then there must be some structural difference between X 
and one of X’s ancestral progenitors (where this progenitor did perform its function) and 
that this discrepancy does, or would, prevent X from performing F in its normal 
environment. The example of the NMJ will be used to illustrate each of these for 
categories of functioning. The NMJ is used because, as described in Chapter 4 (Section 
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4.2.2, under “Synaptic Selection”), the NMJ is a paradigmatic case for the application of 
neural selectionist theories of synaptic structure formation, along with the development of 
ocular dominance columns in the mammalian visual cortex. Hence, the NMJ allows one 
to present an empirically well-confirmed and detailed example for each of the four 
functional categories.  
As discussed in the previous chapter (Section 4.2.2, under “Synaptic Selection”), 
a selection process brings about the pattern of neural connectivity in the NMJ. This 
allows one to assign functions to synaptic properties of the NMJ. For example, a selection 
process accounts for the one-to-one pattern of connectivity between motor neurons and 
skeletal muscle fibers in the rat NMJ by two weeks after birth (see Figure 4.6). Even if 
the specific mechanisms of this selection process are not known, one can infer that the 
multiple axons that innervated each muscle fiber at birth varied with respect to some 
property, and that this variation contributed to their differential retention on that fiber. 
This implies that once the one-to-one pattern of connectivity is established, some 
property of the remaining axon has the function of ensuring this synaptic connection with 
the target.  
Since synaptic selection is an activity-dependent process, it relies essentially upon 
neural activation – that is, the production of action potentials or graded potentials in the 
pre-synaptic neuron and the release of neurotransmitter onto receptors of the post-
synaptic target. Hence, it is plausible that one property of the innervating axon in the rat 
NMJ that explains its differential retention is its capacity to produce an action potential 
and release the neurotransmitter acetylcholine (ACh) upon the post-synaptic receptors 
embedded in the muscle fiber, thereby eliciting an excitatory potential in that muscle 
fiber. Consequently, according to SPE, one can say one of the functions of the remaining 
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innervating axon is to activate the muscle fiber through the release of ACh onto the post-
synaptic receptors. 
The determination of this function of the innervating axon permits one to 
construct four different scenarios involving the NMJ that illustrate the four different 
categories of functioning, or the four different relationships between the biological entity, 
X – the pre-synaptic neuron – and the activity, F – activation of the muscle fiber through 
the release of ACh onto the post-synaptic receptors. It is obvious that, whatever else it 
may include, the normal environment for the functioning of the pre-synaptic neuron must 
be an environment in which the following two normal input/output conditions hold:  
 
(1) the dendrites of that pre-synaptic neuron are themselves innervated by an 
incoming axon (input); and 
(2) that pre-synaptic neuron synapses onto ACh receptors that are capable of 
producing excitatory potentials within the muscle fiber (output).  
 
Although there are other conditions that must be imposed on the normal 
environment for that neuron’s functioning (e.g., adequate amounts of extracellular 
calcium and potassium to generate an action potential), these two conditions are 
necessary features of that normal environment. In other words, if either condition (1) or 
(2) is not met then the pre-synaptic neuron is not within the normal environment for its 
functioning, since, historically, conditions (1) and (2) have been instrumental for every 
prior performance of its function. The four categories of functioning can now be 
illustrated through the following four scenarios.  
 Functional. Through the selection process described above, a motor neuron comes 
to have the function of activating the muscle fiber through the release of ACh onto the 
post-synaptic receptor (see Figure 5.1). With respect to those features of its environment 
that have a bearing on its ability to release ACh, its current environment is similar. 
Consequently, it can be said to occupy the normal environment for its functioning – one 
in which it is adequately innervated by incoming neurons, and in which there are 
adequate and functional post-synaptic receptors in the muscle fiber that it innervates, as 
well as adequate amounts of extracellular calcium, potassium, and so on. Upon sufficient 
excitatory stimulation, it produces an action potential and releases ACh onto the muscle 
fiber, thus producing an excitatory post-synaptic potential in the muscle fiber and thereby 
completing the performance of its function. This is a paradigm case of synaptic 






Figure 5.1: Functional motor neuron. 
 Unable to function due to abnormal environment. The neuron undergoes the same 
selection process described in the previous paragraph and hence comes to have the 
function of activating the muscle fiber. However, a muscular disorder, Myasthenia 
Gravis, affects the ability of the muscle fiber to receive transmitter. In Myasthenia Gravis 
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it is believed that antibodies to the ACh receptor destroy the ability of the muscle fiber to 
respond to transmitters (Rich at al. [1994]). (See Figure 5.2, in which certain 
postsynaptic receptors are marked with an ‘X’ to indicate an inability to receive 
transmitter.) In this case, the motor neuron is not in the normal environment for its 
functioning, because one of the essential prerequisites which has allowed it to activate the 
muscle fiber – namely, the fact that functional ACh receptors are embedded within the 
muscle fiber – does not exist. (This is represented by the violation of condition [2] above, 
which implies a disruption of its normal “output” condition.) However, structurally, the 
motor neuron is similar to one that is able to perform its function. This suggests that were 
the motor neuron in the normal environment for its functioning – that is, in the absence of 
the neuromuscular disease that affects the postsynaptic receptors – it would be able to 
perform its function. Consequently, the motor neuron does not satisfy the third criterion 
(iii) of the definition of “dysfunction” and cannot be said to be dysfunctional with respect 
to that activity. Rather, it is unable to function due to an abnormal environment. In this 
case it would be as counterintuitive to say that the motor neuron is “dysfunctional” as it 
would be to say of a person’s legs that are bound with rope that they are “dysfunctional” 
because they are unable to walk. A comparison of Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 illustrates 
that structurally, the motor neuron is identical in both cases and therefore it should not 






Figure 5.2: Motor neuron that is unable to function due to abnormal environment.  
Dysfunctional. The neuron undergoes the same selection process described in the 
previous two paragraphs and hence comes to have the function of activating the muscle 
fiber. In most respects its current environment is similar to that in which it came to 
possess the function, and hence it is in the “normal environment for its functioning”. 
However, due to a neuromuscular disorder such as Lambert-Eaton syndrome the neuron 
is unable to release neurotransmitters onto the muscle fiber. Lambert-Eaton syndrome is 
an autoimmune disorder that involves antibodies to the voltage-gated calcium channels in 
the presynaptic neuron, which are essential for the release of neurotransmitter (Takamori 
[2004]). Hence, it disrupts a neuron’s ability to release ACh. (See Figure 5.3, in which 
certain calcium channels are marked with an ‘X’ to indicate an inability to conduct 
calcium.) Since it is in its normal environment but cannot perform its function then it is 
dysfunctional. 
One might argue that the neuron afflicted by Lambert-Eaton syndrome is not in 
the normal environment for its functioning, because the presence of calcium channel 
antibodies could not have been a component of the environment within which its 
progenitors were able to perform their function.  This can be admitted; the essential point 
is that, supposing that the disease has degraded the calcium channels in the pre-synaptic 
terminal in such a way as to prohibit sufficient calcium influx, the neuron’s structure has 
been affected to such an extent that it cannot perform its function. Hence, even if one 
were to place the neuron in the normal environment for its functioning by removing the 
calcium channel antibodies, it would still be unable to perform its function because of 







Figure 5.3: Dysfunctional motor neuron.  
Without function. As the situation has been described above, the reason that the 
motor neuron has the function of activating the muscle fiber is because its capacity to 
activate the muscle fiber is one of the reasons that it was differentially retained on the 
muscle fiber. As noted in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2, under “Evidence for Neural 
Selection”) the selection process that determines the one-to-one pattern of connectivity 
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between motor neuron and muscle fiber in the rat NMJ is more or less complete by two 
weeks after birth. Before this selection process begins, then, the multiple motor neurons 
that innervate the muscle fiber do not have the function of activating the muscle fiber by 
the release of ACh since they have not yet been selected for because of that capacity.148 
In this case, the motor neuron simply does not have the relevant function at all. This 
implies that if a neuromuscular disease were to destroy its capacity to release transmitter 
within the first two weeks of birth, one could not say that the neuron would be 
dysfunctional. 
In many cases, the distinction between “functional” and “unable to function due 
to an abnormal environment” can only be drawn in a conventional manner, because it 
relies upon the precise way that one chooses to describe the function of the entity. This is 
a consequence of a well-known problem of indeterminacy for function ascriptions, which 
is called the “problem of functional indeterminacy” (Dretske [1986]; Sterelny [1990]; 
Shapiro [1992]; Goode and Griffiths [1995]; Neander [1995]; Buller [1997]). The heart 
provides a simple example of this indeterminacy. By beating, the heart circulates blood 
and thereby sustains the life of the organism; this explains why hearts were selected for 
by natural selection and hence why hearts currently exist. Consequently, the function of 
the heart can be described in several ways: one can say that the function of the heart is to 
beat, or that the function of the heart is to circulate blood, or that the function of the heart 
is to sustain the life of the organism. No version of the etiological theory of function 
described in Chapter 4 allows one to “pick out” one of these three descriptions of the 
heart as the “uniquely correct” description of its function: since they are all equally 
justified, there is no uniquely correct such description.  
 
148 Perhaps the motor neurons have been selected for by natural selection operating over an evolutionary 
time frame because of their capacity to activate muscle fibers, in which case they would have the relevant 
function even before the synaptic selection process has affected its structure. This will be ignored for the 
purpose of illustration. 
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This indeterminacy can create ambiguities in deciding whether the heart is 
“functioning normally” or “unable to function due to an abnormal environment”. For 
example, suppose that one says that the function of the heart is to circulate blood. 
Suppose then that, due to a severe hemorrhage in the brain, a person’s heart is unable to 
circulate a sufficient quantity of blood to keep that person alive, even though it is still 
beating and pumping blood. In this case, one would have to say that the heart is unable to 
perform its function due to an abnormal environment. Alternatively, suppose that one 
says that the function of the heart is merely to beat. In this case, so long as the heart is 
beating, it is able to perform its function even if, due to a hemorrhage, it is not able to 
properly circulate the blood. Under this description one would have to say that the heart 
is functioning normally. Consequently, in the case of this hemorrhage, whether one 
chooses to say that the heart is “functional”, or, alternatively, that it is “unable to perform 
its function due to an abnormal environment”, is a purely conventional decision. 
The same can be said of the NMJ described above. There, it was said that the 
motor neuron has the function of activating the muscle fiber through the release of ACh 
onto the post-synaptic receptors. Consequently, if, due to Mysthenia Gravis, the muscle 
fiber cannot be activated, one would have to say that the motor neuron is unable to 
perform its proper function. Alternatively, suppose that one merely attributes to the motor 
neuron the function of releasing ACh onto the muscle fiber. Then, one would have to say 
that the motor neuron is functional in the case of Myasthenia Gravis, since Myasthenia 
Gravis does not affect the ability of the motor neuron to release neurotransmitter onto 
muscle fiber (see Figure 5.2). Hence, from the point of view of this dissertation, the 
distinction between “functional” and “unable to function due to an abnormal 
environment” is not a very important distinction.  
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The distinction that is crucial to the dissertation is that between the case in which 
an entity is dysfunctional and the case in which it is not dysfunctional. The problem of 
functional indeterminacy does not affect this distinction; hence it is not a matter of 
convention. In the case of Lambert-Eaton syndrome, which affects the ability of the 
neuron to produce action potentials (see Figure 5.3), the structure of the neuron is 
sufficiently affected that it cannot initiate the sequence of events that explains its 
differential retention on the muscle fiber. In other words, it cannot perform any of its 
“functions”, however described. Similarly, if the heart is unable to pump blood, due to 
stenosis of the mitral valve, then it cannot perform any of the activities that explain its 
differential reproduction: pumping, circulating blood, assisting cell metabolism or 
contributing to the survival of the organism. This is because its structure prohibits it from 
doing so. As Neander (1995, 120) puts it, it is dysfunctional because it cannot perform 
the function that is “most specific to the trait in question”, or its “most specific function”, 
even within the normal environment for its functioning.  
 Equipped with this analytical schema, one is now in a position to evaluate the 
various hypothesized neurochemical and neurodevelopmental mechanisms for the 
etiology of schizophrenia that will be presented in the next section. This enables one to 
answer the following question in a precise manner: under what conditions does a given 
hypothetical mechanism for the etiology of schizophrenia represent a “dysfunctional” 
mechanism, and under what conditions does it represent a “non-dysfunctional” one? Note 
that even if it is empirically unknown which hypothesis is correct, as long as one is given 
a sufficiently detailed model for the etiology of schizophrenia, one can classify the 
mechanisms postulated in that model to be either “dysfunctional” or “non-dysfunctional” 
– which is all that is necessary for evaluating the question that the dissertation poses.  
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5.2 NEUROBIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SCHIZOPHRENIA 
This section will begin by describing some of the symptoms of schizophrenia and 
characterizing some of the main directions of contemporary research (Section 5.2.1). 
Then it will present the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia, and go on to present 
evidence suggesting that in the case of schizophrenia, there is little warrant for claiming 
that the dopamine system itself is dysfunctional, but rather, that it is unable to perform its 
function due to an abnormal neurochemical environment. This will show that the mere 
presence of a well-defined biochemical abnormality associated with schizophrenia is not 
in itself conclusive reason to assume that schizophrenia stems from a biological 
dysfunction (Section 5.2.2). One might argue, of course, that even if the dopamine system 
itself is not dysfunctional, then the existence of such a gross abnormality entails that there 
must be some dysfunction in the brain that is creating such an abnormal environment for 
the dopamine system. The final part of the section will respond to this claim by using a 
neurodevelopmental example to show that the neurobiological abnormality in question 
could represent a plastic response of the brain to a relatively unusual environment 
(Section 5.2.3). In this case, nothing “inside” the person would be dysfunctional. Since 
there is currently not enough evidence to rule this hypothesis out, then there is not enough 
evidence to rule out the possibility that schizophrenia does not stem from a biological 
dysfunction at all. 
5.2.1 A Brief Overview of Schizophrenia  
This section will provide a short introduction to the topic of schizophrenia, which 
will be useful for the remainder of the section, which evaluates different proposed 
etiological mechanisms. The reason that the dissertation specifically focuses on 
schizophrenia is that this illness – or, perhaps, the heterogeneous set of conditions that 
fall under that category – tends to represent the paradigm of lay or colloquial usage of 
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“mental disorder” itself, or its more pejorative associations: “madness”, “insanity”, and 
“craziness” (e.g., see Smith [1982, 13]; Heinrichs [2001, 3]). Secondly, it cannot be 
doubted that schizophrenia is a central target of biologically-oriented research in 
psychiatry. For this reason, one cannot impugn the following argument on the grounds 
that it exploits a marginal diagnostic category, or one that is on the fringes of biological 
research. Consequently, this section purports to show that a condition that is currently 
considered to be a central target of biologically-oriented research in psychiatry, as well as 
a paradigm case of “mental disorder”, does not in any obvious way stem from a 
biological dysfunction. 
Schizophrenia as a Diagnostic Construct 
Ever since the inception of “dementia praecox” as a diagnostic category by the 
German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin in the fifth edition of his Psychiatrie (1896, 426-41), 
schizophrenia has been characterized by a diversity of symptoms that do not always 
overlap within the same person. In the sixth edition of 1899, Kraepelin himself suggested 
the existence of three different subtypes of schizophrenia, the hebephrenic, the catatonic, 
and the paranoid types. The paranoid type is characterized by the rather “florid” 
symptoms of hallucinations and delusions – those symptoms most paradigmatically tied 
to “madness” or “insanity”. The catatonic form is marked by stupor, the maintenance of 
rigid and often bizarre postures, negativism or automatic obedience, and occasionally, 
outbursts of reckless activity. Finally, Kraepelin describes the hebephrenic form in the 
seventh edition of his textbook as “the gradual or subacute development of a simple more 
or less profound mental deterioration” (Kraepelin [1981 (1907), 230]).149 Although this 
form may be marked by hallucinations or delusions, it is primarily characterized by 
 
149 The above quote is from the English translation of the seventh edition of his textbook, which was 
originally published in 1907.  
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emotional indifference, as well as a progressive disorganization of thought, speech, and 
behavior (Ibid., 234). Today this is referred to as the “disorganized” subtype (APA [2000, 
314-5]).  
Eugen Bleuler, who in 1911 coined the term “schizophrenia” to replace the 
descriptively inaccurate expression “dementia praecox”150, used the term to characterize a 
“group of psychoses” (Bleuler [1950 (1911), 7]), all of which are characterized by “a 
more or less clear-cut splitting of the psychic functions” (Ibid., 9). Bleuler retained 
Kraepelin’s three subtypes, and added a fourth, “schizophrenia simplex” (Ibid., 235). 
This subtype was expressed by “mildly pathological symptoms” (Ibid., 239), and a 
gradual and generalized decline in intellectual and emotional functioning. Thus, 
heterogeneity at the syndromal level has always been a recognized feature of 
schizophrenia.  
Kraepelin’s classification of the major subtypes of schizophrenia has been 
remarkably preserved through the present century. These subtypes are clearly seen in the 
contemporary DSM (APA [2000]) and ICD (WHO [1992]) mental disorder 
classifications.151 According to the most recent edition of DSM, the DSM-IV-TR (APA 
[2000]), in order to possess schizophrenia one must usually have at least two of the 




(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence) 
(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior 
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition (Ibid., 312) 
 
 
150 Schizophrenia, Bleuler noted, is not always associated with early onset nor with an irreversible mental 
deterioration as implied by Kraepelin’s designation (Bleuler [1950 (1911), 7]).   
151 See fn. 1 on the DSM classification of mental disorders, and fn. 54 on the ICD classification. 
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 The DSM classification also explicitly utilizes the essentially Kraepelinean 
subtypes of paranoid (Ibid., 313-314), catatonic (Ibid., 315-316), and disorganized (Ibid., 
314-315), the latter of which is identified in the text with Kraepelin’s hebephrenic 
subtype (Ibid., 314).152 Kraepelin’s subtypes, then, still play an influential role in 
diagnosis. Moreover, factor analysis, a statistical technique that can be used for grouping 
symptoms into clusters, suggests three main syndromes: “psychomotor poverty”, 
“disorganization”, and “reality distortion”, which correspond, at least in part, to the three 
main types codified in the DSM (Liddle [1987]). Thus, contrary to the rather pessimistic 
conclusion drawn by Boyle (1990) – who claims that the diagnostic category has been so 
mutable over the course of the twentieth century that it is both ontologically suspect and 
practically useless – schizophrenia as a diagnostic construct has been a fairly stable one.  
Another common way of arranging these symptoms is by classifying them under 
two main categories, “Type I” and “Type II” syndromes (Crow [1980a; 1980b]). The 
original purpose of this classification was to sharpen an earlier distinction between so-
called “positive” and “negative” symptoms of schizophrenia (Strauss et al. [1974]) and to 
correlate these two different types of symptoms with different neurobiological 
abnormalities. In short, Type I or “positive” symptoms of schizophrenia refer to the 
presence of florid abnormalities such as hallucinations and delusions; the Type II or 
“negative” symptoms of schizophrenia refer to the “absence” of expected cognitive or 
behavioral traits such as affective flatness, social withdrawal, lack of volition, or 
catatonia. However, this distinction has also been criticized, because many patients 
exhibit mixed positive and negative symptoms, and the supposed etiological clarification 
gained by the distinction has not received adequate confirmation (Zuckerman [1999, 325-
 
152 In addition, the DSM-IV-TR includes an “undifferentiated” subtype (Ibid., 316) which meets the 
criteria for schizophrenia but does not meet specific criteria for the first three subtypes, and a “residual” 
type (Ibid., 316-317), in which symptoms are present in an attenuated manner. The ICD-10 classification is 
essentially similar (WHO [1992]).   
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331]). Additionally, some symptoms, such as those associated with disorganized thought, 
do not fall obviously under either category (Jablensky [2001, 19-20]; Walker and Lewine 
[1988, 316-7]). 
Neurobiological Approaches to Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia appears to affect 0.5% - 1.5% of the general population (APA 
[2000, 308]), prevalence rates being comparable across the world, with prognosis being 
somewhat better in less industrialized countries (Sartorius et al. [1986]). It is widely 
believed to be influenced genetically (Moises and Gottesman [2001]; Tsuang [2000]), 
although it does not follow a classic Mendelian pattern of inheritance, and attempts to 
localize specific genes have not been successfully replicated (Riley and McGuffin 
[2000]; Torrey and Yolken [2000]; Moldin [1997]). Neurobiological approaches have 
fared somewhat better. The “cardinal” neurological abnormalities associated with 
schizophrenia are decreased cerebral cortex volume, lateral ventricle enlargement, and 
enlarged sulci (Weinberger [1984]; Woods et al. [1996]); these have been found at the 
onset of the illness, signifying that it is not a secondary effect of the disorder. A recent 
meta-analysis of neurobiological data accumulated from 1980 to 1999, however, suggests 
an estimated distribution overlap of about 75% between normal and schizophrenic 
populations on the specific trait of reduced frontal brain volume (Heinrichs [2001, 109]). 
What this means is that only about 25% of schizophrenics and non-schizophrenics can be 
distinguished by utilizing this measure alone.153 Consequently, although these features 
 
153 This meta-analysis is over 39 studies, which utilize data derived from both computerized axial 
tomography and magnetic resonance imaging studies. A meta-analysis published in 1990 (Raz and Raz 
[1990]) gave a more optimistic estimate, with an estimated distribution overlap of 60%, implying that 40% 
of schizophrenic patients and normal controls could be distinguished in terms of frontal brain volume. 
However, the earlier meta-analysis was based exclusively on computerized axial tomography, which is less 
accurate than magnetic resonance imaging and probably led to an inflated estimation of the actual degree of 
non-overlap (Heinrichs [2001, 108-110]).  
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fall far short of the specificity required to constitute neurobiological “markers” for 
schizophrenia, they may designate a “subtype” of schizophrenia. 
The brain regions that are centrally implicated in schizophrenia and that receive 
substantial research attention are the frontal and temporal lobes (Heinrichs [2001, 106-
116, 137-148]). Gross neurostructural abnormalities, subtle neurostructural abnormalities, 
gross neurofunctional abnormalities, and subtle neurofunctional abnormalities have been 
claimed for these regions.154 Yet many of the specific findings tend to be limited in their 
generality, and have been difficult to replicate consistently (Ibid. [2001, 116-118, 148-
149]).155 An example of a gross neurofunctional abnormality is that described by the 
“hypofrontality” hypothesis (Ingvar and Franzen [1974]; see Heinrichs [2001, 112-116] 
for an overview of research) according to which people with schizophrenia have reduced 
frontal brain activity relative to normal controls. This hypothesis stems from functional 
imaging studies that purport to show that in some schizophrenic patients there is little 
difference in prefrontal activity immediately before, and during, the performance of 
certain cognitive tasks, such as the Wisconsin Card Sort Task, which challenges working 
memory (Weinberger et al. [1986]; Andreasen et al. [1992]; Andreasen et al. [1997]).156 
However, results have been inconsistent (Heinrichs [2001, 113]; Ingvar [1987]; 
Andreasen et al. [1997]), leading some to suggest abandoning the hypofrontality 
hypothesis altogether (Gur and Gur [1995]). A meta-analysis over 21 studies suggests 
that hypofrontality distinguishes about 40% of schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic 
 
154 An example of a gross neurostructural abnormality is ventricle enlargement; an example of a more 
subtle neurostructural abnormality is neuronal disarray in certain areas of the hippocampus. An example of 
a gross neurofunctional abnormality is reduced activity in the prefrontal cortex; an example of a more 
subtle abnormality would be excessive dopamine availability in the mesolimbic dopamine tract.  
155 The following discussion of neurobiological abnormalities is not intended to be a comprehensive 
overview (see Heinrichs [2001] or Harrison [1999]); rather, it presents certain central findings for the sake 
of illustrating major trends in schizophrenia research.  
156 Andreasen et al. (1992) reports decreased activity only in patients with negative symptoms; however, 
Gur and Gur (1995) claim that the results have been found over different schizophrenic subtypes. 
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populations – still a substantial minority – but there exists significant inconsistency 
between individual studies (Heinrichs [2001, 113]). An example of a more subtle 
neurofunctional abnormality would be found in abnormal neurotransmission, a 
hypothesis that will be described below (Section 5.2.2). 
An example of a gross neurostructural abnormality would be ventricular 
enlargement, a hypothesis described earlier. An example of a subtle neurostructural 
abnormality associated with schizophrenia is provided by postmortem brain research, 
which has shown microscopic cytoarchitectural disturbances in the prefrontal cortex, 
hippocampus, entorhinal area, and cingulate gyrus (Beckmann [2001]). According to one 
hypothesis that stems from this research, schizophrenia is associated with abnormalities 
in the orientation of pyramidal cells (or “cell disarray”) in the hippocampus (Beckmann 
[2001, 84-5]; Heinrichs [2001, 197-99]). However, there is substantial variation between 
individual studies, ranging from virtually no overlap between schizophrenic and normal 
populations to virtually complete overlap (Arnold and Trojanowski [1996, 223]). Meta-
analysis over eight studies produces an average overlap of about 49% (Heinrichs [2001, 
198]), which suggests that hippocampal abnormalities affect about half of schizophrenic 
patients. However, the effects of neuroleptic medication may compromise these results 
(Ibid.). Another neurostructural finding is that of an abnormal distribution of neurons in 
the white matter directly beneath the prefrontal cortex (Akbarian et al. 1993a; 1996]). 
This anomaly supports a neurodevelopmental theory of schizophrenia since the nature of 
the distribution suggests a disruption of early cell migration. However, it is based on a 
relatively small postmortem sample size (Harrison [1999, 602-3]).  
Schizophrenia as a Heterogeneous Illness 
One oft-cited reason for the often partial and inconsistent research results is that 
schizophrenia is a “heterogeneous” illness (Crow [1995]; Goldberg and Weinberger 
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[1995]; Cardno and Farmer [1995]; Tsuang and Faraone [1995]). What this means is that 
different etiological mechanisms produce the symptom-clusters characteristic of 
schizophrenia, and therefore that, to the extent that diseases are individuated by 
pathology, schizophrenia is best conceived as a family of diverse illnesses. The 
heterogeneity of schizophrenia has given rise to the attempt to correlate the diverse 
biological abnormalities more precisely with specific “subtypes” of schizophrenia, as 
noted above. For example, the distinction between Type I and Type II symptoms 
represented such an attempt (see above, under “Schizophrenia as a Diagnostic 
Construct”). Its originator suggested that Type I syndrome predicts potential response to 
neuroleptic drugs – and hence is caused by subtle neurofunctional abnormalities – and 
that Type II predicts increased ventricle size and poor outcome – and hence is associated 
with gross neurostructural abnormalities (Crow [1980b, 383-4]). However, as noted 
above, these results have not held up to empirical scrutiny. Moreover, and unfortunately, 
the vast majority of schizophrenia research has been conducted on the basis of diagnosis 
and not on the basis of differentiated subtypes or symptoms (Jablensky [2001, 28]); in 
other words, research groups are usually composed of people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia as such, without regard to subtype. Consequently, little systematic work 
has been done in correlating neurobiological abnormalities with specific subtypes of 
schizophrenia. The resolution of the problem of heterogeneity, then, will clearly involve 
some dialectical interplay between biological research results and refined clinical 
descriptions and classification (Andreasen [1987]).  
However, the fact that schizophrenia is probably a heterogeneous illness helps to 
place the following discussion in proper perspective. The following subsection will 
examine the dopamine hypothesis as well as the view that the primary neurochemical 
abnormality in schizophrenia is related to the glutamate system (Section 5.2.2). There is 
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no implication, however, that abnormalities in glutamatergic transmission underlie most, 
or even a majority, of diagnoses of schizophrenia. It is enough for the present purposes if 
abnormal glutamatergic transmission is associated with at least some cases of 
schizophrenia. This allows one to ask the following question: For the specific subgroup 
of persons with schizophrenia for which, e.g., the glutamate hypothesis is valid, or for 
that specific subtype of schizophrenia which is associated with abnormal glutamatergic 
transmission, is there warrant for saying that schizophrenia stems from an internal 
dysfunction? Hence, the discussion of specific etiological mechanisms will be abstracted 
away from any specific claim about the prevalence of that mechanism. Whether or not 
“schizophrenia”, as such, turns out to be one illness or many is irrelevant to the 
discussion. 
5.2.2 A Neurochemical Approach: The Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia 
This section will adopt a neurochemical approach to schizophrenia, and, in 
particular, it will examine a specific neurochemical hypothesis, the dopamine hypothesis. 
According to the classic formulation of the dopamine hypothesis, schizophrenia – or at 
least some subtype of schizophrenia (Crow [1980a]) – stems from the overproduction of 
dopamine in the brain. This section will look at more recent evidence that although such 
an abnormality may exist, it is more reasonable to suppose that this abnormality stems 
from an abnormality in the glutamate system, which regulates the dopamine system. 
Consequently, it would be incorrect to say that in the case of schizophrenia, the dopamine 
system is dysfunctional; rather, one should say that it is unable to perform its proper 
function due to an abnormal environment. The next subsection will examine more fully 
the nature of the glutamate abnormality in question and present the possibility that it 
results from a plastic brain response to an abnormal formative environment and not an 
inherent dysfunction. If this is so, then this chapter will have provided at least a plausible 
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scenario according to which, despite the neurobiological abnormalities associated with 
schizophrenia, nothing in the brain is dysfunctional. Since, empirically, there is not 
sufficient warrant for deciding between the various scenarios, there is not sufficient 
warrant for claiming that schizophrenia stems from a neurobiological dysfunction. 
According to one of the initial formulations of the dopamine hypothesis (Carlsson 
[1974]), schizophrenia stems from excessive production or availability of dopamine in 
the brain. Two major lines of reasoning contribute to the plausibility of this hypothesis 
(see, e.g., Pliszka [2003, 232-239] for an overview). The first is that all known 
antipsychotic (“neuroleptic”) medications block the dopamine D2 receptor (Meltzer and 
Deutch [1999, 1060])157. This is true of the more recent, “atypical” antipsychotics such as 
clozapine and risperidone – which usually exhibit higher antagonist effects at serotonin 
(5-HT) receptors relative to their antagonist effects at dopamine D2 receptors – in 
addition to the “typical” antipsychotics such as chlorpromazine and haloperidol (Kapur 
and Seeman [2001]).158 A second line of evidence is that amphetamines, which can 
mimic some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, act by releasing dopamine 
(Grace [1991, 2]).  
Although few attempts at integrative neurocognitive models for schizophrenia 
exist – that is, attempts to build models that explain the relation between, e.g., excessive 
dopamine availability and the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia159 – the 
anatomical distribution of dopamine producing regions, and their terminal fields, are 
suggestive of basic neurocognitive functions that would be affected.160  
 
157 The sole exception to this generalization is reserpine, which depletes vesicular stores of dopamine and 
is not currently in use (Ibid.). 
158 The atypical antipsychotics also appear to bind the D3 and D4 receptors more effectively than D2 
receptors (Kandel et al. [2000, 1200]). 
159 See Andreasen (1997) for an overview of various attempts; also see Kapur (2003) for a specific attempt 
to link the dopamine hypothesis to cognitive disturbance in schizophrenia.  
160 Much of the following discussion of neuroanatomy is based on Pliszka (2003, 66-68).  
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There are two major groups of dopamine-producing neurons in the brain, both of 
which are located in the midbrain. The first resides in the ventral tegmental area of the 
brain and sends groups of axons into two main regions, the limbic system and the cortex, 
particularly the frontal lobes. The former tract is called the “mesolimbic” dopamine tract 
because it originates in the midbrain and terminates in the limbic system – those parts of 
the brain specifically implicated in the regulation of emotion and motivation. One of the 
most important terminal fields of the mesolimbic tract is the nucleus accumbens of the 
ventral striatum, which is involved in reward and pleasure (Berridge and Robinson 
[1998]; Wise [2002]). The latter tract is called the “mesocortical” tract because it 
originates in the midbrain and terminates in the cortex, especially in the prefrontal cortex. 
This area of the brain is thought to be implicated in the temporal organization of 
behavior, motivation, and attention (Kandel et al. [2000, 1202]). Consequently, abnormal 
dopamine production in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) can profoundly affect emotion 
and cognition.  
The second major group of dopamine-producing cells in the brain is in the 
substantia nigra compacta. The axons from these cells terminate in the neostriatum, 
which is implicated in (among other things) motor control; it is called the “nigrostriatal” 
tract because it originates in the substantia nigra and terminates in the striatum. It is 
believed that insufficient production of dopamine in this region is responsible for the loss 
of motor regulation found in Parkinson’s disease. Consequently, the antagonistic effect of 
antipsychotic drugs at dopamine receptors in this tract is probably responsible for some 
of the extrapyramidal side-effects associated with typical antipsychotics, such as the 
dyskinesias (various forms of motor impairment). The improvement in extrapyramidal 
side-effects associated with the atypical antipsychotics is probably a result of their 
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reduced affinity for the dopamine receptor as compared to the typical antipsychotics 
(Kapur and Seeman [2001, 361]).  
However, despite the initial plausibility of the dopamine hypothesis, it has not 
been verified more directly and faces several challenges (Pliszka [2003, 233]; Grace 
[2000, 331]). Firstly, if schizophrenia is associated with increased dopamine availability, 
then there ought to be a measurable increase in homovanillic acid (HVA) in the 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), since HVA is the primary metabolite of dopamine (Pliszka 
[2003, 233]). But such a correlation has not been consistently discovered (e.g., Post et al. 
[1975]; van Kammen et al. [1986]; Beuger et al. [1996]). Secondly, although the 
antagonistic effects of antipsychotics take place more or less immediately, their 
therapeutic effect can take several weeks (Grace et al. [1997, 31]). Consequently, 
dopamine receptor antagonism alone cannot be sufficient for resolving schizophrenic 
symptoms.161 Thirdly, drugs such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and phencyclidine 
(PCP) can also produce psychotic symptoms, although neither operates primarily through 
releasing dopamine: LSD appears to be a serotonin agonist, and PCP, a glutamate 
antagonist which binds the glutamatergic NMDA receptor. Hence, excess dopamine 
production does not appear to be necessary for producing schizophrenic symptoms 
(Pliszka [2003, 233]). Finally, as noted above, the atypical antipsychotics exhibit a 
decreased antagonist effect on dopamine than the typical antipsychotics, relative to their 
effect on the serotonin and norepinephrine systems (Ibid., 233-235). This has 
substantially broadened the scope of recent neuropharmacological research into 
 
161 This challenge can be accounted for by the hypothesis that the therapeutic action of antipsychotic drugs 
is not dopamine receptor antagonism as such – which takes place immediately upon application – but a 
phenomenon called “depolarization block”, which refers to the inactivation of dopamine neurons that takes 
place after several weeks of constant antagonism (Grace et al. [1997]).  
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schizophrenia (e.g., see Holden [2003]), and suggested that other transmitter systems may 
be deeply implicated.162
Moreover, for the present purposes, even if schizophrenia – or at least some 
subtype of schizophrenia – is related to high dopamine production, it does not follow that 
the dopamine system is itself dysfunctional. One possibility, which will not be considered 
here, is that in schizophrenia, the dopamine system merely occupies the higher end of its 
normal functioning. A second possibility, which is more important from the perspective 
of the dissertation, is that it may be unable to function properly owing to an abnormal 
environment. This would be the case if, for example, the excessive production of 
dopamine is a consequence of an abnormality in a different neurotransmitter system. An 
examination of the structure and function of a typical dopamine-producing neuron can 
help to clarify the various scenarios that may be at work (see Figure 5.4).163
Dopamine is synthesized from tyrosine, which is converted into L-dopa by the 
enzyme tyrosine hydroxylase (step 1); L-dopa, in turn, yields dopamine through the 
action of a second enzyme, dopa-decarboxylase (step 2). The newly synthesized 
dopamine is taken up by a vesicle transport protein into presynaptic vesicles, where it is 
stored while the neuron is inactive (step 3). Upon activation by an action potential, 
calcium enters the axon terminal through voltage-gated calcium channels, and this influx 
of calcium causes the vesicle to release its contents into the synapse (step 4). Here, it can 
stimulate dopamine receptors on the post-synaptic terminal before it is rapidly removed 
 
162 However, it has recently been argued influentially that the therapeutic effect of atypical antipsychotics 
such as clozapine is not its multireceptor profile, but rather its relatively fast rate of dissociation from the 
dopamine D2 receptor (Kapur and Seeman [2001]; Kapur and Remington [2001]). According to their 
argument, this dissociation rate attenuates the phasic release of dopamine, but because it does not 
completely block dopamine activity it leads to a reduced incidence of extrapyramidal effects. This is 
suggested by the fact that serotonin receptor occupancy alone is not sufficient for atypical antipsychotic 
effect (Kapur and Seeman [2001, 362]), nor is it necessary; for example, the antipsychotic amisulpride is a 
selective dopamine receptor antagonist which produces atypical antipsychotic effects but does not block 
serotonin receptors.  
163 Much of the following material is from Wilcox et al. (1999, 3-11) and Kandel et al. (2000, 1200-1203). 
from the synapse. Some neurotransmitter is degraded by enzymes and some is taken back 
up into the presynaptic terminal by membrane transporters (step 5). Once inside the 
terminal it is either degraded by a different enzyme, monoamine oxidase, or recycled and 

























Figure 5.4: Dopamine synapse (redrawn from Kandel et al. [2000, 1202]).  
The dopamine neuron utilizes a homeostatic mechanism that ensures the presence 
of a constant level of dopamine in the synapse (Wilcox et al. [1999, 6-7]). In other words, 
when the level of dopamine in the synapse exceeds a certain “set point”, the dopamine 
neuron reduces the amount of dopamine it releases into the synapse; when it drops below 
this point, it increases the amount of dopamine it releases, thereby maintaining a constant 
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amount. In the ventral striatum, this level is estimated to lie between 20nM and 50nM 
(Grace [2000, 336]). It is as if the dopamine neuron is continuously “monitoring” the 
amount of dopamine in the synapse, and continually adjusting the rate of dopamine 
synthesis and release in order to maintain this level. In mesolimbic and nigrostriatal 
dopamine neurons, this synaptic level is monitored by dopamine autoreceptors, that is, 
receptors that are located on the axon terminal itself (see Figure 5.4).164 Like the post-
synaptic receptors, the dopamine autoreceptors bind synaptic dopamine. When the 
amount of synaptic dopamine exceeds this “set point”, a larger percentage of 
autoreceptors are bound. In response, the dopamine neuron exercises an inhibitory effect 
on tyrosine hydroxylase, which is one of the two enzymes crucial for the synthesis of 
dopamine (step 1). This decreases the available presynaptic pool of dopamine, and hence 
leads to a reduction in synaptic dopamine back to this “set point”. Conversely, when the 
amount of synaptic dopamine drops below this point, a smaller percentage of 
autoreceptors are bound, and as a consequence, tyrosine hydroxylase is activated and 
more dopamine is synthesized. This causes a greater amount of dopamine to be released 
into the synapse and hence returns the level of synaptic dopamine to this “set point”.  
On the basis of the structure and function of the typical dopamine neuron, it 
seems reasonable to infer that at least one major function of the dopamine neuron is to 
dynamically maintain the level of synaptic dopamine at this “set point”. Ideally, this 
statement about the function of the dopamine receptor could be verified by presenting the 
selection history that explains its current persistence. In other words, it would be ideal if 
one could present the evolutionary history of the dopamine receptor, or even the 
ontogenetic history of the dopamine neuron in a single individual, and show that the 
evolution or persistence of that structure was partly due to a selection process. 
 
164 Of the five dopamine receptors, D2 and D3 function as pre-synaptic autoreceptors as well as post-
synaptic heteroceptors (Kandel et al. [2000, 1200]).  
 301
                                                
Unfortunately, it is not known whether or not the dopamine neuron was specifically 
selected for by natural selection or synaptic selection because it maintained a constant 
level of synaptic dopamine. However, the apparently homeostatic, self-regulatory 
structure of the neuron suggests that the neuron has been adapted specifically for this 
function by a selection process operating over an evolutionary time-scale, an ontogenetic 
time-scale, or both. At any rate, that a function of the dopamine receptor is to maintain a 
constant level of synaptic dopamine will be a working assumption for the remainder of 
this section. 
Once a function has been assigned to the dopamine neuron as a whole, one can 
reasonably infer the function of the individual parts of the dopamine neuron by assessing 
the manner in which they contribute to the functioning of the whole. If the function of the 
whole neuron is to maintain a constant amount of synaptic dopamine, then it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the function of each part of that neuron consists in its 
specific contribution to that global function. For example, knowing that dopamine 
binding at the autoreceptor has an important regulatory influence on tyrosine 
hydroxylase, and that this regulatory influence is critical in allowing the dopamine 
neuron to perform its function of maintaining a constant level of synaptic dopamine, one 
can reasonably assume that the specific function of the dopamine autoreceptor is to 
regulate the activation of tyrosine hydroxylase. By a similar inference it could be said 
that the function of tyrosine hydroxylase is to regulate the presynaptic availability of 
dopamine (through the conversion of tyrosine into L-dopa) and that the function of the 
vesicle transporter is to ensure the preservation and storage of presynaptic dopamine by 
transporting dopamine into the vesicle.165
 
165 As noted above (Section 5.1.1), because of the problem of functional indeterminacy, there are numerous 
ways that one might describe the function of any given part of the neuron, and each description is equally 
correct. For example, one might say that the function of tyrosine hydroxylase is to convert tyrosine into L-
dopa, or that the function of tyrosine hydroxylase is to regulate the presynaptic availability of dopamine, or 
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Equipped now with a working model of the dopamine neuron, one can understand 
the diversity of ways in which the regulation of dopamine can be pharmacologically 
manipulated to produce an excessive amount of synaptic dopamine. This can be used to 
generate several different hypotheses that would explain the dopamine abnormality. 
There are several agents that would produce this effect (Kandel et al. [2000, 1202]; see 
Figure 5.4). For example, amphetamines appear to increase the amount of synaptic 
dopamine by stimulating the process of vesicular release (step 4) (Wilcox et al. [1999, 
6]), whereas cocaine increases synaptic dopamine by preventing the reuptake of 
dopamine by the membrane transporter (step 5) (Ibid., 8). A common therapeutic 
intervention for Parkinson’s disease is the administration of the dopamine precursor L-
dopa, which increases the presynaptic availability of dopamine (step 2) (Kandel et al. 
[2000, 862]).   
Given the spectrum of ways in which the normal activity of the dopamine system 
can be pharmacologically manipulated, one can envision different specific mechanisms 
that may underlie the excessive availability of dopamine envisioned by the dopamine 
hypothesis. For each proposed mechanism, one can then say whether or not the dopamine 
system would be “dysfunctional”, or rather, whether it would be merely unable to 
function owing to an abnormal environment. Three different scenarios will be described:  
 
(i) a genetic mutation leads to an amino acid substitution at the dopamine 
autoreceptor, which, in turn, prevents that receptor from binding dopamine and 
thereby regulating the further synthesis of dopamine. In this case, the autoreceptor 
would clearly be unable to perform its function. Moreover, since the mutation 
 
that the function of tyrosine hydroxylase is to contribute to maintaining a constant level of synaptic 
dopamine. Fortunately, for present purposes, it is immaterial which description is selected, because, as will 
be seen immediately below, the conditions under which tyrosine hydroxylase can be said to be 
dysfunctional do not depend on which specific description is selected.  
 303
                                                
affects the very structure of the autoreceptor in such a way that, even if it is in the 
normal environment for its functioning, it is prohibited from carrying out that 
function, then according to the definition presented above it would be 
dysfunctional. If such a scenario were validated empirically, then it would be 
appropriate to say that at least in some cases, schizophrenia stems from a 
biological dysfunction on the part of the dopamine neuron, and more specifically, 
of the receptor;  
 
(ii)  due to the administration of cocaine – which, as noted above, inhibits the 
reuptake of dopamine and thereby increases its synaptic availability – the 
membrane transporter is prevented from performing its normal function of 
dopamine uptake. Clearly, the membrane transporter is unable to perform its 
proper function. However, in this case, the dopamine neuron is not in the normal 
environment for its functioning. Consequently, in the absence of any significant 
structural change induced by cocaine exposure, if the dopamine neuron were 
returned to its normal environment then it would be able to perform its function. 
In the case of cocaine administration, then, one would have to say that the 
dopamine neuron is not dysfunctional, but rather, that it is unable to perform its 
normal function due to an abnormal environment;166  
 
 
166 A slightly different example would yield a case in which the dopamine neuron is dysfunctional. The 
drug reserpine inhibits the storage of dopamine by interfering with the vesicle transport protein. The 
presence of reserpine eventually causes long-term structural damage to the vesicles, as a consequence of 
which, even if the drug is removed, the vesicles are permanently unable to store transmitter (Kandel et al. 
[2000, 1202]). Once the structural damage is accomplished then the dopamine neuron could be called 
dysfunctional, since even if it were placed in its normal environment (that is, in the absence of reserpine) it 
would still be unable to store transmitter for structural reasons. 
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(iii) a third possibility stems from considering not only the way the dopamine 
neuron is regulated internally, but externally. Dopamine activity in the 
mesolimbic tract is regulated in part by glutamate neurons in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), which can affect dopamine activity in complex ways (Carlsson and 
Carlsson [1990, 273-274]; Grace [1991, 6-8]). In this case, abnormal 
glutamatergic activity could bring about abnormal dopamine activity, as a 
consequence of which, one could not say that the dopamine system itself is 
dysfunctional but rather that, due to abnormal glutamate activity, it is unable to 
perform its proper function due to an abnormal environment.  
 
 Several lines of evidence, in fact, suggest this last possibility to be the case. Grace 
(2000; also see Grace [1991]) reviews evidence that, like dopamine neurons originating 
in the ventral tegmental area, glutamate neurons originating in the PFC also terminate in 
the nucleus accumbens and modulate dopamine activity there. Specifically, he provides a 
model according to which decreased PFC glutamate activity (“glutamate hypofunction”) 
would lead to increased dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens (“dopamine 
hyperfunction”) (Grace [2000, 335-6]; also see Grace [1991, 7-8]).167 In this case, as 
Grace points out, the primary neurochemical abnormality in schizophirenia would not be 
in the dopamine system, but in the glutamate system: “[C]urrent models into the 
pathophysiology of schizophrenia suggest…that the [dopamine] system may be relatively 
normal, but is subjected to a dysregulation as a consequence of the abnormal control by 
 
167 Briefly, according to Grace’s model, PFC glutamatergic inputs to the nucleus accumbens regulate the 
tonic level of dopamine, that is, the ability of the dopamine neuron to maintain a constant level of 
dopamine in the synapse. A decrease in glutamate activity would bring about a decrease in tonic dopamine 
activity (this would be equivalent to decreasing the “set point” of synaptic dopamine). As a compensatory 
response to this decreased amount, there is an increase in dopamine synthesis (owing to the decreased 
autoreceptor binding) and an upregulation of post-synaptic dopamine receptors. As a consequence, normal 
activity-dependent (phasic) dopamine release would have an abnormally large effect, thus creating a 
dopamine hyperfunction (Grace [1991, 7]).  
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cortical glutamatergic afferents…”(Grace [2000, 332]). Carlsson (2001; also see Carlsson 
and Carlsson [1990]) – who originally proposed the dopamine hypothesis for 
schizophrenia – arrives at a similar conclusion, arguing that “the elevated dopamine 
function in schizophrenia could perhaps even be a compensatory, exaggerated, and 
deleterious response to a failure of a different system” (Carlson [2001, 4]). 
 Some of the lines of evidence that suggest the presence of glutamate hypofunction 
in schizophrenia have already been touched upon in this section. First, as noted above, 
psychostimulants such as PCP inhibit the NMDA glutamate receptor and produce 
symptoms analogous to schizophrenia; in fact, it has been argued that PCP intoxication 
bears a closer resemblance to schizophrenia than that due to LSD or amphetamines 
because it more closely approximates negative as well as positive symptoms (Olney et al. 
[1999, 524]). Second, evidence for “hypofrontality”, that is, for decrease prefrontal 
activity in schizophrenia, would also indicate a relative decrease in glutamate activity in 
that region, as would evidence for decreased frontal lobe volume in schizophrenia 
(Carlsson and Carlsson [1990, 275]). Third, some reports suggest that administration of 
glycine, a transmitter that is necessary for NMDA glutamate receptor function, alleviates 
schizophrenic symptoms (Meltzer and Deutch [1999, 1067]). Finally, prolonged NMDA 
receptor antagonism can lead to toxic pyramidal cell excitation in the cortex and limbic 
system, the areas most typically tied to aberrant cell morphology in schizophrenia (Hirsch 
et al. [1997, 798]; also see Olney et al. [1999, 524-5]). 
 According to the concept of function developed in this dissertation, if the 
abnormally high levels of synaptic dopamine in the nucleus accumbens represent a 
response to a glutamatergic abnormality, then one would have to say that the dopamine 
system is unable to perform its function due to an abnormal environment, rather than that 
the dopamine system is dysfunctional. This is because, in the absence of substantial 
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structural alteration in the dopamine system produced by prolonged exposure to an 
abnormal environment, if the mesolimbic dopamine neurons were situated within the 
normal environment for their functioning, then they would be able to perform their proper 
function. This is not to say that there is no neurobiological dysfunction in schizophrenia, 
or that the glutamate hypothesis is ultimately correct. The point is that, since there are 
multiple plausible scenarios that may underlie the dopamine abnormality, and only some 
of them implicate dopamine system dysfunction, then one is not warranted in saying that 
schizophrenia stems from a dysfunction in that system. 
One might argue that this conclusion, while valid, is relatively trivial, since it 
surely implies that even if the dopamine system is not dysfunctional in schizophrenia, 
there must exist some neurobiological dysfunction that explains the dopamine 
abnormality. It may be, for example, that the glutamate system is dysfunctional in 
schizophrenia, or, at least, whatever it is in the brain that explains the abnormal glutamate 
activity. This possibility will be pursued in the following subsection (Section 5.2.3). 
However, one plausible scenario that will be presented there is that the glutamate 
abnormality associated with schizophrenia is the result of a neurodevelopmental 
abnormality, specifically, an abnormally long or intensive phase of synaptic elimination 
(“pruning”) during childhood and adolescence. Since it is known that the extent and 
duration of synaptic pruning can represent a plastic response of the brain to differing 
levels of environmental stimulation, then it is possible that the glutamatergic abnormality 
in the brain is simply the expression of a plastic response of the brain to a formative 
environment that is unusually stimulating (or impoverished) in certain respects. If this is 
so, then it would be inappropriate to say that schizophrenia stems from a biological – or 
even an “internal” – dysfunction at all. Rather, the abnormality is one that is associated 
with the formative external environment and not, ultimately, with the internal milieu of 
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the person with schizophrenia. Again, the point is not that this scenario is ultimately 
correct, but that it is plausible, and as a consequence, one is not warranted in inferring the 
existence of a biological dysfunction merely on the basis of a neurobiological 
abnormality associated with schizophrenia.  
5.2.3 A Neurodevelopmental Approach: Synaptic Selection and Neural Plasticity 
The following section examines the neurodevelopmental hypothesis of 
schizophrenia, and provides a brief overview of different specific models. In particular, it 
will examine the view that the primary neurodevelopmental abnormality in schizophrenia 
involves an abnormality in synaptic selection (“pruning”) and that this underlies the 
proposed glutamatergic abnormality described in the previous section. It will argue that, 
depending on the specific mechanism involved, this pruning abnormality may or may not 
reflect a developmental dysfunction. Instead of dysfunction, it may, in fact, represent a 
plastic response of the brain to a formative environment that is unusually stimulating, or 
impoverished, in certain respects. In this case, the neurobiological abnormalities wrought 
by this developmental abnormality could not be said to represent a biological, or internal, 
dysfunction. Since the correct hypothesis is unknown, it is not known whether or not 
schizophrenia stems from a biological dysfunction. The conclusion arrived at in this 
subsection, then, reinforces that drawn in the previous subsection, namely, just because 
schizophrenia may be associated with a biological abnormality does not imply that it 
stems from a biological dysfunction. 
In its broadest form, the neurodevelopmental hypothesis states that schizophrenia 
results from abnormal genetic or epigenetic events which disrupt early brain 
development. These early events may interact with later developmental processes to 
result in the neurobiological abnormalities associated with schizophrenia (see McClure 
and Weinberger [2001] for a summary statement and overview of the 
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neurodevelopmental hypothesis). The neurodevelopmental approach probably represents 
the most prominent current viewpoint on the etiology of schizophrenia (Harrison [1999, 
606]). 
There are two primary strands of evidence which support the neurodevelopmental 
hypothesis (Harrison [1997]). The first is that the gross neurostructural abnormalities 
associated with (at least some subtypes) of schizophrenia, such as ventricular 
enlargement or reduced frontal lobe volume, appear to be present at the onset of the 
illness, and are rarely progressive in character. Secondly, some of the more subtle 
cytoarchitectural abnormalities, such as hippocampal cellular disarray, or abnormal 
distribution of neurons in the PFC, suggest an early neurodevelopmental origin. This is 
supported by the absence of observable gliosis – a reactive product of neurodegeneration 
– in the schizophrenic brain. In other words, if the cellular abnormalities associated with 
schizophrenia were due to late-onset neurodegeneration then one would expect to find 
gliosis. Therefore, the absence of gliosis indirectly supports the neurodevelopmental 
model.  
Specific neurodevelopmental hypotheses fall under two types of 
neurodevelopmental models, an early model and a late model (Keshavan et al. [1994, 
240]; Lewis [1997, 386]). The first model emphasizes early neurodevelopmental 
abnormalities in the etiology of schizophrenia, such as a prenatal lesion in the developing 
brain, which then interacts with normal neurobiological development to yield the 
schizophrenic pathology (Murray and Lewis [1987]; Weinberger [1987]). The second 
model emphasizes deviation in ongoing maturational processes in cortical development 
rather than any specific early developmental insult.  
Most proponents of the early model believe that this early developmental insult 
occurs during the second trimester of pregnancy. This is because profound 
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neurostructural abnormalities would result if this insult afflicts the fetus in the first 
trimester, and gliosis would be apparent if it afflicts the fetus during or after the third 
trimester (Harrison [1999, 606]). Additional evidence stems from animal models. 
Induced hippocampal lesions in neonatal rats lead to certain behavioral alterations in the 
mature rat. These alterations include an increased sensitivity to stress and amphetamines, 
and hyperlocomotion. However, the induction of similar lesions in mature rats does not 
produce those alterations (discussed in Grace [2000, 332]). This shows that an early 
lesion in the developing brain could be responsible for fairly late-onset behavioral 
abnormalities. Since schizophrenia most frequently emerges in the third decade of life, 
any neurodevelopmental model must be able to account for the relative quiescence of 
symptoms during childhood and early adolescence (Harrison [1997, 285-6]).  
It has been argued in the literature that the source of this proposed early lesion in 
schizophrenia may be fetal malnutrition, obstetric complications, or maternal exposure to 
a virus (McClure and Weinberger [2001, 29-30]). It is also commonly argued that this 
early insult may be due to a failure of neural migration or an abnormality in programmed 
cell death (Akbarian et al. [1993a; 1993b; 1996]; Jones [1995]; Bunney et al. [1997]). 
Since neural cell migration is a process which ends by the middle of the second trimester, 
it falls squarely within the postulated “window of vulnerability”. A central strand of 
evidence for the particular hypothesis of abnormal cell migration stems from 
observations of an abnormal distribution of a certain type of neuron, that expressing the 
nicotinamide-adenine dinucleotide phosphate-diaphorase (NADPH-d) enzyme, in the 
white matter directly below the prefrontal and temporal cortices. Relative to normal 
controls, in schizophrenic subjects there is a decreased density of NADPH-d neurons 
immediately below the cortex, and an increased density in deeper layers of white matter. 
This suggests that in the process of early neural migration, these neurons “failed” to reach 
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their proper destination and were prematurely set in deeper white matter (Akbarian et al. 
[1993a, 175]; Akbarian et al. [1993b, 183-4]).168 It has also been suggested that this 
abnormal distribution is due to abnormalities in programmed cell death (Akbarian et al. 
[1996, 433]; Bunney et al. [1997, 168]).  
However, Harrison (1999, 606) criticizes the early model, arguing that 
schizophrenia has been associated with diverse types of cytoarchitectural abnormalities, 
and only some of them implicate early (e.g., second trimester) abnormalities. Moreover, 
the abnormalities that are typically invoked to support the early model – such as those 
that implicate cell migration – are precisely those that have not been firmly established 
and replicated by ongoing research. Those cytoarchitectural abnormalities that are more 
well-established could be due to ongoing developmental processes that are not limited to 
such a short, specific window of time, such as an abnormality in the normal process of 
cell adhesion, myelination, or synaptic elimination (synaptic pruning) (Ibid., 606-7). 
These cytoarchitectural abnormalities include reduced neuronal size, and synaptic loss, in 
various regions including the PFC (Ibid.; also see McGlashan and Hoffman [2000, 638]; 
Lewis [1997, 385-6]). Hence, though the evidence still implicates a neurodevelopmental 
abnormality, it is not necessarily one that accords with an early model. The remainder of 
the section will examine evidence for a specific version of the late model, namely, the 
hypothesis that schizophrenia stems from ongoing abnormalities in the process of 
synaptic pruning, since it is a topic that has already been introduced and reviewed in the 
previous chapter (Section 4.2). 
There are three main lines of evidence that suggest that schizophrenia stems from 
an abnormality in synaptic pruning. The first is that it would explain the average age of 
 
168 See Akbarian et al. (1996), however, which relies on a larger population than Akbarian et al. (1993a; 
1993b), and where these results are less prevalent. Also see Harrison (1999, 602-603) for criticism of these 
results.  
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onset. Feinberg (1982/83) – who first suggested the pruning hypothesis – reasoned on the 
basis of evidence that synaptic pruning in the frontal cortex continues until adolescence 
(Huttenlocher [1979]; also see Rakic et al. [1986], which confirms this finding). Since the 
onset of schizophrenia frequently occurs in adolescence or later, Feinberg (1982/83, 331) 
suggested that it could result from an abnormality in synaptic pruning, although he 
remained agnostic about the exact nature of this abnormality: “As a result of some 
abnormality in this process, too many, too few or the wrong synapses are eliminated 
(Regrettably, we have no basis to choose among these possibilities)” (Ibid.). 
A second line of evidence stems from the fact that synaptic pruning in the PFC 
appears to affect disproportionately asymmetric type synapses, which are primarily 
glutamatergic inputs to pyramidal cells (Keshavan [1994, 241]; also see Lewis [1997, 
390]). This suggests that abnormally intensive pruning in the PFC could lead to reduced 
connectivity in glutamatergic neurons or the pyramidal cells they innervate (Keshavan 
[1994, 252-3]), and that this could manifest itself as glutamate hypofunction, thus 
providing a basis for the glutamate theory of schizophrenia described in the previous 
subsection. Postmortem tissue studies have substantiated this inference by finding 
decreased spine density on PFC pyramidal neurons in schizophrenic brains (See 
McGlashan and Hoffman [2000, 638] and several references therein). However, Deakin 
and Simpson (1997), on the basis of postmortem tissue studies, report increased levels of 
glutamate synapses in the prefrontal cortex and speculate that the glutamatergic 
abnormality in schizophrenia stems from an arrest of the normal process of synaptic 
pruning, rather than an abnormally intensive pruning (Ibid., 288-9).  
Thirdly, there exists intriguing neurocomputational evidence that certain 
symptoms of schizophrenia, in particular, auditory hallucinations, can be generated by 
excessive synaptic pruning (McGlashan and Hoffman [2000]; also see Hoffman and 
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McGlashan [1993]). A neural network was constructed that utilizes an initial phase of 
supervised learning to build a verbal working memory. This allows it to classify degraded 
inputs as identifiable words. The performance of the network was correlated with the 
extent of synaptic “pruning”, which was simulated by the elimination of synaptic 
“connections” between neurons. The number of correctly identified words increased as 
pruning continued until the elimination of about 30% of the network connections had 
taken place. After this point, performance decreased with continued pruning. After 40% 
of the connections had been eliminated, the network began generating words during 
periods of input silence, and producing various forms of speech impairment. The 
generation of unprovoked words was interpreted as a simulated auditory hallucination 
(McGlashan and Hoffman [2000, 638]). The authors of the study argue that this model 
can be used to explain specific symptoms of schizophrenia, age of onset, sex differences 
in onset and course, specific neurodevelopmental deficits, and degree of cognitive 
deterioration after onset.  
Moreover, as they point out, synaptic pruning may be related in one of several 
different ways to the pathological reduction of neural connectivity. It may be that the 
degree of synaptic pruning is relatively normal, but an early developmental insult leads to 
a reduced initial synaptic density, thus resulting in an abnormally low final synaptic 
density. Alternatively, it may be that initial synaptic density is relatively normal, but 
some other factor provokes an unusually intensive or lengthy “window” of synaptic 
pruning, thus resulting in the same outcome (Ibid., 639). For example, Etienne and 
Baudry (1990, 42-3) hypothesize that NMDA receptor maturation determines the period 
of time during which synaptic pruning takes place; thus, any genetic abnormality that 
produces a delay in NMDA receptor maturation would extend the “window” of pruning 
and hence result in “overpruning” and consequent PFC abnormalities. Hence, the 
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neurocomputational model is intended be compatible with both early and late 
neurodevelopmental models of schizophrenia. 
Having provided a specific neurodevelopmental hypothesis for schizophrenia 
(involvement of abnormal synaptic pruning), one is now in a position to evaluate various 
specific mechanisms that would give rise to this abnormality and decide, for each 
proposed mechanism, whether or not that mechanism should be called “dysfunctional” or 
“non-dysfunctional” – as was done in the previous subsection. Again, these three 
proposals are merely presented as plausible alternatives; there is no implication that any 
of them are more warranted than alternate proposals that are not listed here:  
 
(i) an early developmental lesion afflicts the hippocampal area and thereby causes 
a severe reduction in synaptic density. As a consequence, although there is no 
abnormality in the process of synaptic pruning as such, the early insult interacts 
with normal pruning in such as way that a net loss of PFC connectivity results. 
This, in turn, gives rise to some of the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia. 
This possibility is attested to by research indicated earlier (discussed in Grace 
[2000, 332]), in which hippocampal lesions were induced in postnatal rats, and 
these lesions gave rise to cytoarchitectural abnormalities in frontal and temporal 
cortices in adult rats that were associated with behavioral abnormalities. 
According to Grace (2000, 337), one of the functions of the hippocampus is to 
inhibit prefrontal inputs to the nucleus accumbens. He speculates that, as a result 
of this hippocampal lesion, the hippocampus is unable to perform this function. 
Moreover, since the lesion initially affects only the hippocampus – the 
environment of which is otherwise normal – one would have to say that the 
hippocampus is dysfunctional, rather than unable to perform its function due to an 
 314
                                                
abnormal environment. Consequently, evidence for an early-onset 
neurodevelopmental model for schizophrenia that implicates a prenatal 
hippocampal lesion would qualify as evidence that schizophrenia does, in fact, 
stem from a neurobiological dysfunction;  
 
(ii) there is no early developmental lesion or insult that afflicts fetal brain. Rather, 
the PFC abnormalities in schizophrenia stem from an abnormally extended 
“window” of time during which synaptic pruning takes place, thus resulting in an 
abnormal decrease in synaptic density. Suppose that this window of time is 
genetically regulated, and that the genetic mechanisms that regulate the length of 
this window have been selected for by natural selection because they optimize the 
precise degree of synaptic pruning (McGlashan and Hoffman [2000, 643]).169 If a 
genetic mutation causes an abnormal extension in the time period during which 
pruning takes place, then overpruning may result, thereby disrupting the important 
cognitive functions that optimal pruning allows. In this case, one would say that a 
genetically-induced dysfunction is responsible for schizophrenia. This is because 
the genetic mutation prevents that gene segment from performing its function of 
regulating the degree of pruning, even when that gene segment is in the normal 
environment for its functioning. For example, as noted above, Etienne and Baudry 
(1990, 42-3) hypothesize that NMDA receptor maturation determines the length 
of the process of synaptic pruning; thus, any genetic abnormality that delays the 
onset of NMDA receptor maturation would extend the “window” of pruning and 
 
169 As McGlashan and Hoffman (2000, 643) suggest, synaptic pruning can increase the accuracy, 
efficiency, and degree of learning; thus, there may have been selection for the maximal degree of synaptic 
pruning that is compatible with these traits. Consequently, if schizophrenia is due to overpruning, then one 
could say that natural selection itself inherently tends to produce a risk for schizophrenia. It is possible, of 
course, that this could lead to dysfunction.  
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result in “overpruning”. According to this hypothesis one would be able to say 
that schizophrenia stems from a biological, and specifically genetic, dysfunction 
on the part of the individual; 
 
 (iii) there is no early developmental lesion or insult that afflicts fetal brain. 
Rather, the glutamate abnormality stems from an abnormally long or intensive 
window of synaptic pruning. However, rather than being the result of a genetic 
dysfunction (as suggested in scenario [ii] above) the intensive degree of synaptic 
pruning represents a plastic response of the brain to a formative environment 
which is in certain respects unusually overstimulating or impoverished. This last 
option is suggested by the fact that the nature and degree of synaptic pruning is 
related to the nature and degree of environmental stimulation. This option will be 
explored in more detail below. What is crucial is that, according to this scenario, 
one could not necessarily say that schizophrenia stems from a biological 
dysfunction at all, but rather, that certain parts of the brain may be unable to 
perform their proper function due to an abnormal environment, or that they are, in 
fact, functioning normally. 
 
As noted in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2), the nature and extent of synaptic elimination 
in the cortex is related to the nature and degree of certain types of environmental 
stimulation. For example, visual activity is a determinant of the extent to which synaptic 
selection processes “sculpt” the mammalian visual cortex, since complete dark rearing of 
kittens inhibits that activity altogether. Moreover, the fact that synaptic selection allows 
the brain to respond in a plastic manner to environmental stimulation is shown by the fact 
that monocular occlusion (e.g., suture of a single eyelid) causes the vast majority of 
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neurons in the visual cortex to be selectively responsive only to the non-occluded eye. 
This is a plastic response of the visual system to abnormally impoverished visual 
experience. The relation between synaptic elimination and neural activity has also been 
shown for the neuromuscular junction: the inhibition of motor neuron activity by 
tetrodotoxin, a sodium-channel blocker, decreases the rate at which synapses are 
eliminated, while more enhanced activity increases this rate (Purves and Lichtman [1980, 
156]). Hence there is a systematic dependence between the nature and degree of synaptic 
pruning and the nature and extent of neural stimulation. 
The existence of this systematic dependence is also suggested by reports that the 
extent of pruning in the forebrain of domestic chicks is related to emotional experience 
(Bock and Braun [1998]). In newborn chicks, the extent of dendritic spine reduction in 
the neostriatum was correlated with the degree of experience with an imprinting situation 
(which consisted of a mother surrogate and an imprinting tone, followed by behavioral 
tests). Interestingly, there was little difference in dendritic spine density in chicks 
exposed only to the auditory tone – in the absence of the emotional content associated 
with a mother surrogate – and chicks that were not exposed to any stimulus at all. 
Experience with the mother surrogate, then, both initiated and shaped the course of 
synaptic pruning in chicks. Is it overly speculative to suggest on this basis that abnormal 
emotional experience in humans could result in an abnormal degree of synaptic pruning 
(Ibid., 25)? 
Moreover, as noted in Chapter 4, the extent and nature of synaptic elimination is 
relevant to the manner in which functions are attributed to synaptic structures. For 
example, under conditions of complete dark rearing, ocular dominance columns do not 
form. However, one cannot say in this case that the visual cortical neurons, or their ocular 
connections, are “dysfunctional”. This is because the very process that allows one to 
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assign functions to the specific synaptic structures that underlie ocular dominance 
columns – namely, synaptic selection – has not taken place (see Section 5.1 for a similar 
discussion concerning the neuromuscular junction). Consequently, one would have to say 
that the visual cortex of the dark-reared kitten is simply unable to perform its function of 
mediating binocular vision due to an abnormal environment, or that it lacks that function 
altogether.  
On similar grounds, under conditions of monocular occlusion, almost all of the 
visual cortical neurons become exclusively responsive to stimulation from the non-
occluded eye. This is certainly abnormal, but it does not in any sense represent a 
“dysfunction” on the part of the visual cortex. Rather, there are two alternate possibilities. 
First, as in the case of dark-rearing, one might say that the visual cortex of the kitten 
subjected to monocular occlusion is unable to perform its function of mediating binocular 
vision due to an abnormal environment. Second, one could say that, if the function of the 
visual cortex is to maximize visual discrimination given the particular environment 
within which the kitten is raised, the abnormal formation of the visual cortex under 
conditions of monocular occlusion represents the normal or proper functioning of the 
visual cortex, rather than an inability to function due to an abnormal environment. As 
noted above (Section 5.1), in certain cases, whether an entity is unable to perform its 
function due to an abnormal environment, or whether it is, instead, functioning normally, 
depends on the precise way in which the function of that entity is described. Since there 
are often multiple correct descriptions of an entity’s function (due to the problem of 
functional indeterminacy) then the precise way in which the function of an entity is 
described is often a matter of convention. Consequently, in some cases, whether the 
entity should be said to be functioning normally, or unable to function owing to an 
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abnormal environment, is also a matter of convention. Such a case is illustrated by the 
structure of the visual cortex under conditions of monocular occlusion. 
Certain authors who have speculated about a relation between schizophrenia and 
synaptic pruning have acknowledged the fact that the nature and extent of synaptic 
pruning is shaped by the nature of environmental stimulation, and have even suggested 
that the environmental dependence of synaptic pruning may provide a way to model the 
interaction of “biological” and “environmental” factors in the etiology of schizophrenia. 
As Keshavan et al. (1994) note, one strength of the pruning model of schizophrenia is 
that the environmental-dependence of synaptic sculpting through pruning would “allow 
for the integration of psychosocial factors into this pathphysiological model” (Ibid., 257). 
Moreover, they argue, “In view of the possibility that experience may influence selective 
survival of certain synapses, it is conceivable that genetic abnormalities of programmed 
synaptic pruning processes and adverse life experiences in early life could interact to 
result in pathological brain maturation and consequently the schizophrenic diathesis” 
(Ibid.). Feinberg (1982/83) himself notes that: 
 
A late reduction in synaptic processes must not, of course, be blind with respect to 
their utility: it would hardly do to eliminate heavily used connections and leave 
unneeded ones intact. Whatever process is involved must be sensitive to the “life 
experience” of the neurons, i.e., their history of activity. This consideration 
permits some role for environmental and experiential (including “emotional”) 
factors in the model proposed here for the neuropathology of schizophrenia, as 
my colleague Simon Auster (personal communication) pointed out. (Ibid., 329) 
 
Finally, as McGlashan and Hoffman (2000) point out, the adaptive significance of 
neural pruning is related to the fact that “it serves learning by increasing cognitive 
capacity, accuracy, efficiency, and speed of learning” (Ibid., 643); consequently, the 
nature and extent of synaptic pruning must be systematically related to the nature and 
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extent of what there is to be learned: in a relatively impoverished environment (e.g., dark 
rearing) one might expect a relative paucity of synaptic elimination; in a relatively 
stimulating environment, one might expect a greater degree of synaptic sculpting through 
some mixture of constructive growth and selective elimination of new synapses. 
In summary, what is the relevance of the environmental dependence of the rate, 
degree, and nature of synaptic pruning to models of schizophrenia that postulate the 
existence of abnormalities in synaptic pruning in schizophrenia? The general result 
suggested by several studies is that differences in the rate and degree of synaptic pruning 
in different individuals represent the plastic response of different brains to changing and 
unpredictable environmental circumstances. Therefore, any specific cytoarchitectural 
abnormalities resulting from abnormalities in synaptic pruning – such as reductions in 
glutamatergic connectivity and the potential consequences of glutamate dysfunction for 
the dopamine system – may represent the brain’s “best attempt” to adapt to the degree 
and nature of those environmental circumstances that participate in sculpting its mature 
form. This possibility is not proposed here as an ascertained fact; rather, it is suggested as 
a plausible hypothesis about the nature and function of the process of synaptic 
elimination itself. However, to the extent that this hypothesis is plausible, then one 
cannot unproblematically infer from the presence of neurobiological abnormalities 
associated with schizophrenia that schizophrenia stems from a biological dysfunction. 
The fact that a central target of biological research in psychiatry, as well as a paradigm 
case of mental disorder, does not necessarily stem from a biological dysfunction, suggests 
that the view that psychiatric disorders, in general, stem from biological dysfunctions, 
should be treated with suspicion. And this is what this dissertation set out to show. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: A Misbegotten Attempt 
If there is a single prescription that emerges from this dissertation, it is a note of 
caution in the context of psychiatric practice: it advises caution in making the all-too-
slippery transition from psychiatric disorders to biological dysfunctions. If careful 
attention to neurobiological details shows that, in the case of schizophrenia, the biological 
evidence for the existence of such a dysfunction is ambivalent, then it is reasonable to 
suppose that careful attention to neurobiological details associated with other mental 
disorders might reveal the same thing. Of course, the dissertation may ultimately be 
wrong. But this can be considered a strength of the dissertation, rather than a weakness, 
because it means that the question – “Do psychiatric disorders stem from biological 
dysfunctions?” – has been translated into a clear, empirical question, rather than an empty 
slogan. 
This conclusion, however – that there is little warrant for the claim that 
psychiatric disorders stem from biological dysfunctions – should not seem altogether 
surprising. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 2, the appeal to “internal 
dysfunctions” was largely motivated by the felt need among biologically-oriented 
psychiatrists in the early 1970s to justify the medical orientation of their discipline in the 
face of mounting criticism of the arbitrariness of psychiatric nosology (see Section 2.1.1, 
under “Homosexuality and the Legitimation Crisis”). Stated simply, an important purpose 
of the expression was to make psychiatry seem more like physiological medicine, the 
scientific credentials of which were not generally held in dispute. 
However, with few notable exceptions (see Section 2.3), there was little concern 
with what, precisely, would constitute an internal “dysfunction” and how such 
“dysfunctions” would be identified. R. E. Kendall, a psychiatrist who eventually 
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abandoned the attempt to formulate an appropriate definition of “disease” for psychiatry, 
concluded rightly that the DSM’s usage of “dysfunction” does not resolve any 
fundamental problems, but rather, is “vaguely worded [enough] to allow any term with 
medical connotations to be either included or excluded in conformity with contemporary 
medical opinion” (Kendell [1986, 41]). Should it be surprising, then, that given a 
definition of “dysfunction” that is theoretically defensible and empirically appropriate to 
the context of psychiatry, such dysfunctions do not clearly emerge from biological 
research? Or that, in the network of diverse biological anomalies associated with various 
mental disorders, one cannot necessarily pinpoint any specific dysfunctions?  
One might argue that the thesis of the dissertation is relatively trivial. Who cares 
if mental disorders do not stem from “biological dysfunctions”, according to some 
philosophical definition of “function”? After all, the dissertation has acknowledged 
evidence of important and substantial biological differences between the brains of people 
who do, and do not, have schizophrenia. Furthermore, the dissertation does not question 
that schizophrenia, whatever its basis, is a very horrifying condition – both for the person 
so afflicted as well as that person’s friends and family – and that, hopefully, it will 
someday be eradicated by the advent of biological and other forms of treatment. It is still 
a great victory for biological psychiatry that schizophrenia, and other severe mental 
disorders, can safely be said to stem from biological “abnormalities”, or to represent 
“unfortunate biological conditions”, and this dissertation does not seek to deny that 
victory. So – one might argue – why should it matter whether or not schizophrenia can be 
said to stem from a “biological dysfunction”? 
The reason the thesis matters is that the language of “dysfunction” in psychiatry is 
powerful and significant. Whether or not the brain can be said to be “dysfunctioning” in 
the case of a severe mental disorder has a tremendous bearing on the way that mental 
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disorders are conceptualized in psychiatric practice, as well as among the public. On the 
surface of it, to say that someone has a mental disorder is often to say that something has 
gone “wrong”, as it were, inside the person – inside the person’s mind or brain. The idea 
that nature has in some sense “erred” in the brain of a person with a mental disorder 
bears, for many, an unmistakable intuitive appeal. It is only natural, then, to want to “look 
inside” the person – whether through psychodynamic psychology or biological 
intervention – and find out what “went wrong”. The language of inner “dysfunctions”, 
then, supports individualistic models of psychiatry  that look “inside” the person rather 
than “outside” the person to his or her environment.  
Suppose, however, that one does not say that mental disorders stem from 
biological dysfunctions, but rather, one merely states that they have biological “causes”, 
or that they stem from “unusual biological conditions”, or simply that the brains of 
people with mental disorders are “different” from the brains of those without? While 
these statements may be true, they does not carry the same normative weight because 
they are not accompanied by the implicit suggestion that anything in the brain has “gone 
wrong”. To say that the neurobiology underlying some forms of schizophrenia reveals an 
“adaptive response of the brain to an unusual formative environment” simply does not 
suggest that anything in the brain has “gone wrong”, but, in fact, that everything in the 
brain is going “exactly as it should be” under those circumstances. Taking this 
perspective to an extreme, one might suggest that the unusual biological formations 
associated with schizophrenia represent a creative triumph of the human brain to adapt to 
unusual events. The analogy is that of monocular occlusion in kittens – as noted above 
(Chapter 5.2.2), the unusual development of the mammalian visual cortex under 
conditions of monocular occlusion represents a triumph of neurobiological plasticity. It is 
left to the reader to ponder how conceiving of the biology of mental illness along these 
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lines might affect his or her conception of these illnesses and of the people who have 
them.  
A second notable prescription emerges from this dissertation, which is targeted 
specifically at philosophers: it suggests that various attempts to define “mental disorder” 
in terms of a supposed internal dysfunction should be abandoned. Whether or not 
schizophrenia qualifies as a “mental disorder”, according to some well-crafted definition, 
should not ultimately turn on whether it stems from a biological dysfunction or from a 
nondysfunctional, plastic response to an unusual environment. Yet, as shown in the last 
chapter, existing neurobiological evidence is consistent with both of these possibilities. 
Yet, does psychiatric research or practice require a definition of “mental 
disorder”? It is sometimes argued that a definition of “mental disorder” is crucial for 
resolving scientific disputes over controversial diagnostic categories (e.g., Wakefield and 
First [2003]). For example, should racism be considered a disorder?170 What about Pre-
Menstrual Dysphoric Disorder (APA [2000, 771-774])?171 Or Self-defeating Personality 
Disorder (APA [1987, 371-374])?172 At first glance, it seems obvious that only a clear, 
agreed-upon definition of “mental disorder” can settle pressing dilemmas such as these. 
Yet even in the classic example of psychiatric controversy – that concerning the 
diagnostic status of homosexuality – it is questionable that Spitzer’s definition of “mental 
disorder” actually performed any substantial cognitive service. (See Section 2.1.2, under 
“Charge to Define Mental Disorder”.) This is suggested by the fact that as soon as 
psychiatrists discovered that the proposed definition actually excluded conditions that 
most psychiatrists thought to be disorders – such as the paraphilias (“sexual deviations”) 
– the definition was promptly discarded. As Spitzer himself observed, many critics 
 
170 See fn. 7. 
171 See Robinson (1998).  
172 See Kutchins and Kirk (1997).  
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argued that the problem with any proposed “definition” of mental disorder is that it would 
merely be tinkered with in order to justify, post hoc, controversial diagnostic decisions 
(Spitzer [1978, 16]). 
In retrospect, then, it appears rash to have assumed that the problem of 
demarcation in psychiatric classification would be resolved by invoking any simple 
biological principle, such as the presence or absence of an internal “dysfunction”. 
Perhaps some fairly straightforward principle does exist that will offer a more or less 
clear, unambiguous, and objective demarcation between psychological conditions that 
should, and should not, qualify as mental disorders. One such view is that mental 
disorders involve a psychologically defined “failure of action” (e.g., Fulford [1989]; 
Bolton and Hill [1996]), rather than a biologically defined “failure of function”. 
According to Bolton and Hill (Ibid., 280), all mental disorders involve what they call a 
“breakdown of intentionality”, although one that does not necessarily involve a disruption 
of physical functioning. This breakdown can occur when a representational system 
persistently fails to represent reality correctly, or when it embodies a persistent and 
unresolved conflict between rules involved in the regulation of action. Many mental 
disorders probably exhibit both. Yet this definition of disorder, like the biological one, 
still remains enmeshed in the idea that mental illness is essentially bound up with 
“failure”, whether this failure is located on a biological or psychological level. The 
project of formulating a robust conceptualization of mental disorder that falls completely 
outside of the rubric of “failure” remains to be accomplished.  
The fact that this dissertation does not advance or endorse any novel 
conceptualization of mental disorder, or its furtive “essence”, means that the conclusion 
of the dissertation is a largely “negative” or “critical” one, rather than a “constructive” 
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one. However, it is often essential to backtrack away from a false hypothesis in order to 
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